The Dissertation (or Treatise) Committee for Mark Richard McClish Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation (or treatise):

Political Brahmanism and the State: A Compositional History of the *Arthaśāstra*

Committee:

Patrick Olivelle, Supervisor

Joel Brereton

Oliver Freiberger

Martha Selby

Cynthia Talbot

Political Brahmanism and the State: A Compositional History of the *Arthaśāstra*

by

Mark Richard McClish, B.A.; M.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

August 2009

Dedication

for Finn

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the generous support, both personal and financial, that I have received from the faculty and staff of the Department of Asian Studies at The University of Texas at Austin. I am extremely grateful to all of you. I would also like to thank the Department of Education for a Fulbright DDRA Fellowship during which research on this dissertation was carried out.

Most importantly, I would like to thank my advisor, Patrick Olivelle, who has given so generously of his time and considerable expertise on the legal and political literature of classical India. It is not an overstatement to say that this dissertation would not have been possible in so many ways without his help and support. I am proud to call myself his student, but, as always, the errors and misconstruals in the following are solely my responsibility.

Political Brahmanism and the State: A Compositional History of the *Arthaśāstra*

Publication No._____

Mark Richard McClish, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2009

Supervisor: Patrick Olivelle

This dissertation is about how to use the *Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya* as a source for the study of religion and culture in classical South Asia. The *Arthaśāstra* is perhaps the single most important source for reconstructing the culture of the period and one of the most misunderstood. In the following pages, I take two approaches to helping scholars produce more and better information from the text. First, I engage in source criticism of the extant *Arthaśāstra*, trying to unlock its various layers and compositional moments. Second, I use this material to demonstrate how the ideology of Brahmanism, which promotes the political interests of the Brahmanical community, was a later addition to a text previously devoid of such concerns. In the conclusion, I apply these findings to the current thinking on the history of religions in this period and argue that the redaction of the *Arthaśāstra* was part of a broad re-assertion of Brahmanical privilege in a new political context.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

Text Abbreviations

A	*Aṣṭādhyāyī*
AB	*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*
ĀDS	*Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*
AV	*Atharvaveda*
BDS	*Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra*
CU	*Chandogya Upaniṣad*
GDS	*Gautama Dharmasūtra*
KAŚ	*Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*
KapS	*Kapila Saṃhitā*
KS	*Kāṭhika Saṃhitā*
MS	*Manusmṛti*
NS	*Nāradasmṛti*
PB	*Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa*
PMS	*Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra*
ṚV	*Ṛgveda*
TB	*Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa*
TS	*Taittirīya Saṃhitā*
ŚB	*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*
ŚP	*Śāntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*
VS	*Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā*
YS	*Yājñavalkyasmṛti*

A Note on the Use of Sources and Sanskrit Terminology

Unless otherwise stated, all translations of the *Arthaśāstra* are based on Kangle (1972), although I have not noted where I deviate from his translation. The same is true for translations of the Dharmasūtras and the *Manusmṛti*, which come from Olivelle 2000 and Olivelle 2005, respectively. The sources of other translations are noted as they occur.

I use italics for all Sanskrit terms, such as "*adhikaraṇa*" or "*adhyāya*," except such terms as are typically considered English, such as "Sanskrit" and "Prakrit." When citing a text, I use italics, such as "the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*," but when citing a genre do not use italics, as in "the Dharmasūtras." Finally, when discussing an area of knowledge, as opposed to a genre, I will use lower case italics. Hence, the term "Dharmaśāstras" refers to the texts of that genre, while "*dharmaśāstra*" refers to the expert tradition on *dharma*. Hence, one will find *Arthaśāstra*, Arthaśāstra, and *arthaśāstra*, referring, respectively, to the text, the genre, and the expert tradition.

Finally, when identifying passages from a text, I will identify the text itself by abbreviation only during the first citation in a given sentence. Hence, you will read, "One sees at KAŚ 2.34 a phenomenon quite different from that at 2.33."

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is about how to use the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* (*Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya*) as a source for the study and writing of South Asian religious history. It represents a first attempt on the part of the author to apply the tools of philology and textual criticism to this text so that scholars may draw more and better information from the societies that contributed to its composition. In doing so, I hope to increase the usefulness of this text, which Julius Jolly has called "perhaps the most precious work in the whole range of Sanskrit" (1923, 1) and regarding which Moritz Winternitz has said, "No other work of Indian literature provides us with so rich amount of information about ancient Indian political and social conditions" (1983, 612).

The *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* (hereafter, simply the *Arthaśāstra* or KAŚ) is a relatively recent entrant into the body of textual sources used to reconstruct the history of the classical period. Coming to the attention of modern scholars only at the beginning of the 20th century, the *Arthaśāstra* is the only text of its kind to have survived from the classical period. It is unique among texts of the period (Sanskrit or otherwise) in its purely political orientation. Motivated by the success of the state, the *Arthaśāstra* goes into great detail about the king's training, his appointment of government officials, the operation of the monarchical bureaucracy, civil and criminal law, public safety, police activity, court intrigue, diplomacy, foreign policy, espionage, war, treaties, siege tactics, useful magic, and so forth. While many of these topics are discussed in other texts of the period briefly or in digest form, the *Arthaśāstra* distinguishes itself both through its breadth of topics and its single-minded focus on the state.

With so many aspects of social life and culture treated in detail, the *Arthaśāstra* promises the historian critical information not otherwise available for the reconstruction

of certain eras of South Asian history. And so we find the text invoked frequently for the reconstruction of religious, political, and social life over an exceedingly broad period (4th century BCE–3rd century CE).[1] Whereas historians, in particular political and economic historians, have been quick to make use of the unique kinds of information provided by the extant *Arthaśāstra*, firm conclusions on the text's historical context based on textual criticism have lagged by comparison. Aspects of the text's composition have received attention in a number of excellent monographs and studies[2] as well as in a few major works of great importance,[3] but the *Arthaśāstra* still lacks a comprehensive study of its form and structure aimed at uncovering the production of the text in detail, much less a critical mass of such studies sufficient to produce durable and useful hypotheses regarding its authorship, date, and composition. Hence, histories informed by the *Arthaśāstra* have all suffered from the collectively provisional character of the information provided by textual criticism. This dissertation is intended to begin the process of filling this gap by advancing a detailed theory of the text's composition.[4]

0.1 Textual Criticism and Historiography

The first manuscript of the *Arthaśāstra* to be recovered in modern times was given in 1905 by an anonymous pundit to R. Shamasastry, then librarian at the Mysore

---

[1] For a pointed example of the direct use of the *Arthaśāstra* as a source for reconstruction of the Mauryan period, (*ca.* 4th –3rd century BCE) see F.R. Allchin (1995, 189*ff.*). For a more nuanced view of the text's composition with yet just such a broad application of its data, see Thapar 2002.

[2] Edgerton (1923), Nag (1923), Breloer (1927–1934), Kosambi (1958), Wilhelm (1960), Renou (1961), Sternbach (1968), Konow (1975), to name a few of the more important.

[3] Kangle (1965), Trautmann (1971), and Scharfe (1993 revised English ed.; 1968 1st German ed.)

[4] Although the words of A.L. Basham, as quoted in Mabbet (1964, 169) seem now to me to be undoubtedly true: "Before further precision can be reached [in the dating of the text] we require a thorough critical and comparative analysis of the whole text and the minute study of every phrase from all aspects and points of view." I see the present work as a first step in this direction.

Government Oriental Library.[5] Shamasastry published the *editio princeps* in 1909, followed by a full English translation in 1915.[6] The text was received with great fanfare, particularly as South Asian intellectual culture was thought to have lacked an indigenous tradition of political science in the early period. The absence of such expertise reinforced stereotypes that the "Indian mind" was dominated by "otherworldly" concerns. But, as Trautmann has noted, "[t]he rediscovery of the *Arthaśāstra* proved a corrective to this notion, and within decades over a dozen Indian scholars, and a few Western, had written books on ancient Indian political theories and institutions" (1971, 2). The text was, for obvious reasons, co-opted by the nationalist movement as evidence of a pragmatic and virile tradition of self-rule in India's past, a position that served well to negate colonial aspersions of effeminacy and unfitness for self-rule: "[n]ationalist aspirations seemed somehow fortified when the existence of strongly centralized empires and native schools of political theory was shown" (1971, 3).

What is more, the *Arthaśāstra* not only provided the emergent nationalist identity with evidence of an indigenous expert tradition in politics, it also provided the incipient nation with a link to the most powerful dynasty in South Asian antiquity: the Mauryan Empire (*c*. 321–185 BCE). For, the text ascribes itself to a figure named Kauṭilya, who is identified in medieval sources with the brilliant political tactician Cāṇakya, the legendary prime minister of the first Mauryan emperor, Candragupta, and who engineered the usurpation of the previous dynasty and installed Candragupta on the throne.[7] Although the ascription of the text to Kauṭilya is not supported by any firm evidence (nor even is

[5] Trautmann 1971, 1

[6] Successive editions were published by Jolly and Schmidt (Lahore, 1923) and T. Ganapati Sastri (Trivandrum, 1924). The text has attained its most reliable form, however, only with Kangle's critical edition (Bombay, 1960), with a second edition in 1972.

[7] Scharfe 1993, 75; Trautmann has an exhaustive consideration of the later Cāṇakya legends (1971, 10–67).

the existence of a Kauṭilya/Cāṇakya), the attractiveness of the possibility that the *Arthaśāstra* issued from South Asia's greatest political genius seems to have exerted a great influence on scholarly interpretations of the text's composition.

From the beginning, therefore, the debate over the composition of the *Arthaśāstra* has been heavily influenced by its traditional ascription to Kauṭilya. The importance of this ascription to the issue of composition lies in the conclusion that, if the text is to fit the traditional narrative leading up to the reign of Candragupta (*c.* 321–297 BCE),[8] then the extant version of the *Arthaśāstra* must represent the unitary composition of a single author (*i.e.*, Kauṭilya/Cāṇakya). Given the absolute paucity of sources for this most intriguing era, many scholars seem unable to resist using the *Arthaśāstra* as a source for the period, despite a decided lack of supporting evidence.[9] Although this motive cannot be ascribed to all of those who favor the traditional account of the text's origins, the desire on the part of Indologists to possess just such a source seems to have exerted, in general, a strong influence on conclusions about the compositional history of the text.[10]

However, since shortly after the *editio princeps* was published by Shamasastry, many philologists and text critics have argued that certain features of the *Arthaśāstra* suggest for it composition through successive redactions or by an individual much later than the legendary Kauṭilya.[11] Specific features, such as the text's dual division into

---

[8] There is some discrepancy on these dates. These are taken from Thapar 2002, 174–177.

[9] Even among historians such as Romila Thapar, who, despite claiming that "[t]he present form of the text is the work of Vishnugupta in about the third century AD" and "[e]ven if some sections are likely to be dated to the Mauryan period, such as Book II, they should not be taken as descriptive since, as a theoretical treatise, it is only a pointer to what were regarded as essential matters pertaining to governance…" nevertheless goes on to use the text liberally as as source for the period (2002, 184–5*ff.*)

[10] Shamasastry (1915), Fleet (1915), Jacobi (1911), Meyer (1925), Breloer (1927–1934), Kangle (1965). etc. Scharfe (1993, 1) reports, however, that Jacobi later changed his mind on this matter.

[11] Winternitz (1998 [1963 trans.; 1920 German ed.]), Stein (1921), Jolly (1923), Nag (1923), Keith (1996 [1928]), Scharfe (1993 2nd ed.; 1968 German ed.]), Trautmann (1971), Witzel (2006), etc.

*prakaraṇa*s and *adhyāya*s, the logical disjunction generated by the occurrence of Kauṭilya's direct speech in his own text, shifts in style, and the general breadth of the work suggested a more complex compositional process (these are all examined below). As any theory of composition other than unitary authorship would mean that the present text could not be used uncritically as a source for the Mauryan period, the vicissitudes and politics of historiography have remained wedded to the study of the text's composition.[12] It is my intention, therefore, to look at the composition of the text entirely in isolation from specific theses about the historical context of its origins.

Aside from the theory of unitary authorship, which finds relatively less support now among text critics than in previous generations, two major theories of composition have emerged. The first, argued most recently and fully by Hartmut Scharfe (1968[13]), is that the extant *Arthaśāstra* is the prose expansion of an earlier verse original. To the contrary, Thomas Trautmann (1971) has argued that the text is not only prose in origin, but ultimately an aggregation of disparate prose sources. While both of these theories have their adherents, neither has been explicated with rigor sufficient to make them particularly useful to the historiographical issues that surround the text. Given that, of the major recent studies, Kangle produced his in 1965, Scharfe in 1968, and Trautmann in 1971, little, if any, major work has been done on the composition of the *Arthaśāstra* in nearly forty years.

---

[12] An example of the passions incited in this case can be read in the work of the esteemed scholar of Dharmaśāstra, P.V. Kane (see, for example, 1974, 189*f.*).

[13] The theory itself dates to the 1968 publication of his text *Untersuchungen zur Staatsrechtslehre des Kauṭalya* (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz). This is availabe in a revised English edition, the 1993 *Investigations in Kauṭalya's Manual of Political Science* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag). I refer to the older in order to accurately reflect the age of these arguments.

This dissertation aims to resuscitate the conversation by presenting as detailed a compositional theory as presently possible. This project is carried out in Part One, with my conclusions coming in Chapter 7 and arguments for the date of the text coming in the Conclusion.

0.2 BRAHMANISM AND THE *ARTHAŚĀSTRA*

Rendering the *Arthaśāstra* a more useful source for students of South Asian history and religions also requires examining other aspects pertaining to its composition. In particular, we are unable to appreciate the content of the *Arthaśāstra* as a historical source until it has been rescued from its ideological subordination to another and more well-attested genre, that of *dharmaśāstra*. At stake in this matter is one of the pressing issues in the history of South Asian religion and politics: the influence of classical South Asia's sacerdotal and intellectual elite, the Brahmins, on state policy and governance.

In most scholarly circles, the *Arthaśāstra* has generally failed to distinguish itself as different in kind from the much better represented genre of *dharmaśāstra*. Important differences are to be found between the two, however. While the *dharma* literature of the period demonstrates an interest in statecraft and jurisprudence, it remains focused primarily on the customs, education, rituals, penances, and, most importantly for this study, *the political interests* of the orthodox Brahmanical community, the hereditary class of religious and intellectual elites in classical South Asia. The *Arthaśāstra*, with its exclusive interest in statecraft, overlaps with the subjects of the *dharma* literature in the areas of jurisprudence and statecraft, without, however, showing much concern for Brahmanical custom itself.

The discrete points of contact between the two traditions are provided, on one hand, by a mutual interest in statecraft (and jurisprudence) and, on the other hand, by the

mutual promotion of the political interests of the Brahmanical community. But the relationship between the two is not usually rendered as one between two parallel genres. Kane has enunciated this clearly: "Arthaśāstra is really a branch of Dharmaśāstra, as the former deals with the responsibilities of kings for whom rules are laid down in many treatises on *dharma*" (1974, 158). This statement reveals the logic of the relationship posited between the two genres: *arthaśāstra* is a subsidiary of *dharmaśāstra* because it deals in greater detail with a subset of the interests found in the *dharma* texts. But, this relationship does not merely result from an analysis of areas of interest. Kane's opinion reveals also the ideological implications at stake: the rules laid down for the king in the *Arthaśāstra* are, therefore, theoretically subordinate to a much broader mandate of *dharma*. As such, Kane is following the logic of a hermeneutical convention expressed by *dharmaśāstra* exegetes themselves, when they claim that a rule from *dharmaśāstra* always overrides a rule from *arthaśāstra*.[14] In other words, the corpus of injunctions and proscriptions in the *dharma* texts, inculcating the political interests of the Brahmanical community, represent a more complete framework into which the prescriptions of the *Arthaśāstra* must fit.

Now, it must be noted that the extant *Arthaśāstra* does, in fact, agree in many places with the subordination of the king's authority to the greater order of *dharma*. And, there can also be little doubt that among Sanskrit texts the *Arthaśāstra* is most closely related to the Dharmaśāstras. But, the relationship posited above, drawn from Brahmanical exegetics and reinforced through the mutual promotion of political Brahmanism, obscures important differences suggesting widely divergent origins for the two. The Dharmaśāstras as a genre have their origin among experts in the customary

[14] Lingat (1998 [1973], 145–147)

traditions of the orthodox Brahmanical community and the education of young Brahmin males. Traditionally, these texts cover the topics of education (*svādhyāya*), ritual observances (*saṃskāra*), proper conduct (*ācāra*), penances (*prayaścitta*), and, to a lesser extent, statecraft (*rājadharma*) and dispute resolution (*vyavahāra*). The *Arthaśāstra* is thoroughly grounded in the urban reality of kingship and statecraft, and, despite proclamations theoretically undermining the authority of the king in the extant treatise, is fully concerned with promoting the interests of the state in areas such as public works, regulation, law and order, dispute resolution, espionage, war, and so forth. Over time, the *dharmaśāstra* literature evolves a far greater interest in statecraft and, in particular, dispute resolution. Hence, by the time of the Dharmaśāstra *par excellence*, the *Manusmṛti*, a complete abridged discussion of statecraft, including a fully-developed discussion of *vyavahāra* has become a standard feature of the literature.

But this should properly be viewed more as a historical convergence than an implicit relationship revealed. For, it has been convincingly argued by Vigasin and Samozvantsev that, regarding the areas in which the two genres are most similar, jurisprudence, it is the Dharmaśāstras that have borrowed historically from the *arthaśāstra* genre (1985, 26–27).[15] Hence, while the Dharmaśāstras may provide a convincing and convenient hermeneutical appropriation of *arthaśāstra*, in point of historical origin, it is the tradition of *arthaśāstra* that appears to have precedence in the substantive areas in which they show close contact.[16] This, in turn, suggests a difference in their original contexts of production.

---

[15] See also Samozvantsev 1980. *Cf*. Kangle 1965, 12*ff*., 78

[16] It should also be noted that the disappearance of the genre of Arthaśāstra for many centuries after the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, during which time statecraft was discussed entirely within the *dharma* literature, has also contributed to the sense that *arthaśāstra* was merely a subgenre of Dharamśāstra. See Samozvantsev 1980, 363 on the loss of the legal authority of *arthaśāstra*.

The most important result of the acceptance of the hermeneutical subordination of *arthaśāstra* to *dharmaśāstra* for the present study has been the tacit acceptance that the two genres *must* agree quite naturally on specific points of religious and political ideology, primarily the integration of special privileges for the Brahmanical community into the policies and practices of the state or what I have called "political Brahmanism." That the exemplary text on statecraft from the classical period, the *Arthaśāstra*, agrees that the state should institute the hierarchical precedence of Brahmins lends support to those who wish to see in the expression of this religious ideology an accurate description of lived relations within the greater political order of the classical period.

This dissertation will challenge the assertion that Brahmanical interests were always part of the *Arthaśāstra* and demonstrate that, in fact, this ideology of Brahmanical privilege was written into the *Arthaśāstra* at a relatively late period and probably in one stroke. By demonstrating this, I hope to articulate the distinctions between these two genres. The ultimate goal of this study is to retrieve the ideological background of the *Arthaśāstra* and to thereby promote it as an independent voice in the study of the history of South Asian religions.

0.3 The Compositional History of the *Arthaśāstra*

As outlined above, the problems attending the use of the *Arthaśāstra* as a source for the reconstruction of Indian history are rooted in an imperfect understanding of the manner in which the text was composed and evolved over time. This makes it extremely difficult not only to date the various passages of the text, but also to understand how the ideology of and concepts within the text may have evolved over time and, therefore, how the text is related to other sources from the period.

Proceeding from the belief that the usefulness of the *Arthaśāstra* as a historical source is determined by the extent to which we can understand its compositional history, the present study analyzes the influence of Brahmanical ideology on the *Arthaśāstra* in two phases. The first phase (Part One) carries out a philological analysis of the history of the text for the purpose of developing a clear model of its composition and evolution, while the second phase (Part Two) takes the information gained thereby and attempts to chart the gradual exertion of Brahmanical influence on the *Arthaśāstra*, a heretofore unrecognized phenomenon of great importance to the history of politics and religion in the classical period.

The first of these two analyses, carried out in Part One of the dissertation, examines how the *Arthaśāstra* evolved into the form found in the extant manuscripts. Because the *Arthaśāstra* is a large and heterogeneous text, establishing its compositional history is a complex matter. The project of Part One is carried out over seven chapters. In Chapter One, I introduce the reader to the major features of the *Arthaśāstra* as a text, including its manuscript history, style, formal and informal structures, and whether it has lost any appreciable amount of material over time. After establishing the basic characteristics of the extant text, I proceed in Chapter Two to scrutinize the major theories forwarded by previous scholars to explain the composition and evolution of the text. In Chapters Three through Six, I argue that the form of the extant *Arthaśāstra* has resulted from a major redaction of an earlier recension of the text and that the extent of this redaction can be discerned through a number of discrete studies, each of which is carried out in its own chapter. Finally, in Chapter Seven, I bring together the results of these individual studies, charting the extent of hypothesized redaction and confirming the accuracy of that hypothesis with reference to another text, the *Manusmṛti*, which seems to have used this earlier, pre-redaction recension of the *Arthaśāstra* as a source for its own

discussion of statecraft. In Chapter Seven, I also demonstrate how this earlier recension of the *Arthaśāstra* was itself composed partly by compiling preexisting sources and partly by adding new material. Overall, Part One gives us a much clearer, more articulate, and better supported model of how the *Arthaśāstra* was composed over time, a model that enables us to chart clearly in Part Two how Brahmanical ideology emerges only in the later parts of the text.

The second part of this dissertation, Part Two, takes the model of the *Arthaśāstra*'s textual evolution from Part One and uses it to examine the growth of Brahmanical ideology in the text. It was mentioned above that the *Arthaśāstra* has generally been considered to have originated in a social context similar to that of the *dharma* literature due to the putative agreement of the extant *Arthaśāstra* with the *dharma* texts in the matter of Brahmanical ideology. The compositional history of the text presented in Part One, however, allows me to demonstrate clearly that the passages of the *Arthaśāstra* that reflect this Brahmanical ideology date to the period of its redaction, meaning that the earlier recension of the *Arthaśāstra* was devoid of this ideology. The fact that the earlier recension was free of such pro-Brahmanical proclivities has many important implications for the history of statecraft in the classical period. The most important of these implications, however, is that we find no evidence in the *Arthaśāstra* that the state recognized claims of Brahmanical exceptionalism, which is a central assumption in the standard model of classical Indian kingship in modern scholarship.

Using the compositional model from Part One, I demonstrate in Part Two the relative lateness of Brahmanical ideology in the *Arthaśāstra* over the course five chapters (Chapters Eight through Twelve). In the first of these, Chapter 8, I explore the sentiment of "Brahmanical exceptionalism," which is the belief that Brahmins were deserving of

special rights and privileges within the greater political order of the period. In that chapter, I discuss how this sentiment is expressed in ideological terms through the rubric of *varṇadharma*, or the theory that society was originally (and still ought to be) divided into four classes arranged hierarchically, and that an individual's rights were based on their class. I argue that we can, therefore, track the emergence of the Brahmanical exceptionalism or "political Brahmanism" in the text partly by looking at references to the ideology of *varṇadharma*.

The subsequent chapters of Part Two (Chapters Nine through Twelve) look at various concepts tied into the ideology of *varṇadharma*, such as *varṇa*, *dharma*, and *svadharma*, as well as outright claims to exceptional treatment for Brahmins found in the text. Through the studies in these four chapters, I demonstrate that the sentiment of Brahmanical exceptionalism is clearly linked in all cases to material interpolated during the redaction of the earlier recension of the *Arthaśāstra*.

In the Conclusion, I explore some of the implications of my findings for our understanding of religion and politics in classical South Asia and connect the emergence of Brahmanical ideology in the *Arthaśāstra* to political shifts reflected in other sources from the period. Above all, I hope in this dissertation to demonstrate the interdependence of philological inquiry and cultural studies in addressing some of the most vexing and basic issues in the political and religious history of the classical period. I hope to show that it is only because of the detailed study in Part One that the findings made in Part Two and the Conclusion are possible.

PART I: THE COMPOSITION OF THE TEXT

Chapter 1: Introduction to the *Arthaśāstra*

In this chapter, the reader is introduced to the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* as a text, including the manuscript history, the stylistic features of the text, and its formal and informal structural elements. This chapter is intended to serve as a reference to which the reader may return when necessary for detailed information about specific aspects of the text. This chapter should be read initially to gain sufficient familiarity with the major structural elements of the text to follow the arguments in the remainder of Part One.

1.1 The Extant *Arthaśāstra*: Genre and Style

The *Arthaśāstra* suffers from a poverty of known manuscripts. The critical edition of the text (Kangle 1969) used only 6 complete manuscripts and 1 fragment. The complete manuscripts were all traced by Kangle back to only 2 originals (G_1 and M_1),[17] and the fragmentary manuscript (D), while providing generally superior readings (1969, x), runs from KAŚ 1.1.4–2.7.29; 2.11.21–39: only about 20% of the text. In addition to these manuscripts, Kangle made use of 6 fragmentary commentaries.[18] Several manuscripts not used in Kangle's critical edition have either emerged or been lost over the years, although it is not clear whether any originated from a source different than G_1

[17] Manuscript sigla are taken from Kangle 1969.

[18] On the length of each of these fragmentary commentaries see Kangle 1969, xv–xvii. Scharfe (1993, 7) has noted, however, that Kangle did not actually use the most important commentary, the Old Malayalam *Bhāṣāvyākhyānam* (Cb), in the preparation of his edition, but, when citing it, actually provides the text of T. Ganapati Sāstrī's 1924–25 edition of the text (which had been provided as a root text in the printed editions of the commentary). Sāstrī himself made use of the Old Malayalam commentary for both his edition as well as his own commentary, *Śrīmūla* (Cs), but his own editorial emendations cannot be taken as readings from the commentary, which does not contain a root text at all.

or M_1.[19] The earliest dateable manuscripts take the form of the text back to about the 12th century CE.[20]

Kangle's is presently the authoritative edition, as he has best represented the known manuscripts and has alone made use of the important manuscript D, which came to light only after the other editions were published.[21] His estimation is that "[t]here are no versions, much less recensions, of the text of the *Arthaśāstra*" (1969, xv). Given the state of the manuscript tradition, we have little choice but to accept the extant text of Kangle's edition as sufficiently representative of the text as it existed in the classical period.[22]

The text of Kangle's critical edition of the *Arthaśāstra* numbers some 5,397 passages.[23] By comparison, it is nearly twice as long as the *Manusmṛti*[24] and a little less

---

[19] Kangle records that he was unable to trace the manuscipt (*ka*) used in Ganapati Sāstrī's edition as well as another manuscript from the Government Mss. Library, Cochin to which Ganapati had access but found to be extremely worn. Winternitz (ZII 6, 14–27) has reviewed a manuscript in Chennamangalam, Cochin, but, found it to support the readings of the Punjab (Jolly and Schmidt) and Trivandrum (Ganapati Sāstrī) editions. I was able to locate a manuscript (I have called M_4) in Trivandrum (Kerala University, Oriental Research Institute 18195), which does not appear to have been used in previous editions of the text. It appears to support the better readings of Kangle's edition.

[20] The "Patan fragment" (D) has been dated to the 12th century by Jina Vijay (Kosambi 1959, 1). The Malayalam commentary, which runs only through *adhikaraṇa* 7, has been dated to about the same period by K.N. Ezhuthachan (1960). Thus, while we have no complete manuscript dating to an early period, we have concurrence between two widely-dispersed manuscripts (Gujurat and Kerala, respectively) from this time on a substantial portion of the existing text. It is not unlikely, therefore, the Kangle's edition more or less reflects the extent of the text in that period.

[21] Edited by Jina Vijay 1959 in the *Singhi Jain Series*.

[22] Unfortunately, no texts from the period are known to cite the *Arthaśāstra* in sufficient detail or length to confirm or refute the readings and general shape of the critical edition (see Scharfe 1993, 1–5). It may turn out, however, that we can find some confirmation of the general order of topics discussed in the *Manusmṛti* (see §7.6.2 below).

[23] This figure is my tabulation of the number of *sūtra*s and verses in Kangle's second edition (1969) and does not include the colophons, *prakaraṇa* headers, nor the spurious final verse in the edition (*15.1.74). Considering that formal *sūtra* boundaries are often absent in manuscripts and find their place in our editions based on the decisions of modern editors, such a number provides less fixity than it might seem. In support of this we find that Jolly and Schmidt's edition of the *Arthaśāstra* (1923) possesses about 6,880 *sūtra*s and verses (Kangle 1965, 21). The discrepancy between the two editions is largely accounted for by

than 5 times as long as the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*.[25] The extant text is composed in a combination of prose and verse in a ratio of about 13:1.

The *Arthaśāstra*'s discursive style is characterized by lengthy prose disquisitions[26] regularly punctuated or concluded by one or more stanzas of verse.[27] Irrupting irregularly into this general format are prose debates on specific doctrinal positions with a variety of "teachers" typically proffering the erroneous or prior position (*pūrvapakṣa*) and Kauṭilya offering the correct or final position (*uttarapakṣa*). Kauṭilya's frequent rebuttal of an offered position echoes throughout the text: *neti kauṭilyaḥ*: "'Not so,' says Kauṭilya."

Jolly (among others[28]) sees in the style of the *Arthaśāstra* a kinship with Sūtra literature:[29] "[i]n point of style, the Arthaśāstra exhibits that mixture of prose and verse

---

the placement of *sūtra* boundaries and not by disagreement over the inclusion of additional material. A *sūtra* near the beginning of the *Arthaśāstra* (KAŚ 1.1.18) calculates the extent of the text at 6,000 *śloka*s. Unfortunately, the meaning of the term "*śloka*" in this passage is unclear. It could pertain only to verses in the *śloka* meter, to all syntactically-finite passages in general, or to the 32-syllable unit used by copyists to tabulate the extent of their labor. None of these options, however, generates a number close to 6,000. This passage has generated a great deal of disagreement among modern scholars, and is discussed below as relevant to Kosambi's theory that a substantial amount of material has been lost from the text (§2.4).

[24] Using Kangle's estimate of 4800 32-syllable *śloka* units in the text (1965, 21), his edition of the *Arthaśāstra* is about 500 *śloka*s shy of being twice the length of the *Manusmṛti,* based on the 2,680 *śloka*s in Olivelle's critical edition (2005).

[25] Based on the same calculation used in the previous footnote, Kangle's edition of the *Arthaśāstra* is about 200 *śloka*s less than 5 times the length of the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*. The latter is complete in 1009 *śloka*s in Acharya's edition (1949).

[26] This progression of (semi-) independent discussions follows the division of the text into segments known as *prakaraṇa*s (see §1.4.2.1).

[27] These are overwhelming composed in the *anuṣṭubh śloka* meter. This pattern of prose and verse alternation defines the segments of the text known as *adhyāya*s (see §1.4.2.2).

[28] Kangle: "The style of the work is that of the early *sūtra* works (1965, 37); R. Shamasastry: "the style of the author follows that of Āpastamba, Baudhāyana and other Sūtra writers…in a few places it approaches the diction of the Upanishads and later Brāhmaṇas" (1924, xxii).

[29] I refer here to the genres of *śrautasūtra*, *gṛhyasūtra*, *dharmasūtra*, and *śulbasūtra*. These texts are written in a highly compressed and characteristically pithy prose style with verses typically cited in support of prose statements. See Gonda 1977.

which is so common in *sūtra*-works, e.g., in the Dharmasūtras" (1923, 5). But, the *Arthaśāstra* cannot match the works referred to in brevity and concision,[30] the hallmarks of the Sūtra style.[31] Instead, the grammar of its prose is for the most part fully expressed, and the text does not tend to rely heavily on implied elements borrowed from previous passages (*anuvṛtti*), nor does it frequently suppress finite verbs. Moreover, despite a similarity in the pattern of stanza dispersal within the prose, the manner in which these verses occur in the *Arthaśāstra* is altogether different from their occurrence in Sūtra literature. Most of the verses (80%) in the *Arthaśāstra* are used to conclude textual segments, which stands in contrast to the practice typical of Sūtra literature of citing verses *within* discussions, typically to lend authority to a point just made.[32] Still, the Sūtras may provide the closest texts in point of style, although Shamasastry's suggestion that "in a few places it approaches the diction of the Upanishads and later Brāhmaṇas" (1924, xxii) certainly merits further inquiry.

While admitting to the presence of a variety of prose styles,[33] the *Arthaśāstra*'s prose is typically straightforward in composition and workmanlike in tone, neither

---

[30] Edgerton agrees, although he may be overstating the case to some extent when he says that "[i]t is not exactly *sūtra* style, but approaches it in brevity and compression" (1928, 293).

[31] On *sūtra* style see Gonda 1977, 465–466. 629*ff*. There are, of course, passages in the *Arthaśāstra* conforming more closely to the *sūtra* style. In this regard, we might look at the key passages of the discussions of *vidyāsamuddeśaḥ* ("Enumeration of the Sciences"), *vṛddhasaṃyogaḥ* ("Association with Elders"), and *indriyajayaḥ* ("Conquering the Senses") (KAŚ 1.2–1.7). These are discussed in this context at §7.3.7.

[32] On the Śrauta- and Gṛhyasūtras, see Gonda 1977, 640; on the Dharmasūtras, see Olivelle (2000, 6–7), who notes, however, that "In Baudhāyana and Vasiṣṭha[, which he reckons as representing a later evolution within the Dharmasūtras], however, there is an increasing use of verse not merely as quotations but as integral parts of the composition, reflecting the genre of the later Smṛtis." Neither of these, however, approach the consistent pattern of verse usage seen in the *Arthaśāstra*.

[33] Perhaps owing to the stylistic diversity of the text, we find markedly different descriptions of the writing. Kangle is in general agreement with my assessment of the straightfoward character of the prose: "The *sūtra*s are mostly simple in construction and free from obscurity caused by long compounds or involved expressions" (1965, 37). Edgerton, however, has a very different view of the language of the *Arthaśāstra*:

excessively parsimonious nor overly embellished.[34] It tends toward a certain economy, without, however, risking incompleteness.[35] Where the text becomes difficult, it is most frequently owing to obscure terminology or disjointed passages, although a minority of difficult passages results from inherent syntactic ambiguity or confusion.[36] The frequency of shifts in style along with the prevalence of disjointed passages generates the initial suspicion of the presence of more than one hand in the text.

The verses in the text are mostly composed in the *anuṣṭubh śloka* meter, although a few verses in the *indravrajā* or *upajāti* meters are also encountered.[37] About 80% of all verses in the text fall at the end of text segments called *adhyāya*s (see §1.3.2), the presence of verses *within adhyāya*s is both irregular and infrequent.[38] Regarding their

---

"The style is crabbed and difficult…In general it is anything but lucid, and frequently abrupt and harsh" (1928, 293).

[34] Mabbet states that "[t]he standard for judgment is not clearly objective, but the Arthaśāstra appears to lack both the calculated pithiness of the sūtra literature and the abstraction and dense syntax of the later commentaries. It is natural to place it with the earlier smṛtis" (1968, 164). This, despite the fact that it is composed overwhelmingly in prose.

[35] Kangle: "Its terseness is not that of the philosophical or other similar sūtras" (1965, 37). The relative fullness of the *Arthaśāstra*s prose style, in contrast especially to the philosophical *sūtra*s, might suggest that it was not written in an intensely scholasticized environment where *sūtra*s served as mnemonic devices for traditional expansion in a didactic context.

[36] As Kangle points out, "If the text is found difficult, it is mainly because of the technical nature of its contents and the many technical words it has used. The claim made on its behalf [KAŚ 1.1.19] that it is easy to understand and grasp is not unjustified, provided the technical nature of its contents is born in mind"(1965, 37). Edgerton is in general agreement with this assessment, although he finds the resulting situation somewhat more intractable: "The text is at best so difficult that an interpreter cannot afford to neglect any possible source of aid. Problems galore will remain in spite of everything. The vocabulary is peculiar; it contains many words which do not occur, or are not used in the same senses, in the more familiar Sanskrit literature…The subject-matter, too, is exceptionally remote from our point of view, which adds to the difficulty of understanding what is meant" (1928, 293). Fleet finds that "the text is by no means a simple one; it is laconic and difficult to a degree" (Introduction to Shamasastry 1923, vi.).

[37] Kane (1968, 198) finds two classical Upajātis at KAŚ 2.9.32–35, five Upajātis in KAŚ 2.10, and one Puṣpitāgrā (2.12.10). Verses in these meters never fall at the end of an *adhyāya* (Sternbach 1968, 495).

[38] On the relationship between the verses and prose, see Sternbach 1968. The verses are examined in detail in Chapter 5, and the *adhyāya*-internal verses are examined at §5.1–2.

content, Sternbach relates that "[a] great part of the verses in the KA. are gnomic verses but also a great part of them are verses dealing with *rāja-nīti*" (1968, 495). These categories, however, are not mutually exclusive and one finds that, regardless of topic, many of the verses in the text (particularly those at the end of *adhyāya*s) seem to have been composed for their current location (see Chapter 5).

There is some debate over whether the *Arthaśāstra*'s *sūtra*s and verses display differences in point of style. Specifically, scholars have questioned whether the tendency of the latter to be rather more florid, abstract, and simply constructed is merely endemic to the verse medium or evidence of separate authorship.[39] There is a similar debate regarding whether the style of the prose itself shifts throughout the text.[40]

The language of the *Arthaśāstra* is a mixture of relatively archaic and more recent usages of both syntax and vocabulary. Among its syntactic archaisms are the use of the *–tvā* ending with gerunds possessing preverbs,[41] rendering non-neuter, two-member copulative (*dvandva*) compounds in the dual (as opposed to the later practice of rendering such compounds in the neuter singular),[42] the use of the potential passive participle in the

[39] Breloer finds that "the style of verses deviates from that the sūtra style of the prose and that in the prose itself various types of style and a certain variation in terminology are found" (1934, 8; quotation is Kangle 1965, 37). Kangle dismisses this as natural to the media: "It is true that the stanzas appear to be much simpler in style than the prose. But simplicity is natural to the Anuṣṭubh śloka metre. If the prose, in some places, appears more difficult, that is due to the technical nature of the subject rather than to any essential difference in style. There is, no doubt, a certain variation in terminology, which seems to be due to the difference in the source from which the material is derived…The general impression is one of uniformity throughout the work"(1965, 37).

[40] Trautmann's work (1971) stands as the most robust defense of heterogeneous style in the text. Nag also finds that the discussion of foreign policy in *adhikaraṇa*s 6 and 7 "es plus homogène qu'ailleurs" (1923, 114). Kangle argues, on the contrary, that "[t]here can…be no distinction made in the different *adhikaraṇa*s from the point of view of homogeneity or orderliness in the treatment of topics" (1965, 31).

[41] This is found primarily with causatives and generally only in the latter half of the text (3 examples aside). It does appear that this usage was retained in some of the Prakrits and may rather be a sign of their influence rather than an indication of high antiquity. See Jacobi 1911, 966n; Scharfe 1993, 97; Kangle 1965, 38.

[42] The Pāṇinean rule (A2.4.2–17), however, is not exclusively observed. See Scharfe 1993, 95–96.

active sense, and failure to use the *–tva* ending to form abstract nouns in a few cases.[43] In counterpoint, Scharfe has found what appear to be syntactical proclivities adhering to later usages (1993, 96–97). Scholarly opinion remains divided on the provenance and import of such constructions, and, given the likelihood of a composite origin for the text, resolution of the contradictory character of the text's language may lie in a better understanding of its compositional history.

The treatise also contains a relatively high number of technical terms not found elsewhere in Sanskrit literature[44] and even more frequently relies on idiosyncratic definitions of well-attested terms (Kangle 1965, 38–39). Additionally, we find a number of terms in the *Arthaśāstra* otherwise found during this period only in Prakrit sources.[45] As with the syntax, a number of lexical items have also been adduced as archaic, specifically owing to perceived similarities with the vocabulary of the Aśokan edicts, although Mabbet has concluded that "[i]n general the…words listed [by Thapar as early] are found also in later sources with the same meanings as in the AŚ" (1968, 164). On the whole, arguments for attributing the language of the *Arthaśāstra* to a particular historical period remain inconclusive.

1.2 Informal Structure of the Text

Although such a division is nowhere recognized in the text itself, the material of the *Arthaśāstra* falls cleary into front matter (KAŚ 1.1), the main text (KAŚ 1.2–14.4), and back matter (KAŚ 15.1). The front matter is represented by the first lesson (*adhyāya*)

---

[43] See Kangle 1965, 38, where the he argues for several less conclusive examples of archaisms in the text.

[44] Shamasastry styles these peculiarities "obsolete" (1923, xxii). See also Kangle (1965, 38), as well as his glossary of special terms and usages at the end of his second edition (1969, 285–343). For a discussion, see Scharfe 1993, 90–95. On the peculiarities of the *Arthaśāstra*'s vocabulary see Konow 1975, 52–65; Jolly 1912–13, 204–210; Jolly 1914, 345–359 and 1915, 169–378.

[45] On this point, see Kangle 1965, 39 and Scharfe 1993, 79–90.

at KAŚ 1.1, which consists primarily of a table of contents that lists 180 topics (*prakaraṇa*s) and 15 books (*adhikaraṇa*s) of the text (KAŚ 1.1.3–17). I will hereafter refer to this list of topics and books as either the "*prakaraṇa* list" or the "table of contents." The *prakaraṇa* list does not mention the material comprising the first lesson itself.

The main text stretches from the beginning of the second lesson (KAŚ 1.2.1) to the end of the 14th book (KAŚ 14.4.14), representing the vast majority of the treatise. This material is entirely given to topics germane to statecraft.

The back matter is represented by the final and 150th lesson of the text (KAŚ 15.1). It is, like the first lesson, not directly concerned with statecraft. Instead, it is a purely technical compendium of 32 rhetorical elements (*tantrayukti*s)[46] employed within the treatise, each of which is illustrated by a citation from the preceding text. This appendectical lesson also comprises the 15th book of the treatise, called *tantrayukti* ("The Method of the Treatise"). Such *tantrayukti* appendices are not unique to the *Arthaśāstra*: concluding chapters of the same kind can be found at the end of several other texts.[47] They appear to represent an independent subgenre.[48]

Renou has commented that such introductory and concluding lessons are generally not found among ancient Sanskrit works and reveal, to him, the presence of an individual intelligence guiding the organization of the text (1961, 184). The value of identifying these informal structural elements lies in their ability to speak to whether the

---

[46] Kangle describes this section as follows: "[the *tantrayukti*s] constitute the various methods in which the śāstra is treated. Some of them are concerned with the contents of the text; for example *upadeśa* 'advice or instruction', *apadeśa* 'quotation' of some one's opinion and so on. But the majority refer to stylistic peculiarities natural to the work. Thus we have *upamāna* 'analogy', *nidarśana* 'illustration', *arthāpatti* 'implication'…These *yukti*s show an awareness of the various devices which the author of an expository work will find himself bound to use if he is to make it systematic as well as interesting" (1965, 30).

[47] *Tantrayukti* sections can also be found at the end of the *Suśrutasaṃhitā* and *Carakasaṃhitā*.

[48] Kangle (1965, 30–31) states: "It seems rather that *yukti*s were formulated independent of any particular *śāstra*."

extant *Arthaśāstra* betrays evidence of having been purposely composed in such a fashion, which is to say, whether it shows evidence of a planned effort by a single individual.

Looking more closely at the main text, one sees that it falls into two major divisions: *tantra* (internal administration) and *āvāpa* (foreign policy). Like the division of the text into front matter, main text, and back matter, the division into *tantra* and *āvāpa* is not recognized anywhere within the text, but has been noted only by later writers on political science (Kangle 1965, 19). Applying their hermeneutical categories to the extant text, we are able to see a clear division in the text between topics pertaining to internal administration (*tantra*: 1.2–5.6) and foreign policy (*āvāpa*: 6.2–13.5):



Fig. 1: The *Arthaśāstra* as Divided into *Tantra* and *Āvāpa*

Despite the absence of any overt reference to this organization in the text itself, the division is sufficiently unambiguous to recognize that it is the result of an intentional compositional plan.[49] As such, it provides us with our most fundamental sense of how the extant *Arthaśāstra* was composed. The full implications of this division are discussed in Chapter 7.

An important thing to note about this division is that it leaves out certain parts of the text.[50] In particular, we have the introductory lesson at KAŚ 1.1 (denoted by the

[49] This is reinforced by certain formal elements discussed in Chapter 7.

[50] Given that this is an informal division with boundaries set (in this case) by my own reading of the text, there may be some small measure of disagreement as whether, for example, 6.1 or *adhikaraṇa* 14 should be

shaded area at the left edge of the bar) and two concluding passages at KAŚ 14 and 15 (at the right end). These passages are left out of this reckoning into *tantra* and *āvāpa* because they deal neither with domestic nor foreign politics. While the two extremities (KAŚ 1.1 and KAS 15) do not deal with statecraft *at all*, the first of the appendices (KAŚ 14) is a collection of magical spells and recipes and not linked to statecraft *per se*. Finally, KAŚ 6.1, which stands between the two halves, outlines a sevenfold (*saptāṅga*) theory of the state that includes both domestic and foreign elements. As such, it appears to embrace both domestic (*tantra*) and foreign policy (*āvāpa*) and cannot be easily assigned to either.[51]

The segments excluded from this division of the text into two halves become significant at §3.3 when we revisit the plan of the text. We note here only that these passages, with their appendectical character, possess a certain logical posteriority to the fundamental division into *tantra* and *āvāpa*. Whether or not they represent secondary additions to an earlier text is left to formal analysis below.

1.3 Formal Structure of the Text

More important to the present study is an understanding of the formal arrangement of the *Arthaśāstra*. This discussion focuses on the textual segments by which the extant text is formally subdivided: 15 *adhikaraṇa*s ("subjects") divided over both 180 *prakaraṇa*s ("topics") as well as 150 *adhyāya*s ("lessons"). Each is discussed here in detail in order to give the reader a sense of how they relate the material of the text.

---

included in the *āvāpa* section. These do not change the arguments I am about to make and will be addressed below in Chapter 7.

[51] Nevertheless, this passage seems, for various reasons to be more closely related to the latter half. See Chapter 7.

1.3.1 *Adhikaraṇa*s

The text of the *Arthaśāstra* is divided into 15 *adhikaraṇa*s ("Subjects" or "Books"). These *adhikaraṇa*s comprise the largest formal divisions of the text. The extent of each is unambiguous, owing to the presence of terminal colophons. No *prakaraṇa* or *adhyāya*, the smaller subdivisions of the text, appears to cross an *adhikaraṇa* boundary.

The *adhikaraṇa* is conceived both as a segment of text as well as a bounded subject area.[52] As such, each *adhikaraṇa* is identified both by a serial number (*i.e.*, as *adhikaraṇa*s 1–15) as well as a unique name identifying its subject matter (e.g. *adhikaraṇa* 1 = *vinayādhikārikam*, "On the Topic of Training").[53]

The fifteen *adhikaraṇa*s vary widely in length and do not display uniform internal structure. The smallest *adhikaraṇa* represents only 1% of the total work, while the largest accounts for almost 25% of the text. The disparity in *adhikaraṇa* length is depicted in the following illustration:[54]



Fig. 2: The *Arthaśāstra* as Segmented by *Adhikaraṇa*

---

[52] The term *adhikaraṇa* is common in the *Arthaśāstra* and typically means "appointment," "office," or "official." We do, however, find the term *adhikaraṇa* used in the text both in reference to the textual units under discussion (KAŚ 1.1.3–18; *adhikaraṇa* colophons) as well as in a reference to a subject (*artha*) (KAŚ 15.1.4). Importantly, all such uses of the term *adhikaraṇa* are confined entirely to the *prakaraṇa* list and colophons.

[53] Both the unique names and serial numbers of the *adhikaraṇa*s are provided by the *prakaraṇa list* at KAŚ 1.1.3–17 and repeated in the colophons.

[54] The percentage ascribed to each *adhikaraṇa* represents the number of passages in each *adhikaraṇa* divided by the overall number in the text. The length of individual passages are not taken into account. It is not expected that the integration of such information would alter the numbers given here substantially.

Although *adhikaraṇa* boundaries are discretely marked in the text, the content of a given *adhikaraṇa* does not always represent a cohesive "subject." In several cases, the boundary marked by the conclusion of one *adhikaraṇa* and the beginning of the next is only weakly reflected in the content of the text.[55] Thus, while some *adhikaraṇa*s show strong internal organization (e.g., the 8th), there is not always a discrete relationship between a given subject area and recognized *adhikaraṇa* boundaries.

It is this general condition that raises the suspicion that either some *adhikaraṇa*s have been superimposed on underlying prose or the addition of material to existing *adhikaraṇa*s has muddled their original semantic integrity. We note in this regard that the *adhikaraṇa*s in the text are defined primarily by the *prakaraṇa* list and colophons, and are only weakly recognized in the text proper, if at all.

We note, finally, a few patterns in the length of the 15 *adhikaraṇa*s. First, the *adhikaraṇa*s of the first half tend to be much longer than those in the second half, with the first four *adhikaraṇa*s comprising almost half of the text. Second, each half of the text is dominated by an *adhikaraṇa* that is substantially longer than the rest. So, the first half of the text is dominated by the 2nd *adhikaraṇa* and the second half by the 7th *adhikaraṇa*.[56]

Attestation of *adhikaraṇa* nomenclature can tell us something about their place in the compositional history of the text. The use of the term "*adhikaraṇa*" in a technical

[55] This is noted particularly in the transition between *adhikaraṇa*s 4/5 and 6/7. We note also outright disagreement on the beginning of the fourth *adhikaraṇa*, which would seem to find a more suitable start at KAŚ 4.4.1 than it does, according to the colophons, at KAŚ 4.1.1. These issues become important in the analysis of the *prakaraṇa*-text in Chapter 7.

[56] These patterns become important in our examination of the structure of the text in Chapter 7, where the 2nd and 7th *adhikaraṇa*s appear to have been nuclei around which their respective halves were composed.

sense is limited to the the front matter, colophons, and back matter.[57] Thus, we find no recognition of "*adhikaraṇa*s," whether referring to textual segments or subject areas, within the parts of the text actually dealing with statecraft.

Moreover, the unique *adhikaraṇa* names are also derived from the *prakaraṇa* list at KAŚ 1.1.3–17 and in the *adhikaraṇa* colophons:

1. *vinayādhikārikam*	"On the Subject of Training"
2. *adhyakṣapracāraḥ*	"The Duties of State Employees"
3. *dharmasthīyam*	"The Judiciary"
4. *kaṇṭakaśodhanam*	"The Clearing of Thorns"
5. *yogavṛttam*	"Practical Matters"
6. *maṇḍalayoniḥ*	"The Basis of the Circle of Kings"
7. *ṣāḍguṇyam*	"The Six Measures [of Foreign Policy]"
8. *vyasanādhikārikam*	"On the Subject of Calamities"
9. *abhiyāsyatkarma*	"The Work of a King Preparing to March"
10. *sāṃgrāmikam*	"On War"
11. *saṃghavṛttam*	"Procedure against Republics"
12. *ābalīyasam*	"On the Weaker King"
13. *durgalambhopāyaḥ*	"Strategy for Taking a Fortress"
14. *aupaniṣadikam*	"On Secret Practices"
15. *tantrayuktiḥ*	"The Technique of the Treatise"

Of these specific *adhikaraṇa* names, only the fourth appears to be directly named in the text proper: *kaṇṭakaśodhana*, "The Clearing of Thorns." This term refers to the removal of troublesome elements from the kingdom and is variously applied to criminals, natural disasters, traitors, dishonest administrators, and so forth. It may also refer, in a more specific sense, to the governmental body charged with remediating some or all of these "thorns."[58] So we find two passages that appear to refer to the fourth *adhikaraṇa*:

---

[57] It does not always demonstrate the meaning with which it is used here, but also seems to refer more broadly to "a matter" or "a subject" not necessarily co-extensive with the subject of one of the 15 *adhikaraṇa*s. See KAŚ 15.1.4–5.

[58] Evidence for this comes in the form of references to the appointment of ministers to positions within *kaṇṭakaśodhana*, to the attestation that *pradeṣṭṛ*s, the functionaries of *kaṇṭakaśodhana*, assessed fines, and to mention of evidence being brought before officials in the investigations of *kaṇṭakaśodhana*.

KAŚ 1.12.17 kaṇṭakaśodhanoktāś cāpasarpāḥ pareṣu kṛtavetanā vaseyur asampātinaś cārārtham

And spies mentioned in "The Clearing of Thorns" shall, for the purpose of spying, dwell separately among the enemies and draw their sustenance from them.

KAŚ 13.3.50 eta evāṭavīnām apasarpāḥ kaṇṭakaśodhanoktāś ca

These same are for forest tribes as well as the spies mentioned in "The Clearing of Thorns."

These two references, drawn from opposite ends of the text, not only appear to cite the same *adhikaraṇa*, but also likely refer *to the same sūtra*: KAŚ 4.4.3. Neither passage (KAŚ 1.12.17; 13.3.50) is particularly well-protected in their respective contexts.[59] What is more, it is not entirely clear that they must be referring to the *adhikaraṇa* called *kaṇṭakaśodhana per se*. For, the discussion of *kaṇṭakaśodhana* appears to be inaugurated in two different verses in the extant text: KAŚ 4.1.1 and 4.4.1. As the *sūtra* referred to falls in the latter, the two passages could be referring to the *adhikaraṇa*, but they might equally be referring to the unified and more limited discussion of *kaṇṭakaśodhana* at KAŚ 4.4–4.8.[60] Hence, the only unambiguous uses of an *adhikaraṇa* name turn out to be quite problematic.

---

[59] Both passages appear to inaugurate extensions to foregoing passages that seem to have just concluded. So at KAŚ 1.12, the discussion of "Rules for Secret Agents" would seem to be complete at 1.12.16, where the rules for the two kinds of spies mentioned in the previous passages, *saṃsthā*s and *saṃcara*s, concludes. Moreover, the point of this activity in KAŚ 1.11–12 is domestic espionage, and the extension of this at 1.12.17 to spying on enemies is out of place, particularly considering that domestic espionage is again the topic of KAŚ 1.13. Finally, 1.12.17–18 clearly introduces the end verse cluster at KAŚ 1.12.18–25. The disconnection of 13.3.50 is even more clear, for it falls immediately after a minor colophon (*iti rājāpasarpāḥ*, "These are the Secret Agents to Use Against the King") appears to have concluded the discussion at KAŚ 13.3 on *apasarpapaṇidhiḥ*, which means, in its extended context, "The Use of Secret Agents [to Take a Fort]." Like KAŚ 1.12.17, 13.3.50 is tightly linked with its *adhyāya* end verse (see §1.3.4). Both passages, then, not only appear to be united by a common function (introducing subsequent novel passages), but are also linked to the end verses of their respective *adhyāya*s. On the significance of this relationship, see §5.6.3.

[60] See KAŚ 1.10.13; 4.9.18.

One finds, more generally, the use of *adhikaraṇa* names without any discrete indication that they are referring to text segments rather than concepts after which those segments are named.[61] The seemingly titular use of *adhikaraṇa* names, however, occurs within the prose at the beginning or end of a given *adhikaraṇa*.[62] But, again, it cannot easily be determined whether these are intentional references to textual segments, or whether the textual segments have drawn their names from iconic concepts already found within the text (or both).

We can conclude this consideration of *adhikaraṇa* form by noting that, while the *prakaraṇa* list and colophons are certainly aware of both *adhikaraṇa* names and boundaries, the same awareness is not so clearly demonstrated within the text itself. Those passages that do seem to possess some awareness may prove important to our compositional history.

Generally, each of the 15 *adhikaraṇa*s deals with an independent aspect of statecraft. The exception to this is the 15th *adhikaraṇa*, which, as the back matter of the text, deals only with the discursive strategies of the text itself. But, among the remaining *adhikaraṇa*s, their cohesiveness as independent "subjects" is just as variable as their length.

---

[61] Following are uses of the same terms as those found in the *adhikaraṇa* titles that seem to refer to something other than the *adhikaraṇa* itself: *adhyakṣapracāraḥ* (2nd *adhikaraṇa*): 8.1.13; *dharmasthīyam* (3rd): 1.10.13; 2.5.5; 4.9.21; *kaṇṭakaśodhanam* (4th): KAŚ 1.10.13; 2.14.13; 3.19.15; 4.1.1; 4.4.2; 5.1.1; 13.1.2; *ṣāḍguṇyam* (7th) 6.2.4; 7.1.1; 7.1.2; 7.1.4; 7.1.5; 7.3.1; 7.3.20; 7.18.43; 8.1.62; *sāmgrāmikam* (10th): 2.18.1; 2.30.42; 2.31.1; 2.32.4; 2.32.15; 2.33.5; *ābalīyasyam* (11th): 7.3.5; 7.3.35; 7.3.36; 7.14.28; *aupaniṣadikam* (14th): 2.18.19; 4.3.13; 14.1.1; *tantrayuktiḥ* (15th): 15.1.71.

[62] *Adhikaraṇa* names are used in a conspicuously titular fashion at the beginning or end of a given *adhikaraṇa* at KAŚ 4.1.1; 5.1.1–2; 7.1.1; 14.1.1; and 15.1.71. To this we might add the reference at KAŚ 4.4.1. The extent to which these uses are informally titular is not clear. We should note that two of them are drawn from the clearly appendectical *adhikaraṇa*s 14 and 15 and two others from the same *adhikaraṇa*, *kaṇṭakaśodhana*, cited at KAŚ 1.12.17 and 13.3.50. For a number of reasons discussed in the following chapters and summarized in Chapter 7, it seems that these passages appear to come from later textual layers.

Most *adhikaraṇa*s possess an identifiable subject area, if not a cohesive subject. The only *adhikaraṇa* that fails completely in this regard is the fifth, *yogavṛttam*, "Practical Matters," which covers a hodge-podge of topics and reads like a set of appendices to the first half of the text. Among the remainder, we find varying degrees of topical cohesion. The most generally cohesive are the eighth (on calamities), the third (on civil law), the fourteenth (on secret practices), and the fifteenth (on discursive elements). Several *adhikaraṇa*s display notable cohesion, but only in part, such as the second, ninth, and thirteenth. Among the rest, the first, fourth, seventh, eighth, tenth, and twelfth, a general subject area prevails, although significant disjunctures can be found. The brief sixth and eleventh, while not strongly integrated, are too short to achieve major disjuncture.

Can we say anything, then, about the general relationship between the *adhikaraṇa* boundaries and their subjects? Generally speaking, the wide disparity in their respective lengths strongly suggests that the subject matter of the *adhikaraṇa*s has exerted a profound influence on the form of at least some of them. But, given the variability in the cohesiveness of *adhikaraṇa* subjects and the inconsistency of their organizational structure, it seems that other factors may have influenced the final "shape" of each *adhikaraṇa*.[63]

[63] That is to say, the subject matter of such *adhikaraṇa*s does not seem to necessitate their composition into a single *adhikaraṇa qua* "subject." It is possible, therefore that the *adhikaraṇa* division postdates the inclusion of such material in the text and that the more strongly integrated *adhikaraṇa*s could be among the later portions of the text. It is also possible, however, that the most heterogeneous *adhikaraṇa*s are also late, representing the aggregation of disparate addenda within the format of the "proper" *adhikaraṇa*. Detailed consideration is left to the Chapter 7.

1.3.2 Redundant Segmentation: *Prakaraṇa*s and *Adhyāya*s

These fifteen *adhikaraṇa*s are further subdivided by two overlapping and redundant segmentation schemes. The first of these schemes parcels out the text into 180 *prakaraṇa*s or "topics," while the second divides the same material into 150 *adhyāya*s or "lessons." The manner in which these two segmentation schemes divide the text is characterized by both coincidence and divergence.

This dual division is most easily illustrated by examining the organization of the text over its first ten *prakaraṇa*s and fourteen *adhyāya*s:[64]

	prakaraṇa 1			2	3		4	5	6	7	8	9	10
adhyāya 1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.10	1.11	1.12	1.13	1.14

Fig. 3: The Beginning of the *Arthaśāstra* by *Prakaraṇa* and *Adhyāya*

Quite often in the *Arthaśāstra* a single *prakaraṇa* will be coextensive with a single *adhyāya* (85 times).[65] Just as often, however, they will diverge: either a long *prakaraṇa* will be divided into more than one *adhyāya* (13 times) or, more, frequently several short *prakaraṇa*s are brought together into a longer *adhyāya* (82 times).[66] Although it is characteristic of the relationship between the *adhyāya*s and *prakaraṇa*s that

---

[64] The *prakaraṇa* and *adhyāya* boundaries given here conform to those in Kangle's second edition. My own emendation to these are pointed out below (§3.5).

[65] This number is given notwithstanding instances wherein an "coextensive" *prakaraṇa* and *adhyāya* disagree to a small degree on the precise location of one of their boundaries. Such cases are very important to understanding the historical relationship between the *prakaraṇas* and *adhyāya*s and are discussed at §3.5.

[66] Theoretically, we might reverse the perspective here and say that 13 times short *adhyāya*s are brought together into a longer *prakaraṇa* and 82 times a long *adhyāya* is divided into more than one *prakaraṇa*. In fact, the choice of perspective is not arbitrary, for the most consistent element of the mutual subdivision and aggregation of these segments is that the *adhyāya*s remain much more homogeneous in length than the *prakaraṇa*s through this process. Moreover, we will adduce evidence below sufficient to demonstrate that the *adhyāya*s are chronologically later than the *prakaraṇa*s. See Chapter 3, particularly §3.5.

they subdivide one another evenly without leaving any dismembered *adhyāya* or *prakaraṇa* subsections to be absorbed into another whole *adhyāya* or *prakaraṇa*, this does occur in a few instances (5 times) that prove very consequential to our analysis.[67] And, despite the frequent divergence in the manner of segmentation effected by each of these two schemes, it should be noted that there are no examples of either a *prakaraṇa* or an *adhyāya* spreading across an *adhikaraṇa* boundary.

Of the two segments, the *prakaraṇa*s are defined primarily by their relation to their subject matter rather than by formally marked boundaries. Independent of instances of isomorphism with a single *adhyāya*, the marking of *prakaraṇa* boundaries is neither standardized nor regular. Put differently, the *prakaraṇa*s appear more properly as topics of discussion than segments of text, the boundaries between many *prakaraṇa*s being poorly marked (if marked at all) and a minority of *prakaraṇa* boundaries being difficult or impossible to locate.[68] The close connection between the discussions of text and the *prakaraṇa*s is primarily responsible for the suspicion that the *prakaraṇa*s are the earlier of the two redundant segmentation schemes.

The *adhyāya*s, in contrast to the *prakaraṇa*s, are characterized by firmly marked boundaries: each *adhyāya* ends with at least one verse in the *anuṣṭubh śloka* meter[69] and a colophon. Because these firm boundary markers serve as strong and unambiguous points

---

[67] For example, the 61st *prakaraṇa*, *vāstukam*, comprises the entirety of *adhyāya*s 3.8 and 3.9, but only the first 35 *sūtra*s of *adhyāya* 3.10. The 12 remaining passages of *adhyāya* 3.10 cover the next *prakaraṇa*, *samayasyānapākarma*. Typically, the text divides long *prakaraṇa*s like *vāstukam* into an even number of *adhyāya*s without remainder. The cases of irregular subdivision are discussed at §3.3.

[68] Thus, in some cases, a title from the *prakaraṇa* list cannot be correlated with a discrete segment of text. In contrast to the opinion given above, Scharfe concludes that on the whole, the *prakaraṇa*s are "well marked in the text" (1993, 35). My reasons for diverging from his considered opinion are detailed in the following chapters.

[69] *Adhyāya* 14.1 is an exception to this. It is likely, however, that the mantra following the final *śloka* in that *adhyāya* (14.1.39–40) is an interpolation meant to provide the *agnimantra* mentioned in the original end verse at 14.1.38. This has been argued by Jacobi (1918, 192n).

of reference, the *adhyāya*s dominate the *prakaraṇa*s in the text: individual passages are predominantly cited in the secondary literature by *adhikaraṇa*, *adhyāya*, and *sūtra* number (e.g. KAŚ 4.2.13). In contrast to the *prakaraṇa*s, however, topical unity is of secondary importance to the structure of an *adhyāya*. In fact, topical unity within an *adhyāya* is typically found only in such cases as an *adhyāya* happens to overlap exactly with a single *prakaraṇa*. The looser adherence of the *adhyāya*s to the subject matter is the major element prompting suspicion of the posteriority of the *adhyāya*s, redundant segmentation (especially one showing such notable differences on the division of the text) unlikely to have been produced by a single composer.

The manner in which this redundant segmentation is carried out in the *Arthaśāstra* will provide a point of departure for our analysis of the compositional history of the text (Chapter 3). Because of the importance of this feature, the following sections look at both the *prakaraṇa*s and *adhyāya*s in greater detail.

1.3.3 *Prakaraṇa*s

A *prakaraṇa* almost always represents the independent discussion of a single subtopic of its *adhikaraṇa*'s subject area.[70] As such, *prakaraṇa*s are, as a group, defined by their topic matter and distinguished from one another by the transition between subtopics and not necessarily by formally-marked boundaries (such as end verses or colophons).

As an example of the relationship between the *adhikaraṇa*s and the *prakaraṇa*s, we can look to the 13th *adhikaraṇa*, entitled *durgalambhopāyaḥ*, "The Means of Taking a

[70] Some *prakaraṇa*s relate more directly to the subject of their *adhikaraṇa* than others. Typically this is a reflection of the cohesiveness of the *adhikaraṇa*'s subject. It should also be noted that the 15th *adhikaraṇa* possesses a single *prakaraṇa* that cannot, therefore, be thought of as a constituent "subtopic" of the *adhikaraṇa*. Both *prakaraṇa* and *adhikaraṇa* are titled *tantrayukti* ("Method of the Treatise").

Fortress." This *adhikaraṇa* comprises six *prakaraṇa*s. They are presented as follows in the table of contents:

> KAŚ 1.1.15 upajāpaḥ | yogavāmanam | upasarpapraṇidhiḥ | paryupāsanakarma | avamardaḥ | labdhapraśamanam | iti durgalambhopāyas trayodaśam adhikaraṇam
>
> Instigation to Sedition, Drawing Out by Means of Stratagems, Employment of Secret Agents, The Work of Laying Siege, Storming, Pacification of the Conquered Territory: these constitute the 13th *adhikaraṇa*, "Means of Taking a Fort."

As this citation illustrates, it is the *prakaraṇa* that represents the unit of meaningful discourse in the *Arthaśāstra*. The *adhikaraṇa*s, as semantic units, generally only reflect (or attempt to manufacture) thematic linkages between the *prakaraṇa*s; little discourse in the *Arthaśāstra* takes place at the level of the *adhikaraṇa*.[71]

Like the *adhikaraṇa*s, the *prakaraṇa*s of the text vary widely in length, stretching in length from less than one sentence long up to a maximum of 167 *sūtra*s.[72] *Prakaraṇa*s are identified in the *Arthaśāstra* by the name given to each in the *prakaraṇa* list, although modern convention also enumerates them serially from the beginning of the text (*i.e.*, §1–180).

It is not always the case, however, that the text proceeds in a series of independent discussions that match the profile of most *prakaraṇa*s. Parts of the latter half of the *Arthaśāstra* are sufficiently confused so as not to submit to a clear division into such (semi-)independent discussions. Moreover, the 180 names provided by the table of contents (KAŚ 1.1.3–17) are, in a few cases, difficult to identify with any certainty in the text. These represent two different issues. First, the *prakaraṇa* structure of the text, while

---

[71] Although we do see a few instances of this, such as in the 9th *adhikaraṇa*, as well as, to a more limited extent, here in the 13th *adhikaraṇa*.

[72] *Prakaraṇa*s 167 and 116, respectively. The average length a *prakaraṇa* is 29.88 passages.

clear in most places, breaks down at points. Second, it is not clear whether the *prakaraṇa* names on the list might not, in part, represent a superimposition of a formal structure over earlier discussions that were not formally or consistently marked (and, in some cases, don't proceed in autonomous discussions). This raises the important distinction between the notion of the *prakaraṇa* as one of 180 similar segments in the *Arthaśāstra* as opposed to an identifiable, though not necessarily discretely bounded, topic through which the discussion of the text proceeds.

1.3.4 *Adhyāya*s

At the same time that the *adhikaraṇa*s of the *Arthaśāstra* are divided into *prakaraṇa*s, they are also divided independently into *adhyāya*s ("teachings" or "lessons"). Whereas a *prakaraṇa* is nearly always a unified, hermetic discussion, *adhyāya*s do not always reflect independent, stand-alone discussions. Frequently, an *adhyāya* will combine several short *prakaraṇa*s or subdivide one long *prakaraṇa*. When combining short *prakaraṇa*s or dismembered *prakaraṇa* segments, the *adhyāya*s never demonstrate a novel integration of their constituent *prakaraṇa*s superseding that provided by the *prakaraṇa*s (see §3.2).

Here is an example taken from the second *adhikaraṇa*, in which a single *adhyāya* (KAŚ 2.34) comprehends two *prakaraṇa*s: "The Superintendent of Passports" (52) & "The Superintendent of Pastures" (53) (the *adhyāya* end verse is given in italics):

> KAŚ 2.34.1–12 The Superintendent of Passports (*mudrādhyakṣa*) should issue a sealed pass for one *māṣaka*. Only a person with a sealed pass shall be entitled to enter or leave the countryside. A native of the land, without a sealed pass, shall pay twelve *paṇa*s. One bearing a forged pass shall pay the lowest fine for violence. One not of the country shall pay the highest fine for violence.
>
> The Superintendent of Pastures (*vivītādhyakṣa*) should ask for a sealed pass. And he should establish pasture land in regions between

villages. He should clear lowlands and forests of robbers and wild animals. In waterless regions, he should establish wells, waterworks and springs, also flower and fruit enclosures. Fowlers and hunters should go round in the forest. At the approach of robbers or enemies, they should produce a sound with conch shells or drums, not allowing themselves to be caught by climbing mountains or trees or by riding in swift vehicles. And he should convey to the king movements of enemies and forest tribes by means of domesticated pigeons carrying sealed letters or by a series of smokes and fires.

He should insure the livelihood of those in produce forests and elephant forests and secure the road cess, protect against robbers, escort caravans, and protect cattle and trade.

Here we see that, aside from the connection between the two *prakaraṇa*s in the issuance and inspection of the passport, the *adhyāya* segment does not display the kind of holistic semantic integration found in each *prakaraṇa*.[73] Moreover, the final end verse of the *adhyāya* refers back only to the second of the two *prakaraṇa*s.

Instead of adherence to independent discussions, the *adhyāya*s are established in the text by formally-marked boundaries: each *adhyāya* concludes with at least one verse and a colophon. The formal manner in which the colophons unambiguously conclude an *adhyāya* is mirrored within the text proper by the operation of the *śloka*s to bring each *adhyāya* to a rhythmic and substantive conclusion. What follows is a relatively standard example of how the end verse and colophon work in concert within the text (the end verse, KAŚ 4.1.65, is given in italics):

KAŚ 4.1.58–65 Actors shall live in one place during the rainy season. They shall avoid excessive gifts of love by one person and excessive praise of one. For transgression of that, the fine is twelve *paṇa*s. They may, at will, entertain by making fun of countries, castes, families, schools, and love affairs.

By actors are explained wandering minstrels and mendicants. For them the punishment shall be as many lashes with the whip as the number of *paṇa*s the [judges] may pronounce as the fine, to be inflicted with an iron rod.

[73] For more detailed discussion, see §3.3.

> In the case of the remaining kinds of work, he shall lay down wages for artists in accordance with what they produce.
> *In this manner, he should prevent thieves who are not known as thieves such as traders, artisans, actors, mendicants, jugglers, and others from oppressing the country.*
>
> Here ends the first *adhyāya*, (comprising the *prakaraṇa*) "Protecting Against Artisans," in the fourth *adhikaraṇa*, "The Clearing of Thorns."

Most frequently, the end verses conclude an *adhyāya* by providing a conclusion to or summary of a foregoing topic or topics. These conclusions can provide either a generic summary of the foregoing prose[74] or a final element integral to the prose discussion.[75] In some cases, the end verse will pick up on some aspect of the foregoing subject and provide a related gnomic verse on the topic,[76] in the manner of the usage of *smṛti* verses in the earlier Dharmasūtras (see §1.1). In other cases, an end verse will extend,[77] inflect,[78] or amend[79] the foregoing prose into new areas or applications. Thus, while all end verses share the function of rhythmically concluding an *adhyāya*, their relationship to the content of that *adhyāya* can follow several models. We will look at these models more closely when we consider the nuances of individual end verses at §5.3–5.

101 of 150 *adhyāya*s conclude with a single end verse, 23 in couplets; 7 end in three verses, and 19 *adhyāya*s possess four or more verses at their conclusion. The largest number of verses to end an *adhyāya* is 15 (KAŚ 7.3). Hence, we see a divergent tendency:

---

[74] E.g. KAŚ 3.20.34

[75] E.g. KAŚ 7.6.34–41, especially 7.6.40–41

[76] E.g. KAŚ 2.29.48

[77] E.g. KAŚ 1.12.19–25

[78] E.g. KAŚ 3.19.30

[79] E.g. KAŚ 1.10.16–20

most *adhyāya*s end in a single verse, but those that do not typically end in much longer and more substantive verse clusters.

The manuscripts of the *Arthaśāstra* are virtually unanimous in the placement of the *adhyāya* colophons, and witness thereby a consistent profile to the extent and boundaries of the *adhyāya* segments in the *Arthaśāstra*.[80] And, although the *adhyāya* colophons in the manuscripts are inconsistent in the amount of information they give (variances are found both within a single manuscript as well as between different manuscripts), they can all be seen as variations on one or two archetypal forms, deviating only in the omission and/or arrangement of certain standard elements.[81]

---

[80] Some minor discrepancies are recorded among the manuscripts, however. The Malayalam commentary (Cb) considers *adhyāya* 1.8 to begin after 1.7.7. There is, moreover, some discrepancy among the mss. over the distribution of *prakaraṇa*s 162–163 over *adhyāya*s 12.1–12.3, although the *adhyāya* boundaries are firm.

[81] At a minimum, an *adhyāya* colophon will identify the *adhyāya* by number relative to its *adhikaraṇa* (these colophons are taken from the manuscript M_4):

[KAŚ 1.3] *iti vināyadhikārike tṛtīyo 'dhyāyaḥ*

Here ends the third *adhyāya* in [the *adhikaraṇa*] "On the Topic of Training."

Typically, a colophon also identifies the *prakaraṇa*s or *prakaraṇa* subsections comprehended by a given *adhyāya*, although the form of this can be somewhat variable:

[KAŚ 1.2] *iti vinayādhikārike samuddeśe ānvīkṣikīsthāpanā dvitīyo 'dhyāyaḥ*

Here ends the second *adhyāya*, [discussing] "The Establishment of Philosophy" in [the *prakaraṇa*] "The Enumeration of the Sciences" in [the *adhikaraṇa*] "On the Topic of Training"

or

[KAŚ 1.16] *iti vinayādhikarike ṣoḍaśo 'dhyāyaḥ | dūtapraṇidhiḥ*

Here ends the twelfth *adhyāya* in [the *adhikaraṇa*] "On the Topic of Training" [comprised of the *prakaraṇa*] "The Job of the Envoy."

Finally, in *adhyāya*s beyond the first *adhikaraṇa*, the colophons will usually record the absolute position of the *adhyāya* from the beginning of the text:

[KAŚ 2.32] *dvātiṃśaḥ | hastipracāraḥ | āditas tripañcāśaḥ*

The thirty-second [*adhyāya* in the second *adhikaraṇa*], [comprised of the *prakaraṇa*] "The Behavior of Elephants," fifty-third [*adhyāya*] from the beginning.

Despite the fact that Kangle fails to present *variae lectiones* for the entirety of each colophon, he does provide alternate readings for the names of *prakaraṇa*s and *prakaraṇa* subsections, thereby demonstrating the consistency with which the colophons cite the names of the *prakaraṇa*s and their subsections.

The *adhyāya*s always display a relatively greater degree of standardization, possessing a minimum length of 9 sentences and exhibiting a moderately greater uniformity in length (between 9 and 117 passages[82]), than the *prakaraṇa*s. This feature, along with the noted proclivity of an *adhyāya* to aggregate short *prakaraṇa*s[83] or subdivide long ones,[84] lends to them a clear redactorial character (Kangle 1965, 25).

1.4 SCHOLASTIC EXCHANGES

The final distinguishing compositional feature of the *Arthaśāstra* is the frequent but irregular irruptions into the text (83 times) of direct speech attributed to earlier teachers on political science, Kauṭilya himself, or, most frequently, both.[85] These scholastic exchanges generally take the form of the *pūrvapakṣa/uttarapakṣa* exchange

---

Kangle's edition standardizes all *adhyāya* colophons into a maximal, archetypal format:

[KAŚ 7.38] *iti ṣāḍguṇye saptame 'dhikaraṇe ṣāḍguṇysamuddeśaḥ kṣayasthānavṛddhiniścayaś ca prathamo 'dhyāyaḥ | ādito navanavatitamaḥ*

Here ends the first *adhyāya* in the seventh *adhikaraṇa*, "The Six-fold Policy," [comprehending the *prakaraṇa*s] "Enumeration of the Six-fold Policy" and "Determinations in Loss, Stability, and Growth," ninety-ninth [*adhyāya*] from the beginning.

[82] *Adhyāya* 1.7 is the shortest at 9 passages; *adhyāya* 2.11 is the longest at 117. The average *adhyāya* length in the text is 35.98 passages.

[83] E.g. KAŚ 7.4

[84] E.g. KAŚ 7.9–12

[85] The 15th *adhikaraṇa*, *tantrayukti*, refers to these exchanges, or more precisely to the citation of the opinions of both the earlier teachers and Kauṭilya, as *apadeśaḥ*: *evam asāv āhety apadeśaḥ* (15.1.21). Applicable in a more general sense to references from both Kauṭilya and the teachers is the *yukti* called *upadeṣaḥ* or "advice." *Cf.* 15.1.19–20.

common to Sanskrit dialogics, with generic or eponymous teachers or schools providing the *pūrvapakṣa* (*prima facie* view) and Kauṭilya the *uttarapakṣa* (final or proper view). It is not uncommon in these cases for Kauṭilya's initially succinct response to stretch into a long explanatory passage marked by the enclitic particle *hi*, "For,…" and frequently (but not always) concluding with the quotative particle *iti*. It is also possible that subsequent passages not so introduced by *hi* are meant to be read in the voice of Kauṭilya.[86] On at least one occasion, an exchange between earlier teachers is given without any response from Kauṭilya.[87] These, as well as other attributes, mark the presentation of the direct speech of Kauṭilya and earlier teachers in the *Arthaśāstra* as highly variable.[88]

A Kauṭilya dialogue, as I will refer to these exchanges, will generally (but not invariably) open with the presentation of an erroneous viewpoint (*pūrvapakṣa*).[89] Sometimes a chain of *pūrvapakṣa*s is presented as a series of proclamations and/or digressions from various eponymous teachers (*i.e.*, Manu, Bṛhaspati, Uśanas, etc.) or their adherents (*i.e.*, the Māṇavas, Bārhaspatyas, Auśanasas, etc.). In either case Kauṭilya's correct view (*uttarapakṣa*) concludes the dialogue:

KAŚ 1.15.47–50 mantripariṣadaṃ dvādaśāmātyān kurvīteti mānavāḥ
ṣoḍaśeti bārhaspatyāḥ
viṃśatim ity auśanasāḥ
yathāsāmarthyam iti kauṭilyaḥ

---

[86] E.g. KAŚ 7.1.31*ff*. discussed at §6.5.2.1

[87] KAŚ 10.6.1–2. It is referred to in *tantrayukti* (15.1.41–42) as *paravākyam apratiṣiddham anumatam*, "The statement of another, not contradicted, is 'agreement.'"

[88] The vast majority of these cases, however, conform to the structure of the *pūrvapakṣa*/*uttarapakṣa* exchange, and I will therefore refer to all of these instances of direct speech in the text as "Kauṭilya dialogues."

[89] Several times the dialogues are prompted by the presentation of a statement, which is disagreed with by the *pūrvapakṣin*s but ultimately endorsed in Kauṭily*a*'s own *uttarapakṣa*. See, e.g., KAŚ 1.2.1–10.

"The King should appoint a Councilor's Assembly consisting of 12 Councilors," say the followers of Manu.
"Sixteen," say the followers of Bṛhaspati.
"Twenty," say the followers of Uśanas.
"As is suitable to conditions," says Kauṭilya.

A variation of this format is found in a few debates wherein Kauṭilya responds individually to a series of *pūrvapakṣa*s presented by different teachers or schools. It should be noted, as above, that the *uttarapakṣa* is sometimes followed by a longer explanation in Kauṭilya's voice.

Most frequently, however, only a single *pūrvapakṣa* is given. Generally, this will be attributed generically to "the teachers" (*iti ācāryāḥ*), although in some cases it is ascribed to a specific teacher/school.

KAŚ 3.14.6–8 upasthitam akārayataḥ kṛtam eva vidyād ity ācāryāḥ
neti kauṭilyaḥ
kṛtasya vetanaṃ nākṛtasyāsti

"When someone fails to employ an individual who has arrived [for contracted labor], the works should be considered as completed," say the teachers.
"No," says Kauṭilya.
"Pay is for work that is done, not for work that is not done."

Such one-to-one exchanges are sometimes united into a long chain of *uttarapakṣa*s and *pūrvapakṣa*s between "the teachers" and Kauṭilya. The attribution of a *pūrvapakṣa* to specific teachers and schools is found most frequently in the earlier *adhikaraṇa*s, while the generic attribution of *pūrvapakṣa*s of "the *ācārya*s" (teachers) are generally found in the latter half of the text. It is not clear whether this pattern is meaningful to the reconstruction of the composition of the text.

The dispersal of the Kauṭilya dialogues in the KAŚ is irregular, and a handful of *adhyāya*s are characterized by the very heavy, if not exclusive, presence of Kauṭilya dialogues (KAŚ 1.8, 1.15, 7.9–12, 8.1–4); these four passages represent the greater part of

the Kauṭilya dialogues in the *Arthaśāstra*. Several scholars have seen in these dialogues the oldest portions of the *Arthaśāstra*[90] or concrete evidence of an earlier expert tradition on *artha* (Kangle 1965, 34–35). It may be that differences in the style of these polemical dialogues bears on the ultimate composition of the text. They are discussed in detail at Chapter 6.

1.5 INTEGRATED COMMENTARY?

Based on a verse falling *after* the concluding colophon of the text, it has been suggested that extant *Arthaśāstra* is divided somehow into *sūtra* and *bhāṣya*; *i.e.*, statement and commentary:

> KAŚ *15.1.74 dṛṣṭvā vipratipattiṃ bahudhā śāstreṣu bhāṣyakārāṇām
> svayam eva viṣṇuguptaś cakāra sūtraṃ ca bhāṣyaṃ ca
>
> Having seen the many inconsistencies of the commentators on *śāstra*s,
> Viṣṇugupta himself composed both the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*.

Despite the fact that the source of this distinction is clearly a spurious verse, the image of a text divided somehow into *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* has been endorsed.[91]

We can state with complete confidence that, as a consistent feature evident throughout the treatise, no clear relationship between different elements of the text readily suggests itself as the referent to the *sūtra/bhāṣya* distinction. The explanations offered by various scholars in defense of the fundamental veracity of the claims of this spurious verse fail to illustrate any such unambiguous referent.[92] As such, based on a simple analysis of the composition of the *Arthaśāstra*, we can dispense with the

---

[90] Hillebrandt 1908; Bruce 2001

[91] Jacobi 1918, 190

[92] Jacobi's argument that the division between *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* can be found in the alternation of brief passages with longer, more complete discussions. Although such a representation of the text may come close to describing certain passages (*i.e.*, KAŚ 1.2–17; see Chapter 7), it is not well supported generally.

suggestion that distinction between *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* is a major feature, on par with those discussed here, of the extant text of the *Arthaśāstra*.[93]

1.6 Conclusion

Thus, we have a mixed prose/verse text divided into 15 *adhikaraṇa*s. These 15 *adhikaraṇa*s are then sub-divided by two dissimilar second-order segmentation systems into 180 *prakaraṇa*s and 150 *adhyāya*s. Colophons conclude each *adhikaraṇa* and *adhyāya*, but not the *prakaraṇa*s. A broad division of the text's contents prevails between discussions on internal administration (*tantra*) and foreign policy (*āvāpa*). Finally, the text possesses two framing *adhyāya*s, the former of which mostly comprises of a table of contents listing the *adhikaraṇa*s and *prakaraṇa*s, but not the *adhyāya*s. By all indications the extant *Arthaśāstra* possesses no major lacunae (See §2.4).

[93] This observation may have been made in reference to a more esoteric dimension of the text, but not one easily apprehended by simple familiarity with the source.

Chapter 2: Theories of Composition

This chapter presents the various theories forwarded by scholars to account for the state of the extant *Arthaśāstra*. This discussion is designed not only to familiarize the reader with the current theories in the field, but also to highlight which textual elements have emerged as central to a determination of the origin of the text. By the end of this chapter, the reader should have a clear understanding of why, in particular, the relationship between the *adhyāya*s and the *prakaraṇa*s is so important to unlocking the history of the text.

2.1 Unitary Authorship and Its Difficulties

Scholarly opinion is notably unsettled regarding how the *Arthaśāstra* came into its present form. The most straightforward and conservative theories derive from the "traditional" view[94] of the text's origins and claim that the present text faithfully[95] reflects the original composition of a single author, usually Cāṇakya or Kauṭilya. We find

[94] As enunciated by Kangle: "[t]he traditional view in this matter is that Kauṭilya, also known as Cāṇakya or Viṣṇugupta, who destroyed the power of the Nandas and placed Candragupta Maurya on the throne of Magadha, is the author of the work. And as Candragupta is known to have come to the throne in 321 B.C. or thereabouts, the date of the composition of the work is assumed to be the end of the fourth century B.C." (1965, 61). Direct internal attributions of the *Arthaśāstra* to "Kauṭilya" come at 1.1.19 and 2.10.63 and to "him, who, in resentment, quickly regenerated the science and the weapon and the earth that was under the control of the Nanda kings" at 15.1.73, all *adhyāya* end verses and the last being the final verse of the text proper; the attribution of the text to "Viṣṇugupta" after the final colophon (*i.e.*, *15.1.74) is clearly an interpolation. Potential attributions of lesser certitude are the 83 direct citations of Kauṭilya in the text. Whether these, however, are Kauṭilya quoting himself or being quoted by another remains a matter of controversy. We are concerned in this chapter only with the aspect of the traditional view that attributes the entire extant *Arthaśāstra* to a single author, whether that author is Cāṇakya or another. The issues of date and authorship are taken up in the Conclusion. For a discussion of the traditional view as it pertains to date and author, see Kangle 1965, 61–115. For a detailed treatment of the story cycles concerning the legendary Kauṭilya (the so-called *Cāṇakya-Candragupta-Kathā*s) see Trautmann 1971, 10–67.

[95] Less, of course, minor losses and accretions common to the manner of South Asian textual transmission. Kangle: "Most manuscripts no doubt show here and there a sūtra missing or a line" (1965, 21).

such a theory of unitary authorship supported by J. F. Fleet[96], H. Jacobi[97] and such learned translators and editors of the text as R. Shamasastry[98] and R. P. Kangle.[99]

For many such scholars, the issue of compositional history is not considered separately from the identity of the author. Thus, most of the proponents of this view spend a great part of their energy trying to fit the content of the text to the Mauryan period (thereby reinforcing their historical model), while dismissing idiosyncratic structural elements as peculiarities of the author's style.[100] Whatever the merits of such diverse attempts to ascribe the extant *Arthaśāstra* to the legendary prime minister of Candragupta Maurya, all theories of unitary authorship retain in common the goal of discrediting whatever evidence and arguments be adduced in favor of the view that the present *Arthaśāstra* is in any manner the product of substantive, volitional redaction.

---

[96] "And it seems to be agreed by competent judges that, though the existing text is, perhaps, not absolutely word for word that which was written by Kauṭilya, still we have essentially a work that he did compose in [321–296 B.C.]" (Introduction to Shamasastry 1923, v-vi).

[97] Kangle 1965, 27: "Jacobi…believed that this text, like the *Nirukta* and *Mahābhāṣya*, was held in high esteem and therefore was 'saved also from the hand of the meddlesome interpolator.'"

[98] Shamasastry: "I trust the foregoing pages [of the Preface to his translation] contain overwhelming evidence in favour of the genuineness of the Arthaśāstra as I have published it, and of Kauṭilya's authorship thereof" (1923, xxiii).

[99] Kangle: "considering the extent of the work, the interpolations do not appear to be either extensive or significant. Of a wholesale incorporation of later material there does not appear to be any indication at all." This list on names, of course, leaves out a number of scholars (Meyer, Hillebrandt *et al*) who do attribute some portion of the present text of the *Arthaśāstra* to Kauṭilya, but not all.

[100] This is my interpretation, but is supported by the proclivities of both Shamasastry's preface (1923) and Kangle's study of the text (1965). We witness this, for example, in Kangle's cursory treatment of the disjuncture between the *prakaraṇa* and *adhyāya* segmentation schemes: "it is not altogether unlikely that the two-fold division stems from the author himself, who may be supposed to have intended that his work, besides being suitably divided into sections, should also be the object of study by others" (1965, 26); and, on the first *adhyāya*, which is not counted among any *prakaraṇa*: "Perhaps the first Chapter giving the table of contents was regarded [by the author] as suitable for constituting a separate chapter, though it contained no section dealing with the actual śāstra" (1965, 25). *Cf.* Shamasastry on *Kauṭilya* quoting himself: "this is a common practice with all Indian writers" (1923, xxiv).

The primary difficulty for the theory of unitary authorship lies in accounting for the redundant segmentation of the text: why would an author have re-divided his own text with a second system that frequently conflicts with the first? Among those scholars who subscribe to a theory of unitary authorship and are willing to acknowledge sufficient grounds to suspect a secondary redaction into *adhyāya*s, Kangle gives the only defense of which I am aware. In a study of the text accompanying his critical edition and translation of the *Arthaśāstra*, Kangle admits that the *prakaraṇa* division "appears more natural, being germane to the science" and allows that "[i]t may be argued that the former division [*i.e.*, the *prakaraṇa*s] being natural is original and that the division into chapters [*i.e.*, *adhyāya*s] was imposed on it later" (1965, 25–26). But having recognized the fecund ground for this assumption, Kangle resists the conclusion, without openly rejecting it, that the *adhyāya*s must be the work of a second hand: "it is not altogether unlikely that the two-fold division stems from the author himself, who may be supposed to have intended that his work, besides being suitably divided into sections [*i.e.*, *prakaraṇa*s], should also be the object of study [in the form of *adhyāya*s] by others" (1965, 26). This possibility, that the author did not combine his priorities of composition and presentation and used so clumsy a method to accomplish these divergent goals, is far less likely than the occurrence of some kind of redaction to the text.[101] Because any possibility of redaction diminishes the likelihood of the traditional account, one can only imagine that the motive behind promoting such an improbable theory is to defend Kauṭilya's supposed authorship.

[101] This is not to say that there are not signs of integration within the greater text, but only that the *prakaraṇa*/*adhyāya* issue is enormously problematic to the theory of unitary authorship.

It remains, however, that the redundant division of the text into *prakaraṇa*s and *adhyāya*s gives immediate cause to suspect a redaction to the text, a suspicion borne out in a discrete comparison of the two systems (see Chapter 3).

2.2 *ADHYĀYA* REDACTION

Over and against the compositional theory of unitary authorship, a substantial number of theories have been forwarded to explain the apparent disjuncture between the *prakaraṇa*s and *adhyāya*s through one or more instances of extensive redaction.[102]

2.2.1 Addition of Colophons Only

One theory, proposed soon after the publication of the *editio princeps* and which continues to attract a great deal of support is the now commonly held view that the division of the text into *adhyāya*s represents the secondary segmentation of a text originally divided only into *prakaraṇa*s (the hypothetical "*prakaraṇa*-text"). The specific evidence pertaining to this proposed redaction is discussed in the next four chapters. Despite its broad acceptance, however, the widespread acknowledgement of this redaction has not resulted in concomitant accord over the precise character and extent of proposed editorial transformations.

But to what extent might the text have been altered during its redaction into *adhyāya*s? Kangle, who seems to feel the pressure of this problem more acutely than his cohort, would limit any secondary *adhyāya* redaction to the addition of the *adhyāya* colophons: he directly rules out any "significant" interpolations or the "wholesale

[102] In many of these theories, the term "redaction" may be insufficient to describe the extensive renovation or rewriting that earlier "versions" of the text are posited to have undergone. I use the term here 1) because I wish to examine all of the various transformations suggested in the different compositional theories as a group; and 2) to highlight the continuity between earlier "versions" of the *Arthaśāstra* and its present form proposed in the different theories.

incorporation of later material" in the present text (1965, 30).[103] Such a redaction would merely have formalized the efforts of the composer, who had already functionally divided the text into *adhyāya* segments by including the present *adhyāya* end verses at appropriate intervals.[104] And even as he admits in places to the possibility of an *adhyāya* redaction, the implicit position to which Kangle continually returns in his writing is that the present *Arthaśāstra* reflects almost exactly the original work of a single author. So, even as he fails to address directly the origin of the *adhyāya* colophons, Kangle's implicit position is that they are original to the text. Shamasastry, for his part, does not hesitate at all in attributing the colophons to the composer of the original treatise (1923, ix).[105]

Scharfe has, in my opinion, most convincingly demonstrated that the *adhyāya* segmentation is, in fact, "an early addition" to the work brought about by a redactor who could not have been the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text (1993, 29–40, 67).[106] The *adhyāya*s, in Scharfe's model, would have been generated out of the *prakaraṇa*-text solely by the introduction of the present *adhyāya* colophons at intervals suggested by pre-existing verses (1993, 40–41).[107] In his view this redaction into a*dhyāya*s was a "secondary mechanical division" suggested by the verses scattered throughout the text

---

[103] This is made clear when Kangle relates that "[a]lthough quite a number of ślokas appear to be borrowed from earlier sources…[m]any of them are obviously by the author himself" (1965, 34).

[104] *I.e.*, at the present *adhyāya* intervals. That whoever introduced them must have done so with the intention of producing a second organizational scheme is admitted by Kangle (1965, 25).

[105] The different approaches of these two editors of the text might be due to the fact that Kangle, writing more than 40 years later than Shamasastry, was presenting his work in a climate in which the theory of an *adhyāya* redaction was generally enjoying greater support.

[106] Scharfe demonstrates this based on certain erroneous interpretations of *prakaraṇa* boundaries by the producer of the *adhyāya* segments. I disagree, however, with his assessment that the *adhyāya* redaction was limited to the introduction of the *adhyāya* colophons.

[107] It should be noted, however, that Scharfe (among others) does not believe that the version of the *prakaraṇa*-text recovered by purging the *adhyāya* colophons is, in fact, the original version of the *Arthaśāstra*. See below, this chapter.

and carried out in imitation of the secondary subdivision found in many Vedic works (1993, 41). Just as in Kangle's model, Scharfe posits that the location of the present *adhyāya* end verses was governed by processes inherent in the composition of the *prakaraṇa*-text and amounted to little more than the formalization of an incipient division into *adhyāya*s already being carried out by the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text.

The significance of any position that limits the *adhyāya* redaction to the addition of the colophons alone lies in the implication that the *adhyāya* end verses that everywhere precede these colophons in the extant text *pre-date the formal adhyāya redaction* itself. As a result, both of the above theories must account for the fact that the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* would already have been *de facto* divided into the present *adhyāya* segments by the same concluding verses that (along with the colophons) form the boundary of each *adhyāya* in the present text. This would mean, of course, that the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text divided his work according to two frequently contradictory schemes. In both theories, as we shall see, Scharfe and Kangle are each beholden to larger theoretical conclusions that rule out the possibility that the present *adhyāya* end verses were introduced by an *adhyāya* redactor along with the colophons.

2.2.2 Addition of Verses and Colophons

A model that avoids the particular difficulty of accounting for a text functionally divided into *adhyāya*s (by the verses) *before* its formal redaction into *adhyāya*s (by the colophons) has been proffered by A. B. Keith (1941, 452) and supported by T. Trautmann (1971, 75–76). In such a model the *adhyāya* redaction consisted of the introduction of the present *adhyāya* end verses as well as the *adhyāya* colophons. The theory is based generally on the fact that such verses in the *Arthaśāstra* invariably operate in tandem with the colophons in marking *adhyāya* boundaries, that they are in many

cases clearly conclusive, and that some of the resulting boundaries seem to produce strange disjunctures in the text.[108] There is a good deal of evidence to support this theory, and I will be arguing in favor of this position in the following chapters of this study.

The *adhyāya* redaction, in this model, would represent a much more extensive transformation of the text than the "cosmetic" addition of colophons. Not only would the redaction have added a minimum of 8% to the overall length of the earlier *prakaraṇa*-text in the form of appended *adhyāya* end verses, but the character of the new material and its re-segmentation of the text would also have inflected and/or changed the presentation of material in the *Arthaśāstra* both locally and globally.[109] Moreover, the addition of substantive material (as opposed simply to metadiscursive colophons) increases the possibility that the *adhyāya* redaction was a more invasive and extensive transformation of the text than previously suspected. For the present, however, it is sufficient to note that this model suggests that the *adhyāya* redaction was potentially a more important moment in the compositional history than has previously been admitted.

These models suffice to outline the general shape of the debate regarding a potential *adhyāya* redaction. Even if we support the occurrence of a maximally transformative *adhyāya* redaction, however, it would remain that the vast majority of the present *Arthaśāstra* must pre-date this *adhyāya* redaction (this is the so-called "*prakaraṇa*-text"). Thus, whether, on one hand, one dismisses the possibility of an *adhyāya* redaction altogether or, on the other hand, believes that it was an extensive,

[108] See below at §3.1–6.

[109] E.g., the only direct ascriptions of the text to Kauṭilya (outside the less certain Kauṭilya dialogues) are all found in *adhyāya* end verses. Thus, the work of ascribing the present text to that author might be seen, at least in part, to have been undertaken by the *adhyāya* redactor.

global transformation of the text, we are still faced with the issue of the provenance and development of the greater portion of the extant text.

2.3 THE ORIGIN OF THE *PRAKARAṆA*-TEXT

Clearly, for those scholars who subscribe to a theory of unitary composition for the present *Arthaśāstra*, there existed no prior "*prakaraṇa*-text" to speak of; rather, the present *Arthaśāstra is* the "*prakaraṇa*-text." Even for those theories holding that the *adhyāya* redaction did occur, but consisted solely of the addition of the present *adhyāya* colophons, the *prakaraṇa*-text that preceded it would have been substantially identical to the present editions of the *Arthaśāstra*. And, as mentioned above, any such model would, from our perspective, need to explain how the *adhyāya* end verses in the extant text, which fall precisely at the end of the present *adhyāya*s, could exist before the formal division of the *prakaraṇa*-text into such *adhyāya* segments had been made.

2.3.1 Unitary *Prakaraṇa* Authorship

Kangle does not address this problem directly in the volume accompanying his edition and translation, but he *does* maintain that the author of the *prakaraṇa*-text is responsible for the *adhyāya* end verses (1965, 34). As to the purpose of these verses, he admits that the *adhyāya* division "has a practical aim, namely, to present the text in more or less equal divisions convenient for the purpose of study" (1965, 25). According to Kangle, therefore, the author of the *prakaraṇa*-text studded his own prose work with verses (both pre-existing as well as his own compositions) at the present *adhyāya* intervals, presumably for the purpose of creating the present *adhyāya*s as a second divisional scheme to supersede his own *prakaraṇa*s.

Thus, Kangle ultimately endorses the position that the "*prakaraṇa*-text" is fundamentally identical to the present edition, with only the provenance of the colophons

left to question.[110] This, the first of the two models, is required if one wishes to keep intact the present *Arthaśāstra* as the work of a single composer without major changes in its compositional history. But, as this theory attributes both divisional schema, the *prakaraṇa*s and the *adhyāya*s, to the same original composer of the text, it fails to address serious discrepancies between the *adhyāya* division and the *prakaraṇa* division that strongly suggest that both cannot be the work of a single author (see §3.4). Ultimately, this model is distinguished from theories that completely rule out any changes whatsoever to the text over time (such as Shamasastry's) only in allowing for the possibility that the composer's *adhyāya* divisions were formalized later by another hand through the secondary addition of colophons.[111]

2.3.2 Verse-Original Theory

For Scharfe, the present *adhyāya* end verses are also original to the *prakaraṇa*-text. But, Scharfe's explanation for their existence is linked to the much more ambitious theory, suggested first by Bhandarkar (1926, 65*ff.*) and supported variously by Wilhelm (1960, 147–148) and Nath (1931b) that the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* is itself the prose expansion of an original verse-form *Arthaśāstra*, from which the present *adhyāya* end verses have been retained.[112] Put differently, the dispersal of verses in the text can be explained as verses retained from the original *Arthaśāstra* when it was converted into prose. According to Scharfe, the reasons why the present *adhyāya* end verses were

[110] But, as we have seen, Kangle makes no real allowance in his work for the occurrence of any *adhyāya* redaction.

[111] A modified version of this compositional history would have the present *adhyāya* end verses finding their present location by a purely accidental process, an argument for which I can find no serious proponents.

[112] It should be noted that a great deal of disagreement is to be found in the espousal of this general theory by the aforementioned scholars. I present Scharfe's as the fullest, most recent, and most persuasive articulation of this theory.

retained from this original verse text are manifold: because they provided important additional data (1993, 53–55), "to mark divisions" (*ibid*.), "to articulate [an] excessively long…topic" (56,) and so forth.

In this, the second model, the global and regular pattern of *adhyāya* end verses in the *Arthaśāstra* is the result of a number of disparate exigencies arising from the process through which a verse text was expanded into a prose text. The *adhyāya* end verses, therefore, would not be the collective result of a specific and directed effort to divide the text into *adhyāya* segments. Rather, the *adhyāya* division would merely have lain dormant in the unguided distribution of retained verses left over from the production of the *prakaraṇa*–text[113] until an opportunistic redactor exploited it to create the formal *adhyāya* division through the introduction of colophons at points suggested by these verses.[114] This ingenious solution allows that the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text is functionally responsible for the *adhyāya* redaction, without, however, having been fully aware of or intending it.

Scharfe cites several pieces of evidence supposedly reflecting the process by which the text was turned from verse to prose. Nevertheless, the better evidence adduced in favor of this ambitious theory is, as we shall see, rather meager, consisting of 1) only a

---

[113] As one of the reasons Scharfe gives for the retention of original verses is "to articulate an excessively long topic." we can posit a specific, if not holistic, volitional tendency toward the re-division of the text in new segmentary units. Interestingly, Scharfe does not include as one of the reasons for the retention of the verses another result they seem to produce: the combination of very short *prakaraṇa*s into longer segmentary units. It remains, however, that, for Scharfe, the retention of original verses was not guided by an unambiguous, global desire to produce formal textual segments, although that desire may have have emerged in more local contexts.

[114] "The redactor had two options if he wanted to replace the loose articulation of the text with clear-cut divisions. He could try to match the list of topics found in the introduction with the text; the result would be sections of very uneven length, and some topics would be difficult to disentangle; or he could use the verses that often summarize or complement the preceding prose—and some obvious changes in content—to achieve sections of comparable length. That is the procedure the redactor chose…" (1993, 40–41).

handful of instances where the prose immediately preceding an *adhyāya* end verse seems to be an expansion of that verse; and 2) a few other cases in which other prose segments of the text can be identified as expansions of verses known from other contexts.[115] I will argue that the instances identified by Scharfe as occurrences of verse turned to prose have different explanations and that an underlying verse-form text identical in its topics and their order is extremely unlikely (see §5.6).[116]

2.3.3 Built around Kauṭilya Axioms

A similar compositional history, representing a third position, argues that the present text is also based on earlier material, but that this material is to be found not in verses retained from a hypothetical verse original, but in the citations of Kauṭilya himself. Arguments have been variously forwarded by A. Hillebrandt (1923) and E. B. Brooks (2001) that the 83 instances of direct speech in the *Arthaśāstra* attributed to Kauṭilya (in the polemical dialogues) form the oldest layer or "core" of the text. The prose surrounding them (*i.e.*, the overwhelming majority of the present text) would represent a

---

[115] Scharfe would also point to suggested discrepancies between the *prakaraṇa* list at KAŚ 1.1.3–17, which he sees as having been based on the verse text, and the actual treatment of topics in the prose text as an indication that the *prakaraṇa* list refers to a different but nearly topically identical version of the present *Arthaśāstra* (1993, 67–70).

[116] This existence of an underlying verse text is rejected by Kangle both for specific textual reasons as well as on the more general grounds that "there does not appear to be any valid motive for the supposed transformation of a metrical work into prose" (1965, 32). Although I agree with Kangle on many of his more specific reasons why such a transformation is unlikely (e.g. that despite Scharfe's explanations it remains "difficult to see why some three hundred and eighty ślokas which are found in the present text should have been retained in the prose" [*ibid.*]), that we cannot perceive a motive for such a transformation does not rule out just such an idiosyncratic occurrence. The most persuasive argument against an original verse text of the *Arthaśāstra* comes from evidence forwarded by Breloer (1934) and Nag (1924) and the research of Trautmann (1971) suggesting that the present *Arthaśāstra* displays unevenness in composition and style and is itself very likely a composite work. That sizeable segments of the *Arthaśāstra* display a wide divergence in style and form would seem to indicate that they represent in themselves originally distinct prose sources. This would rule out the possibility that of a single "verse *Arthaśāstra*" source for the present *adhyāya* ending verses resembling the present text closely enough in the discussion of its topics (particularly in its adherence to the *prakaraṇa* list) to deserve identification as a previous "version" of the present text. Although the use of some verse sources in the construction of the text is possible.

later expansion by the followers of Kauṭilya.[117] Such a theory is suggested, of course, by the logical disjuncture repeatedly generated in the text by the sporadic quotation of Kauṭilya in a work elsewhere attributed to him in its entirety.[118] As a common-sense response to this compositional oddity, scholars have suggested that the present text is the result of the gradual expansion of Kauṭilya's original "maxims."[119] While this theory finds some superficial support in the text's own tendency to cite pre-existing authors and present Kauṭilya's judgment on their opinions, there is, unfortunately, little philological evidence to support the historical priority of the Kauṭilya citations and/or dialogues. This study will present evidence that argues, on the contrary, that these dialogues are in all likelihood not an early but a late feature of the *Arthaśāstra*'s compositional history.[120]

---

[117] As in the case of the theories of a verse original, there is a great divergence of opinion over the details of how this expansion occurred.

[118] This is my own interpretation. Brooks states that "[t]he chief fact on which the present argument is based is that the Kauṭilya maxims do not occur evenly distributed within the ArS, but are confined to certain books and chapters. It can then be verified that the linguistic features which have often been pointed out as signs of late date of the ArS as a whole are clustered in the ArS books and chapters which do not contain Kauṭilya maxims. The implication is that the Kauṭilya maxims comprise a linguistically early stratum within ArS, and that the rest of ArS represents an expansion (perhaps in several instalments [*sic*]) beyond that original stratum" (2001). They argue that Scharfe's dating of the text to *ca.* 150 CE applies only to books which do not contain many or any Kauṭilya quotes. The determination of "early" and "late" linguistic features by different scholars, however, remains inconclusive. Moreover, it can be argued that at least some of the Kauṭilya dialogues show "later" features than the rest of the text. See §6.5.

[119] Bruce and Brooks (2001) argue out that "the group of [Kauṭilya] citations did not exist *as a text* prior to its use by the early ArS. It then seems likely that the early ArS compiler himself did the assembling and rephrasing of these pre-Kautilyan maxims, and structured them so as to maximize the force of the Kautilyan maxims themselves." Accordingly, the composition of this compiler formed the "core" of the present *Arthaśāstra*: "[t]hat early layer must then comprise approximately the chapters containing significant numbers of Kauṭilya citations. But even these chapters do not wholly *consist* of those citations; they normally continue with statements further developing the position attributed to Kauṭilya, or else they precede the Kauṭilya citations by other material on the same general topic. These more developed statements are presumably the original voice of the *Arthashāstra compiler,* as distinct from the quoted voice of *Kauṭilya.*"

[120] See Chapter 6.

2.3.4 Composite Text

Finally, Trautmann (1971) has attempted to scientifically prove the theory, favored in different respects by Nag (1920, 114) and Hillebrandt (1923, 156), that the *Arthaśāstra* (or, more properly, the *prakaraṇa*-text) is a composite text assembled from disparate sources.[121] He has done so by undertaking a rigorous statistical analysis of patterns of word usage in the three longest *adhikaraṇa*s of the text. He argues that these patterns demonstrate that the second, third, and seventh *adhikaraṇa*s must ultimately have each had a different author. To his statistical approach can be added the research of Nag (1920) and Breloer (1927–1934), who have argued that the text displays unevenness in composition both between and within *adhikaraṇa*s as well as between the prose and the verses. I will argue in the following chapters that a great deal of evidence can be adduced in favor of this theory, that it is almost certainly accurate to state that the *Arthaśāstra* is a composite text and, what is more, that it may have been assembled in successive stages by different hands.

2.4 Loss to the Text?

A theory forwarded by D. D. Kosambi, in his preface to the publication of the text of the "Patan fragment" (Kangle's ms. D).[122] There, Kosambi asserts, based on the testimony of a verse in the first *adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.1.18) that puts the extent of the text at "6,000 *śloka*s," that the present text has suffered the loss of about 1/5 of its original material.

---

[121] See, for example, Sternbach 1982; Scharfe 1989, 21n

[122] Preface to Muni Jina Vijaya, ed. (1959). *A Fragment of the Koutalya's Arthaśāstra alias Rajāsiddānta*. Bombay: Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavana, pp. 1–8.

Kosambi's detailed arguments in favor of specific areas of the text in which some of the loss may have occurred are, however, unconvincing.[123] The same may be said for his erroneous reading of the *prakaraṇa* list, in which he identifies some 4 *prakaraṇa*s "missing" in the extant manuscripts.[124] Moreover, as Kangle has argued, it is impossible after reading the text to imagine that every *prakaraṇa* of the present text is missing, on average, 20% of its original material.[125]

Clearly, the problem in this matter lies in the manner in which the term "*śloka*" should be understood in KAŚ 1.1.18. Interpreted as the 32-syllable unit used by copyists to tabulate the extent of their labor (Kangle 1965, 20), it is true that the text records closer to 4,640 *śloka*s.[126] But, if *śloka* refers to sentences, reckoned both as complete syntactical *sūtra*s and verses, then we get a wide range, from around 5,370 in Kangle's second edition to 6,880 in Jolly and Schmidt's edition. Nevertheless, the referent of the term remains unclear.[127] Moreover, the prefatory *adhyāya* is likely younger than the remainder of the text[128] and (aside from the *prakaraṇa* list) can be demonstrated to date in all

---

[123] Scharfe: "In no way would [Kosambi's arguments] allow the expansion of the traditional text by the twenty-five percent that would necessary to reach Kosambi's goal of six thousand *śloka*-s" (1993, 8).

[124] *Cf.* Kangle 1965, 22–23.

[125] Kangle 1965, 22: "it seems quite unlikely that originally there was twenty-five percent more [of Book 7] in the text. The same can be said of most of the other Books."

[126] Kosambi's estimate (1959, 5).

[127] It cannot, of course, refer to the 370 or so actual śloka verses in the present text. As a reference to units of 32 syllables, which "is how copyists usually calculate the extent of a work," Kangle has tabulated the text at about 4800 ślokas (1965, 20–21). It is not unlikely that "the statement about six thousand ślokas is an extremely rough guess" (Kangle 1965, 23), but, if the calculations of 1.1.18 are accurate, then the 6000 *śloka*s must refer to the sum of *sūtra*s and verses in the text, substantial loss of material in the text (which does not seem to have occurred, see below) notwithstanding. This need not concern us unduly here, however, as it bears more on the issues of the provenance of *sūtra* 1.1.18 (discussed below) and whether a substantial amount of material has been dropped from the text over time (also discussed below). On criticism of *sūtra* 1.1.18 and the length of the text, see Kangle 1965, 20–25.

[128] See §3.4.

likelihood to the *adhyāya* redaction, meaning that this verse is not well protected in the text. Even among this potentially late *adhyāya*, the *sūtra* KAŚ 1.1.18 is corrupt and, for various reasons, considered problematic.[129]

Scharfe has examined instances of discrete cross-referencing in the *Arthaśāstra* and determined from that that the present text possesses no major lacunae (1993, 8–10). This is the opinion also held by Kangle (1965, 30–31) and myself. In short, the situation remains that KAŚ 1.1.18 represents on its own insufficient evidence to suggest that the text has endured substantial loss; other evidence adduced in favor of such loss has been entirely unconvincing. Thus, while the text may have suffered some "normal" loss (as well as accretion), we have little reason to accept Kosambi's claim.

2.5 CONCLUSION

After a century a number of mutually-opposed theories remain in popular circulation regarding the composition of the *Arthaśāstra*. The outstanding issue with which each must contend, however, is the presence in the text of redundant segmentation. All issues pertaining to the origin of the *prakaraṇa*-text depend on the outcome of that investigation, which is taken up in the next chapter. From the results of that inquiry, we will be able to move on to consideration of the origin of the *prakaraṇa*-text.

[129] Kangle 1965, 25; Scharfe 1993, 28

Chapter 3: Redundant Segmentation

As should be apparent from the previous chapter, the relationship between the *Arthaśāstra*'s two segmentary systems, *prakaraṇa*s and *adhyāya*s, is of great importance to the compositional history of the text. As the compositional feature most clearly implying a redaction of the entire text, determining the chronological relationship between these two competing segmentary schemes promises to provide a discrete editorial moment around which to construct a greater compositional history of the text.

The present chapter compares the two segmentation systems in the *Arthaśāstra* holistically. This enables us to look broadly at how the two systems interrelate, which, in turn, provides evidence pertaining to their relative chronology. I will, in this chapter, demonstrate that the *adhyāya* division post-dates the division of the text into *prakaraṇa*s, that it occurred in a single compositional moment, and that it must have been the work of someone different from the composer of the underlying text.

My analysis of the composition of the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* begins with the most prominent compositional feature of the text: its redundant division into both *prakaraṇa*s and *adhyāya*s (see §1.3.2). The redundancy prevailing between these two systems suggests that one of the two likely resulted from a global redaction of the *Arthaśāstra*, when the content of the existing text was completely re-apportioned into novel segments. The logic for this is based on the conviction that a single author would not produce redundant segmentary schemes, particularly two schemes that disagree with frequency on the manner in which they divide the text (§3.4)

The present chapter develops its comparison of these two segmentary schemes through four lines of inquiry. First, I compare the redundant segmentation in the *Arthaśāstra* with examples of redundant segmentation found in other Sanskrit texts

(§3.1). Second, I consider the manner in which the *adhyāya* segments are frequently divorced from the material they bound (§3.2). Third, I establish that the present *adhyāya* redaction can only have arisen as the result of a single organizational plan and that it comprehends material not included in the text as reckoned into *prakaraṇa*s (§3.3). Finally, having established not only the posteriority of the *adhyāya*s, but also that they were produced according to a logical plan, I demonstrate that the individual who produced the *adhyāya* redaction cannot have been the same individual who composed the *prakaraṇa* text (§3.4). My conclusions are presented at §3.5.

3.1 Redundant Segmentation in Sanskrit Literature

The phenomenon I refer to as "redundant segmentation" indicates the presence in a text of more than one system for apportioning its material, each of which is capable of providing an independent indexing of the passages of the text, carried out in such a manner that one segmentation would suffice to fulfill that role and the others are superfluous. Because such redundancy is unlikely to have resulted from the efforts of a single composer, its presence strongly implies editorial activity or redaction in the compositional history of a text.[130]

This phenomenon is not uncommon in extant Sanskrit texts from the Vedic and classical periods. From the Vedic corpus, triple segmentation is found in the *Ṛgveda*

[130] At a minimum, redundancy implies two different logics of textual presentation. This, in turn, almost certainly implies two distinct compositional moments, if not also two composers. It is possible, however unlikely, to imagine that a single individual composed a redundantly segmented text all at once. More likely, but still highly improbable is that a single author re-apportioned his own text in a second compositional "moment." This is precisely what Kangle (1965, 26) has argued in favor of to explain the redundant segmentation of the *Arthaśāstra*, namely that its composer chose to re-apportion his own text after its composition (this argument is refuted below). But, both proposals suggest at least two different compositional "moments": one in which the text was composed and one in which the text was re-apportioned. They simply assign both of these moments to the same broad "moment" in which the text was composed. The purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate that these two moments cannot have both come from the same individual.

Saṁhitā (Gonda 1975, 9), as well as double segmentation in certain recensions of the *Yajurveda Saṁhitā* and *Sāmaveda Saṁhitā* (1975, 314*ff.*). To this we can add the double segmentation of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (Gonda 1975, 344n), the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* (1975, 350), and the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (1975, 352). Among the Dharmasūtras we find redundant segmentation in the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*, *Gautama Dharmasūtra*, and *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra* (Olivelle, 2000). We note also the double segmentation of the *Manusmṛti* (Olivelle 2005, 7*ff.*). These do not exhaust the examples of redundant segmentation available in the ancient and classical literature. Thus, that the *Arthaśāstra* should be doubly-divided in this manner is not as "unusual" as Kangle (1965, 25) asserts.

A useful example of redundant segmentation comes from the *Ṛgveda*, which is divided by multiple segmentary schemes. The first of these, which is considered "original" to the composition of the text (in its present form[131]), is the content-based division of the text's hymns into 10 *maṇḍala*s ("books"). A secondary division, based purely on the production of units of similar size and carried out without regard for the content so divided, is the purely numeric division of the text into 8 *aṣṭaka*s ("eighths"). The example provided by the *Ṛgveda* is extremely instructive in understanding the redundant segmentation of the *Arthaśāstra*.

In the *Ṛgveda*, as elsewhere, we are able to identify one of the redundant segmentary systems as "secondary" because it displays a subdivisional logic "external" to the content of the text, such as the generation of segments of a standard length.[132] This is clearly the case with the *aṣṭaka* ("eighths") system of the *Ṛgveda*, which ignores the

[131] The Kuru rescension of the hymns. See Witzel 1997, 264–266.

[132] This is in contradistinction to texts possessed of multiple segmentary systems wherein one system provides a unique and useful articulation of another system or in texts where neither system can be demonstrated to adhere to the material of the text better than the other.

boundaries of the hymns themselves when it divides the text into 8 *aṣṭaka*s, each comprises 8 *adhyāya*s, which, in turn, comprise a number of 5–6 stanza *varga*s or "groups" (Gonda 1975, 9).

The impetus for the redivision of a text lies in pressures exerted on it by the context(s) of its transmission. A demonstrable secondary division implies that the earlier segmentation of the text (if any) was not well suited to the needs of a text's transmitters. In classical South Asia, the redundant division of a text is most often assumed to have occurred when a text was adapted to a form more amenable to its study,[133] broadly understood.[134] Prevalent among the pressures exerted by the pedagogical environment were the time constraints of the daily educational curriculum or other regular practice, which prompted the novel segmentation of a text into portions of a standard length more suitable to the structure of the curriculum. We can identify, in brief, the presence of a subdivisional logic in secondary segmentations that is "external" to the content of the text being divided.

3.2 Failure of the *Adhyāya*s to Integrate Content

Comparing the redundant segmentation in the *Arthaśāstra* to that of the *Ṛgveda* provides a clear correlation: the *prakaraṇa*s tend to follow the logic of the text quite closely (§1.3.3), while the *adhyāya*s frequently diverge from the structure of its discourses (§1.3.4). This fact has been observed frequently in studies of the text.[135] The divergence between the *adhyāya*s and the content of the text, when compared with the

[133] This is certainly the assumption of many scholars (Gonda 1975, 9; Kangle 1965, 25; Scharfe 1993, 40–41; Trautmann 1971, 71–72) and is implied in the pedagogical nomenclature of many secondary segments as "lessons" (*adhyāya*) or "lectures" (*prapāṭhaka*).

[134] Understanding the concept of "study" here to include both rote memorization as well as more active "teaching" of the text through the commentarial exegesis of an expert in the tradition.

[135] Kangle 1965, 25; Trautmann 1971, 71–72

intimate connection between *prakaraṇa* and content, strongly suggests that the *adhyāya*s demonstrate a subdivisional logic external to the composition.

We can find some confirmation of this external logic in a comparison of the relative distribution of the length of *adhyāya* segments over and against *prakaraṇa* segments (see §1.3.2). Moreover, we see that more than half of the text's *prakaraṇa*s are either subdivided (when long) or aggregated (when short) by an *adhyāya*. Hence, the presentation of the material of the *prakaraṇa*s in relatively more uniform segments helps to explain the logic governing the divergence of the *adhyāya*s from the content of the text. This provides the most conclusive evidence for general posteriority of the *adhyāya*s and the occurrence of an "*adhyāya* redaction" to an underlying "*prakaraṇa*-text," although both terms require greater articulation.

An illustration of the *adhyāya*s' failure to integrate their own content can be taken from *adhyāya* 2.34, at which we looked above and which contains two *prakaraṇa*s, "The Superintendent of Passports" and "The Superintendent of Pastures" (end verse is given in italics):

> KAŚ 2.34.1–12 The Superintendent of Passports (*mudrādhyakṣa*) should issue a sealed pass for one *māṣaka*. Only a person with a sealed pass shall be entitled to enter or leave the countryside. A native of the land, without a sealed pass, shall pay twelve *paṇa*s. One bearing a forged pass shall pay the lowest fine for violence. One not of the country shall pay the highest fine for violence.
>
> The Superintendent of Pastures (*vivītādhyakṣa*) should ask for a sealed pass. And he should establish pasture land in regions between villages. He should clear lowlands and forests of robbers and wild animals. In waterless regions, he should establish wells, waterworks, and springs, also flower and fruit enclosures. Fowlers and hunters should go round in the forest. At the approach of robbers or enemies, they should produce a sound with conch shells or drums, not allowing themselves to be caught by climbing mountains or trees or by riding in swift vehicles. And he should convey to the king

> movements of enemies and forest tribes by means of domesticated pigeons carrying sealed letters or by a series of smokes and fires.
>
> *He should insure the livelihood of those in produce forests and elephant forests and secure the road cess, protect against robbers, escort caravans, and protect cattle and trade.*

Here the *prakaraṇa*s closely reflect the organizational logic of the text itself: each represents a complete discussion of one *adhyakṣa*. The *adhyāya*, for its part, is little more than an aggregation of the two *prakaraṇa*s. Even though two *prakaraṇa*s *are* linked by the issuance and inspection of the passport (*mudrā*: 2.34.1, 6), respectively, the internal unity of the *adhyāya* does not rival that of the *prakaraṇa*s, which remain autonomous disquisitions.

This failure of the *adhyāya*s to integrate constituent *prakaraṇa*s where possible is a thoroughgoing feature of the text. Of the text's 150 *adhyāya*s, some 39 contain parts of more than one *prakaraṇa*, and in none of these do we witness a greater level of content integration at the level of the *adhyāya* than at the level of the *prakaraṇa*.[136] It is clear, then, that of the two, the subdivisional logic of the *adhyāya*s follows some principal or principals external to the logic of the text's composition.

Thus, the demonstrably more intimate connection to material of the text demonstrated by the *prakaraṇa*s over against the traces of subdivisional logic external to the composition seen in the *adhyāya*s supports the anteriority of the former. Although such a conclusion does not speak to the ultimate origins of the text, the failure of the *adhyāya*s to integrate their contents to a greater degree than their constituent *prakaraṇa*s demonstrates that the convention of composing and/or identifying segments of text as *prakaraṇa*s predates the convention of composing and/or identifying segments of texts as

[136] Although the relevance of both *prakaraṇa* and *adhyāya* to a given topic is, in a few situations, unclear (§4.3). What is more, I am certainly <u>not</u> implying by this that the *adhyāya*s are, in every case, later than the material that they subdivide.

*adhyāya*s. If the *adhyāya*s were the earlier of the two, one would have to imagine that the text was not simply resegmented into *prakaraṇa*s, but entirely recomposed in *prakaraṇa*s even as the strongly articulated *adhyāya* boundaries (marked both by end verse and colophon) were left in the text. Moreover, it is shown below that the *prakaraṇa*s and *adhyāya*s disagree on the conclusion of certain topical boundaries (§3.4). This would be impossible if the strongly marked *adhyāya*s preexisted a putative *prakaraṇa* redaction.

While we can confidently state that the text was composed in *prakaraṇa*s before it was resegmented into *adhyāya*s, we cannot concomitantly claim that in every case a given *adhyāya* is younger than its constituent *prakaraṇa*(s). The redivision of the text into *adhyāya*s also involved the interpolation of significant segments of text that continued the pattern of dual segmentation. So, even though a few *prakaraṇa*s will be found to date to the time of the *adhyāya* redaction, it is nevertheless possible safely to posit that in the compositional history of the *Arthaśāstra* a "*prakaraṇa*-text" underwent an "*adhyāya* redaction."[137]

The foregoing should not imply that the re-division of the *Arthaśāstra* into *adhyāya*s, in comparison with that of the *Ṛgveda*, was a mechanical or automatic process. The *adhyāya*s are not so mathematically regular in their division of the *Arthaśāstra* that we can, through uncovering some kind of clear subdivisional logic, lay bare the pattern and extent of the *adhyāya* redaction. The passage cited above illustrates this point well: the connection between the two *prakaraṇa*s found in the issuance and inspection of the

[137] The use of scare quotes is meant to indicate the titular rather than attributional character of these phrases. We can surmise that the division of the text into "*adhyāya*s" post-dates the comprehension of the text as composed in "*prakaraṇa*s." What we do not yet know is the extent of the earlier text, whether it was thought of as composed of *prakaraṇa*s, and, even then, whether "*prakaraṇa*s" has always refered to discrete segments of text as opposed to relatively more amorphous "subjects." Moreover, given the obvious convention of composing in *prakaraṇa*s and dividing in *adhyāya*s, there is good reason to suspect that any later additions to the text would have reproduced this program anachronistically. See §4.3.

passport demonstrates that, while the division of the *Arthaśāstra* into *adhyāya*s was governed by a desire to present segments of relatively more uniform length, the division was also carried out with regard for the content being redivided. In short, the *adhyāya* redaction, although clearly later, also bears important relationships with the content of the text, and these relationships may help to reveal the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction itself.[138]

3.3 The Plan of the *Adhyāya* Redaction

That the *Arthaśāstra* underwent some kind of redaction into *adhyāya*s is clear: the best scholarship on the point has long supported this theory.[139] It is necessary now to see if we can refine our understanding of this redaction. By looking more closely at the *adhyāya*s as a group, we can demonstrate that this redaction did not occur in a haphazard or gradual fashion, but was carried out according to a single plan that recast the entire treatise into its current form, more or less. If we can demonstrate that the present *adhyāya* boundaries emerged from a single, planned effort, then details about the entire *adhyāya* redaction can be adduced from individual *adhyāya*s.

The first indication that all of the *adhyāya*s in the extant *Arthaśāstra* found their present form during a single *adhyāya* redaction comes from the fact that in redividing the entire text they number exactly 150, as recognized in a passage near the beginning of the text:[140]

KAŚ 1.1.18 śāstrasamuddeśaḥ pañcadaśādhikaraṇāni sāśīti prakaraṇaśataṃ sapañcāśad adhyāyaśataṃ ṣaṭ ślokasahasrāṇīti

---

[138] See, especially, §3.5, 4.2, 5.4 and 6.3, as well as Chapter 7

[139] See Chapter 2.

[140] Although the provenance of this passage has been called into question (Scharfe 1993, 28; Kangle 1965, 20–21) it accurately reflects the number of *adhikaraṇa*s, *prakaraṇa*s and *adhyāya*s that are generated by the colophons of the text.

> Contents of the *śāstra*: 15 *adhikaraṇa*s, 180 *prakaraṇa*s, 150 *adhyāya*s, 6000 *śloka*s.

What makes the number 150 significant is that it is unlikely to be accidental, particularly when one considers how these 150 *adhyāya*s are marked within the text by exactly 150 colophons. Moreover, these 150 colophons record, with varying degrees of precision, exactly the 180 *prakaraṇa*s attested in the passage above. Hence, the subdivision of the text into exactly 150 *adhyāya*s and 180 *prakaraṇa*s is carried out through a distributed network of colophons and is not merely resident in an external list ascribing these divisions from outside the text. These numbers, therefore, testify to the fact that the present dispersal of *adhyāya*s resulted from a planned editorial intervention.

Reinforcement of this conclusion comes from a few key features of the *adhyāya* segmentation. Importantly, we find that the *adhyāya* text is slightly larger than the *prakaraṇa*-text:[141] the first *adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.1) is *not* included in the *prakaraṇa*-text, which begins only at the second *adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.2). Because the first *adhyāya* is not part of the *prakaraṇa*-text, we actually have 180 *prakaraṇa*s divided over 149 *adhyāya*s, with the non-*prakaraṇa* material in KAŚ 1.1 comprising the 150th *adhyāya*. When we consider that the numbers 150 and 180 are certainly intentional, we recognize that the *adhyāya* redactor must have purposely apportioned the text into 180 *prakaraṇa*s over exactly 149 *adhyāya*s[142] so that the inclusion of the apocryphal non-*prakaraṇa* material in KAŚ 1.1 could represent the 150th *adhyāya*.

---

[141] As discussed below at §3.4.2

[142] It is to the *adhyāya* redactor that the existence of exactly 180 *prakaraṇa*s should be attributed, not to the theoretical composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text. What remains significant, however, is that, regardless of the number of *prakaraṇa*s ultimately adduced by the *adhyāya* redactor, the beginning of the *prakaraṇa* text was clearly established, and the non-*prakaraṇa* material falling before it necessitated a novel *adhyāya*. Hence, the division of the "complete" *prakaraṇa* text (*i.e.*, "complete" in 180 *prakaraṇa*s), is carried out by the "complete" *adhyāya* text less one *adhyāya*. Hence, the distinction between the length of the two texts reveals the careful apportioning of the text by the *adhyāya* redactor.

One can look also in this regard at the presence of the two "framing" passages discussed above: KAŚ 1.1 and KAŚ 15.1. These are the 1st and 150th *adhyāya*s. They work in tandem to "close" the text to substantial future emendation by explicitly opening (KAŚ 1.1.1) and concluding (KAŚ 15.1.71–73) the work. If these can be demonstrated to share an origin, they will provide good evidence that the *adhyāya* redaction was carried out in a single compositional moment.

The best evidence in this regard comes from the unique use of shared tropes in the opening and closing passages of each of these framing *adhyāya*s:

KAŚ 1.1.1 pṛthivyā lābhe pālane ca yāvanty arthaśāstrāṇi pūrvācāryaiḥ
prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni saṃhṛtyaikam idam arthaśāstram kṛtam

This single *arthaśāstra* was composed by bringing together most of *arthaśāstra*s that have been composed by previous teachers for the purpose of acquiring and protecting the world.

KAŚ 1.1.19 sukhagrahaṇavijñeyaṃ tattvārthapadaniścitam
kauṭilyena kṛtaṃ śāstraṃ vimuktagranthavistaram

Easy to grasp and understand, harmonious between reality, meaning, and word, this *śāstra* was composed by Kauṭilya, free of excess verbiage.

KAŚ 15.1.1–2 manuṣyāṇāṃ vṛttir arthaḥ manuṣyavatī bhūmir ity arthaḥ
tasyāḥ pṛthivyā lābhapālanopāyaḥ śāstram arthaśāstram iti

Artha is the livelihood of mortals, which is to say that the earth itself, possessed of mortals, is *artha*;
The *śāstra* that is the strategy for acquiring and protecting this earth is *arthaśāstra*.

KAŚ 15.1.71–73 evam śāstram idaṃ yuktam etābhis tantrayuktibhiḥ
avāptau pālane coktam lokasyāsya parasya ca
dharmam arthaṃ ca kāmaṃ ca pravartayati pāti ca
adharmānarthavidveśān idam śāstraṃ nihanti ca
yena śāstraṃ ca śastraṃ ca nandarājagatā ca bhūḥ
amarṣeṇoddhṛtāny āsu tena śāstram idaṃ kṛtam

> Thus this *śāstra*, expounded with these *tantrayukti*s, has been composed for the acquisition and protection of this world and the next.
> This *śāstra* brings into being and preserves *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma* and destroys *adharma*, *anartha* and hatred.
> This *śāstra* has been composed by him [*i.e.*, Kauṭilya], who in resentment, quickly regenerated the science and the weapon and the earth that was under the control of the Nanda kings.

These passages are the only ones in the text[143] to use the archetypal idioms *pṛthivyā lābhapālana* ("the acquisition and protection of the earth") and [*idaṃ*] *śāstraṃ kṛtam* ("[this] *śāstra* was composed").[144] These passages, written in the same unique idiom, are furthermore clearly aware of their inaugural and conclusive functions, and do so using overt characterizations of the text's form and purpose that can be found only here.[145] Finally, each pair frames an internal technical discourse, the table of contents (KAŚ 1.1.3–17) and the *tantrayukti*s (KAŚ 15.1.3–70), respectively. We see, therefore, in these *adhyāya*s a concurrence in language, function, and form. In this way, these framing elements collectively bear witness to the plan according to which the *adhyāya* redaction appears to have been carried out.

Renou states of this arrangement that

> [t]his frame confirms the suspicion that the Kauṭilīya was composed as a single coherent work, closed to all additions, well removed all in all from the ancient works that

---

[143] Despite the unique manner in which it distills the essence of *arthaśāstra*, the archetypal phrase *pṛthivyā lābhapālana* ("the acquisition and protection of the world") occurs only here, while the term *pṛthivī* is itself restricted to end verses and two other *adhyāya*s (KAŚ 9.1 and 13.4). The archetypal formula [*idaṃ*] *śāstram kṛtam*, which runs through these verses and provides the context for the only direct attributions of the text to Kauṭilya himself, also occurs only here (with echoes at KAŚ 1.6.3 and 2.10.63).

[144] KAŚ 1.1.1: *pṛthivyā lābhe pālane ca*; KAŚ 15.1.1: *pṛthivyā lābhapālana-*; KAŚ 1.1.1 *idaṃ śāstraṃ kṛtam*/KAŚ 1.1.19 *kauṭilyena kṛtaṃ śāstram*; KAŚ 15.1.1 *śāstram arthaśāstram iti*; KAŚ 15.1.71 *śāstram idaṃ yuktam*; KAŚ 15.1.72 *idaṃ śāstram*; KAŚ *yena śāstram…tena śāstram idaṃ kṛtam*

[145] With a related example, in which a single *adhyāya* is ascribed to Kauṭilya in an end verse at KAŚ 2.10.63, which also linked to the *adhyāya* redaction (see §6.1).

> generally possess neither introduction nor conclusion and appear to have been composed in successive layers. In brief, they confirm the presence of an author.[146]

Indeed, the organization of the *Arthaśāstra* into 150 *adhyāya*s gives us every reason to expect that it resulted from a single coherent plan. But, we can recognize, in light of the previous argument, that this plan should be attributed not to the composer of the *prakaraṇa*s, but the creator of the present division into *adhyāya*s.[147]

The above discussion has implicated the first and last *adhyāya*s (KAŚ 1.1 and 15.1) in the *adhyāya* redaction. This is the first indication that some additional material found its way into the text during the *adhyāya* redaction. I look now briefly at the anatomy of these two sections and their interrelationship in order to understand more about the kind of material that can be attributed to the *adhyāya* redactor.

The first *adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.1), representing the front matter of the text, consists of the first 19 passages of the extant *Arthaśāstra* (KAŚ 1.1.1–19), itself a small but consequential portion of the greater text. The greater part of this passage is taken up by the long *prakaraṇa* list (KAŚ 1.1.3–17), which relates that the text starts at the beginning

---

[146] "Cet encadrement atteste le souci qu'a eu Kau. de composer une oeuvre cohérente, fermée à tous addenda, bien à éloignée en somme des Traités anciens qui ne possédaient en général ni introduction ni conclusion et semblaient s'être formés par voie de couches successives. Bref, ils confirment la présence d'un auteur" (1961, 184).

[147] That the present shape of the *adhyāya* redaction is the result of a single coherent plan is clear. The only question remaining is whether that plan can also be linked to the individual who first effected the *adhyāya* division or whether the plan is the perfection of an earlier division of *adhyāya*s. The construction of alternate compositional routes through which the present plan might have been achieved in steps requires examination of complex evidence for the purpose of an unlikely hypothesis. And, yet, one thing that all such alternatives bear in common is that none of them are able to demonstrate or defend any potential changes to the extant *adhyāya* boundaries in the text. Hence, we can deduce that the present *adhyāya* boundaries are those created by the initial *adhyāya* redactor. The indications of a single plan evident in the present dispersal of *adhyāya*s, including the likelihood of a common origin for key passages in the first and last *adhyāya*s, recommend without reservation that the present shape of the *adhyāya* redaction is that effected during the initial re-division of the text into *adhyāya*s. That the first and final *adhyāya*s were part of the *adhyāya* redaction is endorsed by Trautmann (1971, 75).

of the *following adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.2).[148] Hence, the majority of the disputed segment is made up of a list that testifies to its own exclusion (and the exclusion of its *adhyāya*) from the text as divided into 180 *prakaraṇa*s. The divergence between the two segmentary systems can be illustrated in the graphic representation of the opening of the *Arthaśāstra*:

	prakaraṇa 1			2	3		4	5	6	7	8	9	10
adhyāya 1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.10	1.11	1.12	1.13	1.14

Fig. 4: The Disagreement over KAŚ 1.1

That the *adhyāya*-text encompasses the entire *prakaraṇa*-text as well as material "external" to the *prakaraṇa*-text lends even more support to the notion that the *adhyāya* redaction comprehended and subsumed the pre-existing *prakaraṇa*-text.

Upon examination we see that KAŚ 1.1 is constituted mainly of the long *prakaraṇa* list at KAŚ 1.1.3–17, which accounts for 15 of the 19 passages in KAŚ 1.1. An analysis of the first *adhyāya* reveals that it has been crafted simply by adding four passages (KAŚ 1.1.1–2, 18–19) to the *prakaraṇa* list. Our analysis of KAŚ 1.1.1 and 1.1.19 above demonstrates features linking them directly to the plan of the *adhyāya* redaction.

[148] That the *prakaraṇa*-text begins here is incontrovertible, as there is no way to integrate the contents of the first *adhyāya* under the rubric *vidyāsamuddeśaḥ*. Even the colophons agree on this point by omitting any proper *prakaraṇa* name for the first *adhyāya*. In ms. M_4 the *adhyāya* is called [*tantrasamuddeśaḥ*] as a sort of 181st *prakaraṇa*, which is not, however, reflected in the table of contents. KAŚ 1.2.1 also seems to be recognized as the beginning of the text proper in the manuscripts, the better of which introduce KAŚ 1.2.1 with the term *rājavṛttiḥ*, meaning "The Conduct of the King." This is either a reference to the first *adhikaraṇa*, *vinayādhikārikam*, "On the Subject of [the King's] Training" or to the entire text, which can be seen, being a *śāstra* on statecraft generally, as comprising the basic teaching for a king. Whether *rājavṛttiḥ* reflects an older marker or became necessary when the addition of the material at KAŚ 1.1.1–19 displaced 1.2.1 from the actual beginning of the text, the manuscripts appear to recognize KAŚ 1.2.1 as the beginning of the text proper.

The other two passages in the *adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.1.2, 18) are wholly dependent on the *prakaraṇa* list.[149]

The *prakaraṇa* list, in its original form, must post-date some version of the *prakaraṇa*-text, which it takes as its subject. The manner of the framing of the *prakaraṇa* list in this *adhyāya* by material dateable to the *adhyāya* redaction, the failure of the list to mention the *adhyāya* segments in the text, and its failure to include the material of the first *adhyāya* in the *prakaraṇa*-text tell us that the *prakaraṇa* list preexisted the *adhyāya* redaction. The origin of this segment, then, is relatively clear: an apocryphal *prakaraṇa* list had been appended to the beginning of the text (by whom we do not yet know). During the *adhyāya* redaction, this material was formally integrated into the text by constructing out of it a new *adhyāya*, accomplished by the addition of only a few passages (including, crucially, an end verse).

The final *adhyāya* and back matter of the text (KAŚ 15.1) has also been linked above to the *adhyāya* redaction by virtue of the role it plays as the 150th and concluding *adhyāya*. One finds, moreover, that these two *adhyāya*s share a parallel structure. Comparing the structure of KAŚ 15.1 to that of 1.1 (discussed above), one recognizes that the final *adhyāya* (KAŚ 15.1) is constructed in the same manner as the first *adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.1): a long technical list (the discussion of the 32 *tantrayukti*s, or rhetorical elements, at KAŚ 15.1; the *prakaraṇa* list at KAŚ 1.1) is introduced and concluded by passages that use the same key tropes in both *adhyāya*s.

The difference between these two *adhyāya*s however, is that, unlike the *prakaraṇa* list, which appears to predate the *adhyāya* redaction, the technical discourse framed in KAŚ 15.1, called *tantrayukti*, clearly *depends* on the *adhyāya* redaction. Two

[149] This is even clear in KAŚ 1.1.18, whose reference to 150 *adhyāya*s is probably spurious (Scharfe 1993, 28).

passages in the discussion of *tantrayukti* (KAŚ 15.1.5 and 15.1.7) directly cite passages from the first *adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.1.1 and 1.1.3, respectively), demonstrating the dependence of the former on the latter.[150] What is more, the *tantrayukti* section cites many other passages in the text that we will come to associate with the *adhyāya* redaction.[151]

We have strong indication, then, from the above analysis that significant elements of the framing chapters, KAŚ 1.1–2, 18–19 and all of 15.1, date to the *adhyāya* redaction. This is significant, as the ability to assign certain elements of the text to the *adhyāya* redaction begins to give us a substantive sense of the character of that transformation. A further implication of this lies in our recognition that the *adhyāya* redactor added (and likely composed) the end verses of these segments himself. This establishes, at least, the fact that the *adhyāya* composer did add *some* of the *adhyāya* end verses during the *adhyāya* redaction. This is taken up in more detail in Chapter 5.

3.4 THE MISCONSTRUAL OF *PRAKARAṆA* BOUNDARIES

It has been shown above that an original *prakaraṇa*-text of unknown extent was transformed by an *adhyāya* redaction of unknown extent. It has also been shown that the *adhyāya* segments in the extant *Arthaśāstra* were produced according to a single plan that was carried out at one time. It is not possible to identify clear examples in which the

---

[150] Because of the internal consistency with which the *tantrayukti*s, "methods used in the treatise," are treated, these two citations, which illustrate the first two and two of the most elementary *tantrayukti*s, must be integral to the passage. We can say, at a minimum, that all of KAŚ 15.1.3–70 is aware of KAŚ 1.1.1 and 1.1.3.

[151] It remains possible that the material in the final *adhyāya* predated the *adhyāya* redaction if the following conditions are true: a) KAŚ 1.1.1 had been added to the *prakaraṇa* list before the *adhyāya* redaction; b) all of the passages cited by the discussion of the *tantrayukti*s belonged to the *prakaraṇa*-text; and, c) the composer of the *tantrayukti* section felt that the apocryphal material before the *prakaraṇa*-text was part of the greater *Arthaśāstra*. The first is difficult to establish, while the last is very unlikely. But, it is the second that prevents this theory from finding purchase: the *tantrayukti*s cite the *adhyāya* end verse at KAŚ 1.14.16 and Kauṭilya dialogues at KAŚ 1.7.7; 1.7.3; 1.15.47–50; 7.5.12; 8.1.9; 10.6.1; 8.1.7; 8.1.17–18; and 1.17.33, all of which a generally linked to the *adhyāya* redaction (§5.8; 6.5).

placement of the *adhyāya* colophons indicates that the *adhyāya* redactor has misconstrued (intentionally or otherwise) the transition between *prakaraṇa*s. These misconstruals are of such a nature that they could not have been produced by the composer of the underlying prose, who would have been aware of the change in topics. Because we know that the *adhyāya*s were created in a single editorial moment, these misconstruals consign the *adhyāya* redaction to a second hand.

Even though *prakaraṇa* boundaries are sometimes not formally marked, the division between different *prakaraṇa*s is clearly articulated in many cases (including those discussed here). Thus, one is typically able to identify the commencement of a new *prakaraṇa* simply by reading the text. The *prakaraṇa* boundaries that emerge are something of which the composer of these *prakaraṇa*s would have been aware. It is, therefore, extremely significant that *adhyāya* colophons appear in several places to misconstrue a *prakaraṇa* boundary that they are attempting to mark.

Prakaraṇa 1: Vidyāsamuddeśaḥ

The first *prakaraṇa* of the text, *vidyāsamuddeśaḥ*, appears to conclude not at KAŚ 1.4.15 (or with the end verse at 1.4.16) as the *adhyāya* colophon indicates, but at KAŚ 1.5.1. For, KAŚ 1.5.1 belongs properly to the topic of *vidyāsamuddeśaḥ*, "Enumeration of the Sciences," and not at all to the next *prakaraṇa*, *vṛddhasaṃyogaḥ*, "Association with Elders." The passage under dispute reads:

KAŚ 1.5.1 tasmād daṇḍamulās tisro vidyāḥ

Therefore, the three sciences have their root in [the fourth science], the Staff.

The discussion of "Association with Elders," which is a euphemism for education (*vinaya*), clearly picks up at KAŚ 1.5.2:

KAŚ 1.5.2 vinayamūlo daṇḍaḥ prāṇabhṛtāṃ yogakṣemāvahaḥ

The Staff, rooted in training, conveys welfare to living creatures.

Absent the *adhyāya* colophon (and end verse), the division between the first and second *prakaraṇa*s clearly falls between KAŚ 1.5.1 and 1.5.2.

Moreover, KAŚ 1.5.1 represents the conclusion of a discussion begun earlier in the first *prakaraṇa* at KAŚ 1.4.3:

KAŚ 1.4.3a ānvīkṣikītrayīvārttānāṃ yogakṣemasādhano daṇḍaḥ tasya nītir daṇḍanītiḥ

The Staff ensures the welfare of [the three sciences of] Philosophy, the Veda, and Economics; its proper use (*nīti*) constitutes Political Science (*daṇḍanīti*),

The phrase "therefore, the three sciences have their root in the Staff" forms the logical conclusion to this statement. Thus, KAŚ 1.5.1 is doubly connected to the previous *prakaraṇa*.[152]

Thus, whoever generated the *adhyāya* colophon (in concert with the *adhyāya* end verse) before KAŚ 1.5.1 misconstrued, purposefully or accidentally, the transitional point between the *prakaraṇa*s. Regardless of motive, it is unlikely that the composer of those *prakaraṇa*s would not have placed a colophon there.[153]

Prakaraṇa 4: Amātyotpattiḥ

The colophon at the end of KAŚ 1.8 purports to conclude the *prakaraṇa* called *amātyotpattiḥ*, "The Appointment of Ministers." In fact, this *prakaraṇa* ends some 8

[152] It is triply connected if we consider also the fact that no *prakaraṇa* that begins an *adhyāya* does so with connective syntax (see §4.2).

[153] We note also how the placement of the *adhyāya* colophon in concert with the *adhyāya* end verse diminishes the conclusion of the first *adhyāya*, namely that all of the other sciences depend on the Staff. This otherwise forceful conclusion is almost an afterthought by virtue of being relegated to the introduction of the next *adhyāya*. Perhaps this misconstrual was not accidental.

sentences later, after KAŚ 1.9.8 with the minor colophon *iti amātyakarma* ("Here ends the work [of appointing] ministers").[154] It is expliciatly indicated (at KAŚ 1.9.1 and 1.9.8) that the truncated passage at KAŚ 1.9.1–8 is discussing ministers (*amātya*s) and their work and has nothing at all to do with the subsequent *prakaraṇa mantripurohitotpattiḥ*, "The Appointment of the Councilors and Chaplain/of the Prime Minister." There can be no doubt, therefore, that the *prakaraṇa amātyotpattiḥ* ends at KAŚ 1.9.8 and not at 1.8.29 as indicated by the *adhyāya* colophon.[155]

Prakaraṇa 99: Ṣāḍguṇyasamuddeśaḥ

The final example comes in the 99th *prakaraṇa*, *kṣayasthānavṛddhiniścayaḥ* ("Deciding [among the Six Measures of Foreign Policy] in Decline, Stability, and Growth"). This *prakaraṇa* begins at KAŚ 7.1.20, but does not appear to conclude until *after* the *adhyāya* colophon, at 7.2.5. As with the above example, the truncated passage at KAŚ 7.2.1–5 explicitly continues the topic of the 99th *prakaraṇa*:

---

[154] This *adhyāya* colophon identifies KAŚ 1.9 as dealing with *mantripurohitotpattiḥ* ("Appointment of the Councillors and Chaplain [*or* Prime-Minister]"). This creates a certain problem because, although the appointment of the *purohita* (Chaplain) is clearly discussed at KAŚ 1.9.9–10, we find no previous discussion on the appointment of councilors (*mantrin*). Thus, I would argue that the *adhyāya* redactor assumed that the discussion at KAŚ 1.9.1–8 on the appointment of ministers (*amātya*) must have been what was refered to in the *prakaraṇa* title as *mantrin* (councilors). And, it will be argued, adding a new section in KAŚ 1.8 to account for the (now missing) discussion of the fourth *prakaraṇa*, *amātyopatti* ("The Appointment of Ministers"). In other words, the *adhyāya* redactor appears to have converted the fourth *prakaraṇa* into the first half of the fifth *prakaraṇa* and generated an entirely new fourth *prakaraṇa* to fill the gap. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. It should be noted that the *amātya*s and *mantrin*s are two entirely distinct types of official in the *Arthaśāstra*.

[155] The confusion on display here, as between *mantrin*s and *amātya*s dogs the first *adhikaraṇa* of the text generally. And, I think it is because the text originally spoke not of an official called the *purohita* ("Chaplain"), but of an official called the *mantripurohita* ("Councilor-Chaplain," *i.e.*, "prime minister"). For some reason, this title made no sense to the *adhyāya* redactor, who was forced to tweak the text in order to "find" a discussion of the appointment of independent *mantrin*s *in addition to* the appointment of the *purohita*. Needless to say, no such discussion exists. This theory has the advantage of clearing up the infamous confusion between *amātya*s and *mantrin*s that prevails in the current text. It is discussed below in Chapter 7.

KAŚ 7.2.1–5 If there is equal advancement in peace or war, he should resort to peace. For, in war there are losses, expenses, marches away from home, and hindrances. By that is explained staying quiet, as between staying quiet and marching.

As between dual policy and seeking shelter, he should resort to dual policy. For, he who resorts to dual policy, giving prominence to his own undertakings, serves only his own interests, while he who takes shelter serves the interests of the other, not his own.

As is evident here, the discussion of deciding between the Six Measures does not conclude until KAŚ 7.2.5, six passages after the *adhyāya* colophon marking the conclusion of the *prakaraṇa*.[156]

These three cases[157] demonstrate that the *adhyāya* redactor cannot have been the composer of the underlying *prakaraṇa*-text. We note also that it is not only the *adhyāya* colophons that erroneously mark these boundaries: the accompanying *adhyāya* end verses also help to mark them. Hence, we have further evidence that verses marking *adhyāya* boundaries in the extant text were added during the *adhyāya* redaction (and do not predate it).

3.5 CONCLUSION

Although I have presented the evidence for an *adhyāya* redaction serially, each of the areas discussed reinforce one another. Hence, the *adhyāya*s demonstrate a logic somewhat "external" to the discussion of topics in the text. The *adhyāya*s also invariably fail to integrate their material beyond the semantic integration found in the *prakaraṇa*s. Importantly, the *adhyāya* text appears to have been produced at one time according to a

---

[156] It may well be that the dismemberment of *prakaraṇa* 99 was intentional and designed to generate a "stub" from which to hang the following *prakaraṇa*, *saṃśrayavṛttiḥ* ("Conduct When Seeking Shelter"). If this had been the wish of the composer, however, he could have easily penned a brief transitional introduction to the latter.

[157] That so few cases of this are found should not trouble us: *prakaraṇa* boundaries are typically easy to identify, and the *adhyāya* redactor must certainly have been reading the text very closely. We should also remember that these misconstruals may not be oversights, but purposeful inflections of the text.

single plan, actually comprehends the slightly smaller *prakaraṇa* text. Finally, the *adhyāya* boundaries in a few cases erroneously mark the *prakaraṇa* boundaries. From this it is most likely that the occurrence of an *adhyāya* redaction carried out by a second hand.

To conclude this analysis of redundant segmentation in the *Arthaśāstra*, I would like to venture a preliminary thesis on the composition of the text based on the evidence adduced above.

We have, on the eve of the *adhyāya* redaction, a text composed in *prakaraṇa*s, which I have been referring to as the "*prakaraṇa*-text." The extent, origin, and compositional history of this text is as yet unknown, and we cannot be certain whether it was properly divided into segments called *prakaraṇa*s or more loosely composed of a series of topics, sometimes lacking discrete boundaries. Some time after the completion of the earliest *prakaraṇa*-text, a list of "topics" (*prakaraṇa*s) was appended to the beginning. Aside from this, it is not yet clear where the *prakaraṇa* list fits into the composition of the *prakaraṇa*-text.

Eventually, the transmission of the *Arthaśāstra* into a didactic context exerted editorial pressure upon it, and it was reapportioned by someone other than its original composer(s) into "lessons" (*adhyāya*s) of a more standardized length. It was at this time that the *prakaraṇa* list was formally integrated "within" the text by constructing out of it the first of 150 *adhyāya*s (KAŚ 1.1). Also at this time, the *adhyāya* colophons were placed in the text (and at least some *adhyāya* end verses) and the final *adhyāya* (KAŚ 15.1) was added. While it is clear that at least *some* new material was added to the text at this time, we do not yet know the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction. I will begin to consider this question in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: *Adhyāya* Redaction I – *Adhyāya* Segments

I have just argued that the *Arthaśāstra* did indeed undergo an *adhyāya* redaction and that it occurred at one time according to a coherent plan and was carried out by an individual other than the composer(s) of the *prakaraṇa*-text. I have also argued that at least two *adhyāya*s, KAŚ 1.1 and 15.1, the first and last, were added at that time. It remains now to determine the total extent of that *adhyāya* redaction. That task is undertaken in the present chapter by examining the manner in which the *adhyāya* colophons divide the text. This analysis will demonstrate that the *adhyāya* redaction transformed the underlying text to a much greater extent than simply reapportioning its material. Evidence will be presented here to demonstrate that it also involved the interpolation of significant tracts of text.

4.1 Evidence of More Extensive *Adhyāya* Redaction

We have reason to suspect, based on the additions of KAŚ 1.1 and 15.1, that the *adhyāya* redactor may have added substantial segments to the text. One way to use the *adhyāya* segments to search for other potential interpolations is to try to identify cases in which segments of text betray some kind of awareness of the *adhyāya* redaction. The term "*adhyāya*" occurs only once in the text, in the disputed passage KAŚ 1.1.18 found within the front matter and dated above to the *adhyāya* redaction itself. Moreover, since the *adhyāya*s aren't given independent names in either the main text or the colophons, but are identified in the colophons only by number and their constituent *prakaraṇa*s, one doesn't find direct references to them in the text. As such, we must resort to different methods.

The opportunity to look for such indications comes in *adhyāya*s that comprehend parts of more than one *prakaraṇa*. In the same way that these *adhyāya*s demonstrate the

lack of topical integration within *adhyāya*s generally (§1.3.4; 3.2), so do such passages provide an opportunity to determine whether their constituent *prakaraṇa*s might be aware of their inclusion in a greater textual segment, *i.e.*, in an *adhyāya*.

The *adhyāya*s invariably conclude, as mentioned above (§1.3.4), with at least one end verse and a colophon. Of the two, the colophons formally "create" an *adhyāya*, while the end verses do so in a less formal manner (see Chapter 5). Because it has not yet been demonstrated that the *adhyāya* end verses must all date the *adhyāya* redaction, the present chapter will look at the *adhyāya* segments as generated only by the colophons in order to refine our understanding of the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction.

In all, we find in the *Arthaśāstra* 36 cases wherein an *adhyāya* contains parts of more than one *prakaraṇa*.[158] In all of these cases, as discussed above (§3.2), the *adhyāya* fails to demonstrate greater topical integration than its constituent *prakaraṇa*s. In many of these cases (13 of 36) the *adhyāya* fails utterly to demonstrate any synthesis whatsoever of its constituent *prakaraṇa*s. These passages are found at KAŚ 1.12, 2.34, 3.1, 3.10, 3.14, 7.1, 7.3, 7.6, 7.15, 8.5, 10.4, 10.5, and 13.4.

In a number of these *adhyāya*s (10 of 36), however, *non-initial prakaraṇa*s, that is, the second or third *prakaraṇa*s of an *adhyāya*, express a minor but significant syntactic connection (using such connective syntax as *tu*, *ca, evam, teṣām*, etc.) to a previous *prakaraṇa* in the same *adhyāya*. An example of this comes in KAŚ 3.20, which comprehends the *prakaraṇa*s *dyūtādhyakṣaḥ* (74) and *prakīrṇakam* (75):

KAŚ 3.20.1–2 dyūtādhyakṣo dyūtam ekamukham kārayet

The Director of Gambling (*dyūtādhakṣa*) should cause gambling to be carried out in one place

[158] This is if we do not include the three misconstrued boundaries discussed above at §3.5.

KAŚ 3.20.14 prakīrṇakaṃ tu yācitakāvakrītakāhitakanikṣepakāṇāṃ…

> As to miscellaneous, however—for one not returning at the proper place and time a thing borrowed, hired, pledged, or entrusted…

Here, the initial *prakaraṇa* opens with a syntactically independent sentence—no element depends directly on any foregoing passage—while the latter *prakaraṇa* possesses an enclitic *tu* ("but"), indicating the presence of and dependence upon some preceding passage.

A yet finer illustration of this comes in KAŚ 2.33, which comprehends the *prakaraṇa*s *rathādhyakṣaḥ* ("Director of Chariots"; 49), *pattyadhyakṣaḥ* ("Director of Foot Soldiers"; 50), and *senāpatipracāraḥ* ("Duties of the Army Commander"; 51):

KAŚ 2.34.1–11 The Director of Chariots is explained with reference to the Director of Horses (*aśvādhyakṣeṇa rathādhyakṣo vyākhyātaḥ*). He should establish factories for chariots. One with ten *puruṣa*s and twelve interior is a chariot. Less than that by one interior space up to six interior spaces; thus, there are seven chariots. He should cause to be made chariots: temple chariot, festive chariot, war chariot, travelling carriage, chariot for marching against an enemy's city, and chariot for training. He should be conversant with arrangement of bows, striking weapons, armor and accoutrements, and the employment of charioteers, chariot attendants, and chariot horses in various work, also food and wages till the conclusion of the work of servants hired and not hired, giving practice to and protecting them, as well as making gifts and showing honor to them.

> By this is explained the Director of Foot Soldiers (*etena pattyadhyakṣo vyākhyātaḥ*). He should be conversant with the strength or weakness of hereditary, hired, banded, allied, alien, and forest troops, with military operations in water or on high ground, with open or tactical fighting, in trenches or in the open, by day or by night, and with the employment or absence of employment in work.
>
> In the same way, the Head of the Army (*tad eva senāpatiḥ*), trained in the science of all fights and weapons, renowned for riding on elephants, horses, or in chariots, should be conversant with the direction of the work carried out by the four-fold troops. He should look out for suitable ground for one's side, season for fighting, arraying a force against, breaking unbroken ranks, re-forming broken ranks, breaking compact ranks, destroying broken ranks, destroying the fort and the season for an expedition.

Being devoted to the training of the troops, he should arrange signals for the arrays by means of musical instruments, banners, and flags, when halting, marching, or attacking.

In this *adhyāya*, we see a logical connection in the opening words of the initial *prakaraṇa*: *aśvādhyakṣeṇa rathādhyakṣo vyākhyātaḥ*, "The Director of Chariots is explained with reference to the Director of Horses." The difference between this and discrete syntactic connection in the following *prakaraṇa*s is illustrated by the beginning of the second *prakaraṇa*: *etena pattyadhyakṣo vyākhyātaḥ*, "The Director of Footsoldiers is explained with reference to this." Unlike in the first *prakaraṇa*, the term *etena* in the second *prakaraṇa* directly presupposes a foregoing referent that does not need independent identification. We see the same in the third *prakaraṇa*, which is introduced with the phrase *tad eva*, "Just like that." Both the second and third *prakaraṇa*s depend on preceding prose.

These instances are significant because in the *Arthaśāstra* connective syntax, such as that indicated above, only occurs at the beginning of a *prakaraṇa* when that *prakaraṇa* is the second or third in a given *adhyāya*. Put differently, no *prakaraṇa* that begins an *adhyāya* opens with connective syntax.[159] Aside from these 13 examples, *prakaraṇa*s in the *Arthaśāstra* do not, as a rule, begin with connective syntax.

---

[159] This can be cited as a rule in the text, although it is quite typical for such *prakaraṇa*s to begin with an emblematic phrase continued from the previous *prakaraṇa*. Two potential exceptions, at KAŚ 12.2.1 and 12.4.1, come consipicuously in the most confused passages in the entire text, wherein the *prakaraṇa*s are so undefined that it is not possible to locate their boundaries. Thus, in both cases, the apparent beginning of the *prakaraṇa* is purely determined by the location of the *adhyāya* boundary. The apparent exception at 1.5.1 (*tasmād daṇḍamūlās tisro vidyāḥ*) comes rather from the misreading of the *prakaraṇa* boundary by the *adhyāya* redactor (see above §3.5). A second apparent violation of this at 7.14.1 (*sāmavāiykair evam abhiyukto vijigīṣur yas teṣāṃ pradhānastaṃ bruyāt*) is mistranslated by Kangle: "When attacked by the confederates in this manner…" In fact, the preceding discussions do not discuss this. Instead, a parallel passages at 5.6.1 and usages of *evam* at 7.6.1 and 7.7.1 (the only such introductory uses of *evam*) make clear that this should be translated, "The king attacked by confederates, should speak *thus* to he who is foremost among them."

Concomitantly, the *adhyāya*s in which such instances can be found demonstrate at least that minor degree of semantic integration among their constituent *prakaraṇa*s as is indicated by the connective syntax. Examples include:[160] KAŚ 1.18.13 (*aparaddhaṃ tu…*), KAŚ 2.33.7; 2.33.9 (*etena pattyadhyakṣo vyākhyātaḥ*; *tad eva senāpatiḥ…*), KAŚ 2.35.11 (*samāhartṛpradiṣṭāś ca…*), KAŚ 3.16.10; 3.16.29 (*asvāmivikrayas tu…*; *svasvāmisaṃbandhas tu…*), KAŚ 3.20.14 (*prakīrṇakaṃ tu…*), KAŚ 5.6.23 (*evam ekaiśvaryam amātyaḥ kārayed iti kauṭilya*),[161] KAŚ 8.4.49 (*tābhyāṃ pīḍanair yathoktaiś ca pīditaḥ…*),[162] KAŚ 9.7.67 (*tāsām siddhiḥ*), KAŚ 10.6.42 (*teṣāṃ pradaraṃ dṛḍhakena ghātayet…*),[163] and KAŚ 11.1.31 (*saṃghamukhyaputram ātmasambhāvitaṃ vā…*).[164]

Given that no *adhyāya*-initial *prakaraṇa* in the entire *Arthaśāstra* begins with connective syntax, we can only conclude that the connective syntax in these *prakaraṇa*s indicates that they (wholly or in part) are aware that they fall in *adhyāya*s and, therefore, must be contemporaneous with or post-date the *adhyāya* redaction.[165] But, rather than

---

[160] We could add to these KAŚ 9.2, which demonstrates clear connective syntax, but it also shows underlying structure and, as such, is discussed below at §4.3.

[161] The boundary here is quite indistinct. The second *prakaraṇa* here, *ekaiśvaryam* is introduced in the passage cited above (KAŚ 5.6.23), but the topic itself is set up at KAŚ 5.6.21. Despite this hazy transition, however, the topics are distinct. We note also the presence here of a Kauṭilya dialogue.

[162] In this case, the second of the three *prakaraṇa*s in KAŚ 8.5 is not connected to the first. But, the third connects all of them together with *tābhyām pīdanāir yathoktaiś ca pīditaḥ…* ("Afflicted by these two [hindrances, in *prakaraṇa* 131] and the afflictions [described in *prakaraṇa* 130]…). Thus, the third *prakaraṇa* (132), must have been written in awareness of its inclusion in an *adhyāya* with 130 and 131. This does not say anything about the connection between 130 and 131, but does demonstrate an integration at the level of the *adhyāya* (as does the end verse at 8.5.50).

[163] The verses at 10.6.48–51 are really part of neither *prakaraṇa*. It is possible that all four verses are part of the "end verse," or only the final (10.6.51). Either way, the passages fall rather clearly outside of the last *prakaraṇa*.

[164] This *vā* is clearly a connective to the preceding passage and not an option to the first two compounds, which stand in apposition.

[165] It might also indicate, in certain cases, that the *adhyāya* redactor created a new *prakaraṇa* division where one does not seem to have existed in the underlying text, which might, but does not necessarily, imply the introduction of new material.

suggesting that *all* of the *prakaraṇa*s presuppose *adhyāya*s, what these examples tell us, I would argue, is that some substantial passages in the text were added during the time of the *adhyāya* redaction. Significantly, they also tell us that even when the *adhyāya* redactor was composing or integrating new material, he felt compelled to compose it in *prakaraṇa*s. This would further indicate that the *adhyāya* redaction was carried out by a second hand who felt certain limitations on the manner in which he could modify the text. What is not clear is whether it is only the syntactically connected, non-initial *prakaraṇa*s that are interpolations, or entire *adhyāya*s. This will certainly have to be decided on an individual basis and will be undertaken in Chapter 7.

To claim that these examples indicate the work of the *adhyāya* redactor might appear to be denying evidence for the posteriority of the *adhyāya*s. But, the balance of evidence unambiguously supports that the *adhyāya*s are a secondary addition to the text. Moreover, the examples given above betray a stylistic proclivity (the use of connective syntax to begin a *prakaraṇa*) not found elsewhere in the text. I might finally add that these passages are found exclusively in *adhyāya*s falling near or at the end of their respective *adhikaraṇa*s, conforming to the frequently noted pattern which commonly finds interpolated passages at the end of their respective segments.[166] Far from being a loose pattern, this practice is confined to the final *adhyāya*s of a given *adhikaraṇa*.

The above analysis strongly suggests that these examples mark loci where additions were made to the text during the *adhyāya* redaction. It will be demonstrated

[166] The first *adhikaraṇa*, comprising 21 *adhyāya*s, shows *prakaraṇa*-initial connective syntax in KAŚ 1.18, while the second (comprising 36 *adhyāya*s) at KAŚ 2.33 and 2.35, the third (comprising 20 *adhyāya*s) at KAŚ 3.16 and 3.20, the fifth (comprising 6 *adhyāya*s) at KAŚ 5.6, the eighth (comprising 5 *adhyāya*s) at KAŚ 8.4, the ninth (comprising 7 *adhyāya*s) at KAŚ 9.7, the tenth (comprising 6 *adhyāya*s) at KAŚ 10.6, and the eleventh (comprising a single *adhyāya*) at KAŚ 11.1.

below that these passages also fit into other patterns within the text linking them to the *adhyāya* redaction.

4.2 A More Fundamental Structure in the Text?

In a few very consequential passages (12 of 36), neither the *prakaraṇa*s nor the *adhyāya*s fit the logic of the relevant passage particularly well. In these cases both *prakaraṇa* and *adhyāya* seem to be superimpositions on an underlying source: KAŚ 7.4,[167] 7.5,[168] 7.8,[169] 9.1, 9.2, 9.3,[170] 10.2,[171] 10.3,[172] 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, and 12.5.[173] This phenomenon is limited entirely to the second half of the text, and 11 of the 12 instances occur in four "runs" of *adhyāya*s: KAŚ 7.4–7.5; 9.1–9.3; 10.2–10.3; 12.2–12.5.

These passages present a special set of conditions, one wherein the fundamental "logic" of a given passage defies both its *prakaraṇa* and *adhyāya* segmentation. This is

---

[167] The *adhyāya* comprehends 4 of the 5 *prakaraṇa*s.

[168] The third *prakaraṇa* shows syntactic connection, but connects not to the previous *prakaraṇa*, but one preceding it in another *adhyāya*.

[169] The *adhyāya* has a well-defined *prakaraṇa* at 7.8.1–4. But 7.8.5–10 seems to go better with preceding *prakaraṇa*s.7.8.11–33 is not necessarily well defined either. Thus, we see poor cohesion prevailing generally, with neither the *prakaraṇa*s nor the *adhyāya*s lending much to its clarity.

[170] These three *adhyāya*s represent a passage with a logic more fundamental than its division into *prakaraṇa*s or *adhyāya*s. See below.

[171] Something is amiss in this section, with the first *prakaraṇa* (10.2.1–16) relatively well-defined, the second (10.2.17) comprising a single long sentence, and the remainder of the *adhyāya* (10.2.18–19) not fitting well with either. It may be construed with the first *prakaraṇa* of the following *adhyāya* (10.3.1–25), but this is not clear, particularly as the opening of sentence of that *prakaraṇa* (KAŚ 10.3.1) has every appearance of beginning a new discussion.

[172] As in KAŚ 10.2, there is no syntactic or semantic cohesion prevailing at the level of the *adhyāya*, but the division into *prakaraṇa* is also unhappy. The first *prakaraṇa* (KAŚ 10.3.1–25) is relatively unified, but the second (10.3.26–47) falls into two seemingly redundant segments (10.3. 27–37 and 10.3.38–47). The third is clear (10.3.48–53), but, as in 10.2, the *adhyāya* concludes with a passage (10.3.54-56) pertinent to none of these three *prakaraṇa*s, nor to the first *prakaraṇa* of the following *adhyāya*. Again, this suggests a more fundamental structure being obscured. We note this occurs, to a lesser extent, at 10.4 also.

[173] The discussion at KAŚ 12.2–4 bears no clear relationship to either the *prakaraṇa* titles nor to the *adhyāya* division.

significant to the present analysis because it does not allow for us to identify the underlying text discretely with the *prakaraṇa* segmentation. Unable to link the text directly to the *prakaraṇa* division, a determination of the chronological relationship between the two segmentary systems becomes much more complex. For, rather than finding and comparing only a *prakaraṇa*-text and an *adhyāya* redaction, we seem in these places to find three elements: the underlying text, the *prakaraṇa*s, and the *adhyāya*s.[174]

Firm conclusions regarding the relationship of these three elements in the relevant passages depends on a thoroughgoing analysis of their contexts, a project reserved for the detailed examination of the *prakaraṇa*-text in Chapter 7. Our present purpose is simply to analyze the segments of text generated by the *adhyāya* colophons in order to elucidate the place of the *adhyāya*s in the compositional history of the text. We must, then, find a way to speak generally about these 12 *adhyāya*s in a way that uncovers the information that we seek.

Among the 12 *adhyāya*s featuring poorly-suited *prakaraṇa*s and *adhyāya*s, we can make a few general claims that pertain to most of them. In 10 of these *adhyāya*s[175] the *prakaraṇa* and *adhikaraṇa* segmentations are unconvincing because the underlying text shows glimpses of a structure that these segments do not recognize. A prime example of this is KAŚ 7.4, which possess five *prakaraṇa*s.[176] There we read:

> KAŚ 7.4.1 Staying quiet (*āsanam*) and marching (*yānam*) in peace (*saṃdhi*) and war (*vigraha*) are now explained.

---

[174] Or, perhaps, the extant confusion has resulted from redactions to the *prakaraṇa*-text so extensive that its relationship to the text has been lost.

[175] KAŚ 7.4–7.5, 7.8, 9.1–9.3, 12.2–12.5.

[176] *vigṛhyāsanam* (103); *saṃdhāyāsanam* (104); *vigṛhyayānam* (105); *saṃdhāyayānam* (106); *saṃbhūyapryāṇam* (107)

Its first passage, KAŚ 7.4.1, introduces the first four *prakaraṇa*s (KAŚ 7.4.2–18): "Staying Quiet after Making War" (*vigṛhyāsanam*; 103), "Staying Quiet after Making Peace" (*saṃdhāyāsanam*; 104), "Marching after Making War" (*vigṛhyayānam*; 105), and "Marching after Making Peace" (*saṃdhāyayānam*; 106). It does not, however, make reference to the fifth *prakaraṇa*, "Marching after Making an Alliance" (*saṃbhūyayānam*; 107).

Hence, the *adhyāya* appears to reveal an underlying structure that departs from both the *prakaraṇa* segments and the *adhyāya* segments. To begin with, the initial passage (KAŚ 7.4.1) introduces the next four *prakaraṇa*s as a single segment, excluding the fifth. Moreover, these four *prakaraṇa*s show a clear internal structure (see §6.4.1). Hence, we have indication of an organizational structure more fundamental than its (secondary) division into *prakaraṇa*s (which do not account for the introductory passage itself) as well as its segmentation into an *adhyāya*, which includes a fifth topic not referred to by the opening sentence. Likely, then, we are looking at the remnant of a more fundamental source that discussed "Staying Quiet and Marching in Peace and War," which was partitioned into four *prakaraṇa*s and to which was added a discussion of alliances as a fifth *prakaraṇa*. Such a model, however, does not tell us if the *prakaraṇa* designations were applied by the *adhyāya* redactor or earlier.[177]

[177] It could argued that the fifth *prakaraṇa* is really an extension of the fourth *prakaraṇa*, *i.e.*, that the discussion of "alliances" in the fifth is a subtopic of the discussion of "making peace" or "signing treaties" in the fourth. This would mean that the *adhyāya* division actually did, in this case, show a greater semantic integration than the *prakaraṇa*s. But, this is belied by the demonstration of a single internal structure uniting the preceding passage (§6.5.1). Moreover, the discussion of marching after making alliances is resumed at KAŚ 7.5.38, after an interruption by two divergent *prakaraṇa*s (108 and 109).

The prevailing conditions in most of the remaining examples[178] are too complex to submit to any brief analysis. But, in one group of *adhyāya*s, KAŚ 9.1–9.3, the underlying structure of the entire 9th *adhikaraṇa* is revealed in the opening passage:

> KAŚ 9.1.1 vijigīṣur ātmanaḥ parasya ca balābalaṃ śaktideśakālayātrākāla-balasamuddhānakālapaścātkopakṣayavyayalābhāpadām jñātvā viśiṣṭabalo yāyāt anyathā 'sīta
>
> After ascertaining the [relative] strength or weakness of powers, place, time, seasons for marching, time for raising armies, revolts in the rear, losses, expenses, gains, and troubles of himself and of the enemy, the Conqueror should march if superior in strength; otherwise, he should stay quiet.

This passage tells us that the king must compare his strength to that of the enemy in 8 areas: 1) power; 2) place; 3) time; 4) seasons for marching; 5) occasions to raise troops; 6) revolts in the rear; 7) losses, expenses, and gains; and, 8) troubles. We find that these 8 topics present the organizational logic of the following passage, which is to say that they show us the plan by which the 9th *adhikaraṇa* was composed. We can compare the organizational logic of KAŚ 9.1.1 with its division into *prakaraṇa*s and *adhyāya*s:

KAŚ 9.1.1	***prakaraṇa***	***adhyāya***
1. Power	*śaktideśakālabalābalajñānam*	**[9.1.2**–16
2. Place		17–21
3. Time		22–24
4. Seasons for Marching	*yātrākālāḥ*	25–**9.1.52]**
5. Occasions to Raise Troops	*balopādānakālāḥ*	**[9.2.1**–12
	saṃnāhaguṇāḥ	13–24
	pratibalakarma	25–**30]**
6. Revolt in the Rear	*paścātkopacintāḥ*	**[9.3.1**-8
	bāhyābhyantaraprakṛtikopapratīkāraḥ	9–9.3.**42]**
7. Loss, Expenses, and Gains	*kṣayavyayalābhaviparimarśaḥ*	**[9.4.1**–**27]**
8. Dangers	*bāhyabhyantarāś cāpadaḥ*	**[9.5.1**–**9.5.32]**
	duṣyaśatrusaṃyuktāḥ	**[9.6.1**–**9.6.73]**
	arthanarthasaṃśayayuktāḥ	**[9.7.1**–66
	tāsām upāyivikalpajāḥ	67–**9.7.84]**

[178] This is certainly the case with KAŚ 7.5, 7.8, 10.2–10.3, 12.2–12.5.

The segmentation into *prakaraṇa*s demonstrates a few irregularities, the most important of these being the aggregation of the first three topics into a single *prakaraṇa*, *śaktideśakālabalābalajñānam*. The reason for doing so is unclear, but it indicates, at any rate, that the *prakaraṇa*s *depend on* the logic of the underlying passage without following it closely enough to suggest that the passage was *composed* in *prakaraṇa*s,[179] particularly since the first sentence, KAŚ 9.1.1, stands outside of any *prakaraṇa*. For, it is in the nature of composition in *prakaraṇa*s (*i.e.*, individual "topics") to disallow statements lending overt structure to tracts of text larger than the *prakaraṇa*: no "topic" in a series of like discussions could rise semantically above its own level.[180]

With the *adhyāya*s we see that they independently follow the logic of the underlying source as well as the organization of the *prakaraṇa*s. So, for example, although the *prakaraṇa*s divide the topic of "Occasions for Raising Troops" into three *prakaraṇa*s (*balopādānakālāḥ*, *saṃnāhaguṇāḥ*, and *pratibalakarma*), the *adhyāya* KAŚ 9.2 reunites them into a single unit. But the division into *prakaraṇa*s is only apparently "beneath" the level of the *adhyāya*: the actual topic of raising troops is concluded in the first *prakaraṇa*, while connective syntax in the second and third *prakaraṇa*s reveals that the articulation of the topic into three *prakaraṇa*s can only have been the work of the *adhyāya* redactor.[181] Confusion between *prakaraṇa* divisions in KAŚ 9.3 likewise renders

---

[179] For, the *prakaraṇa*s archetypally represent the only level of independent discussion in the text, and we should therefore, expect them to follow the divisional logic of KAŚ 9.1.1.

[180] Particularly since the first sentence, KAŚ 9.1.1 stands properly "outside" any of the *prakaraṇa*s.

[181] Which is to say that the composer of the "original" tract completed his discussion in the first *prakaraṇa* of 9.2, therefore the awareness of the subsequent *prakaraṇa*s that they are occuring within a greater segment can only be explained within the context of the *adhyāya* redaction. So, at KAŚ 9.2.12, *pūrvaṃ pūrvaṃ caiṣāṃ śreyaḥ saṃnāhayitum,* "And it is better to equip for war each earlier one among these than each later one"; and, at 9.2.25, *tasmād evaṃ balaḥ paraḥ tasyaitat pratibalam iti balasamuddānaṃ kuryāt* , "Therefore, he should raise troops keeping in mind, "the enemy has these troops; for them these would be counter-troops."

its aggregation of two *prakaraṇa*s according to the original structure problematic (Kangle 1972, 413n.).

What makes the *adhyāya* division clearly posterior to the underlying structure of the ninth *adhikaraṇa*, however, is its adumbration of the final topic, *bāhyābhyantarāś cāpadaḥ*, "Dangers from the Outer Regions and the Interior" into two additional *adhyāya*s, KAŚ 9.6–7, the latter of which (KAŚ 9.7) also demonstrates connective syntax in a non-initial *prakaraṇa*.

Thus, in this case we can see that despite the apparent presence of an underlying structure, the *prakaraṇa*s follow the the logic of KAŚ 9.1.1 more closely than the *adhyāya* segments. Ultimately, however, these apparently more fundamental structures must be accounted for in the theory of the *prakaraṇa*-text.

4.3 Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has demonstrated several important features of the relationship between the *prakaraṇa*s and the *adhyāya*s in the *Arthaśāstra*. First, we found that some *adhyāya*s do display small but significant occasions of connective syntax at the beginning of non-initial *prakaraṇa*s, suggesting that these *prakaraṇa*s (if not the whole *adhyāya*) were composed in awareness of, and therefore contemporaneous with or after, the *adhyāya* redaction. Not only does this result indicate that the *adhyāya* redaction likely involved a substantial enlargement of the text, but it also gives a sense of the pattern according to which such additions may have been made (*i.e.*, largely at the end of *adhikaraṇa*s). Moreover, it suggests that the *adhyāya* redactor felt compelled to compose his own new material in *prakaraṇa*s, a phenomenon that can only be explained if the *adhyāya* redactor felt that the *prakaraṇa* division was sufficiently well established as to require adherence in novel compositions.

Second, the latter half of the *Arthaśāstra* exhibits several passages in which neither the *prakaraṇa* nor *adhyāya* division is particularly well suited to the text. We found that each one of these passages requires a fuller explication than is possible in this chapter, but that where evidence was adducible, it continued to favor the logical posteriority of the *adhyāya*s over against the earlier *prakaraṇa*s, as demonstrated generally in Chapter 3. Moreover, these passages suggest the existence in the latter half of the text of underlying autonomous source texts over which both *prakaraṇa* and *adhyāya* divisions had been superimposed. This stands as an important warning that in parts of the *Arthaśāstra* we may be dealing with a textual history significantly more complex and convoluted than a simple interaction between a "*prakaraṇa*-text" and an "*adhyāya* redaction."

The foregoing analysis cautions us against facile comparisons between *prakaraṇa*-text and *adhyāya* redaction, indicating for at least certain parts of the *Arthaśāstra* demonstrate a much more complex textual history. Although the adducible evidence in this analysis has consistently supported the anteriority of the *prakaraṇa*s and ruled out the possibility that the same individual was also responsible for the *adhyāya* redaction, we remain aware that many of the questions raised here will remain undecided until we can look more closely at the *prakaraṇa*-text in Chapter 7.

Chapter 5: *Adhyāya* Redaction II – End Verses

The foregoing analysis of the *adhyāya* redaction has demonstrated that it was carried out a single time by and individual other than the composer(s) of the *prakaraṇa*-text and suggested that certain substantial tracts of the extant *Arthaśāstra* were composed in awareness of (and possibly as part of) that editorial intervention. I turn now to address one of the most pressing issues that remains to be examined: whether the *adhyāya* end verses were introduced along with the colophons during this redaction or are, as Scharfe has argued, artifacts of the *prakaraṇa*-text itself.[182]

It was noted above that every *adhyāya* concludes with both a colophon and at least one verse (§1.3.4). While this intimate relationship between end verse and colophon does not of itself necessarily establish a common origin, it does arouse a strong suspicion that that the end verses must have been introduced as part of the *adhyāya* redaction.[183] Trautmann has summarized Renou's position as follows:

> Renou, sensible to the implication that if the division into chapters [*adhyāya*s] was a secondary development, the verses terminal to the chapters [*i.e.*, the *adhyāya* end verses] must be regarded "as a foreign corpus adjoined to a received text", found that "ordinarily they are of no use to the argumentation and certain formal indices show that the end of the prose coincides with the end of the reasoning. Nevertheless certain compact groups of verses have their utility in perfecting a doctrine; and, what is more telling, there are several signs indicating that there is a continuity in sense between the prose and the verse." He concluded, "The question cannot be resolved without nuances."[184]

---

[182] As discussed above (§2.3.2), the only way the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text could be responsible for the present *adhyāya* end verses is if he was influenced in their placement (or retention) by another force, such as the subdivisional logic of an early (verse) version of the text. This thesis is refuted below at §5.6.3.

[183] Keith 1941, 452; Trautmann 1969, 75.

[184] Trautmann 1965, 75 interpolating Renou 1961, 185-186.

Renou's observations here provide us with an excellent basis from which to approach the question of the origin of the *adhyāya* end verses. We will look at the two major points made in this passage in turn.

The first point made in the above quotation is that the present *adhyāya* end verses cannot predate the division of the text into *adhyāya*s. Presumably, the reasoning for this is that their punctuation of the prose text along with their generally conclusive character produce a *de facto* secondary division of the text into its present *adhyāya*s (the same that is indicated formally by the colophons in the extent text). Hence, whoever composed (or retained) the end verses was responsible for the *adhyāya* division, and, as we have seen above, this cannot have been the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text.[185] Trautmann reaches a similar conclusion.

The strength of this argument, and I do believe it is a strong one, depends on demonstrating two features of the *adhyāya* end verses: 1) that they are, properly speaking, *end verses* in the sense that they mark boundaries; and 2) that they uniquely fulfill this role in the *Arthaśāstra* (*i.e.*, that there are not other examples of other boundary-marking verses in the *Arthaśāstra* aside from the *adhyāya* end verses). The

[185] Scharfe's theory of a verse-text original provides an ingeneous, if (in my opinion erroneous) workaround to this problem. He claims that the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text, producing that prose text from a verse original, retained certain concluding verses from that original text. These verses implied their own subdivisional logic (represented by the present *adhyāya*s), even though the composer of the prose text worked the material into *prakaraṇa* segments. According to Scharfe the the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text retained these verses for several disparate reasons, but only formally divided the text into *prakaraṇa*s. Hence, a later redactor, recognizing the incipient *adhyāya* division lying latent in the pattern of retained verses, marked them with colophons. Hence, for Scharfe, the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text did and didn't also divide the text into *adhyāya*s. On the face of it, this argument suffers from the same problem as other arguments of unitary authorship: a single author would not compose a text with two subdivisional segmentation schemes. Scharfe is relying on a vaguely invoked sense of non-intentionality to explain the second division of the text into *adhyāya*s. On these merits, this argument must be considered insufficient. Scharfe, however, supports the larger theory by trying to demonstrate passages in the text wherein he says we can see that the prose has been generated from verse originals. If true, this would lend strong support to his otherwise unlikely theory. As it is though, he has misread the evidence of verse-to-prose transformations in the text. This theory is examined in detail below at §5.6.3.

extent to which these features can be assigned to the end verses will determine the extent to which the end verses can safely be assigned *as a group* to the *adhyāya* redaction.[186]

In his second point, however, Renou invokes cases in the text wherein certain end verses demonstrate an apparent continuity with the prose. The appearance of such an integral relationship casts doubt upon the ascription of the end verses to the *adhyāya* redactor. By invoking "nuances," Renou is claiming that countervailing local conditions may preclude the assignation of the end verses to the *adhyāya* redaction as a group.

The criterion prompting his pessimistic assessment of our ability to determine the fate of the end verses as a whole lies in the variability with which end verses are integrated or disjointed from the foregoing prose. Renou has correctly observed an important heterogeneity among the end verses: in some cases (e.g., KAŚ 1.10[187]) the logic of a given passage is complete within the prose and the end verses are clearly appendectical, while in other cases (e.g. KAŚ 7.6) the end verses are necessary to the logic of the greater passage. As we have seen, however, there is reason to suspect that it is not only the end verses that may have been added during the *adhyāya* redaction: certain prose passages also seem to presuppose the *adhyāya* redaction. Hence, examples of disjuncture and integration must be considered as individual cases in the context of a potentially larger *adhyāya* redaction.

We will look first to determine whether we can find evidence that the end verses have a common group origin. I will, to this end, query their function (§5.1). I will then examine whether the end verses possess any formal characteristics isolating them as a

---

[186] This is, properly speaking, a *functional approach*, one which seeks to find the origins of the end verses by analyzing their function.

[187] The examples cited are entirely my own, used only to illustrate Renou's point. They are not taken from his work.

distinct body within the text (§5.2). Finally, I will examine the nuances of individual end verse passages in order to understand the frequency with which individual end verses can be linked to the *adhyāya* redaction and whether any local examples provide sufficient evidence to preclude the assignation of the corpus of end verses to the *adhyāya* redaction (§5.3–5). My conclusions are given at §5.6.

5.1 THE UNIQUE FUNCTION OF THE END VERSES

One of the best ways to attempt to isolate the present *adhyāya* end verses as a discrete compositional element is to examine them in the context of all of the verses within the extant *Arthaśāstra*. This allows us to determine whether the end verses are unique in fulfilling the function of dividing topics, or whether they are in this regard simply part of a more general phenomenon.

Kangle's edition of the *Arthaśāstra* possesses 378 verses in total. Of that number, 303 (80%) are found at the end of an *adhyāya*. Thus, the overwhelming pattern of verse dispersal in the extant text follows the *adhyāya* division. The strong correlation of end verse dispersal with the pattern of colophon placement reinforces the sense that these verses, as a group, exist to serve their present function of dividing the text into *adhyāya*s.

The dispersal of the 75 verses *not* found at the end of *adhyāya* is, in contrast to the end verses, not only far less frequent,[188] but also remarkable irregular. Some 91% (68 of 75) of these "*adhyāya*-internal" verses fall in only three *adhikaraṇa*s (the 2nd, 7th, and 14th). Looking more closely, one notes that a remarkable 75% (55 of 73) fall in only four *adhyāya*s (KAŚ 2.10, 7.5, 7.9, 14.3) and 84% fall in just six *adhyā*yas (including, with the previous, 2.24, 14.2). In total, all 75 *adhyāya*-internal verses occur in only 15 *adhyāya*s,

[188] *Adhyāya*-internal verse passages occur at the rate of 1 per 68.4 prose *sūtra*s, while end verse passages occur at the rate of 1 passage per 16.4 prose *sūtra*s.

leaving 135 of 150 *adhyāya*s without any *adhyāya*-internal verses. The following chart summarizes the location of these verses:

adhikaraṇa	*adhyāya*	passage #(s)	*adhyāya* total	*adhikaraṇa* total
1	8	9	(**1**)	(**3**)
	15	17, 22	(**2**)	
2	10	5, 23–24, 38–46	(**12**)	(**17**)
	12	10	(**1**)	
	24	9–10, 26–27	(**4**)	
5	6	31	(**1**)	(**1**)
7	5	19–27	(**9**)	
	6	15	(**1**)	
	9	38–49	(**12**)	
	13	24–25	(**2**)	
10	3	30–31	(**2**)	(**2**)
13	4	7	(**1**)	(**1**)
14	1	5	(**1**)	(**27**)
	2	10, 28–29, 39	(**4**)	
	3	3, 19–24, 34–35, 37–38, 43–46, 51, 73–78	(**22**)	

Thus, we can see that the occurrence of *adhyāya*-internal verses is, generally speaking, a highly localized phenomenon complemented by the sporadic occurrence of singlets and couplets.

If we look at the content and placement of the *adhyāya*-internal verses a little more closely, we can see that many occur in long verse passages: KAŚ 2.10.38–46, 7.5.19–27, and 7.9.38–49. These three passages account 30 of the 75 *adhyāya*- internal verses in the text, with another 16 falling in three additional clusters in KAŚ 14.3: 14.3.19–24, 43–46, and 73–78. The remaining *adhyāya*-internal verses fall in singlets (15) or couplets (14).

Of the longer verse clusters, all represent semi-autonomous discussions: of types of documents (KAŚ 2.10.38–46); of causes of decline, disaffection, and greed among the king's subjects (7.5.19–27); and of different kinds of allies (7.9.38–49). We find this too with the middle-length verse clusters in KAŚ 14.3, two of which are verse portions of

incantations (14.3.19–24, 43–46) and the third a discussion of malevolent talismans (14.3.73–78). Of the couplets, one lists the uses to which royal decrees may be put (and is expanded in a subsequent prose section),[189] two are the verse portion of an incantation,[190] and five are cited as offering additional information after the manner of *smṛti* verses.[191] Of the singlets, eleven are clearly cited as *smṛti* verses,[192] one gives the verse portion of an incantation,[193] and one, possibly also a *smṛti* verse, gives an alternative to a foregoing passage.[194] Four of the singlets, all from the first and fifth *adhikaraṇa*s, are cited in the *pūrvapakṣa* of a Kauṭilya dialogue.[195]

What this analysis tells us is that *adhyāya*–internal verse clusters are only of a few kinds: autonomous passages (5); verse incantations (5); alternatives to foregoing prose (1); or *smṛti*-style verses (16).[196] Without needing to examine them in any greater detail, we can see that *none* of the *adhyāya*-internal verses in the *Arthaśāstra* function to conclude or divide either *prakaraṇa*s or any other subtopic. This means that of the 177

---

[189] KAŚ 2.10.23–24

[190] KAŚ 14.3.34–35; 14.3.37–38

[191] KAŚ 2.24.9–10; 2.24.26–27; 7.13.24–25; 10.3.30–31; 14.2.28–29

[192] KAŚ 1.8.9; 1.15.17; 1.15.22; 2.10.5; 2.12.10; 5.6.31; 7.6.15; 13.4.7; 14.2.9; 14.2.39; 14.3.3

[193] KAŚ 14.3.51

[194] KAŚ 14.1.5

[195] KAŚ 1.8.9; 1.15.17; 1.15.22; and 5.6.3.

[196] The only *adhyāya*–internal verse passage that requires further explication is the couplet at KAŚ 2.10.23–24. This couplet, uniquely, provides new information that is commented upon and expanded by the following prose passage 2.10.25–37. It appears, in this case, that an external verse has been used and then commented upon by the prose text, as though we have a *smṛti* verse with commentary. The uniqueness of the usage does not affect the conclusions drawn above. Moreover, it will be shown that all of KAŚ 2.10, from which this verse is drawn, is an addition of the *adhyāya* redactor.

verse passages in the *Arthaśāstra*, exactly 150 serve to mark a boundary between *prakaraṇa*s or *prakaraṇa* subtopics,[197] and all of these represent *adhyāya* end verses.

Not only does this strengthen the relationship between the end verses and the *adhyāya* division by demonstrating that the end verses have a monopoly on the work of marking topical boundaries, it also tells us that at least some of the present verses must have been added by the *adhyāya* redactor. The above analysis shows us that the *Arthaśāstra* is not abundantly endowed with verses providing convenient topic boundaries: the present *adhyāya* end verses exhaust all such possible examples. Hence, the *adhyāya* redactor did not simply choose 150 existing verses out of a larger pool of topic-bounding verses. It also cannot be the case that the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text is responsible for all of these precisely 150 end verse passages, as this would be tantamount to having introduced a rival re-segmentation to his own *prakaraṇa*s. We are left, then, with only two possibilities.

It could be that the *adhyāya* redactor is responsible for introducing *all* of the *adhyāya* end verses. But, it is also possible that *some* of the extant *adhyāya* end verses were present as more or less randomly dispersed verses in the *prakaraṇa*-text and the *adhyāya* redactor only added enough to produce his 150 relatively uniform segments. Two considerations influence our estimation. First, we note that the extant *adhyāya* division adheres to a minimum *adhyāya* length of 9 sentences. That no two existing end verses fall any closer than that suggests that the phenomenon, if original to the *prakaraṇa*-text, must have been infrequent. Otherwise, we would as easily expect

[197] A possible exception to this is the verse at KAŚ 13.4.7, which seems to conclude the discussion of weakening an enemy before a seige, itself a subtopic of the *prakaraṇa paryupāsankarma*, "The Work of Laying Seige." It is clearly a versification of the preceding prose *sūtra*. As such, it would seem to serve little purpose but as to mark this *prakaraṇa* subtopic, unless its purpose is to integrate the concept of the *prakṛti*s into the passage. The reference to the *prakṛti*s, however, links this verse to the younger layers of the text (Chapter 7). An ambiguous case, it merits further investigation. See below at §6.5.3.

examples of end verses falling closer together than the currently observed minimum *adhyāya* length of eight prose *sūtra*s. Second, we must determine the upper threshold of possible *adhyāya* end verses. How many pre-existing *adhyāya* end verses would have to have existed before they began to constitute some kind of secondary division?

Consideration of these questions quickly leads to conjecture. I believe, however, we possess sufficient evidence at present to assert that the use of verses to bound *prakaraṇa*s and subtopics cannot have been too widespread in the *prakaraṇa*–text, which gives no indication of a preference for formally marking boundaries. Even a single end verse (much less a random smattering) would have disrupted the more subtle boundary markers found among the *prakaraṇa*s. Moreover, even a relatively meager number of end verses (with their ability to create strong boundaries) per *adhikaraṇa* would begin to have had the effect of suggesting a secondary division of the text, even if in broader segments than represented by the present *adhyāya*s. Finally, many of the *adhyāya*-internal verses seem to be interpolations, suggesting that, the end verse passages aside, the *prakaraṇa*-text may have been composed entirely in prose (see below). This highlights the bounding functions of the end verses, and we can assert thereby that the verses in the text have always been intended as boundary markers. That this is restricted only to the present *adhyāya*s suggests that the *prakaraṇa*s were likely never, in fact, marked by end verses. Hence, the end verses appear even more likely to be later additions. It is strongly possible, therefore, that all of the *adhyāya* end verses date to the *adhyāya* redaction. We can say with great certainty, however, that not many, and possibly no, end verses existed before the *adhyāya* redaction.

We have just seen that the present *adhyāya* end verses are the only verses in the text that conclude a *prakaraṇa* or a *prakaraṇa* subtopic. From this, we have derived that the present end verses cannot be thought to have been "selected" as the subset of a larger

body of pre-existing boundary-marking verses. By implication, then, the *adhyāya* redactor must be responsible for the addition of some verses, and, given the proclivity of even a few end verses to begin to create a secondary subdivision of the text, probably the greater part of them.

But, if we are able to demonstrate that the *adhyāya*-internal verses are interpolations, we can then further isolate the end verse phenomenon in the text. More modestly: the extent to which we can demonstrate interpolation among the body of *adhyāya*-internal verses increases the appearance that the verses in the present text are confined to the *adhyāya* end verses. If, in fact, the *prakaraṇa*-text is, outside of the present end verses, composed entirely in prose, then we will have strong indication that the end verses, as a group, are secondary additions to the text dating, no doubt, to the *adhyāya* redaction.

It has been noted already that large tracts of the extant text possess no *adhyāya*-internal verses (*i.e.*, *adhikaraṇa*s 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12). Thus, we note that many parts of the text (135 of 150 *adhyāya*s) do not possess any internal verses. This takes us already a long way to demonstrating the prose character of the *prakaraṇa*-text. Because such an inquiry is potentially vitiated by a desired outcome, we will look first at the *adhyāya*-internal verses that have been marked as likely interpolations by other scholars.

Of the 27 verses/verse clusters in the text, Kangle identifies two (KAŚ 7.6.15; 10.3.30–31) as likely interpolations based on their manner of citation within the text.[198] These have been identified based on prose introductions (*tatraitad bhavati*; *apīha ślokau bhavataḥ*, respectively). We note also this standard marker (*tatraitad bhavati*; KAŚ 7.9.37) of interpolated material introducing the verse cluster at KAŚ 7.9.38–49, which is

[198] 1972, 339n.; 1972, 440n.

also semantically disjointed from the foregoing discussion. Of the remainder, we must look at their relationship to other elements suspected to belong to the *adhyāya* redaction and discussed below.

Thus, the citation of *smṛti* verses at KAŚ 1.8.9, 1.15.17, 1.15.22, and 5.6.31 all come in the *pūrvapakṣa* of Kauṭilya dialogues, which are linked below (Chapter 6) to the *adhyāya* redaction. The verse clusters at KAŚ 2.10.5, 23–24, and 38–46 all fall in an *adhyāya* (KAŚ 2.10) which is also linked to the *adhyāya* redaction (see Chapter 7). If these elements are indeed linked to the *adhyāya* redaction (and there is strong evidence for this), we can assert that, *outside of the present adhyāya end verses, the first half of the prakaraṇa-text was composed entirely in prose*.

In the latter half of the text, most of our verses and verse clusters (10 of 16) fall in the 14th *adhyāya*, which is an addendum appended to the *prakaraṇa*-text during the *adhyāya* redaction (see Chapter 7). Likely, it is composed of independent sources; so its own peculiar habits of verse citation can be ascribed either to its origins or to the hand of the *adhyāya* redactor. Of the remaining six verses/verse clusters in the second half, three are independently suspected to be interpolations (see above). Another, at KAŚ 7.5.19–27 disrupts, along with the other segments of its *adhyāya* (7.5.1–18; 7.5.28–37), the underlying logic of the text by separating what appears to have been a unified discussion of confederated allies starting at KAŚ 7.4.19–21 and concluding, in the extant text, at 7.5.38–44. The remaining two passages, KAŚ 7.13.24–25 and 13.4.7, do not give specific evidence to suggest they are interpolations. But, of the 27 passages examined, they are the only ones not bearing at least moderately good indication of interpolation.

The upshot of this is that, while it is not possible to prove beyond a doubt that all of the *adhyāya*-internal verses in the text are interpolations, we see good and distributed evidence indicating just that for nearly all, while a few are certainly interpolations. The

net effect is to bring the number of *adhyāya*-internal verses potentially native to the *prakaraṇa*-text even lower, so that, aside from the present *adhyāya* end verses, the *prakaraṇa*-text appears to have been very nearly, if not entirely, a prose composition.

Effectively, this further isolates the present *adhyāya* end verses. Not only are they unique in their function,[199] they may be unique altogether, as the *prakaraṇa*-text looks likely to have been a prose composition. Together, these two pieces of evidence further diminish the likelihood that the *adhyāya* redactor had many pre-existing verses to choose from in creating his *adhyāya* redaction, which would have raised the profile of any preexisting verses, thereby rendering them even more effective at providing potential boundary markers. Hence, the number of pre-existing end verses cannot have been very great at all.

Given the limits of our evidence at present it is not possible to say much more about the origin of the end verses based on function. We can deduce that most of the present end verses must have been added by the *adhyāya* redactor, and some evidence suggests they must *all* have been added by him. If we allow, however, that the evidence still affords for the possibility that *some* end verses may have pre-existed the *adhyāya* redaction, then such a group analysis based on function does little to identify which are more likely and which are less likely to belong the *adhyāya* redaction.

We turn, then, to the formal analysis of the verses, an analysis based on shared features of vocabulary, style, and so forth. It is possible that analyzing these characteristics among the group of verses can tell us something about their collective origin.

[199] With the possible exception of KAŚ 13.4.7; see above.

5.2 End Verses as a Body of Writing

The search for such formal unifying elements is frustrated at the outset by the suspicion, already encountered above (§4.1–3), that the *adhyāya* redactor was also responsible for the introduction of substantive prose passages into the text. If true (and this will be well borne out below), it should not be expected that the end verses share many elements isolatable from the prose by an analysis of shared formal characteristics. To further complicate matters, it is not unlikely that at least some of the extant end verses were appropriated from circulating gnomic stanzas or other textual sources,[200] potentially diminishing the possibility of ascertaining unified formal characteristics.

It may, however, still be worthwhile to look at the end verses for some kind of shared features, as long as we recognize that they, as a compositional layer, form a subset of a larger, indefinite corpus within the text represented by the collective additions of the *adhyāya* redactor. The expextation at the outset is that even this subset may demonstrate some common minor characteristics, but that the most telling features may have, as the major ideational contributions of the *adhyāya* redactor, also found a more considered and lengthier expression in adjacent prose segments.

The end verses, like nearly all of the verses in the *Arthaśāstra*, are written in the relatively simple *śloka* meter. They are thereby composed after the fashion of the epics or verse *smṛti*s, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify shared points of style among these verses over against the stark contrast between the end verses and the prose. Breloer argues for stylistic differences between the verses and the prose of the text,[201] to which Kangle has responded that "[i]t is true that the stanzas appear to be much simpler in style than the prose. But simplicity is natural to the Anuṣṭubh śloka metre" (1965, 37). Thus,

[200] Sternbach 1968, 495

[201] 1934, 8*f.*

given the differences in medium between verse and prose (as also prevailing between different prose disquisitions), the demonstrable likelihood of a larger *adhyāya* redaction, and the probability that many stanzas were drawn from older circulating bodies of verse, we should not be disappointed that we are unable to identify many common elements of style setting the end verses off as a body from the rest of the text. A prime example of this is the restriction of the use of the terms *mata* and *smṛta* ("is known/remembered as") to the verses in the text. These terms occur in the *Arthaśāstra* only at the end of even *śloka pada*s and undoubtedly reflect not a stylistic proclivity of the verses' composer, but a feature common to *śloka* composition more generally, where these terms provide the equative sense of the verb "to be" in form amenable to the metrical conclusion of the verse medium.

The search for lexica unique to a posited end verse "layer," which would seem such a promising avenue for demonstrating a unique and common origin, is the element most negatively affected by the above considerations. For, as stated above, the most interesting and important innovations of the end verses are those most likely to have found their way into prose discussions. Without knowing the extent of the redaction, therefore, many of the most telling lexical or conceptual features of the *adhyāya* redaction will not appear unique to the end verses. The full fruit of this analysis must await a more complete understanding of the *adhyāya* redaction. Nevertheless, the end verses do demonstrate knowledge of a few interesting terms and concepts not found elsewhere in the text.

Foremost among these, of course, is the direct ascription of the text to Kauṭilya, found only at KAŚ 1.1.19, 2.10.63, and, indirectly, at 15.1.73, all end verses.[202] While the manifold Kauṭilya dialogues scattered throughout the text speak in the voice of Kauṭilya, the phrase *iti Kauṭilya* ("according to Kauṭilya") falls short of a direct ascription of the entire treatise to the legendary statesman. It is, therefore, significant that it is only in the verses that the entire text is attributed to the man himself, and, in particular, in the verses concluding the first and last *adhyāya*s.

We find also that the end verses frequently take the king as their subject, even in prose contexts where another subject has been used exclusively.[203]

Among the remaining notable concepts unique to the end verses, we find only minor examples: *śramaṇa* (KAŚ 1.12.23); certain geographical areas or peoples such as *prācya* ("the east"), *Cedi*, *Karuṣa*, *Dāśarṇa*, *Saurāṣṭra*, and *Pāñcanada* (KAŚ 2.3.15–16); new (*śukla*-) and full moon observances (*kṛṣṇasaṃdhi*: KAŚ 2.30.50; 2.32.21; 7.3.32–33); and two terms commonly used to conclude half-verses, *mata*[204] and *smṛta*,[205] both roughly translated as "is/are known as."[206] Aside from the last example, none of these are sufficiently well-distributed to act as a characteristic of the end verses as a "layer" of the text.

There are, to be certain, many terms unique to the end verses. Unfortunately, just as with the concepts mentioned above, most occur only once or twice in the entire text:

---

[202] This excludes the interpolated verse falling after the final colophon, which attributes the text to "Viṣṇugupta," purportedly Kauṭilya's personal name (Kangle 1965, 59), but also taken sometimes as the name of a later editor of the text (Thapar 2002, 184–5).

[203] See, e.g. KAŚ 3.1.38; 3.1.43; 4.9.28.

[204] KAŚ 1.2.12; 1.7.9; 1.15.22; 2.19.45; 2.21.15; 7.3.23; 7.8.34; 8.3.65;14.1.5

[205] KAŚ 2.2.16; 2.13.61; 3.17.16;4.11.26; 4.13.41

[206] These are precisely the kind of feature that may have more to do with the exigencies of metrical composition than a distinctive feature of style or thought.

not nearly enough to unite the end verses as a group. Some of the more interesting include *śaśvad*, *vyavasthita*, *pretya, nanda, vartman*, *saciva*, *bheṣaja*, *pūjita*, *prakīrtita*, *paṇḍaka*, *kṣiti*, *vaidya*, *traividya*, *saṃcaya*, *salīla*, *kha*, *bhāṇḍaka*, *jīrṇa*, *abda*, *paṇḍita*, *dama*, and *kṣamāvat*.

As suspected, analysis of the end verses in isolation from other elements of the *adhyāya* redaction demonstrates no key lexica or concepts that would conclusively set them off from the prose text as a group. If we allow for the possibility that some key concepts might appear *primarily* in the end verses, while occurring in a few prose sections, then a number of more important terms can be identified: *trivarga*, *varṇāśrama*, *prithivī*, *mahī*, and *svarga*. It is not unlikely that a better knowledge of the *adhyāya* redaction will reveal these as characteristic elements of that editorial moment.

Ultimately, the analysis of formal elements among the end verses adds nothing at this point to our understanding of their place in the compositional history of the text. Aside from the ascription of the text to Kauṭilya, it is difficult at the present time, if not impossible, to determine whether the minor features demonstrated above help in any way to unify the end verses into a compositional layer or place them in relation to other compositional layers.

5.3 Balance of Evidence: Individual Studies

Pursuant to the initial remarks of this chapter, we have good reason to believe that most, if not all, of the *adhyāya* end verses were integrated by the *adhyāya* redactor. Given the unique role they play in bounding discussions, scholars such as Renou (1961) and Trautmann (1971) have posited that, should they be connected with the *adhyāya* redaction, they must be considered interpolations. We look now at representative

examples of the relationships between prose and verse to determine whether we can deduce anything more specific about their origin as a group.

But here we encounter the same problem: if we suspect certain sections of prose to date to the *adhyāya* redaction as well, then we should as easily expect to find examples of end verses that are integral to the foregoing prose as to find end verses revealing a different origin from the prose. Nevertheless, we can demonstrate based on individual analyses that specific end verses can frequently be shown to have a different origin from the prose, whether misconstruing *prakaraṇa* boundaries (§5.4.1), demonstrating awareness of the *adhyāya* redaction (§5.4.2), emending the preceding prose (§5.4.3), breaking the logic of a prose passage (§5.4.4), or appearing generally disconnected from the prose itself (§5.4.5). On the contrary, a minority of end verses demonstrate a connection with the foregoing prose (§5.5), whether through syntactic integration (§5.5.1), acting as the logically necessary conclusion to a prose segment (§5.5.2), or matching preceding prose very closely (§5.5.3). By demonstrating the frequent disjuncture between prose and verse, on one hand, and the paucity of evidence demonstrating their integration, on the other hand, the end verses come to look even more alien to the *prakaraṇa*-text.

5.4 End Verses Linked to the *Adhyāya* Redaction

A great number of end verses display some kind of relationship with their prose contexts that link them to the *adhyāya* redaction. All of these represent conditions sprecluding mutual authorship of prose and verse by one individual

5.4.1 Boundary Disputes: KAŚ 1.4.16, 1.8.29, and 7.1.38

As discussed previously (§3.2), divergences on the marking of boundaries provide strong evidence for both the posteriority of the *adhyāya*s (as defined by the colophons) as well as their issuance from a second hand. In all three of the cases cited there

(*prakaraṇa*s 1, 4, and 99), it is not only the colophon that has misconstrued the *prakaraṇa* boundary, but also its attendant *adhyāya* end verse. Thus, for same reasons cited regarding the colophons, we can surmise that the end verses at KAŚ 1.4.16, 1.8.29, 7.1.38 cannot originate from the composer of the *prakaraṇa* text.

5.4.2 End Verses "Aware" of *Adhyāya*s:

A number of end verses appear to demonstrate some awareness of the *adhyāya* redaction. This awareness manifests itself in a few different ways.

KAŚ 1.8.29 and 1.9.11

Two end verses are implicated in the *adhyāya* redaction by virtue of their content. We see this clearly, for example, at KAŚ 1.8.29 and 1.9.11, which are the two end verses involved in the misconstrual of the *prakaraṇa* boundary discussed above. The adjoining *prakaraṇa*s at issue are entitled *amātyotpattiḥ*, "The Appointment of Ministers (*amātya*)," and *mantripurohitotpattiḥ*, "The Appointment of the Prime Minister (*mantripurohita*)." Instead of falling between these two *prakaraṇa*s, the end verse at KAŚ 1.8.29 actually falls in the middle of the discussion of *amātyotpattiḥ*, severing the last 8 *sūtra*s of the *prakaraṇa* and relegating them to the next *adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.9).

The reason for this misconstrual, it would seem, is that the *adhyāya* redactor must have read the title of the second *prakaraṇa*, *mantripurohitotpattiḥ*, not as "The Appointment (*utpatti*) of the Prime Minister (*mantripurohita*)," but as, "The Appointment (*utpatti*) of the Councilors (*mantrin*) and Chaplain (*purohita*)."[207] The problem, of course, is that there is no discussion of the appointment of ministers (*mantrin*) to be found here in the text, which passes directly from discussing the appointment of ministers (*amātya*;

[207] This is my theory of the term *mantripurohita*. This theory has the benefit not only of explaining this apparent disjuncture in the text, but also the problem between the identity of the *mantrin*s ("councilors") and *amātya*s ("ministers") prevailing more generally in the text. *Cf.* Scharfe 1993, 127*ff.*)

KAŚ 1.8.1–1.9.8) to the appointment of the *mantripurohita* (KAŚ 1.9.9–10). Because the *adhyāya* redactor could not find a discussion of the appointment of councilors (*mantri*), he created one by severing the discussion of the appointment of ministers (*amātya*) into two parts. The only problem is that nowhere in either of the dismembered discussions of "The Appointment of Ministers (*amātya*)" does the text ever speak of councilors (*mantrin*).

The end verses at KAŚ 1.8.29 and 1.9.11 both seem to take part in the project of recasting the truncated dicussion of *amātya*s as actually pertaining to *mantrin*s. The first, which actually carries out the division of *amātyotpattiḥ*, appears very much to be trying to create the effect of a transition between the discussion of ministers (*amātya*) and the discussion of councilors (*mantrin*):

KAŚ 1.8.29 sāmarthyataś ca—
vibhajyāmātyavibhavaṃ deśakālau ca karma ca
amātyāḥ sarva etaite kāryāḥ syur na tu mantriṇaḥ

And, in accordance with their ability—
by [suitably] distributing rank among ministers (*amātya*) and assigning place, time and work (to them), he should appoint all of these as ministers (*amātya*), not, however, as councilors (*mantrin*)

This verse represents the first use of the term *mantrin* in the body of the *Arthaśāstra* (the second comes in the next end verse, KAŚ 1.9.11), and seems to reflect the logic implicit in the creation of a novel discussion of *mantrin*s (councilors).

The end verse of of the subsequent *adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.9) takes part in the process of recasting the truncated discussion of ministers (*amātya*) at KAŚ 1.9.1–8 into a discussion of councilors (*mantrin*):

KAŚ 1.9.11 brāhmaṇenaidhitaṃ kṣatraṃ mantrimantrābhimantritam
jayaty ajitam atyantaṃ śāstrānugamaśastritam

> Kṣatriya power, made to prosper by the Brahmin [*i.e.*, the *purohita*], sanctified by spells in the form of the counsel of councilors (*mantrin*), possessed of arms in the form of compliance with the science [of politics], triumphs, remaining ever unconquered.

In the first line of this verse, we read that the king's lordly might (*kṣatra*) is enhanced both by the *purohita* and the *mantrin*. In taking the two as separate, it seems to be indicating that the foregoing *adhyāya* possess a discussion of both *mantrin*s and the *purohita*, recasting the truncated section not as a discussion of *amātya*s (which it clearly is) into a discussion of *mantrin*s.

We find awareness of the *adhyāya* redaction also in the verses at KAŚ 1.2.12, 1.3.16–17, and 1.4.16 discussed below (§6.4.1).

KAŚ 2.35.15

The end verse at KAŚ 2.35.15 demonstrates awareness of the *adhyāya* redaction by clearly combining both *prakaraṇa*s falling within its *adhyāya*. We have in the first *prakaraṇa* a discussion of the duties of the official called the *samāhartṛ* (administrator) and in the second directions on his use of secret agents known as *saṃsthā*s (stationary agents). The end verse clearly brings the two *prakaraṇa*s together:

> KAŚ 2.35.15 samāhartā janapadaṃ cintayed evam utthitaḥ
> cintayeyuś ca saṃsthās tāḥ saṃsthāś cānyāḥ svayonayaḥ
>
> Thus the *samāhartṛ*, being ever diligent, should look after the countryside; and those *saṃsthā*s should also look after [it], as also other *saṃsthā*s having their own origin.

Further examples of this can be found at KAŚ 7.1.38, 9.2.30, and 10.5.57–58, all of which refer discretely to elements of the multiple *prakaraṇa*s of which their *adhyāya*s are constituted.[208]

[208] These, it may be argued, are not references to *adhyāya* divisions *per se*, but only look back over a general segment that happens to coincide with *adhyāya* boundaries. That is unlikely in both cases, because of the use of specific terminology that links the verse to the opening line of the *adhyāya*. So at 9.2.30, the verse reads *evaṃ balasamuddānaṃ* ("Thus, the raising of troops), which directly invokes the formula with

KAŚ 1.1.19

At least one end verse is linked to the *adhyāya* redaction by virtue of concluding material not included in the *prakaraṇa*-text. This example comes from the end of the first *adhyāya*, where we read:

> KAŚ 1.1.19 sukhagrahaṇavijñeyaṃ tattvārthapadaniścitam
> kauṭilyena kṛtaṃ śāstraṃ vimuktagranthavistaram
>
> Easy to learn and understand, precise in doctrine, sense, and word, free from prolixity of text, thus has this *śāstra* been composed by Kauṭilya.

This end verse cannot have come from the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text precisely because it summarizes a passage (KAŚ 1.1.1–18) that is not part of the *prakaraṇa*-text. That it is consciously bounding and concluding this *adhyāya* segment is clear from the manner in which it echoes the opening of the passage: compare the phrase *kauṭilyena kṛtaṃ śāstram* ("[this] *śāstra* was composed by Kauṭilya") from the end verse with the phrase *idam ekam arthaśāstram kṛtam* ("this single *arthaśāstra* was composed") from KAŚ 1.1.1, which opens the *adhyāya*.

The foregoing applies also to the end verses of the final *adhyāya*, KAŚ 15.1.71–73, which must also date to the *adhyāya* redaction, as discussed above at §3.3.

5.4.3 End Verses Emend Preceding Prose

A number of end verses serve to emend the foregoing discussion (see below). This is very much against the logic of single authorship and stands as some of the strongest examples of *adhyāya* end verses that must have been composed contemporaneously with or after the preceding prose. The clearest instances of

---

which the *adhyāya* opens: …*balānāṃ samuddānakālāḥ* ("The time for the raising of troops…" KAŚ 9.2.1). At 10.5.57 we find the use of the terms *vyūha* ("battle array") and *yugman* ("odd"), both concepts central to the opening *prakaraṇa*, as well as *vibhava* ("strength"), in reference to the middle *prakaraṇa*, and *aṇga* ("division"), in reference to the third *prakaraṇa*.

disjuncture in the text come from situations in which the *adhyāya* end verses directly contradict the foregoing prose text.[209]

KAŚ 1.10.16–20

The clearest example of the verses emending the foregoing prose comes in *adhyāya* 1.10, comprising the *prakaraṇa* titled "Knowing the Honesty and Dishonesty of the Officials through Secret Tests" (*upadhābhiḥ śaucāśaucajñānam amātyānām*). This passage is the source of the famous "secret tests" by which the king ascertains the loyalty of his ministers to determine the positions they are suitable to fill. The progression of the chapter is logical and orderly. It begins by saying "Attended by his prime minister, [the king] should appoint ministers to common offices and test their integrity by means of secret tests" (KAŚ 1.10.1). We then read of the "test of *dharma*" (KAŚ 1.10.2–4), the "test of *artha*" (1.10.5–6), the "test of *kāma*" (1.10.7–8), and the "test of fear" (1.10.9–12). The prose concludes with a passage detailing the offices to which those who have passed the different tests should be appointed, stating finally that "[t]hose proved honest by all tests, he should make councilors; those dishonest by every test, he should employ in mines, in forests for material produce, in elephant-forests, and in factories" (KAŚ 1.10.14–15).

The tactics used in all of these tests involve convincing the minister either that the king has acted improperly or that the queen is in love with him. The ministers response to this information is meant to demonstrate their loyalty or lack thereof. The five end verses of the *adhyāya*, however, directly contradict these strategies laid out in the prose in great detail:

---

[209] This is <u>not</u> a phenomenon, *i.e.*, the purposeful redaction of earlier rules by later rules, that we find in the prose. It occurs only between verses and prose and is unidirectional in the emendation of the latter by the former.

KAŚ 1.10.16–20 "Thoroughly purified by the group of three and fear, he should appoint ministers, in his own works according to their purity," say the teachers.

"But, never should the Lord make himself or his queen, a target for determining the honesty of the ministers": this is the view of Kauṭilya.

"The fouling of one unfouled, as water with poison, should not be carried out. For, the antidote may never arrive for one so fouled. And a mind tainted by the fourfold tests, returns not to its original state, remaining under the power of the willful. Therefore, he should make an outsider to stand in for the fourfold task. The king should ascertain the honesty and dishonesty of the ministers through secret agents."

Here, the verses completely reject the tactics carefully laid out in the prose. It is unlikely that a single author would not only emend his own writing in such a clumsy fashion, but also fail to outline discrete alternatives. Moreover, the tests, as given in the prose, are purposely designed to judge a minister's loyalty to the king himself. The substitution of another official for the king or queen would render the tests pointless. Although they clearly depend on the preceding prose, they cannot have been produced by the author of that prose.

We find similar examples of textual emendation at KAŚ 2.7.41,[210] KAŚ 2.9.32–36,[211] KAŚ 2.14.55,[212] and KAŚ 3.3.32.[213]

---

[210] Lesser emendations to the text occur at KAŚ 2.7.41, where, after a detailed discussion of the different offenses and attendant penalties for clerical offenses and misappropriation of funds by government employees, the verse states "He should put up with a minor offense and should be content even when the revenue is small; and he should honor with favours the officer who confers great benefit." Is this meant to waive the smaller penalties just enumerated in the prose? Or does it refer to whether those guilty should be released from service? As a matter of disjuncture, we note that the prose does not speak as does the verse to the performance of officers *per se*, but only to their shortcomings and offenses.

211 So, in *adhyāya* 2.9, which is coextensive with the 27th *prakaraṇa*, *upayuktaparīkṣā* (Examining the Work of Appointees), the final prose *sūtra* instructs *bahumukhyam anityaṃ cādhikaraṇaṃ sthāpayet*, "He should establish each appointment with many impermanent leadership positions" (2.9.31). The point of this *sūtra* is to limit corruption by prohibiting the permanent tenure of single individuals in government appointments. Following this final prose *sūtra* occur five verses: the first three warn against malfeasance among government officials. The fourth operates as bridge between this sentiment and that of the the final verse which represents the end verse proper and contraverts the instruction at 2.9.31 *na bhakṣyanti ye tv arthān nyāyato vardhayanti ca nityādhikārāḥ kāryās te rājñaḥ priyahite ratāḥ*, "But those who do not consume his wealth and grow it lawfully. These should be made permanent in their appointment, devoted

5.4.4 End Verses Disrupting the Logic of the Prose

A number of verses produce logical disjunctions with the foregoing prose. We see this at KAŚ 2.4.31, where the prose of KAŚ 2.4 is entirely concerned with the construction and establishment of the fortified city (*durga*) and concludes in the final prose *sūtra* with, "By this is explained the making of frontier forts" (KAŚ 2.4.31). Yet, an *adhyāya* end verse follows this conclusion with a verse pertaining to the administration of the fortified city:

> KAŚ 2.4.32 And he should not allow in the city "outsiders" who cause harm to the country. He should cast them out in the country-side or make them pay all the taxes.

Not only does the preceding prose have nothing to do with the administration of the city, but the topic has shifted to the construction of frontier forts. The verse is out of place.

---

to what is dear and beneficial to the King." This verse is obviously aware of the fact that it is emending the preceding prose, the term *nityādhikārāḥ* a clear reference to *anityam adhikaraṇam*. It is not in the style of the *Arthaśāstra* to use such clumsy emendations of preceding rules. Other aspects of the final two verses mark them as out of phase with the prose of the section, as well. We are justified, then, in seeing this end verse as a willful emendation standing outside of the prose and not a continuation thereof. Moreover, this verse is out of tune with the sentiment of the *prakaraṇa*, which discusses proper and improper behavior for appointees. The *prakaraṇa*, in fact, generates an expectation that ministers "who consume his wealth" are to be dispensed with anyway. By the time that the instruction to establish appointments with many heads and impermanent tenure, the *prakaraṇa* seems already to have dealt with bad appointees. Thus, verse KAŚ 2.9.36 seems even more out of place. As a final note, the final prose *sūtra* at 2.9.31 does seem to hang a bit loosely with the preceding prose.

[212] KAŚ 2.14.55, for its part, refers to the duty of an unnamed official (the *Sauvarṇika* by context) to "impose penalties on the (artisans) as prescribed." No penalties are given in this chapter. It is possible, as Kangle points out, that this is reference to KAŚ 4.1.26*ff*. It is noted, however, that those verses break the formal structure of *adhyāya* 4.1 and that the *adhyāya*, as we have it, appears to assign the right to punish directly to the official called *pradeṣṭṛ* (KAŚ 4.1.1). It is easiest to posit that the end verse is contradicting the prose in assigning a punitive capacity to an office that did not previously possess it.

[213] KAŚ 3.3.32 asserts that misconduct (*aticāra*) on the part of woman leads to the loss of her *strīdhana*. The prose prescribes no such penalty for *aticāra*.

We see the logic of a prose passage disrupted in the end verse also at KAŚ 2.8.32,[214] KAŚ 2.18.20,[215] KAŚ 2.19.46,[216] KAŚ 4.1.65,[217] and KAŚ 7.16.33.[218]

5.4.5 General Disjuncture

A number of other verses produce a variety of quizzical disjunctures with the foregoing prose. Examine, in this regard: KAŚ 1.16.33–34,[219] KAS 2.1.39,[220] KAŚ 2.5.22,[221] KAŚ 2.11.116–117,[222] KAŚ 2.27.30, KAŚ 3.1.38,[223] KAŚ 3.13.37,[224] and KAŚ 3.20.24.[225]

---

[214] This rule should have come after KAŚ 2.8.29 rather than after 2.8.31.

[215] KAŚ 2.18.20 is awkwardly linked to the preceding prose in several respects. But, it is its mention of "forest produce" that is most odd. This has not been discussed at all in this *adhyāya*. Moreover, the *sūtra* stub that introduces the verse "And concerning the factories…" is very out of place. Was the *adhyāya* redactor striving to link a poorly-fitted verse to an alien context? Presumably the Superintendent of the Armory controlled factories to create his implements of war, but the prose is silent on them. This renders the prose tag suspicious as well.

[216] This verse and its preceding prose *sūtra* should have come after KAŚ 2.19.33, as noted by Kangle (1972, 137n).

[217] The verse possesses a singular optative verb without a subject. But, the only subject from the forgoing prose is the plural *pradeṣṭāraḥ*. It could be that the subject is the king, but this produces another disjuncture, as the king has not been discussed for quite some time. It is likely, however, that the end verses run, in a sense, "parallel" to the prose and reflect a slightly different idiom in which the king is an assumed subject.

[218] This should have come after KAŚ 7.16.29.

[219] KAŚ 1.16.33–34 lists the "work of an emissary" (*dūtasya karma*), but include several functions not covered in the prose: conveying secret agents and troops, kidnapping the enemy's kinsmen, stealing treasure, and secret practices. Given the *Arthaśāstra*'s proclivity for detailed topical expositions, the omission of such practices from the prose produces a noteworthy disjuncture. The verses also mention an agent called a "counter-emissary" (*pratidūta*) that is not mentioned anywhere else in the text. Also the advice to guard against an enemy's *dūta*s is found in this final verse, which is is out of keeping with the prose.

[220] At KAŚ 2.1.39 we read, "Thus, the king should protect produce forests, elephant-forests, irrigation works and mines that were made in ancient times and should start new ones." The problem is that instructions regarding produce-forests and elephant-forests are discussed in detail only in the following *adhyāya* (KAŚ 2.2.5 and 2.2.6–12, respectively). The king is instructed to establish produce and elephant-forests "thus" before the instructions on how to do so have been given. In fact, it seems as though KAŚ 2.1 and 2.2 form a unity, and one wonders whether they have been secondarily divided (possibly even in the *prakaraṇa* division).

[221] KAŚ 2.5 deals with the duties of the powerful *Samnidhāṭṛ*, "the Depositor." Discussed is his overseeing construction (2KAŚ .5.2–7), the receipt of goods into his stores (2.5.8–15), and the penalties for theft from these storehouses by his subordinates (2.5.16–20). The prose concludes: "Therefore, with trustworthy men

5.5 Integration between End Verse and Prose

Just as we find numerous examples of disjuncture, so too do we find cases where the end verse displays some kind of connection with the preceding prose. These are important because they might indicate end verses that are original to the *prakaraṇa*-text; equally, they might indicate prose dating to the *adhyāya* redaction. We look below at examples wherein the prose shows syntactic connection to the following verse, the verse completes the argument structure of the prose, and adjacent prose and verse are nearly identical.

5.5.1 Syntactic Integration

In a limited number of passages (6), we find *adhyāya* end verses forming a single syntactic unit with the preceding prose. In each of these cases, the preceding segment of continuous prose is represented by a brief *sūtra* fragment:[226] *samārthyaś ca* (KAŚ 1.8.29);

---

under him, the Collector should bring the stores into being" (2.5.21). Following upon this, an end verse seems to dangle uncomfortably: "He should be conversant with receipts from outside and inside even after a hundred years, so that when asked he would not falter in respect of expenditure, balance and collections." The acceptance of goods into the stores has already been discussed and concluded at KAŚ 2.5.8–15. Moreover, the keeping of records is not mentioned anywhere in the chapter, being assigned in KAŚ 2.7 to the *adhyakṣa*. Additionally, the hyperbolic language of the verse ("even after a hundred years") is most foreign to the style of the prose. Together, all of these factors render this verse an odd ending to the prose.

[222] Breloer, according to Kangle, "thinks that as the verses [KAŚ 2.11.116–117] deal with the guarding of goods while the chapter is concerned with their inspection, they are probably from a different source' (1969, 120n). This is not entirely clear.

[223] One of the most interesting disjunctures in the end verses is the attribution of judicial duty to the king at KAŚ 3.1.38. For, nowhere in the prose of the *Arthaśāstra* is the king characterized as the chief judge of the state. This is a conceit only found in the *adhyāya* end verses. The rest of the verses in KAŚ 3.1.38–47 show a variety of disjunctures from the conception of jurisprudence in the prose.

[224] The sudden discussion of prostitutes at KAŚ 3.13.37 is "not in keeping with the rest of the Chapter and seems derived from a different context" (Kangle 1971, 289n).

[225] This verse, along with the preceding *sūtra*s, clearly intends to conclude the entire *adhikaraṇa*.

[226] Not included here is the phrase *tatra prativiśeṣāḥ* introducing the longest *adhyāya* end cluster in the text (7.3.22–36). The sūtra is not syntactically continuous with the following verses, and seems to indicate discretely that they are a citation. Importantly, this cluster with its preceding sūtra fragment also represents its own *prakaraṇa* (102). Also used twice in *adhikaraṇa* 7 is the similar phrase *tatraitad bhavati* (7.6.14

kurvataś ca (1.15.60–61); *karmāntānāṃ ca* (2.18.20); *deśakālāntaritānāṃ tu paṇyānāṃ* (4.2.36); *tatra tu prativiśeṣaḥ* (7.3.21); *kāryasiddhiḥ* (7.5.45); *evaṃ upalabhya* (9.3.42).[227]

Such examples do demonstrate cases where the prose depends on the verse. But, I must disagree with Scharfe's implication that these examples prove that these verses must be older than their greater prose contexts.[228] Not only has one of these, KAŚ 1.8.29, already been linked to the *adhyāya* redaction, we can see that it would have been little more difficult for a redactor to have added a bit of preceding text along with a verse as it would have been to add the verse itself. Indeed, this might have been quite necessary if the verse was not well adapted to its prose context. These examples might be convincing if the verse were grammatically incomplete, but that is not the case: in all of the passages cited above the following verse is complete unto itself.

For similar reasons connective syntax within *adhyāya* end verses demonstrates only the dependence of the verse on the preceding prose and not any integral connection between the two. It would be a trifling matter for a redactor to have placed connective syntax, such as *vā*, *hi*, *ca*, *tasmāt*, and so forth, in a verse in order to produce a conjunction between pre-existing prose and a novel verse. The same is true for any such language in a verse that looks back to the prose. Neither discrete use of a demonstrative pronoun (*etāḥ*),[229] proper name (*saṃsthāḥ*),[230] emblematic language (*evam svaviśaye*

---

introducing 7.6.15; 7.9.37 introducing 38–49), pointing to a prevailing tendency toward verse citation found only in the 7th *adhikaraṇa*.

[227] Also not included here are the verses referred to as "mantras" in preceding or following *sūtra*s (all syntactically complete whether enumerated with the verse as single unit in Kangle's edition) or and instructed to be recited (2.24.27 and in the 14th *adhikaraṇa*). These examples, like those discussed in the preceding note, show that the text was aware of the verses. But, in both cases, it marks them as quotations. Like the preceding examples then, conscious verse citation provides not evidence for and may actually argue against the kind of casual verse usage argued to underlie the *adhyāya* end verses.

[228] 1993, 50

[229] KAŚ 1.11.22

kṛtyān akṛtyāṃś ca)[231] nor even direct references to the foregoing subject matter (*iti etāḥ pañca saṃsthāḥ prakīrtitāḥ*)[232] are, of themselves, sufficient evidence for adducing an integral relationship between the prose and the *adhyāya* end verses (much less the anteriority of the latter!).[233]

5.5.2 Argument Structure Integration

The only manner in which an integral relationship might be proven between the prose and the *adhyāya* end verses is in cases that the end verse is required to complete an argument whose structure has been enunciated in the prose.[234] The only passages that can possibly be included in this category are few in the text: KAŚ 1.14.11–12, 7.6.40–41, and 13.1.21.[235] Because the demonstration of an integral relationship suggests the dependence of the prose on the verse, thereby indicating the possibility that the verse may have been original to the *prakaraṇa*-text, we will look at each of these examples individually.

---

[230] *Ibid.*

[231] KAŚ 1.13.26

[232] KAŚ 1.11.22

[233] Again, to the contrary, such strategies would make obscuring the novelty of added verses a simple matter.

[234] We should note at the outset, however, that if we imagine that the *adhyāya* redactor may not only have added verses, but may also have converted, in some cases, the original prose conclusions into verse form, then even this type of analysis becomes much less useful. This model is not less possible than Scharfe's, wherein the composer of the prose text leaves verses scattered throughout the text at *adhyāya* junctions.

[235] An exception to this is the end verse at KAŚ 1.8.19, which, however is clearly linked to the *adhyāya* redactor and will be discussed again below in connection with the Kauṭilya dialogues (§6.3.2). A number of lesser examples demonstrate a particularly strong continuity between the end verses and the foregoing prose, although not rising to the level of the two examples given above. Among these, we might site kaŚ 1.10.16–20; 1.11.22; 1.18.16; 1.19.8; 2.3.34–35; 2.19.65–66; 4.2.36; 5.6.45; 7.8.34; 7.12.29–31; 13.2.45–50; 13.3.58; and 13.4.63. Clearly constituting connected but separate discussions are 1.12.19–25; 6.1.15–18; 7.1.25; 7.5.45–49; and 7.6.34–41. I deem all of these however to be ambiguous and to lack a sufficient sense of "necessary connection." This does not mean that more detailed examination of some examples might not yield interesting information, but only that we cannot identify among them firm examples of 'integral and necessary' connection with the prose.

Interestingly, two of these end verses, KAŚ 1.14.11–12 and 13.1.21, are intimately related, despite occuring at opposite ends of the text. The former, KAŚ 1.14.11–22, concludes the *prakaraṇa*, "The Winning Over of Seducible and Non-Seducible Parties in the Enemy's Realm." This passage first describes four groups of people who are liable to be seduced away from the enemy: people who are enraged, frightened, greedy, and proud (KAŚ 1.14.2–5). The passage then advises that the king should "cause them to be instigated" (*upajāpayet*) by secret agents (KAŚ 1.14.6) and goes on to detail what the secret agent should say to each group, concluding the prescribed incitements with *iti* [x] *upajāpayet*, "thus should he instigate [x]." After the passage has given different instructions for the instigation of each of the four groups, the end verse concludes:

KAŚ 1.14.11 tatheti pratipannāms tān saṃhitān paṇakarmaṇā
yojayet yathāśakti sāpasarpāṇ svakarmasu

Those who assent with "yes," bonded with a reward, he should employ
according to their power in his own labors, watched by spies.

So it would appear that the end verse is integrated with the prose by means of providing the sought response from the instigated party: *tathā-iti*, "yes." It then goes on to advise the king to employ them in a generic fashion.

The next example at KAŚ 13.1.21, concludes a *prakaraṇa* called "Instigation." This *prakaraṇa* is concerned with tactics for besieging an enemy's fortress and discusses the demoralization of the enemy prior to the siege (KAŚ 13.1.10) and instigating the enemy's chiefs to sedition (KAŚ 13.1.11–20). So we see immediately a congruence in topic between this and the previous example.

The instigation to sedition occurs in three passages, but only in the final do we find the reported speech of the instigator. Then, as with the previous example, we read in the end verse:

KAŚ 13.1.21 tatheti pratipanneṣu dravyadhānyaparigrahaiḥ
sācivyaṃ kāryam ity etad upajāpād bhutaṃ mahat

When they assent with "yes," aid should be rendered with wares and grains; this is the great miracle arising from instigation.

In neither case is it immediately clear that a response is expected or required. A comparison between the verses allows us to cast more broadly through the text for parallel examples.

We note first that both verses possess nearly identical language in their first *pada* (KAŚ 1.14.11a: *tatheti pratipannān*; KAŚ 1.13.21a: *tatheti pratipanneṣu*). The phrase "*tathā-iti*" is used in other places in the *Arthaśāstra*: KAŚ 1.17.39, 5.6.36, 9.3.41, and 13.2.8.[236] The term *pratipanna* is even better attested, and almost always occurs in the context of agreeing to instigation.[237] Both of these indicate that these end verses are drawing on a more common trope.

If we look more broadly for the practice of rendering responses to instigation (*upa+jap*), we find that some passages detailing instigations discuss either the acceptance (*pratipanna*)[238] or refusal (*pratyākhyāna*)[239] of the instigated party, while others say nothing at all about the response of the instigated party,[240] presumably assuming the acquiescence to the instigation.

---

[236] We note that all of these citations occur in parts of the text dealing with some form of instigation.

[237] Again, however, its use is uneven. In the first four books it is only found at KAŚ 1.14.11. Examples of its use in the latter half of the text, however, are voluminous: KAŚ 5.1.16; 5.1.34, 5.1.51, 5.2.60, 7.8.3, 9.3.29, 9.3.30. 9.3.39, 11.1.23, 11.1.32, 11.1.43, 12.3.13, 12.5.24, 13.1.17, 13.1.21, 13.2.4, 13.2.10, 13.2.19, 13.2.34, 13.2.40, 13.2.43, 13.3.18, 13.3.27, 13.4.31, 13.4.36, 13.4.40, and 13.4.43. The divergence in usage may be important. It is possible that context can explain much, if not all, of this divergence.

[238] These examples, as also at KAŚ 11.1.22, etc.

[239] KAŚ 1.10.4, 1.10.6, 1.10.8, 1.10.12, etc

[240] KAŚ 1.11.3; 9.6.45; 9.6.47 (not with *upa+jap*); 12.3.15; 12.3.16 (not with *upa+jap*)

Ultimately, we find that verbal instigation sometimes warrants a response and at other times does not. Concomitantly, we are left with little sense whether a response to the instigation should be expected in these cases. While they demonstrate a clear connection, it is not entirely clear that they are integral to their greater passages.

The final potential example comes at KAŚ 7.6.40–41. It concludes an *adhyāya* comprising two *prakaraṇa*s: "Concerning the March of Two Kings Who Have Entered an Alliance"; and "Treaties with Stipulations, Without Stipulations, and With Deserters." The first *prakaraṇa* is covered in KAŚ 7.6.1–3. The second is covered in several sections: treaties with stipulations are covered at KAŚ 7.6.4–12; treaties without stipulations are covered in a single sentence at KAŚ 7.6.13. After a brief interpolation, the passage continues:

KAŚ 7.6.16 saṃdher akṛtacikīrṣā kṛtaśleṣaṇaṃ kṛtavidūṣaṇam avaśīrṇakriyā ca
KAŚ 7.6.17 vikramasya prakāśayuddhaṃ kūṭayuddhaṃ tūṣṇīṃyuddham
KAŚ 7.6.18 iti saṃdhivikramau

Of a treaty, there is a desire for one not made, clinging to one made, spoiling one made, and repairing what is broken.
Of war, there is open war, concealed war, and secret war.
Thus, treaty and war.

The passage continues on to discuss at KAŚ 7.6.19-22 the four kinds of treaty mentioned at 7.6.16. This leads into a discussion of whom, among those who have broken a treaty, should be accepted back (KAŚ 7.23–39), which runs into the end verses. Finally, in the final end verse couplet, we read:

KAŚ 7.6.40–41 Open war is fighting at the place and time indicated; creating fright, sudden assault, striking when there is error or calamity, giving way and striking in one place, are types of concealed warfare; that which concerns secret practices and instigations through secret agents is the mark of silent war.

Thus, a topic opened in the prose (KAŚ 7.6.16–18) is apparently concluded in the end verse. The *prakaraṇa* is clearly only concerned with treaties, the mention of war in the prose at KAŚ 7.6.17–18 being topically out of place. This opens the possibility that mention of the four kinds of treaties at 7.6.16 attracted a discussion of the three kinds of war at 7.6.17, the interpolation of which is indicated by the *iti* clause in 7.6.18. Nevertheless, an integral connection between prose and verse is evident, if also somewhat weak. Finally, the two verses referring to the kinds of war come at the end of a long cluster of end verses (KAŚ 7.6.34–41), which may indicate that they are themselves later additions. While it is possible that such a verse may have been added in recognition of the absence of any discussion of the three kinds of war in the text, it is equally likely that it reveals some kind of integral relationship between prose and verse.

We must, therefore, reserve these three examples as evidence of places where the prose and verse might show a degree of rhetorical integration. Ultimately, however, we can only conclude that evidence in favor of *strong* integration between end verse and prose is lacking. These three examples do not rise to the level of clear evidence.

5.5.3 Verses Extending the Prose

We find many examples in the text of end verses that extend the purview of the prose into new areas, subtopics, or applications. These, like the examples of syntactic integration examined above, do not indicate any necessary relationship between prose and verse other than the dependence of the latter on the former. Many examples of this can be found and do not require explication: KAŚ 1.18.16, 2.3.34–35, 2.20.65–66, 4.7.23–28, 6.1.15, 7.6.33–34, 7.11.45, 7.18.43–44, 13.4.63, and 15.1.71.

5.5.4 Redundancy between Prose and Verse

We come, then, to the most important evidence adduced by Scharfe to prove his theory of a verse original for the extant *Arthaśāstra*. He points out several places in the text where an *adhyāya* end verse corresponds very closely to the preceding prose: "in several chapters the last prose sentence corresponds to the concluding stanza, almost to the point of duplicating it; if there are several concluding stanzas, the prose corresponds to the first of them" (1993, 49). As an example of this we can cite KAŚ 4.12.36–37← →4.12.38–40:

KAŚ 4.12.36–37 paracakrāṭavīhṛtām oghapravyūḍhām araṇyeṣu durbhikṣe vā tyaktāṃ pretabhāvotsṛṣṭāṃ vā parastriyaṃ nistārayitvā yathāsaṃbhāṣitaṃ samupabhuñjīta
jātiviśiṣṭām akāmām apatyavatīṃ niṣkrayeṇa dadhyāt

After rescuing a stranger woman, who was being carried off by enemy troops or foresters, or carried away by a current, or was abandoned in a forest or during a famine, or was left under the impression of being dead, a man may enjoy her as agreed upon.
If she is superior in caste, unwilling, or has children, he shall give her back for a ransom.

KAŚ 4.12.38–40 corahastāṇ nadīvegād durbhikṣād deśavibhramāt
nistārayitvā kāntārān naṣṭāṃ tyaktāṃ bhṛteti vā
bhuñjīta striyam anyeṣāṃ yathāsaṃbhāṣitaṃ naraḥ
na tu rājapratāpena pramuktāṃ svajanena vā
na cottamāṃ na cākāmāṃ pūrvāpatyavatīm na ca
īdṛśīṃ tv anurūpeṇa niṣkrayeṇāpavāhayet

After having rescued a woman belong to others from the hands of robbers, from the current of a river, from a famine, from a disturbance in the country, from a forest, or when she is lost or left for dead, a man may enjoy her as agreed, but not one who is saved through the power of the king or by her kinsmen, nor one higher [in caste] nor one unwilling, nor again one who already has children; such a one, however, he should restore in return for a suitable ransom.

He compares this phenomenon in the *Arthaśāstra* "to the *śloka-vārttika*-s which often underlie discussion in the *Mahābhāṣya*, in that parts of the stanzas are quoted, turned into prose and explained; at the end of the discussion the stanzas are quoted once more, completely and without interruption" (1993, 49).

There are several problems, however, with Scharfe's comparison to the *Mahābhāṣya*. To begin with, discrete correspondence between prose and ending verse in the *Arthaśāstra* is far from the norm. Scharfe only adduces 8 examples in 150 *adhyāya*s. If he has identified an underlying structural pattern akin to that of the *Mahābhāṣya*, then we find that it has been remarkably well obscured in most of the text. Moreover, we nowhere see the discrete unpacking of a verse in the prose. As in the example above, the only evidence of such a phenomenon comes a verse merely restating the preceding prose: nowhere is a *vārttikā* observed, nor do any end verses seem to provide a kind of "root" text upon which the prose comments. As we have seen above, most verses are either purposeful conclusions or extensions of the prose. Whatever is going on in the *Arthaśāstra*, it is not occuring on the model of the *ślokavārttika*s.

If we look at the passages Scharfe has adduced in favor of his theory, we see that it is by no means clear that the prose is a repetition of the verse. In many cases, there is simply no evidence of which might have had priority or whether both are borrowing from a third source.[241] In a number of cases, however, we actually have strong evidence that the verses have taken the prose as their model rather than *vice versa*.

If we revisit the example cited above, we note that the verses contain several pieces of information not replicated in the prose, including the important rule that a woman saved through the power of the king or a kinsman is also saved from "being

[241] We cite, in this regard KAŚ 1.6.5←→1.6.11; 3.20.22←→3.20.24; 9.7.82-83 ←→ 9.7.84. The only way to see in these the priority of the verse is to assume it.

enjoyed" (KAŚ 4.12.39). If the prose were later, then this omission is significant and difficult to explain; if the verse is later, we can see it simply as an addition.

If we compare the language of the prose and verse we note that, while some of the same lexical items are used (*durbhikṣa*, *nistārayitvā*, etc.), we also find the use of synonyms (*nadī* in the verse for *ogha* in the prose [river/current]; *kāntāra* for *araṇya* [forest]). It is difficult to understand why, if the verse was the source, the prose would have chosen different terms. Conversely, if the prose were the source, the selection of different terms is easier to explain: the original terms did not fit well to the metrical needs of the verse composer. In this regard we also note that the terms that are identical between prose and verse tend to fall in the first half of the the *śloka*'s *pada*s (feet), where the metrical requirements are much looser:

KAŚ 4.12.38–40 corahastāṇ nadīvegād । durbhikṣād deśavibhramāt
nistārayitvā kāntārān । naṣṭāṃ tyaktām bhṛteti vā
bhuñjīta striyam anyeṣāṃ । yathāsaṃbhāṣitaṃ naraḥ
na tu rājapratāpena । pramuktāṃ svajanena vā
na cottamāṃ na cākāmāṃ । pūrvāpatyavatīṃ na ca
īdṛśīṃ tv anurūpeṇa । niṣkrayeṇāpavāhayet

By these indications, the prose appears to be earlier than the verse. We note similar indications of the anteriority of the prose at KAŚ 6.1.12←→7.9.38, 7.16.29(31)←→7.16.33, and 13.4.6←→13.4.7. The connection between KAŚ 10.3.56 and 10.3.57 is too weak to demonstrate any such dependency, and the latter being very close to a verse at MBh 12.100.13, is likely a free gnomic citation that may have been attracted to thematic similarities to the prose.

Ultimately, the balance of evidence in cases where any relationship can be determined clearly favors that the prose appears to be the source of the verse. But, another consideration that emerges in these cases is the frequency with which passages like this, both prose and verse, are disconnected from the preceding prose discussions.

So, at KAŚ 3.20.14–20, the final *prakaraṇa* lists miscellaneous crimes and punishments (*prakīrṇaka*), until, at 3.20.21, the topic suddenly shifts to jurisprudence more generally, and at 3.20.22 we read that "[t]he judges themselves shall look into the affairs of gods, Brahmins, ascetics…," which is the sentiment repeated in the end verse: "In this way judges should look into affairs…" (KAŚ 3.20.24). Hence, *both prose and verse* demonstrate a disconnection from the foregoing.

This is repeated at KAŚ 4.12.36–40, given above, where *adhyāya* 4.12 has discussed different sexual crimes. The topic repeated in prose and verse, the right of a man to "enjoy" a rescued woman, is wholly out of place. Even more emblematic of this tendency, the repeating prose and verse at KAŚ 9.7.82–84 are completely disconnected with the preceding prose and fall *after* the colophon concluding the final *prakaraṇa* of the *adhyāya*: *iti siddhayaḥ* ("These are the Means of Overcoming [Dangers]").

These examples, which show the prevalence with which the pattern of repeated prose and verse are disconnected from the foregoing prose, suggest a common origin for both. I would argue that, in these cases, the *adhyāya* redactor needed to forge a link between the prose and the sentiment he wished to express in verse. And, to that end, he composed the prose passages and then turned it into a verse.[242]

We must conclude, then, that the available evidence supports the notion that the verses in these cases depend on the prose. This, of course, rules out the possibility that these passages demonstrate the remnants of a process by which a verse composition was converted into a prose text. Hence, we can conclude that Scharfe's theory of the verse original stands on insufficient evidence.

---

[242] We note, in this regard, other examples in the text where a shift in topic occurs in the last one or two prose *sūtra*s of an *adhyāya* that is nevertheless in agreement with the verse itself: KAŚ 2.19.45–46, 2.23.17–19, etc.

5.6 Conclusion: End Verses Implicated

Because the colophons and end verses operate in tandem throughout the text, they appear to have a common origin. It is precisely because of this intimacy, however, that proof of that supposition is so difficult to ascertain.

If we put together what we have learned from the available evidence, a very strong case can be made that nearly all (if not all) of the *adhyāya* end verses are interpolations made by the *adhyāya* redactor. We note first that it is firmly established that this *adhyāya* redaction did take place and was effected on the body of the *prakaraṇa*-text. We have surmised that this redaction must, at a minimum, have been represented by the insertion of colophons at the present *adhyāya* boundaries. I would also argue that bare colophons would not have established the *adhyāya*s so preeminently, and that the verses would have granted to the new *adhyāya* segments a discrete textual shape. The authoritative resonance of their verse form and their frequently conclusive tone would have helped to enunciate the *adhyāya* divisions and generate stable new segments.

The second thing to note is that an examination of the internal verses in the text demonstrates that the use of verses outside of the present *adhyāya* conclusions is infrequent, limited to specific places in the text, and poorly protected from suspicions of interpolation. This shows that the present *adhyāya* end verses can scarcely be viewed as continuous with the use of verse in the text more generally. They are a distinct phenomenon. As such, the *prakaraṇa*-text takes on even more the characteristic of a purely prose text.

The verses that presently end *adhyāya*s are not, therefore, drawn from a scattering of random verses throughout the text, but are built of verses that happen to fall specifically at the present *adhyāya* junctures. This means that the present *adhyāya* end

verses have always served the purpose that they serve now: the subdivision of the text. Their frequently conclusive sentiment reinforces this view.

Despite the fact that this is something that must be judged subjectively, the evidence of widespread disjuncture between prose and verse argues against a common authorship for the two. Scharfe has faulted the prose author for deviating from the dictates of the putative verse Ur-text. This theory is not only counterintuitive, but rests on discredited evidence. The simple truth is that, for the most part, the prose does not need the verses, but the verses need the prose. Evidence of integration between the two is ambiguous.[243]

From this, I would argue that the end verses in the text can generally be attributed to the *adhyāya* redaction. We find little support for the use of verse outside of the *adhyāya* boundaries and evidence of integration between verse and prose is very weak. For the most part, then, we can consider the *Arthaśāstra*'s end verses to be "a foreign corpus adjoined to a received text."

[243] Most end verses, certainly, are unremarkable in this regard, which is to say that they betray neither a necessary connection nor any obvious disjunction with the preceding prose.[243] From these examples we can draw no conclusions, other than that we *do not* find evidence of disjuncture between prose and verse in these passages. Aggregating, with these, the *adhyāya*s that possess inverses themselves integrated with the prose (§5.6.2), we can recognize that *adhikaraṇa*s 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 show no clear disjuncture between verse and prose. On the contrary, clear examples of disjuncture are found only in *adhikaraṇa*s 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7.

Chapter 6: *Adhyāya* Redaction III – Scholastic Exchanges

The inclusion of the end verses in the *adhyāya* redaction gives us a firm body of textual material strongly associated with the *adhyāya* redaction that can be analyzed for content. This moves our analysis of the *adhyāya* redaction from the logic of segmentation to the ideational content of its interpolations. In this chapter, we look at the most prominent feature of the *Arthaśāstra* to be implicated in the *adhyāya* redaction: the scholastic exchanges, which I refer to as Kauṭilya dialogues. An analysis of these dialogues not only shows a direct connection with the *adhyāya* end verses, but also reveals various other ways in which these dialogues betray their own role in the local interpolation and transformation of various passages.

We find the opinion of Kauṭilya directly quoted 88 times in the text.[244] They are concentrated most heavily in *adhikaraṇa*s 1 (9 times), 3 (10), 7 (29), and 8 (28). These Kauṭilya dialogues, for their part, make no such claims about the authorship of the whole treatise, but only the *uttarapakṣa*s given in Kauṭilya's voice.[245] Nevertheless, we do see a common function between the direct attributions from elements dating to the *adhyāya* redaction and the dialogues: both seek to put the words of the text in the mouth of a legendary statesman, a Brahmin no less, who is credited with establishing the greatest South Asian dynasty of antiquity.

The traditional ascription of the entire text to Kauṭilya seems to have come more from the end verses (discussed below) than from the Kauṭilya dialogues, which can as

[244] Not including citations of the same among the *tantrayukti*s in KAŚ 15.1.

[245] Although the extent of these *uttarapakṣa*s is at times unclear, for they do not always begin with the explanatory particle *hi* or conclude with the quotative particle *iti*. A prime example of this occurs in the Kauṭilya dialogue at KAŚ 1.17.30*ff.*, where it is not clear if Kauṭilya has concluded at 1.17.33 or whether his response continues onward, as the next passage (1.17.34) features the connective particle *tu*. These kinds of "voice problems" are common in the *Arthaśāstra*.

easily be interpreted to demonstrate that Kauṭilya did *not* write the greater treatise. On this point, we note that the text itself is identified in the *adhikaraṇa* colophons as the *kauṭalīyārthaśāstra*, which name has two possible translations. The term "Kauṭalīya" is a nominal derivative (*taddhita*) of the clan (*gotra*) name Kauṭilya.[246] Hence, it submits to two translations: "The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya" or "The Arthaśāstra of the Followers of Kauṭilya." The latter would be more in line with the notion of a prose text into which the voice of the followers' teacher occasionally irrupts. Not only do the dialogues themselves speak of him in the third person (a not wholly conclusive fact), but the manner of the irruption of these dialogues into the text mimics the manner in which a teacher might interject or be invoked by his followers to settle the occasional thorny issue on which other teachers have offered erroneous or conflicting opinions. At any rate, the name of the text is not attested before the addition of the *adhikaraṇa* colophons (of uncertain origin), so it tells us little about the origins of the treatise. It does, however, leave open the possibility that the early composers and editors may not have thought that Kauṭilya composed the whole treatise.

The following sections look at the evidence that suggests the Kauṭilya material in the *Arthaśāstra* can be linked to the *adhyāya* redaction. As with the *adhyāya* end verses, we will not be able to implicate all of the Kauṭilya quotations in the text at a stroke. But, as also with those verses, we can find a sufficient concurrence of evidence that many of the passages under consideration are linked to the *adhyāya* redaction and many more cannot have been written by the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text. And, as with the end verses, we can see that the Kauṭilya quotes possess unique tendencies and functions that

[246] I do not here go into the debate regarding the spelling Kauṭilya vs. Kauṭalya. For more on this, see Berger 1955, Jolly 1927, Kangle 1965, 111*ff.*

suggest they can be isolated as a discrete compositional element, the work of a single composer and introduced into the text at a single moment.

6.1 DIRECT ATTRIBUTION OF THE *ARTHAŚĀSTRA* TO KAUṬILYA

As mentioned above, all of the direct ascriptions of the *Arthaśāstra* to Kauṭilya fall in *adhyāya* end verses (KAŚ 1.1.19, 2.10.63, and 15.1.71–73). Because of their connection with the *adhyāya* redaction,[247] these must not only be rejected as providing evidence of the authorship of the text, but must be admitted as potential evidence of the relatively late attribution of the work to Kauṭilya.

The first passage (KAŚ 1.1.19) is the end verse of the first *adhyāya*. As noted above, this *adhyāya* falls "outside" of the *prakaraṇa*-text itself. As such, this verse cannot have its origin with the composer of the *prakaraṇa*-text and was almost certainly added by the *adhyāya* redactor to transform the material of the first *adhyāya* into a uniform segment within the text (the first of 150):

KAŚ 1.1.19 sukhagrahaṇavijñeyaṃ tattvārthapadaniścitam
kauṭilyena kṛtaṃ śāstram vimuktagranthavistaram

Easy to grasp and understand, harmonious among reality, meaning, and word, this *śāstra* was composed by Kauṭilya, free of excess verbiage.

Clearly, this verse, looking back at the long list of *prakaraṇa*s and *adhikaraṇa*s at KAŚ 1.1.3–17, attributes the entire text to Kauṭilya. Moreover, it echoes the opening line of the first *adhyāya* (and hence, the opening line of the text):

KAŚ 1.1.1 pṛthivyā lābhe pālane ca yāvanty arthaśāstrāṇi pūrvācāryaiḥ
prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni saṃhṛtyaikam idam arthaśāstram kṛtam

[247] It should be noted that each of these bears an independent relationship with the *adhyāya* redaction beyond their simply being *adhyāya* end verses. The connection of the first and last *adhyāya*s has been discussed above (§3.4). The connection of KAŚ 2.10 to the *adhyāya* redaction is discussed in Chapter 7.

> This single *arthaśāstra* was composed by bringing together most of *arthaśāstra*s that have been composed by previous teachers for the purpose of acquiring and protecting the world.

The repetition of the [*idam*] [*artha*]*śāstraṃ kṛtam* formula links these two passages and reveals how both are primarily concerned with describing the composition of the text itself. They are hardly incidental, but purposeful testaments to the text as a whole.

The second attribution of the entire treatise to Kauṭilya comes at the end of the final *adhyāya* (KAŚ 15.1), also dated to the *adhyāya* redaction. We note also that this end verse passage concludes the text:

> KAŚ 15.1.71–73 evam śāstram idaṃ yuktam etābhis tantrayuktibhiḥ
> avāptau pālane coktam lokasyāsya parasya ca
> dharmam arthaṃ ca kāmaṃ ca pravartayati pāti ca
> adharmānarthavidveśān idam śāstram nihanti ca
> yena śāstraṃ ca śastraṃ ca nandarājagatā ca bhūḥ
> amarṣeṇoddhṛtāny āsu tena śāstram idaṃ kṛtam
>
> Thus this *śāstra*, expounded with these *tantrayukti*s, has been composed for the acquisition and protection of this world and the next.
> This *śāstra* brings into being and preserves *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma* and destroys *adharma*, *anartha* and hatred.
> This *śāstra* has been composed by him [*i.e.*, Kauṭilya], who in resentment, quickly regenerated the science and the weapon and the earth that was under the control of the Nanda kings.

The verbal formula and concepts at work here weave KAŚ 1.1.1, 1.1.19, and 15.1.71–73 into a comprehensive set of attributions. The verse at KAŚ 15.1.73, with its reference to the acquisition (*avāpti*) and protection (*pālana*) of the earth (*loka*) concludes its *adhyāya* with a restatement of the opening phrase of 1.1.1 (*prithivyā* [:*lokasya*] *lābhe* [:*avaptau*] *pālane* [:*pālane*]), while maintaining the *idaṃ śāstram kṛtam* (:*uktam*) formula from there. The final verse, KAŚ 15.1.73, like 1.1.1, 1.1.19, and 15.1.71 deals with the

composition of the text, and identifies Kauṭilya as the composer in all but name as the vanquisher of the Nanda kings. Note again the formula *tena śāstram idam kṛtam*, a direct echo of *idam arthaśāstraṃ kṛtam* in KAŚ 1.1.1, *kauṭīlyena śāstram kṛtam* in 1.1.19, and *śāstram idam…uktam* in 15.1.73.

Hence we find that our direct attributions of the authorship of the text to Kauṭilya fall at key points in the text: the beginning and end of the first *adhyāya* and the end of the last *adhyāya*, all positions that link them directly to the *adhyāya* redaction. Moreover, their uniquely direct discussion of the composition, utilizing an archetypal formula of **kauṭilyena idam śāstram kṛtam* links them stylistically to one another. This illustrates that the *adhyāya* redactor is responsible for the direct attribution of the entire text to Kauṭilya.

The only other direct attribution of any part of the text to Kauṭilya comes in the end verse of *adhyāya* 2.10, an infamously difficult passage on edicts. Scharfe has ably demonstrated that this *adhyāya* has been culled from several different sources (1993, 60–66). It is also one of the *adhyāya*s richest in *adhyāya*-internal verses. Perhaps in awareness of the transparency of its constructed and novel character (or perhaps because the introduction of a new *adhyāya* provided more freedom in the construction of a novel end verse), its concluding verse hastens to tell us:

> KAŚ 2.10.63 sarvaśāstrāṇy anukramya prayogam upalabhya ca
> kauṭilyena narendrārthe śāsanasya vidhiḥ kṛtaḥ
>
> After going through all the *śāstra*s in detail and after observing the practice, Kauṭilya has made these rules about edicts for the sake of kings.

This end verse in particular among all others is strongly linked to the *adhyāya* redactor (see Chapter 7). Moreover, it is stylistically linked to the verbiage of the KAŚ 1.1.1 as well as the citation formula of the other verses directly attributing the text to

Kauṭilya. Hence we recognize *sarvaśāśtrāṇy anukramya* ("After going through all the *śāstra*s in detail") as a paraphrase of *yāvanty arthaśāstrāṇi pūrvācāryaiḥ prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni saṃhṛtya* ("Having brought together most part of the Arthaśāstras that were composed by previous teachers") from KAŚ 1.1.1. Note also the presence of the citation formula, **kauṭilyena idaṃ śāstraṃ kṛtam* in the verse's *kauṭilyena…vidhiḥ kṛtaḥ*.

6.1.1 Are the Dialogues Linked to These Passages?

It follows that the only direct ascriptions of the text to Kauṭilya are both strongly linked to the *adhyāya* redaction and strongly linked to one another in point of style and phraseology. In these verses, we can identify a concerted effort on the part of the *adhyāya* redactor to demonstrate not only Kauṭilya's authorship of the *Arthaśāstra*, but also the manner of the text's construction (by pulling together previous texts). The recognition of these efforts begins to cast doubt on the origin of the Kauṭilya dialogues, for it is in those places that other "texts" or, at least, "previous teachers," are directly cited in the text. While the precise compositional process referred to in these passages is not entirely clear, it is highly possible that the reference to collating the works of previous teachers is meant to refer to the citation of other teachers in the *pūrvapakṣa*s of the Kauṭilya dialogues.[248]

Let us look again more closely at the opening line of the extant text:

KAŚ 1.1.1 pṛthivyā lābhe pālane ca yāvanty arthaśāstrāṇi pūrvācāryaiḥ prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni saṃhṛtyaikam idam arthaśāstraṃ kṛtam

This single *arthaśāstra* was composed by bringing together most of *arthaśāstra*s that have been composed by previous teachers for the purpose of acquiring and protecting the world.

[248] It is no less likely that the reference to collecting earlier sources refers to the aggregation and editing of larger tracts, perhaps, as Trautmann has argued, comparable to the present *adhikaraṇa*s of the text (1971). My sense, however, is that the reference in KAŚ 1.1.1 is almost certain made regarding the Kauṭilya dialogues.

The key phrase in this regard is *yāvanty arthaśāstrāṇi pūrvācāryaiḥ prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni saṃhṛtya*, which, while being somewhat obscure, is best translated as "having drawn together most of the Arthaśāstras produced by earlier teachers."[249] In this, we are told that the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* was composed after the author had brought together (*saṃ* + √*hṛ*) most of the *arthaśāstra*s produced by *pūrvācārya*s, "previous teachers."

The intention of this passage is not only to recognize the generally composite (*saṃ* + √*hṛ*) nature of the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, but also to highlight the role of the productions (*prasthāpita*) of previous teachers (*pūrvācārya*). And some of these *pūrvācārya*s must indeed appear in our present text, generally providing the *pūrvapakṣa*s in the Kauṭilya dialogues. They are often mentioned by name (*Bhāradvāja*, *Viśālākṣa*, *Parāśara*, *Piśuna*, *Kauṇapadanta*, *Vātavyādhi*, *Bāhudantīputra*, and so on) or by school (*Mānava* [*i.e.*, Manu], *Bārhaspatya* [Bṛhaspati], *Auśanasa* [Uśanas], etc.). Frequently (56 times), however, they are cited collectively as the *ācārya*s.[250] The reference at KAS 1.1.1 and the citations in the *pūrvapakṣa*s are not to the specifically religious *ācārya* of orthodox Vedic education, who is invoked less frequently in the text (13 times)[251] and is defined by his sacral character and personal, lifelong relationship with the pupil, but rather experts in various fields to whom one resorts as needed for expertise in specific

[249] Translations follows Olivelle (forthcoming).

[250] Note the predominance of the generic reference to *ācārya*s in the latter half of the text; the earlier half tends, instead, to cite individual teachers. KAŚ 1.4.6; 1.10.16; 2.9.11; 3.4.9; 3.5.23; 3.7.1; 3.14.6; 3.17.10; 3.19.17; 3.19.19; 3.20.24; 7.1.2; 7.1.30; 7.4.8; 7.5.3; 7.5.12; 7.6.30; 7.9.9; 7.9.13; 7.9.18; 7.9.22; 7.9.26; 7.9.31; 7.9.50; 7.10.12; 7.11.13; 7.11.37; 7.12.9; 7.12.14; 7.12.19; 7.12.22; 7.13.31; 7.15.15; 7.17.3; 8.1.5; 8.2.5; 8.2.29; 8.2.13; 8.2.21; 8.4.2; 8.4.5; 8.4.9; 8.4.13; 8.4.16; 8.4.21; 8.4.25; 8.4.27; 8.4.31; 8.4.34; 8.4.38; 8.4.41; 9.1.5; 9.1.12; 9.1.26; 9.1.42; 9.2.21.

[251] KAŚ 1.3.10; 1.9.10; 1.19.23; 1.19.31; 2.1.7; 2.4.8; 3.6.23; 3.16.37; 3.20.18; 4.11.13; 4.13.30; 5.3.3.

areas, as attested at KAŚ 1.5.6, 2.30.42, and 5.3.18.[252] It is clearly to such specialists, particularly teachers of *arthaśāstra*, that KAŚ 1.1.1 refers.

Hence, the *ācārya*s of the Kauṭilya dialogues are the same kinds of individuals from whose works KAŚ 1.1.1 tells us that the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* was composed. While it is not entirely clear that the *adhyāya* redactor is referring in this passage specifically to the Kauṭilya dialogues themselves, the dialogues do, nevertheless, stand as the most representative examples in the text of the manner in which the *adhyāya* redactor states that the extant *Arthaśāstra* was composed. I would argue, moreover, that this connection would have been extremely clear to the *adhyāya* redactor, who places the collation of previous teachers' pronouncements at the heart of the text's composition (according to KAŚ 1.1.1). Hence, I would argue that we find a possible connection between the way that the *adhyāya* redactor characterized the fundamental process by which the text was composed and the dialogues themselves.

6.2 Overlap between End Verses and Dialogues

Despite the apparent connection discussed above between the Kauṭilya dialogues and direct ascription of the *Arthaśāstra* to Kauṭilya, we have other indications that the *adhyāya* redactor was responsible for the inclusion of some of the Kauṭilya dialogues. The best evidence of this comes in two passages wherein a Kauṭilya dialogue is carried out wholly or in part within an *adhyāya* end verse.

KAŚ 1.10.16–20

The most important of these comes in the end verse of *adhyāya* 1.10 (discussed already at §5.4.3), where not only the entire Kauṭilya dialogue occurs in the end verses,

[252] Note in particular, KAŚ 1.5.6: "But training and discipline in the sciences [are acquired] by [accepting] the authoritativeness of the teachers in the respective sciences (*yathāsvam ācāryaprāmāṇyāt*)."

but the end verses actually cast the preceding prose text as the opinion of "the teachers" (*ācārya*) before going on to give Kauṭilya's.

The context is the discussion of the four tests by which the king may ascertain the loyalty (*śuddha*) of his ministers (*amātya*). The prose discussion describes four tests, each of which involve deceiving a minister by giving the appearance that the king is impious, wicked, or dangerous or that the queen is in love with the targeted minister. In all of the cases the king or queen is the "object" of the ruse. The prose discussion is unambiguous in advising these tests and, what is more, complete unto itself (KAŚ 1.10.1–15).

The prose is followed by four integrated end verses. The first summarizes the conclusion of the prose (KAŚ 1.10.13–15) and crucially presents the entire foregoing passage as the *pūrvapakṣa* (erroneous view) of the "teachers" (*ācārya*):

> KAŚ 1.10.16 "He should appoint ministers, who have been cleared by [the four tests], to duties appropriate to them and in accordance with their integrity": this has been laid down by the teachers (*ācārya*).

Having thus recast the entire prose *prakaraṇa* as the erroneous view, the verses go on to give the *uttarapakṣa* ("correct view") in the voice of Kauṭilya:

> KAŚ 1.10.17–20 "However, under no circumstance must the king make himself or the queen the target for the sake of ascertaining the probity of ministers"; this is the opinion of Kauṭilya (*etat kauṭilyadarśanam*).
> "He should not effect the corruption of the uncorrupted as of water by poison; for, it may well happen that a cure may not be found for one corrupted."
> "And the mind, perverted by the fourfold secret tests, may not turn back without going to the end, remaining fixed in the will of spirited persons. Therefore, the king should make an outsider the object of reference in the fourfold work [of testing] and [thus] investigate through secret agents the integrity or otherwise of ministers."

In effect, the verses have invalidated all four of the tests that comprise the bulk of the prose *prakaraṇa*. There can be little doubt not only that these end verses could not

have been written by the composer of the prose, but also that the *adhyāya* redactor here uses a Kauṭilya dialogue to emend the *prakaraṇa*-text.[253]

Now, the possibility must be admitted that this may represent an isolated case, that the *adhyāya* redactor may simply have been imitating pre-existing dialogues within the text, and therefore, the greater body of Kauṭilya dialogues is not implicated. As such, we will have to look more broadly at the dialogues.

KAŚ 1.8.29

Another crucial example of the connection between the dialogues and the end verses comes at the end of *adhyāya* 1.8. The particular importance of this example is that Kauṭilya's *uttarapakṣa* is written in a combination of prose and verse. After a long series of opinions from specific teachers on the appropriate protocol for selecting ministers (*amātya*) that comprises the entirety of the preceding prose in *adhyāya* 1.8, we read:

> KAŚ 1.8.27–29 "All [of the opinions stated above] are justifiable," says Kauṭilya. "For, from the capacity (*sāmarthya*) for doing work is the ability (*sāmarthya*) of a person judged. And in accordance with that ability (*sāmarthyataś ca*), —
>
> he should appoint all these as ministers, by suitably distributing rank among ministers and assigning place, time, and work [to them]; he should not, however, appoint them as councilors."

The verse forms a seamless continuation of the opinion of Kauṭilya given in the prose. Here, the possibility must also be admitted that the *adhyāya* redactor has simply extended a pre-existing Kauṭilya dialogue into a new end verse of his own composition. We witness, however, a very nice string of logic to close the discussion of *amātyotpatti* ("The Appointment of Ministers"): *sāmarthya* in work determines the *sāmarthya* of an

[253] This example demonstrates two key elements found within the Kauṭilya dialogues: authorship by the *adhyāya* redactor and their use to emend the *prakaraṇa*-text.

individual, and according to that individual's *sāmarthya* should he be assigned a ministership.[254] More to the point, the end verse is required if Kauṭilya's *uttarapakṣa* is to conform to the *pūrvapakṣa*s of this dialogue, all of which give their response to the previous position, justify that response, and directly enjoin the appointment of persons to the office of minister.[255] Thus, the prose and verse almost certainly have the same author: the *adhyāya* redactor. Of this we can be certain because this end verse, KAŚ 1.8.29, is the same that is implicated above in the misconstrual of the boundary of the *amātyotpatti prakaraṇa* (§5.4.2).

Hence, we can see not only that the *adhyāya* redactor composed Kauṭilya dialogues in his end verses (KAŚ 1.10.16–20), but also that he composed them in the prose of the text as well (KAŚ 1.18.1–19). Although these are the only dialogues that are linked directly with the *adhyāya* end verses, we find indication of other links between the Kauṭilya dialogues and the *adhyāya* redaction.

6.3 Dialogues Otherwise Linked to the *Adhyāya* Redaction

Having seen, to this point, a direct connection between the *adhyāya* redaction and certain dialogues, we should look more closely at other dialogues that may be involved with the *adhyāya* redaction in less obvious ways.

---

[254] The likelihood that the *adhyāya* redactor composed this entire dialogue is further increased by the manner in which its fundamental premise (that one should choose ministers based on factors of heredity, friendship, capacity, and so forth) is immediately contradicted by the premise of the next discussion of appointming ministers at KAŚ 1.9.1–8) Which identifies the best candidates for ministership not based on such abstract qualities, but on a lengthy and diverse series of qualifying attributes.

[255] The pattern in the *pūrvapakṣa*s in KAŚ 1.9 is even more discrete. Except for the first, which is different because it must lay out the initial position in its opening line, the next 5 *pūrvapakṣa*s all follow the following format: 1) agreeing or disagreeing with the previous position; 2) giving the major reason for their disagreement; and, 3) enjoining the appointment of certain individuals to ministerships. Without the end verse, Kauṭilya's *uttarapakṣa* lacks the third element. Formally, therefore, it is likely that the same individual is responsible for both end verse and prose.

The most evident of these are passages in which Kauṭilya dialogues provide needed "bulk" to fill out *prakaraṇa* segments dismembered by the *adhyāya* redaction. In these cases, a *prakaraṇa* appears to have been cut into pieces too small to make sufficient *adhyāya*s. It appears that Kauṭilya dialogues were then introduced to provide the necessary verbiage.

KAŚ 1.2, 1.4

The first example comes from the first *prakaraṇa*, *vidyāsamuddeśaḥ* ("The Enumeration of the Sciences"). In the extant text this *prakaraṇa* is spread over *adhyāya*s 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and the first *sūtra* of 1.5. The division of the *prakaraṇa* into *adhyāya*s is irregular. This can be demonstrated if we first look only at the arrangement of the *prakaraṇa* as evident in the *sūtra*s giving its subtopics:

I.	Philosophy, the Veda, Economics, and Political Science (*daṇḍanīti*) are the Sciences.
A.	Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata constitute Philosophy.
B.	The three Vedas, Sāma, Ṛg, and Yajur, constitute the Veda.
C.	Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Trade constitute Economics.
D.	The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Veda, and Economics is the Staff (*daṇḍa*), and its use (*nīti*) constitutes Political Science (*daṇḍanīti*).
II.	Therefore, the three Sciences are rooted in the Staff (*daṇḍa*).

The logic of the *prakaraṇa* being clear, we can now compare it to the logic of the *adhyāya* division:

KAŚ 1.2.1	Philosophy, the Veda, Economics, and Political Science (*daṇḍanīti*) are the Sciences.
KAŚ 1.2.10	Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata constitute Philosophy.
KAŚ 1.3.1	The three Vedas, Sāma, Ṛg, and Yajur, constitute the Veda
KAŚ 1.4.1a	Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Trade constitute Economics.
KAŚ 1.4.6a	The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Veda, and Economics is the Staff (*daṇḍa*), and its use (*nīti*) constitutes Political Science (*daṇḍanīti*).
KAŚ 1.5.1	Therefore, the three Sciences are rooted in the Staff (*daṇḍa*).

The outstanding feature of the *adhyāya* division is the isolation of the second science, the Triple Veda, into its own *adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.3). This has generated two truncated *prakaraṇa* segments with no internal cohesion.

Now, each of the sciences is followed by an explanation of why it is useful.[256] If we add these in, we can expand the above diagram as follows:

KAŚ 1.2.1	Philosophy, the Veda, Economics, and Political Science (*daṇḍanīti*) are the Sciences.
KAŚ 1.2.10	Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata constitute Philosophy.
KAŚ 1.2.11	[*usefulness of Philosophy*]
KAŚ 1.3.1	The three Vedas, Sāma, Rg, and Yajur, constitute the Veda
KAŚ 1.3.4	[*usefulness of the Veda → duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.5	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.6	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.7	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.8	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.9	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.10	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.11	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.12	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.13	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.4.1a	Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Trade constitute Economics.
KAŚ 1.4.1b	[*usefulness of Economics*]
KAŚ 1.4.6a	The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Veda, and Economics is the Staff (*daṇḍa*), and its use (*nīti*) constitutes Political Science (*daṇḍanīti*).
KAŚ 1.4.6b	[*practical definition of Political Science*]
KAŚ 1.5.1	Therefore, the three Sciences are rooted in the Staff (*daṇḍa*).

The addition of these explanations of the usefulness of the sciences (KAŚ 1.2.11, 1.3.4–13, 1.4.1b, and 1.4.6b) results in a strange situation. KAŚ 1.3, the only *adhyāya* to retain any topical integrity (*i.e.*, it is not composed of a truncated subdivision), has been dramatically expanded by an integrated discussion of "the duties of the classes and ways of life" (*varṇāśramadharma*), while the the other sciences have been expanded by only a

[256] In the case of the first three sciences, these explanations all use the verb *upa* + √*kṛ*, "to benefit." The description of *daṇḍanīti*, however, does not follow this format. I think that these three initial "explanations" were added during the *adhyāya* redaction.

single *sūtra* or half *sūtra*. This is because the explanation of the Veda discretely introduces a new passage:

> KAŚ 1.3.4 eṣa trayīdharmaś caturṇāṃ varṇānām āśramāṇāṃ ca svadharmasthāpanād aupkārikaḥ
>
> This Vedic *dharma* is useful because it establishes the Individual Duty (*svadharma*) of the four classes (*varṇa*) and ways of life (*āśrama*s).

This passage is clearly intended to introduce the following extended discussion on the *svadharma* of the four *varṇa*s and *āśrama*s, which begins in the next passage with:

> KAŚ 1.3.5 The *svadharma* of a Brahmin is education, teaching, sacrificing for oneself, sacrificing for others, giving gifts, and receiving gifts.

This is followed by the presentation of the *svadharma* of each of the four *varṇa*s and *āśrama*s (KAŚ 1.3.6–12) as well as the *svadharma* common to all (1.3.13).

We can see, therefore, that the first iteration from the main structure of the *prakaraṇa*, involving passages explaining the usefulness or purpose of each of the sciences, results in the inclusion of a long passage on *varṇāśramadharma* in *adhyāya* 1.3. The special consideration given to the Veda (and *varṇāśramadhama*) over against the other sciences is in agreement with the purpose of the *adhyāya* division, which appears to have been to segregate the discussion of the Veda from the discussion of the other sciences at KAŚ 1.3. This confluence of form and function renders it likely, therefore, that this first iteration from the main structure of the *prakaraṇa* explains the specific manner in which the passage was divided into *adhyāya*s.[257]

---

[257] It could be argued, however, that the explanations of usefulness were already part of the *prakaraṇa* and that the *adhyāya* redactor was only formalizing an already distorted passage. This is very unlikely, both because the discussion of *varṇāśramadharma* disrupts the structure of the *prakaraṇa* and also because the intention of the *prakaraṇa* is clearly to highlight *daṇḍanīti* and not the Veda. We can add to these reasons perhaps the most compelling evidence, namely that the passages cited above as the root passages in the *prakaraṇa* are all written in the pithy *sūtra* style: short and lacking any verbs. In this, it seems to parallel the passage which may have originally began the second half of the text, in KAŚ 7.1. The language of the *prakaraṇa* and its relationship with the opening of the seventh *adhikaraṇa* is discussed below.

But this division has resulted in two *prakaraṇa* segments that do not meet the observed minimum length for *adhyāya*s (8 *sūtra*s). We see how dialogues have been used to augment each section:

KAŚ 1.2.1	Philosophy, the Veda, Economics, and Political Science (*daṇḍanīti*) are the Sciences.
KAŚ 1.2.2	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAŚ 1.2.3	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAŚ 1.2.4	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAŚ 1.2.5	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAŚ 1.2.6	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAŚ 1.2.7	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAŚ 1.2.8	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAŚ 1.2.9	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAŚ 1.2.10	Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata constitute Philosophy.
KAŚ 1.2.11	[*usefulness of Philosophy*]
KAŚ 1.3.1	The three Vedas, Sāma, Ṛg, and Yajur, constitute the Veda.
KAŚ 1.3.4	[*usefulness of the Veda → duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.5	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.6	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.7	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.8	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.9	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.10	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.11	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.12	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.3.13	[*duties of the classes and ways of life*]
KAŚ 1.4.1a	Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Trade constitute Economics.
KAŚ 1.4.1b	[*usefulness of Economics*]
KAŚ 1.4.3a	The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Veda, and Economics is the Staff (*daṇḍa*), and its use (*nīti*) constitutes Political Science (*daṇḍanīti*).
KAŚ 1.4.3b	[*practical definition of Political Science*]
KAS 1.4.4	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAS 1.4.5	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAS 1.4.6	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAS 1.4.7	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAS 1.4.8	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAS 1.4.9	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAS 1.4.10	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAS 1.4.11	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAS 1.4.12	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAS 1.4.13	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAS 1.4.14	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]
KAS 1.4.15	[*Kauṭilya dialogue*]

KAŚ 1.5.1	Therefore, the three Sciences are rooted in the Staff (*daṇḍa*).

Thus, we can see that the Kauṭilya dialogues have provided the required bulk to turn the truncated *prakaraṇa* subsections into *adhyāya*s. By examining the basic structure of the *prakaraṇa* and then the manner in which it has been expanded through successive iterations, we find a confluence between the form and placement of the Kauṭilya dialogues with the function of the *adhyāya* division.[258]

That this transformation occurred during the *adhyāya* redaction is further reinforced by the character of the verses placed at the end of the newly formed *adhyāya*s, each of which speak directly either of "all *dharma*s" (KAŚ 1.2.12) or directly of *svadharma* and the *dharma* of the four *varṇa*s and *āśrama*s (KAŚ 1.3.16–17; 1.4.16). I take the mention of these concepts in the end verse as further revealing the intention of the *adhyāya* redactor, as each links the newly-created *adhyāya*s to the discussion of *varṇāśramadharma*, the inclusion of which has distorted the structure of the *prakaraṇa* in the first place and necessitated the inclusion of the two Kauṭilya dialogues.

KAŚ 1.7

A similar situation occurs in *prakaraṇa* 3, *indriyajayaḥ* ("Control Over the Senses"), which has been divided over two *adhyāya*s. Inserted within the discussion of *indriyajaya* is a discussion of the *ariṣaḍvarga*, ("the group of six enemies;" *i.e.*, lust, anger, greed, pride, arrogance, and foolhardiness). Each of these "enemies" is illustrated

[258] Alternate explanations for the form of the *prakaraṇa* in the extent text do not change this conclusion. For, if the tract on *varṇāśramadharma* was original to the *prakaraṇa*-text, then the *adhyāya* redactor would still have needed to add length to the sections after he segmented off the discussion of the Veda. That the composer of this segment of the *prakaraṇa*-text cannot have written the Kauṭilya dialogues is clear, in that, in the first Kauṭilya dialogue he dismisses the actual position of the text in one of the *pūrvapakṣa*s. We read at KAŚ 1.2.6 that the followers of Uśanas believe that "The science of politics is the only science…for in it are bound up undertakings connected with all the sciences." In his *uttarapakṣa*, Kauṭilya denies this position, even though it is almost identical to the opinion of the text itself at both KAŚ 1.4.3 and 1.5.1.

with reference to the fate of a mythical king who succumbed to one of the enemies (KAŚ 1.6.4–1.7.1). The addition of this material and the division of the *prakaraṇa* resulted in a deficient segment after 1.7.1. It seems that here, too, a Kauṭilya dialogue (KAŚ 1.7.3–7) was added to provide sufficient bulk to the new segment.

KAŚ 5.6.23

For the final clear example of the involvement of Kauṭilya dialogues in the *adhyāya* redaction we return to a verse mentioned above in my examination of connective syntax in certain *prakaraṇa*s (§4.1). There, we noted that the only *prakaraṇa*s in the text that began with connective syntax were always the second or subsequent *prakaraṇa* in a given *adhyāya*. From this, we can deduce that these *prakaraṇa*s must have known they were in an *adhyāya* (as no other *prakaraṇa*s ever do this). Thus, these *prakaraṇa*s must have been written by the *adhyāya* redactor or later. KAŚ 5.6.23 is a Kauṭilya dialogue that also happens to be the first line of a *prakaraṇa* demonstrating connective syntax.

The *adhyāya* in question (KAŚ 5.6) possesses two *prakaraṇa*s, *rājyapratisaṃdhānam* ("Continuance of the Kingdom"; 94) and *ekaiśvaryam* ("Continuous Sovereignty"; 95). The second *prakaraṇa* is introduced at KAŚ 5.6.23:

> KAŚ 5.6.23 evam ekaiśvaryam amātyaḥ kārayed iti kauṭilyaḥ
>
> "In this way, a minister should insure continuous sovereignty," says Kauṭilya.

Thus, despite the manner in which *evam* ("in this way") links the passage to the preceding *prakaraṇa*, the conversation about *ekaiśvaryam* actually begins here.[259] This

[259] I disagree, in this regard, with Kangle's claim that the *prakaraṇa* starts at the previous line. There is nothing to indicate that.

use of connective syntax demonstrates, in the context of the evidence adduced above, that this Kauṭilya dialogue dates to the *adhyāya* redaction.[260]

These examples reinforce what we have begun to deduce from the analysis at §6.2, namely that the Kauṭilya dialogues show in many places and in a variety of ways a close connection with the *adhyāya* redaction.

6.4 Dialogues and Interpolation

Having linked some six Kauṭilya dialogues to the *adhyāya* redaction, we have a good reason to suspect that the rest of the dialogues belong also to that editorial moment. It remains now to determine other methods for connecting them to the *adhyāya* redaction as a group.

The Kauṭilya dialogues resist being identified with the *adhyāya* redaction through formal analysis for the same reasons as do the end verses: they are likely part of a much larger body of interpolated material. With the Kauṭilya dialogues, however, we find an additional problem, as some dialogues seem to have cast parts of the *prakaraṇa*-text as the opinions of previous teachers. In other cases, Kauṭilya himself seems to speak in the voice of the *prakaraṇa*-text.[261] Unlike the end verses, therefore, it is difficult even to decide what parts of the text should be considered parts of a dialogue. Hence, looking for stylistic, lexical, or topical attributes to unify and isolate the dialogues as a body of

---

[260] The remainder of the *prakaraṇa* is carried out as a Kauṭilya dialogue, although a problem in the voice of the text arises (as it does frequently with Kauṭilya dialogues; see §6.5.2). The *pūrvapakṣa* of Bhāradvāha clearly runs from KAŚ 5.6.24–31, and the *uttarapakṣa* of Kauṭilya clearly begins at 5.6.32 with, "'This [suggestion] incites the subjects to revolt, is unrighteous, and is uncertainas to result,' says Kauṭilya." It would appear, then, that the subsequent directions (KAŚ 5.6.33–36) are part of Kauṭilya's *uttarapakṣa*, as the plan sketched out addresses the deficiencies he sees in Bhāradvāja's position. Kangle suggests as much in his edition, although we have no formal marker that directly attributes the passage to Kauṭilya (e.g. *hi* or *iti*). The problem is that, if we take this as Kautilya's *uttarapakṣa*, then presumably we must take the rest of the *prakaraṇa*, or at least KAŚ 5.6.37–39, which really forms a continuation of that passage.

[261] These are discussed below at §6.5.2.

material is nearly impossible. Here, as with the end verses, such study promises to yield better results once the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction is better known.

But, if we can demonstrate that the dialogues regularly interpolate new material (§6.4.1–2) or amend an underlying prose source (§6.4. 3) we will be able to assign them confidently to the *adhyāya* redaction based on the discrete connections that we have drawn above, because they show such consistent indication of having been appended.

The Kauṭilya dialogues appear to alter the underlying text in two ways. First, we see examples wherein a whole dialogue, both the *pūrvapakṣa*(s) and the *uttarapakṣa*, appear to have been inserted into a passage. In some examples, these are quite small passages, while in certain places, the added material is substantial. These will be examined below at §6.4.1 and 6.4.2. In other cases, the dialogues appear to have taken an underlying prose source and converted it either into a *pūrvapakṣa*, an *uttarapakṣa*, or both. These are examined at §6.4.3.

6.4.1 Dialogues Interpolating Material–2

Quite frequently an entire Kauṭilya dialogue appears to interject itself into an otherwise continuous conversation. A clear example of this occurs in KAŚ 7.4.

This passage discusses the conditions under which the king should march or stay quiet after having made war or peace. It proceeds in a clear formula. The topic of staying quiet (*i.e.*, not threatening the adversary) after war and peace is discussed at KAŚ 7.4.4–13, while the topic of marching (*i.e.*, threatening the adversary) is introduced at 7.4.14–18. These two passages have parallel constructions: the topic is introduced (KAŚ 7.4.4; 7.4.14); three alternative considerations are presented with the formula *yadā vā paśyet* (“Or if he should see…”, 7.4.5–7; 7.4.15–17); and finally, a declaration prescribing the opposite choice under reverse circumstances is given (7.4.8; 7.4.18). The geometry of

the two passages is, in a word, perfect. It is this clear pattern that allows us to identify that the Kauṭilya passage is an interpolation.

I present first the structure of the passages without the Kauṭilya dialogue:

KAŚ 7.4.4	The enemy and conqueror, desirous of overmastering the other but unable to harm each other, should **stay quiet after making war or peace**.
KAŚ 7.4.5	**Or, when he should see** [*yadā vā paśyet*]…, he should make war and then stay quiet.
KAŚ 7.4.6	**Or, when he should see**…, he should make war and then stay quiet.
KAŚ 7.4.7	**Or, when he should see**…, he should make war and then stay quiet.
KAŚ 7.4.13	In case the **reverse** of the motives for staying quiet after making war, he should make peace and stay quiet.
KAŚ 7.4.14	When grown in power on the occasions for staying quiet after making war, he **should make war and march**, except when the enemy has mobilized all troops.
KAŚ 7.4.15	**Or, when he should see**…, he should make war and march.
KAŚ 7.4.16	**Or, when he should see**…, he should make war and march.
KAŚ 7.4.17	**Or, when he should see**…, he should make war…and march.
KAŚ 7.4.18	In the **reverse** cases, he should make peace and march.

The manner in which the Kauṭilya quote at KAŚ 7.4.8–12 disrupts this structure is apparent:[262]

KAŚ 7.4.4	The enemy and conqueror, desirous of overmastering the other but unable to harm each other, should **stay** quiet after making war or peace.
KAŚ 7.4.5	Or, when he should see [*yadā vā paśyet*]…, he should make war and then stay quiet.
KAŚ 7.4.6	Or, when he should see…, he should make war and then stay quiet.
KAŚ 7.4.7	Or, when he should see…, he should make war and then stay quiet.

[262] Kauṭilya's point is very difficult to divine out here. In this case, his exact point of disagreement is not entirely clear, for Kauṭilya ends up endorsing the position previously rendered at KAŚ 7.4.7. It appears, as Kangle points out, that the point in question is "Or, if he should see [among many other things, that] 'wishing to march with all troops mobilized in disregard of me, he must not somehow be allowed to march,' then, in order to impede the growth of the enemy and to affirm his valor, he should make war and stay quiet" (KAŚ 7.4.7). The text clearly argues that he should make war and stay quiet, the position that Kauṭilya also endorses. It appears, as an interesting side note, that Kauṭilya's logic is very close to that found at 7.5.2. The situation is far from happy, however, and that KAŚ 7.4.8 should be interpreted as a disagreement is not overtly marked. That the teachers and Kauṭilya are commenting only on the last of the many conditions given in KAŚ 7.4.7 produces a suspicious rupture. For, if the teachers' objection was original to the *prakaraṇa*-text, we should have expected the specific case with which they disagree to be given in its own specific *sūtra*. All of this notwithstanding, we can see clearly the disruption effected by the whole dialogue, which falls nicely into two halves, each introduced and concluded in similar fashion and possessing three examples. Thus, we should rightly regard all of 7.4.8–12 as an interpolation.

KAŚ 7.4.8	**"Turning back, the enemy might swallow the king instead," so say the teachers.**
KAŚ 7.4.9	**"No," says Kauṭilya.**
KAŚ 7.4.10	**"Not beset by calamities, he would only weaken our king; but augmented by his enemy's growth, he destroys our king.**
KAŚ 7.4.11	**In this manner, the enemy's vulnerable foe, now undestroyed, would render aid to our king.**
KAŚ 7.4.12	**Therefore, against one who has martialed all his troops, he should make war and stay quiet."**
KAŚ 7.4.13	In case the reverse of the motives for staying quiet after making war, he should make peace and stay quiet.
KAŚ 7.4.14	When grown in power on the occasions for staying quiet after making war, he **should** make war and march, except when the enemy has mobilized all troops.
KAŚ 7.4.15	Or, when he should see…, he should make war and march.
KAŚ 7.4.16	Or, when he should see…, he should make war and march.
KAŚ 7.4.17	Or, when he should see…, he should make war…and march.
KAŚ 7.4.18	In the **reverse** cases, he should make peace and march.

This stands as very clear evidence that the Kauṭilya dialogue at KAŚ 7.4.8–12 has been interpolated into an earlier source. We find many other examples of dialogues that stand outside of or break the logic of their context: KAŚ 2.9.10–12, 3.4.36, 3.7.3, 3.20.3–7, 7.6.30–31, 7.15.11–20, 7.17.3–5, 9.1.2–16, 9.1.42-44, 9.2.22, 12.1.1–9, and 13.4.2–5. This indicates the frequency with which Kauṭilya dialogues seem to add something extra to an underlying discussion.

6.4.2 Major Interpolations

In a few important places, Kauṭilya dialogues account for the addition of substantial tracts of text. We see this most pointedly in the eighth *adhikaraṇa*, of which the first 4 *adhyāya*s are constituted almost entirely of Kauṭilya dialogues.

Like a few other sections of the extant *Arthaśāstra*, the eighth *adhikaraṇa* is composed almost entirely of "either/or" debates. In this context, a question will be posed as to which is the better or worse of two options. Typically, an individual teacher or "the teachers" (*ācārya*) will first give the erroneous view (*pūrvapakṣa*) and Kauṭilya will give the proper view (*uttarapakṣa*):[263]

[263] However, in a few cases, the *uttarapakṣa* is given first (*cf.* KAŚ 8.1.5; 8.3.5)

KAŚ 8.1.19	"Of calamities befalling the minister or the country, the calamity of the country is more serious," says Viśālākṣa.
KAŚ 8.1.20	"The treasury, army, forest produce, laborers, means of transport, and stores spring from the country."
KAŚ 8.1.21	"In the absence of the country, there would be lack of these, and the [disappearance] of the king and the minister [would follow] immediately thereafter."
KAŚ 8.1.22	"No," says Kauṭilya.
KAŚ 8.1.23	"All undertakings have their origin in the ministers…"

Here, nearly the entire *adhikaraṇa* is composed of such dialogues. The only exceptions to this in the first four *adhyāya*s of the eighth *adhikaraṇa* are the "framing" passages that set up the dialogues.[264] However, the final *adhyāya*, 8.5, proceeds in a style similar to the preceding *adhyāya*s without, however, any hint of polemical dialogues.

There is very good reason to assume that this entire *adhikaraṇa* is interpolated into the text. Not only are the first four *adhyāya*s essentially composed of Kauṭilya dialogues, but the style and topic also stand out within the greater context of the second half of the text. The preceding *adhikaraṇa*, the seventh, is the long discussion of foreign policy that anchors the second half of the text. The following *adhikaraṇa*, the ninth, picks up on that discussion by giving details for the king about to march. This theme is continued in the tenth, which discusses war tactics. As such, the discussion of the relative harm of calamities to the seven constituents of the state that comprises *adhikaraṇa* 8 represents a notable digression from the focus of the seventh and ninth through tenth *adhikaraṇa*s.

Other examples of passages almost wholly comprised of Kauṭilya dialogues include *adhyāya*s 1.8, 1.17, 3.17, and the final *prakaraṇa* of 5.6 (KAŚ 5.6.23–32*ff.*). Each of

[264] KAŚ 8.1.1–4, 8.1.60, 8.2.1–4, 8.2.19, 8.3.1–4, 8.3.23, 8.3.37–38, 8.4.1, and 8.4.8. Seeming exceptions to that at KAŚ 8.3.62–64 and 8.4.44–45, both seem intended to be part of the preceding Kauṭilya quote by virtue of terminal *iti* markers. The passage at 8.4.46–47, however, lacks such a marker, and is anomolous.

these stands at an important juncture in the text, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

6.4.3 Casting Prose as the Dialogic Material

In many places in the *Arthaśāstra*, certain prose passages appear to have been converted into quotations ascribed to Kauṭilya or the other teachers. We saw this above, both at §6.2 (KAŚ 1.10.16–20) and at §6.4.1 (7.4.8–12), where the text had been converted into the opinion of "the teachers" (*ācārya*) to accommodate the inclusion of a retort from Kauṭilya. In fact, there are many clear examples of this practice in the *Arthaśāstra*.

One of the best of these comes at KAŚ 3.11.44–49, where a dialogue has seemingly been constructed out of a continuous passage. The following example shows how little modification an underlying passage would have needed to turn it into a dialogue:

KAŚ 3.11.39–49 sākṣibhede yato bahavaḥ śucayo 'numatā vā tato niyaccheyuḥ madhyaṃ vā gṛhṇīyuḥ
tad vā dravyaṃ rājā haret
sākṣiṇaś ced abhiyogād ūnaṃ brūyur atiriktasyābhiyoktā bandhaṃ dadyāt
atiriktaṃ vā brūyas tad atiriktaṃ rājā haret
bāliśyād abhiyoktur vā duḥśrutaṃ durlikhitaṃ pretābhiniveśaṃ vā samīkṣya sākṣipratyayam eva syāt
sākṣibāliśyeṣv eva pṛthag anuyoge deśakālakāryāṇāṃ pūrvamadhyamottamā daṇḍāḥ ity ācāryāḥ
kūtasākṣiṇo yam artham abhūtaṃ kuryur bhūtaṃ vā nāśayeyus tad daśaguṇaṃ daṇḍaṃ dadyuḥ iti mānavāḥ
bāliśyād vā visaṃvādayatām citro ghātaḥ iti bārhyaspatyāḥ
neti kauṭilyaḥ
dhruvaṃ hi sākṣibhiḥ śrotiyam
aśṛṇvatām caturviṃśatipaṇo daṇḍas tato 'dharmabruvāṇānām

In case of differences among witnesses, they should decide in favor of that party in whose favor are the majority, honest, or approved, or he should follow the middle course. Or, the king should take that object.
If witnesses testify to an amount less than the suit, the plaintiff shall pay a part of the excess. If, on the other hand, they testify to a larger amount, the king should take the excess.

What was badly heard or badly written through the fault of the plaintiff, or the affidavit of a person deceased, shall, after investigation, be decided only on the testimony of witnesses.
If, through the fault of witnesses alone, questioning results in divergent information, they shall be fined the lowest, middlemost, and highest fines, with regard to place, time, and matter. So say the followers of Uśanas.
False witnesses who bring into being a non-existent thing or ruin an existing thing, shall pay ten times that as fine. So say the followers of Manu.
Or, if through their own fault they lead to a false conviction, death by torture. So say the followers of Bṛhaspati.
"No," says Kauṭilya. "For, witnesses have to testify to what is the truth. For those who do not testify to the truth the fine is 24 *paṇa*s, half that for those who do not speak out."

It is clear that the opinions of the three teachers, Uśanas, Manu, and Bṛhaspati, have been built out of a continuous prose passage: Manu cites "ten times the fine" assessed in Uśanas' opinion. Clearly, Bṛhaspati is building on the same passage. The result is almost a comical situation in which the three different teachers are ganging up on Kauṭilya, with each adding a line to a single erroneous *pūrvapakṣa*, perhaps for effect. In fact, it seems most likely that all of KAŚ 3.11.44–46 was a single prose passage recast into the opinions of several teachers.

Another excellent example comes at KAŚ 3.17.3–14 in the discussion of *sāhasa* ("mugging"), one of the titles of law in the *Arthaśāstra*'s civil code. After a brief introduction clarifying the distinction between *sāhasa* and *steya* ("simple theft"), the passage proceeds entirely through two Kauṭilya dialogues. The first begins as a standard disagreement:

KAŚ 3.17.3–5 ratnasāraphalgukupyānāṃ sāhase mūlyasamo daṇḍaḥ iti mānavāḥ
mūlyadviguṇaḥ iti auśanāḥ
yathāparādha iti kauṭilyaḥ

"In case of the forceable seizure of jewels, articles of high value, of low value, and forest produce, the price shall be equal to their value," say the followers of Manu.

"Double the value," say the followers of Uśanas.
"In accordance with the offense," says Kauṭilya.

The following discussion is, like that at KAŚ 3.11, apparently constructed out of an underlying prose passage. For, KAŚ 3.17.6–14 reads very much like any discussion of violent theft, except that its various parts are attributed to different teachers:

KAŚ 3.17.6–14 "For flower, fruits, vegetables, roots, bulbous roots, cooked food, leather goods, wicker-baskets, earthenware, and other trifling articles, the fine is a minimum of 12 *paṇa*s and a maximum of 24 *paṇa*s.
For articles of iron, wood, and ropes, small animals, cloth, and other big articles, the fine is from 24 to 48 *paṇa*s.
For articles of copper, steel, bronze, glass, ivory, and other big articles, the fine is 48 to 96 *paṇa*s.
For large animals, human beings, fields, houses, money, gold, fine cloth, and other big articles, the middle fine for violence.
For one who binds or causes another to bind or releases from bondage a woman or man by using force, the highest fine for violence, from 500 to 1000 *paṇa*s," say the teachers.
"He who causes another to commit an act of force, saying, 'I accept [responsibility],' shall pay double.
One saying, 'I shall give as much money as required,' shall pay a fourfold fine.
One saying, 'I shall give so much money,' shall pay the money as stated as well as the fine," say the followers of Bṛhaspati.
"If he were to plead anger, intoxication, or delusion, he shall impose on him the single fine, as prescribed," says Kauṭilya.

As before, we have what is essentially a unified passage dispersed into the opinions of several teachers. Ultimately, the annexing of three *iti* clauses has turned it into a conversation between various teachers. Removing these *iti* clauses, however, reveals that the passage looks like a very regular and normal discussion of *sāhasa*.

Other examples of what appear to be the transformation of underlying prose sources into Kauṭilya dialogues can be found at KAŚ 3.14.6–9, 7.1.5, 7.1.31, 7.5.1–18, 7.13.29–33, 7.15.11, and possibly, 7.9–7.12.

6.5 CONCLUSION: KAUṬILYA THE INTERLOPER

Several things, then, are generally clear about the Kauṭilya material in the text. First, the direct ascriptions of the text to Kauṭilya all fall in end verses and are spurious. This conscious effort to link the text to Kauṭilya may have been simply an expression of an unrecorded convention, but represents, nevertheless, an innovation in the compositional history of the text.

Second, the end verses are linked in this regard to the more limited ascriptions of the Kauṭilya dialogues. Despite being sporadic phenomena, they are united in function as the only elements within the text identifying any author by name. We find evidence of a discrete link between the two in the case of two end verses that possess (elements of) a Kauṭilya dialogue. We can state without reservation, then, that the *adhyāya* redactor wrote at least *some* of the extant dialogues.

Can the larger body of dialogues be linked with the *adhyāya* redaction? For the same reason as the *adhyāya* end verses (namely that they are only a subset of a larger body of interpolated material), it is difficult to trace formal elements unique to the dialogues, and hence, consign them all to a common origin. Complicating this is the fact that so many of the dialogues have clearly been fashioned out of pre-existing prose sources. We can, however, demonstrate through close scrutiny of individual examples that processes of interpolation and emendation dominate the occurrence of the dialogues in the extant *Arthaśāstra*.

What seems evident from this analysis is that not only are the Kauṭilya dialogues strongly characterized by interpolation, but that they can so frequently be demonstrated to fulfill this function that we might rightly regard them as uniformly interpolated. And, the fingerprints of the *adhyāya* redactor are on a few of them. It is with a high degree of

confidence, therefore, that we can ascribe the Kauṭilya dialogues to the *adhyāya* redaction as well.

Aside from the *adhyāya*-length dialogues (§6.4.2), however, we cannot be certain in any given case whether prose sources transformed by the Kauṭilya dialogues were native to the *prakaraṇa*-text or brought along during the interpolation of the dialogues. Hence, as we go on to construct a more detailed sense of the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction, we will have to consider the likelihood of both possibilities in individual contexts where applicable. Summation of the extent of the additions can be found in the overview of the *adhyāya* redaction in Chapter 7.

Let us finally consider the implications deriving from the possibility that the material directly attributed to the author himself is not original. The general thinking on the *Arthaśāstra* has tended to protect the statements attributed to Kauṭilya as representing the most authentic layers of the text.[265] That is, even if some scholars admit that the text may have undergone some changes, the Kauṭilya quotes are frequently assumed to be relics of the original. But what would be a better way to legitimate new material introduced into a text than by attributing it to the "true" author of the work? This is especially true given the demonstrable ease with which prose can be converted into dialogues. Of course, the interpolation of new material may not have been as important as the overt ascription of the text to Kauṭilya, which corresponds with the witnessed tendency in Sanskrit literature of the classical period to attribute texts to legendary and mythical authorities.[266]

---

[265] See Chapter 2.

[266] It may well also prove that the process of attributing this *śāstra* to Kauṭilya helped bring *Arthaśāstra* into the fold of ecumenical Brahmanism and, by extension, ascribe the success of the Maurya Empire to Brahmanical expertise. If so, the attribution of the text to Kauṭilya seems to provide a strong motive for the *adhyāya* redaction in the first place.

It is not, however, necessary to posit that the addition of the Kauṭilya material was conceived by the *adhyāya* redactor as the interposition of "inauthentic" material into the text, nor is it necessary to subscribe to any conspiracy theory. I think it is very likely that the source of much of this material may have been other treatises on statecraft or collections of Kauṭilya/Cāṇakya maxims. The redactor may have seen himself as completing, updating, or perfecting the text rather than altering it *per se*. Given the rather sporadic nature of much of the Kauṭilya quotes, we can scarcely recognize a pattern of radical opportunism in its transformation of the subject matter. My sense is that the apparent changes probably had more to do with "contemporizing" the *prakaraṇa*-text than deliberately undermining it.

Chapter 7: The Structure of the *Prakaraṇa* Text

Building on the conclusions of the previous chapters, we are now able to delve deeper into the compositional history of the *Arthaśāstra* and examine the anatomy of the greater *prakaraṇa*-text. This will not only enlarge and refine our understanding of the *adhyāya* redaction, but will also demonstrate the key phases in which the *prakaraṇa*-text was composed. It is an injustice to treat such a large issue (larger in fact than that of the *adhyāya* redaction) in a single chapter, but a full consideration of the structure of the *prakaraṇa* text might itself comprise its own voluminous study.

Having purged the text of the *Arthaśāstra* of the obvious additions from the *adhyāya* redaction, including (most if not all of) the *adhyāya* end verses, the Kauṭilya dialogues, and a number of interpolated passages,[267] the question then arises as to the ultimate extent of that editorial intervention as well as the compositional history and character of the underlying *prakaraṇa*-text.[268] Specifically, we want to know first what the *prakaraṇa*-text looked like before the *adhyāya* redaction, and second, how it evolved to reach that form.

Regarding the ultimate extent of the *adhyāya* redaction, we need to determine what segments of the text other than those indicated by the preceding studies are implicated. And, regarding the *prakaraṇa*-text, we want to know whether this text was authored entirely by a single individual, is itself composite, or resulted from some

[267] Also including certain more substantial passages likely dated also the the *adhyāya* redaction, including but not limited to part or all of *adhyāya*s 1.1, 1.2–1.7, 1.8, 1.17–18, 2.33, 3.16–7, 3.20, 5.6, 9.7, 10.6, and 15.1, as well as most or all of *adhikaraṇa* 8.

[268] This is the term I am using to refer to the hypothetical text as it existed before the additions of the *adhyāya* redactor. In extent, it comprises 1.2-13.4 of Kangle's edition.

combination of these processes.[269] Given the character of the *Arthaśāstra*,[270] such questions are best answered by taking the image of the *prakaraṇa*-text that emerges after purging the elements of the *adhyāya* redaction, reading that text closely, analyzing its structure, and identifying such lexical, stylistic, and idiomatic evidence as can support well a theory of its composition.[271]

It is characteristic of the extant *Arthaśāstra* that some parts of the text display a great deal of conceptual cohesiveness as well as consistent structural principles.[272] In such passages can be demonstrated an orderly and sustained progression of conceptually-united topics, bearing evidence of authorial intent. The conciseness and transparency of these sections contrast vividly with the confusion and opacity of some sections and the isolation and disjointedness of others.[273] As a result the *prakaraṇa*-text as a whole possesses a somewhat schizophrenic character, and there is a decided lack of firm

---

[269] The idea of a "composite text" embraces both the synchronic aggregation of different sources in a single compositional moment (horizontally composite) as well as the diachronic aggregation of layers brought about by a series of editorial additions over time (vertically composite). These are, however, only conceptual tools: a single compositional moment can exhibit both characteristics.

[270] In the previous chapters we were able to compare two divergent second-order segmentation systems (*prakaraṇa*s & *adhyāya*s) and determine the relative priority of one (the *prakaraṇa*s) over against the other (the *adhyāya*s). Reduced to a single segmentation system (*prakaraṇas*/*adhikaraṇa*s), there is no second global attribute that can examined diachronically. Further, the *prakaraṇa* text obviates the need for such methods, and allows, instead the content of the text to be analyzed more clearly.

[271] See Chapter 3 for a full discussion of compositional theories. Trautmann (1971) has famously used the statistical method to answer the same questions. This study reinforces many of his conclusions; these agreements are noted as they arise in the present discussion and in the following chapters.

[272] One calls to mind in this regard especially the sections on the testing of ministers, appointment of spies, and espionage (KAŚ 1.9–1.15), the greater part of the description of the officials called *adhyakṣa*s and their duties (2.11–2.34), most of the first 15 titles of law or *vyavahārapada*s in *adhikaraṇa* 3 (3.2–3.16), the explicit discussion of 'the clearing of thorns' or *kaṇṭakaśodhana* in *adhikaraṇa* 4 (4.4–4.6), and the entirety of the short 8th and 13th *adhikaraṇa*s (on calamities and siege tactics, respectively). The prevailing style is, however, unique to each: among them only between 1.9–1.15 and 4.4–4.6 can resemblance in style be found.

[273] The most noticeably-confused parts of the *Arthaśāstra* are undoubtedly the 7th and 9th *adhikaraṇa*s (on foreign policy and war, respectively), both of which proceed according to no discernable plan.

evidence that it or even the greater part of it was authored *ex nihilo* by a single individual.[274] The presence of a series of internally homogeneous yet extrinsically dissimilar passages, often punctuated by the digression of detailed "mini–*śāstra*s"[275] and generally connected by relatively more disjointed and opaque passages, suggests that we are dealing with a deeply, perhaps originally, composite text.[276]

In a text as extensive, heterogeneous, and disjointed as the *Arthaśāstra* there is no end to the evidence that might be summoned to bear witness to its ultimate composition. I will, therefore, rely in this chapter primarily on an examination of the topical structure of the text without regard to its formal division into *prakaraṇa*, *adhyāya*, or *adhikaraṇa*. The result is a topical outline of the text that casts much light on its compositional history.

7.1 Major Conceptual Divisions & Their Relationships

The broadest meaningful division of the text is found between the topics of internal administration (KAŚ 1.2–5.6) and those of foreign affairs (6.2–13.5).[277] Later *arthaśāstrin*s refer to these sections as *tantra* and *āvāpa* respectively (Kangle 1965, 20).

---

[274] Such as Olivelle (2005) has found in the *Manusmṛti*. So striking are the constant shifts in style and the frequent conceptual confusion that it is surprising that any scholar, much less some of the text's most notable editors and translators, could assume the extant *Arthaśāstra* to be the work of a single hand. Yet, a great number of scholars have made just such a claim.

[275] I am thinking here, for example, of brief but focused discussions such as that on the layout of the city (2.4), the activity of elephants (2.32), sex crimes (4.12) and so forth. Many short discussions in the text such as these seem to hint at some kind of independent history.

[276] While we cannot pretend to comprehend fully the prevalent norms of Sanskrit prose composition in this remote time (and whether what we experience as stylistic disjunctures necessarily seemed so to the readers of that time), we *can* expect that a single author could not be responsible for certain kinds of conceptual unevenness. For example, we can surmise that an author would not immediately argue against a position just presented, misapprehend the intention or meaning of a preceding passage, randomly shift lexical registers, idiosyncratically misuse technical terms, or advocate mutually opposed concepts without comment. The presence of such difficulties in a text like the *Arthaśāstra* would tend to lend validity to the surmise that its structural unevenness is rooted in heterogeneous sources and/or successive redactions.

[277] See §1.4.

At their juncture falls KAŚ 6.1, which bridges these two areas with a theory of the state as composed of both foreign and domestic constituents (the seven *prakṛti*s).[278] Finally, an introductory table of contents (KAŚ 1.1) and two independent appendices, one on magic and secret formulas (14.1) and another on the rhetorical elements of the text (15.1), bookend the treatise.



Fig. 5: The Major Structural Elements of the *Arthaśāstra*

Although the *Arthaśāstra* does not itself formally recognize a division of the text into *tantra* and *āvāpa*, we do find close adherence to the topic of internal administration among the material comprising KAŚ 1.2–5.6 and to foreign policy in 6.2–13..5. This thoroughgoing topical division into domestic and external affairs, although undoubtedly intentional, is matched neither by any discrete conceptual organization nor by any thoroughgoing structural elements unifying each half.[279] Instead, a looser conceptual affiliation prevails through the succession of topics within each half,[280] reinforcing the composite character of both.[281]

---

[278] The location of this discussion in *adhyāya* 6 belies its relative closer semantic connection with the *āvāpa* section, which makes use of its theory of the seven *prakṛti*s in several places (as opposed to the first half). Nevertheless, a purely topical analysis must first note its supersession of the broad distinciton between internal and external politics prevailing in the two halves.

[279] We can compare in this regard Olivelle's discovery of a global structure to the text of the *Manusmṛti*, built of lattice of standardized transitional passages and topic markers. Such passages comprise a discursive structure through which the conceptual structure of the text as a whole can be ascertained. It is any markers of these kind that are absent in the *tantra* and *āvāpa* sections as well as the *prakaraṇa*-text as a whole.

[280] The division into *tantra* and *āvāpa* does not account for three passages: KAŚ 1.1, KAŚ 14.1–3, and KAŚ 15.1. The first and third of these have already been identified as belonging to the *adhyāya* redaction.

Despite the lack of any formal internal structure, we do find certain symmetries prevailing between the two halves of the text. These would seem to suggest that we can identify a plan underlying the organization of the greater text. The first significant symmetry lies between two very similar passages near or at the beginning of each half. If we remove the Kauṭilya dialogues from both passages and also the *adhyāya* emendations I have suggested (§6.4.1), we find a parallel passages near the beginning of each half. We begin with the opening of the *tantra* section:

KAŚ 1.2.1	ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti vidyāḥ
KAŚ 1.2.10	sāṃkhyaṃ yogo lokāyataṃ cetyānvīkṣikī
KAŚ 1.3.1	sāmargyajurvedās trayas trayī
KAŚ 1.4.1a	kṛṣipāśupālye vaṇijyā ca vārttā
KAŚ 1.4.3a	ānvīkṣikītrayīvārttānāṃ yogakṣemasādhano daṇḍaḥ tasya nitir daṇḍanītiḥ

Philosophy, the Triple Veda, Economics and Political Science are the Sciences.
Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata are Philosophy.
The three Vedas, Sāma, Ṛg, and Yajur, are the Triple Veda.
Agriculture, animal husbandry, and trade are Economics.
The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Triple Veda, and Economics is the Staff (*daṇḍa*), and its use (*nīti*) is Political Science (*daṇḍanīti*).

Compare this with the KAŚ 7.1.2–12, with the *adhyāya* interpolations removed:

*KAŚ 7.1.1	saṃdhivigrahāsanayānasaṃśrayadvaidhībhāvāḥ ṣāḍguṇyam
KAŚ 7.1.6	tantra paṇabandhaḥ saṃdhiḥ
KAŚ 7.1.7	apakāro vigrahaḥ
KAŚ 7.1.8	upekṣaṇam āsanam
KAŚ 7.1.9	abhyuccayo yānam
KAŚ 7.1.10	parārpaṇaṃ saṃśrayaḥ

The second, which represents the entirety of the 14th *adhikaraṇa* indicates that this section finds no place in the greater logic of the text and, from a topical perspective, is purely appendectical. It will be considered separate below, where we will have occasion to demonstrate its origin in the *adhyāya* redaction.

[281] Though lacking any such unifying edifice, the section on *tantra* displays a more orderly progression of general topic areas (as suggested by it segmentation into *adhikaraṇa*s dealing loosely with king→ state→ law→ enforcement/peacekeeping→ miscellanea) than the section on *āvāpa*.

KAŚ 7.1.11 saṃdhivigrahopādānaṃ dvadhībāvaḥ
KAŚ 7.1.12 iti ṣaḍguṇāḥ

Peace, war, staying quiet, marching, seeking shelter, and dual policy
are the Six Measures.
Among them, entering into a treaty is peace.
Doing injury is war.
Remaining indifferent is staying quiet.
Augmentation is marching.
Submitting to another is seeking shelter.
Resorting to peace and war is dual policy.
These are the six measures.

While these two passages are not perfectly symmetrical, they possess a similar format. What is more, each is used to inaugurate the substantive discussions of their respective halves (the material at KAŚ 6.2.1–7.1.1 representing more of a preamble to the actual discussion of foreign policy).

A second parallel between the two halves is that each possesses one *adhikaraṇa* that is considerably longer than the rest. This raises the suspicion that each half was constructed around a single, long passage. Finally, an analysis of the structure of each half reveals that both appear to possess appendices. In the case of the first half, the appendices are represented by the *adhyāya*s of the 5th *adhikaraṇa*, which represent miscellanous addenda. In the case of the second half, we might see the 14th *adhikaraṇa* as its appendix, with the 15th serving to frame the the greater text.

While these features are not sufficiently symmetrical to establish a template from which can be deduced clear deviation or adherence, they do suggest that the extant *Arthaśāstra*'s division into two halves is intentional and that each possesses an independent organization. I will proceed in the next two sections (§7.2 and 7.3) to look at the structure of each half.

7.2 THE *TANTRA* SECTION (1.2–5.6)

The *adhikaraṇa* titles and boundaries[282] of this section provide a relatively straightforward framework to the discussion of *tantra*:

Fig. 6: The *Tantra* Section of the *Arthaśāstra*

title	*translation*	*topics covered*
1. *vinayādhikārika*	"On Training"	The King and His Political Activities
2. *adhyakṣapracāra*	"The Duty of Officials"	Settlement & Administration
3. *dharmasthīya*	"On Judges"	Jurisprudence and Transactional Law
4. *kaṇṭakaśodhana*	"Clearing Thorns"	Law Enforcement & Policing
5. *yogavṛtta*	"Secret Practices"	Miscellaneous Appendices

Although the subdivision of *tantra* into these five general areas fits the material of the text tolerably well, it also obscures the complex relationships prevailing between non-*adhikaraṇa* text segments.

7.2.1 Topical Outline

A topical analysis of the *tantra* section, undertaken with a few guiding principles, reveals the following structure:

[282] These are both relics of the *prakaraṇa-adhikaraṇa* list and the *adhikaraṇa* colophons. The provenance of both is discussed below.

1 “On Training”	I. The King
2 “Duties of Officials”	II. Officials[283] A. Administrative B. Legal 1. Law Enforcement I_a (rules I)
3 “On Judges”	a. Transactional Law
4 “Clearing Thorns”	2. Law Enforcement I_b (rules II) 3. Law Enforcement II (policing) 4. Law Enforcement III (rules for officials) a. Criminal Law[284]
5 “Secret Practices”	III. Miscellaneous

This outline emerges clearly if we follow two interpretive principles, one general and one specific. The first requires that we take finite optative verbs without a stated subject to refer to the last state grammatical subject (even if falling in a previous discussion). This principle is required to counteract the frequently unwarranted injection of the king into these lacunae as the unspoken agent of any agentless verb (defended below). The second principle is rather more of a critical interprtation (also defended below): the subject of the first three topics of *adhikaraṇa* 2 *cannot be the king*, as demonstrated in the well protected passage at KAŚ 2.2.3. The passage at KAŚ 2.1.15–18 implying the contrary (and to a lesser extent at 2.1.25–29) is, of the two, the more likely interpolation.

There are several important conclusions to be drawn from this interpretation, but the most important contribution of this analysis lies in demonstrating that the majority of the *tantra* section is presented through the idiom of state officials and their duties (IIA

[283] The division of these officials into “administrative” and “legal” classifications is a result of higher textual criticism, and could be stated in a number of ways. The important distinction between these two sets of officials is that the former are administrative posts concerned with the management of a given department, while the latter work in the public sphere in the specific capacity of public safety, policing, and protecting the king’s rule. This is not to suggest that their presentation is structurally similar.

[284] The only element of the general outline requiring any special explanation in this regard is the criminal code presented at 4.9–12. This undoubtedly is intended to fall under the duties of the *samāhartṛ* in the same way that the discussion of the civil code falls under the duties of the *dharmastha*.

and IIB in the outline) with a discussion of the king (I) preceding and a miscellaneous set of appendices (III) following. In rhetorical terms, the presentation of most of the material in the *tantra* section comes through the (mostly) uninterrupted presentation of one official after another.

When we expand this outline to include the subtopics of each of these major sections (appendix A), we see clearly how the idiom of officials and their duties dominates the *tantra* section. Another point revealed in the detailed topic outline (appendix A) is that otherwise well integrated discussions in the *tantra* section give way to more appendectical addenda. We see this first of all at the conclusion of part I, where well integrated discussions of the king's training (IA) and activity (IB) give way to independent treatments of princes (IC), the king's daily schedule (ID), and regulations for the palace and king's safety (IE).[285] So also in part II of the outline, we see strong topical integration throughout (particularly in the face of several subsequent iterations on the topic of law enforcement; see §7.2.4), which devolves in the discussion of criminal justice (KAŚ 4.9–13; outline IIB4a) into a series of similar but unconnected *adhyāya*s. Finally, the general integration at the heart of parts I and II are set off against the miscellaneous character of part III, which is composed of a set of disconnected independent discussions.

What is not shown as clearly in the outline is the relationship between at least one of these appendectical tracts and the *adhyāya* redaction. So, in part I, the discussion of princes (IC), which inaugurates a chain of appendices, comprises two *adhyāya*s (KAS 1.17–18) linked to the *adhyāya* redaction. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the subsequent

[285] In fact, the discussion of princes (IC) covers KAŚ 1.17–18 and the discussion of the construction of the palace and the protection of the king (IE) occur also in two *adhyāya*s: 1.20–21.

appendectical *adhyāya*s (KAŚ 1.19–21) date to or after the *adhyāya* redaction.[286] Finally, if we look more closely at the discussion of transactional law in the outline, we see that the final five topics in the outline are introduced by an interpolated *adhyāya* discussing forceable seizure (KAŚ 3.16) and conclude with another interpolated section on various topics (3.20.14–23). These intervening *adhyāya*s, which follow a formulaic introduction established in KAŚ 3.16, must date also to the *adhyāya* redaction.[287] Hence the identification of these appendices expands our sense of the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction somewhat and indicates a proclivity on the part of the *adhyāya* redactor to add material at junctures revealed by the topical outline.

The final major point that becomes clear in the extended outline at this point is the presence of the official called *samāhartṛ*, "the Collector," at the head of each of the major subdivisions of legal officials. And, even in the discussion of administrative officials, where he is preceded by two other officials, his duties reveal that he oversees all of the subsequent administrative offices (KAŚ 2.6.1*ff*.; 2.7.3*ff*.[288]). This reccurrence of the

---

[286] The only difficulty here lies in KAŚ 1.20, which details the construction of the king's palace and very much resembles a similar discussion on the construction of fortresses at 2.3. Although there are no formal indicators, it seems somewhat topically linked with the following. As such, its provenance is less certain.

[287] This is further reinforced by the inclusion of the *dyūtādhyakṣa* in the legal code at KAŚ 3.20.1–13. This official presumably should have come with the discussion of other officials in the 2nd *adhikaraṇa*. His transplanting to the legal code reflects the relatively less tolerant attitude of the *adhyāya* redactor toward alcohol. For, he seems to be merely another officer of the state, and it is difficult to understand otherwise why he appears in the legal code. This move was almost certainly influenced by the draconian stance against alcohol that typifies the *dharma* literature.

[288] This analysis regards the use of the generic term *adhyakṣa*, "the official," at KAŚ 2.7.1 as referring to the *samāhartṛ* in the previous *adhyāya*, which is justified not only by the failure of the passage to identify any given *adhyakṣa* discretely, as is universally the case elsewhere, but also because the dufies of that official, overseeing income, coincide precisely with the duties of the *samāhartṛ* given in KAŚ 2.6. Even if the *adhyakṣa* be interpreted as a second official, his duties replicate the interests of the *samāhartṛ* so closely that one has to suspect some kind of emendation to the text. Moreover, the use of the generic title *adhyakṣa* in second position in the opening sentence seems to indicate that we are not talking about a new official. It is certainly not the minor official called *kāraṇika*, "Accounts Officer," mentioned at KAŚ 2.7.34.

samāhartṛ will become crucial below as we discuss the iterative steps in which the text seems to have been expanded from a core source.

7.2.2 Integrated Passages

We can now apply our identification of certain stylistic patterns and shifts to this detailed outline. Despite the general heterogeneity of the text, we find a few important segments that appear to follow clear stylistic and rhetorical principles, strongly suggesting that they were the product of a single author or strong editor:

1: King: Training (KAŚ 1.2–1.7, less the *adhyāya* additions outlined at §6.4.1–2)
2: King: King's Political Activities (1.10–1.16)
3: Administrative Officials: Duties of the Directors (2.11–32)
4: Law Enforcement III: Policing (4.4–4.6)

The most important of these is the long integrated passage at KAŚ 2.11–32.

7.2.3 The Core of the *Tantra* Section: KAŚ 2.11–32

The combination of the topical outline with the identification of integrated passages shows that at the heart of the discussion of administrative officials lies the strongly-integrated segment KAŚ 2.11–32. This passage is unified by the invariable use of a simple, standard formula to introduce each successive official. Each official is presented in a *prakaraṇa*-initial *sūtra* that gives the official's title as a sentence-initial nominative and names his primary responsibilities using a finite optative verb. So, the first four *adhyakṣa*s in KAŚ 2.11–32 are introduced as follows:

KAŚ 2.11.1 kośādhyakṣaḥ kośapraveśyaṃ ratnaṃ sāraṃ phalguṃ kupyaṃ vā tajjātakaraṇādhiṣṭhitaḥ pratigṛhṇīyāt

The Director of the Treasury should receive jewels, expensive items, inexpensive items, or forest produce bound for the treasury, aided by assistants skilled in those kinds of goods.

KAŚ 2.12.1 ākarādhyakṣaḥ śulbadhātuśāstrarasapākamaṇirāgajñas tajjñasakho vā tajjātakarmakaropakaraṇasampannaḥ kiṭṭamuṣāṅgārabhasmaliṅgaṃ

vākaraṃ bhūtapūrvam abhutapūrvaṃ vā bhūmiprastararasadhātum athyarthavarṇagauravam ugragandharasaṃ parīkṣeta

The Director of Deposits, knowledgeable about the science of metal veins, smelting ore, and the color of gems or furnished with assistants knowledgeable of the same and furnished with workers in those areas and tools, should inspect an old mine bearing marks of dross, crucibles, coal, and ashes of a possible new mine where there are ores in the earth with excessive color and heaviness and with a strong color and taste.

KAŚ 2.12.23 lohādhyakṣas tāmrasīsatrapuvaikṛntakārakūṭavṛttakaṃsatāla-lohakarmāntān kārayet lohabhāṇḍavyavahāraṃ ca

The Director of Metals should have built copper, lead, tin, *vaikṛntaka*, brass, steel, bronze, bell-metal, and iron factories and start transactions in metal implements.

KAŚ 2.12.24 lakṣaṇādhyakṣaś caturbhāgatāmraṃ rūpyarūpaṃ tīkṣṇatrapusīsāñjanānām anyatamamāṣabījayuktaṃ kārayet…

The Director of the Mint should have made silver coins, ¼ copper and alloyed with one *māṣa* of any of these: iron, tin, lead, and antimony…

This unassuming formula becomes more remarkable as the next 21 officers are introduced serially in an identical fashion. It is the strongest structural feature in the entire text. We can situate this core within the greater portion of the second *adhikaraṇa* as follows:



Fig. 7: The Core within the Second *Adhikaraṇa*

The uninterupted use of the formula outlined above unites the core, but if we cast about more broadly for other passages beginning with the same formula, we find it employed to introduce officials outside of this core passage.[289] Of these uses of the formula, several falling in parts of the second *adhikaraṇa* adjacent to the core passage (*i.e.*, KAŚ 2.1–10 and 2.33–36) suggest that the integrated core at KAŚ 2.11–32 is only the most visible part of a larger underlying passage stretching from KAŚ 2.1–34,[290] with interpolations at least at 2.4,[291] 2.9,[292] and 2.10.[293]

---

[289] See, for example, the following officials: KAŚ 2.2.10 (*nāgavanādhyakṣa*, "Director of Elephant Forests"), 2.4.1 (*samnidhātṛ*, "the Depositor"), 2.5.1 (*samāhartṛ*, "the Collector"), 2.34.1 (*mudrādhyakṣa*, "Director of Passports"), 2.34.5 (*vivītādhyakṣaḥ*, "Director of Pasturelands"), 2.35.1 (*samāhartṛ*), 3.1.1 (*dharmasthīya*s, "Judges"), 3.20.1 (*dyūtādhyakṣa*, "Director of Gambling"), 4.1.1 (*pradeṣṭṛ*s, "Magistrates"), 4.2.1 (*saṃsthādhyakṣa*, "the Director of Markets"), 4.4.3 (*samāhartṛ*), and 4.9.1 (*samāhartṛ* and *pradeṣṭṛ*s).

[290] Examining the latter material we can see that the presentation at KAŚ 2.34 of the *mudrādhyakṣa* (Director of Passports; 2.34.1–4) and *vivītādhyakṣa* (Director of Pasturelands; 2.34.5–11) conforms exactly to the idiom of 2.11–32. The intervening passage, KAŚ 2.33, diverges from the idiom slightly and is evidently an interpolation intended to add a *rathādhyakṣa* (Director of Chariots; KAŚ 2.33.1–6), *pattyadhyakṣa* (Director of Infantry; 2.33.7–8), and Army Commander (*senāpati*; 2.33.9–10) to the presentations in the core passage of the *āśvādhyakṣa* (Director of Horses; KAŚ 2.30) and *hastyadhyakṣa* (Director of Elephants; KAŚ 2.31–32). This was obviously done in imitation of the four-fold division of the army into foot soldiers (*patti*), cavalry (*aśva*), chariots (*ratha*), and elephants (*hasti*) under a *senāpati* described in the latter half of the text (KAŚ 10.4.13–5.47). Moreover, this passage has been connected to the *adhyāya* redaction above (§4.2) by virtue of connective syntax among its constituent *prakaraṇa*s. Sure, then, of its interpolation, we can speak of a single core source from KAŚ 2.11–34 with an interpolation at 2.33 (and other potential minor interpolations throughout).

There is good reason to suppose that much of the earlier material in the second *adhikaraṇa* (*i.e.*, KAŚ 2.1–10) belongs originally to the same core source. On the surface, this passage is divided into a discussion of the settlement and construction of the kingdom (KAŚ 2.1–4), the description of two or three powerful officials (2.5–9), and an excursus on kingly edicts (KAŚ 2.10).

The initial discussion of settlement and construction (KAŚ 2.1–4) possesses one clear interpolation at KAŚ 2.4; the remainder (2.1–3) probably originally described the duties of an official whose name has been elided. The assumption that the king is the subject of these instructions regarding settlement and construction derives both from the preceding *adhikaraṇa*, which is concerned wholly with the king, as well as kingly directives given within it in two excursi in KAŚ 2.1 on land grants (KAŚ 2.1.16*ff)* and rulership (KAŚ 2.1.25–26). But these excursi are contradicted by a passage from KAŚ 2.2 that must be directed at an official other than the king:

KAŚ 2.2.3 *tāvanmātram…mṛgavanaṃ vihārārthaṃ rājñaḥ kārayet*

He should have constructed…an animal forest for the king's sport of identical size.

Among this greater "core passage," the discussion of three officials of a higher order than the rest at KAŚ 2.5–8 (the *samnidhātṛ*, "Depositor,"[294] *samāhartṛ*, "Collector," and *adhyakṣa*, a generic "Director") stands out against the rest of the core section. The

---

It is unlikely that this passage was intended for a king. The identity of its original subject, however, remains a mystery; possibly he is an official known to us from elsewhere in the text. It is not unlikely, then, that KAŚ 2.1–4 originally belonged to the same source as KAŚ 2.11–34, but such cannot be discretely demonstrated. As such, it is safest to relegated this passage to the "middle layers" of the text as discussed in the conclusion (§7.6).

The potential obfuscation of this feature appears to have been prompted by the need to integrate this preexisting passage on construction and settlement with the foregoing discussion of kingship in *adhikaraṇa* 1. There is some evidence to suggest that further changes were wrought upon the original passage. Directions for the construction of the *antaḥpura* (Roy*a*l Residence) *within* the first *adhikaraṇa* (1.20.2–3; 10–13) strongly resemble the settlement directions in 2.1–4 (less the *vāstu* section). Moreover, these instructions are explicitly referred to at 2.4.7. As the construction of the *antaḥpura* provides the central concept of 1.20–21, the final two *prakaraṇa*s of the first *adhikaraṇa*, it becomes even more plausible that an underlying discussion of bureaucratic duties was recast at 1.20–2.4 to link the rest of *adhikaraṇa* 2 to the discussion of the king 1.2–19. This discussion, it should be noted, shows good integration from 1.2–16, with appendectical discussions of princes (1.17–18) and the king's daily routine (1.19) before the construction theme begins at 1.20, foreshadowing 2.1–4. If 1.20–2.4 is the result of the modfication of an underlying text, then those sections preceding it would seem to be the logical locus for later appendices to the discussion of the king's duties. It should also be noted that, given the shift in voice, the discussion of the capital's *vāstu* design in 2.4 is probably interpolated. The most important features of 2.1–4 remain its likely adherence to the idiom of 2.11–34 and the fact that its transformation from a passage giving the duties of an administrative official to a passage giving the duties of the king probably occurred as a result if its being adapted to fit more smoothly with a preceding discussion of kingship.

[291] This passage, detailing the layout of the city within the fortification is marked as an interpolation by its shift from the ever-present finite optative to suppressed verbs and nominal sentence structure. A few passages in this *adhyāya* are likely original: the latter part of KAŚ 2.4.7, 2.4.24–31.

[292] The discussion of "The Inspection of the Work of Officers" at KAŚ 2.9 appears to represent an even higher-order awareness of the core, as it, alone among the elements now found within the core, integrates the various officials into a bureaucratic hierarchy and links them to other parts of the text through important terms within the greater text not otherwise found in the core source: *amātya* (minister), *uttarādhyakṣa* (supervisor), and *sampad* (archetypal quality). In doing so, it demonstrates its dependence on the discussion of the *sampad*s of *amātya*s at KAŚ 1.9, an element well outside the core source.

[293] The discussion of edicts at KAŚ 2.10 appears to depend logically on the preceding discussion 2.9, but is otherwise entirely out of place.

[294] There is some overlap between the duties of the *samnidhātṛ* and an official from the core called the *kośādhyakṣa*, "Director of the Treasury." See Kangle 1971, 97n. The implication of this for the greater text is not clear. The *samnidhātṛ* is, interestingly, somewhat of a transition figure in the text. The passages preceding his introduction have all dealt with settlement and construction, and the duty of the *samnidhātṛ* is to construct and staff the various depositories used by the state. Hence, he straddles construction and administration. But, several other officials are also instructed to construct their venues, which makes this official seem less exceptional. His status in regard to the core source is not clear.

first two are introduced according to the idiom of the greater passage, while the introduction of the third deviates slightly,[295] suggesting it was not written by the composer of the core passage. This official, the *adhyakṣa*, presents other problems, particularly in possessing a generic title[296] and duplicating the activities of the preceding *samāhartṛ*,[297] that indicate the reference at KAŚ 2.7.1 to the *adhyakṣa* is actually meant to refer back to the *samāhartṛ* at KAŚ 2.6.1 (or should be considered, at the least, his subordinate). Hence, we have two high officials heading the remaining discussion of the core passage, the *samnidhātṛ* and the *samāhartṛ*.[298]

These two higher order officials stand somewhat above the profile of the remaining officials of the core passage, and the *samāhartṛ* appears to be given a supervisory role (KAŚ 2.7.3; 2.7.16–20), integrating the subsequent admininstrative

---

[295] This passage opens with the object of its verb and relegating the official to second position:

KAŚ 2.7.1 *akṣapaṭalam adhyakṣah…kārayet*

The Director should have a Records Office constructed…

[296] The identity of this official: "*adhyakṣa*" is a generic term and its use here defies our understanding of the presentation of officials. This *adhyakṣa* either represents a subsidiary official to the *samāhartṛ*, who was introduced in the previous *adhyāya* at KAŚ 2.6.1, or, more likely, is actually a reference back to the *samāhartṛ* hismself.

[297] The evidence in favor of equating these two officials comes primarily because of the close overlap of their duties. We are told in the introduction of the *samāhartṛ* that:

KAŚ 2.6.1 The *samāhartṛ* should oversee (*avekṣeta*) the fort, the country, the mines, irrigation works, forests, herds, and trade routes.

The subsequent passage (KAŚ 2.6.2–8) enumerates the contents of each of these categoreis and then interprets each of these as areas of income, stating at KAŚ 2.6.9: *ity āyaśarīram*, "This is the corpus of income." This tells us that the *samāhartṛ* is responsible for tracking the income of the various productive activities of the state. The economic responsibilities of the *samāhartṛ* are further demonstrated by subsequent discussions of income (KAŚ 2.6.10, 17–22), expenditure (2.6.11, 23–26), time (2.6.12), revenue (2.6.13–17), and balance (2.6.27). Clearly, the *samāhartṛ* is the chief financial officer of the state. These areas overseen by the *samāhartṛ* are then ascribed in the following *adhyāya* to activity of the *adhyakṣa* (KAŚ 2.7.3; 2.7.16–20). It is possible, therefore, that the *adhyakṣa* is a functionary of the *samāhartṛ*, but the overlap in responsibilities suggests, more likely, that they are the same official.

[298] As recognized, perhaps at KAŚ 1.10.13, which mentions that, "those [officials] proved upright by the text of *artha* should be appointed to offices of the *samāhartṛ* and *samnidhātṛ*."

officials in a hierarchical organization beneath him. The higher-order organization of administrative officials here prompts the suspicion that this part of the core passage has undergone some amount of expansion and/or interpolation, a suspicion borne out by the presence in KAŚ 2.5–8 (as also the yet later 2.9) of key terms conceptually important to the following core passage that are, nevertheless, not found there: *adhikaraṇa*, "department"[299] and (*upa-*)*yukta*,[300] "officer."

It seems likely, then, that we have a first-order expansion of the core passage (KAŚ 2.1–34) at 2.5–8 (with subsequent expansions at 2.9 and 2.10, discussed below). This expansion is characterized by the introduction or foregrounding[301] of two powerful officials, the *samnidhātṛ* and the *samāhartṛ*, the latter of which appears to have authority over the remaining officials of the core passage. Hence, it looks as the though the core passage was here modified to create some notion of hierarchical bureaucracy out of what was initially simply a flat list of state officials. We note that it is in the expansion of the duties of the *samāhartṛ* that the major function of this emendation occurs.

7.2.4 Iterations of the Core

Thus, the expansion of the duty of the *samāhartṛ* as a figure integrating the core section (KAŚ 2.1–34) into a bureaucratic hierarch appears to be the first emendation of the core source (with subsequent emendations coming at KAŚ 2.9 and 2.10). We have noted above that the repetition of the office of the *samāhartṛ* marks the beginning of each major

[299] KAŚ 2.5.16; 2.7.2, 3 [2.9.19, 31]

[300] KAŚ 2.5.16; 2.6.20; 2.8.3, 22, 23 [2.9.30?], with a single exception at 2.13.32

[301] The question remains whether, in this emendation, these two officials were newly introduced or merely had their duties expanded. I favor the latter interpretation, as the *samāhartṛ* seems to have always been a financial officer. His subsequent use as a law enforcement officer (at KAŚ 2.35.1, 4.4.3, and 4.9.1) demonstrates explicitly this transformation. If the *samāhartṛ* had been newly introduced, there would not be such a clear transformation of the office of the "Collector."

subdivision of officers: of public safety officers at KAŚ 2.35.1; of police officers at 4.4.1–3; and of officers investigating state officials at 4.9.1. I believe that we are seeing in these iterations successive expansions of the *Arthaśāstra* from its initial compilation of the core source in the first iteration at KAŚ 2.35.1*ff.*, through a second major expansion reflected by the material at 4.4.1–3*ff.*, and a final major expansion beginning at 4.9.1*ff.*, itself probably reflecting the *adhyāya* redaction itself.

The volume of evidence potentially speaking to this theory is truly massive, and consideration of it is beyond the scope of the present study. I present below what I think to be the crucial evidence, and I will refer to the wider picture in the footnotes.

The First Iteration: KAŚ 2.35–4.3

We saw above that an early redactor took the core source (KAŚ 2.11–32/34) and emended the duties of the *samāhartṛ*, turning that financial officer into a general supervisor of the administrative bureaucracy. We can link this expansion, I would argue, to the first iteration of the *samāhartṛ*'s duties into law enforcement (public safety), represented by KAŚ 2.35–4.3 in the extant text.

After his initial mention at KAŚ 2.6–2.8, the *samāhartṛ* is transformed at KAŚ 2.35 from a financial officer (2.35.1), to an official using a network of spies to gather data (2.35.8–12), to an official responsible for investigating the probity of high officers and protecting the people from thieves and agents of the enemy (2.35.13–14). Hence, we see the chief financial officer converted in one *adhyāya* into the chief public safety officer.

These legal aspects newly ascribed to the *samāhartṛ*'s office subsequently serve as a model for the other public safety officers: the *nāgarika*, "City Superintendent" (KAŚ 2.36.1), and *sthānika*, "Divisional Warden" (2.36.4), both of whom are told to discharge

their duties *samāhartṛvat*, "like the *samāhartṛ*," and *evam*, "in the same manner," respectively.

The recasting of the office of the *samāhartṛ* in this new context relies on the expansion of his office already at KAŚ 2.6–8 (evident as a new layer of the text not only in its second-order awareness of the core section but also in the introduction of new critical vocabulary). I would argue, therefore, that his use to head the discussion of public safety at KAŚ 2.35–4.3 provides the motive for the earlier expansion of the office. Thus, the first iteration at KAŚ 2.35 was probably carried out by the same individual who emended the text at KAŚ 2.5–8. We can think of the aggregation of these two sections, KAŚ 2.1–34 and 2.35–4.3 as the "core compilation" or "logical core" of the *Arthaśāstra*.

We cannot, however, be sure of the extent of the first iteration beyond what we have identified in the core compilation, nor can we be certain that it has not been distorted by subsequent emendations. As it stands, the first iteration begins with the re-introduction of the *samāhartṛ* at KAŚ 2.35.1 and concludes with the appendix on calamities in 4.3 that abutts the second iteration and its re-introduction of the *samāhartṛ* at 4.4.1–3.

The first iteration is broadly concerned with public safety, understood to comprise protection of the kingdom's subjects, civic order, prevention of disasters (KAŚ 2.35–36, 4.3), dispute resolution (KAŚ 3.1–20), and policing the business practices of merchants (4.1–2).[302] The aggregation of these topics is what I believe is meant when the following

[302] The first iteration, like the core passage, discusses its topics through the duties of officials, in particular the *samāhartṛ* (KAŚ 2.35), *nāgarika* (2.36), *dharmastha* (3.1–20), *pradeṣṭṛ* (4.1), and *saṃsthādhyakṣa* (4.2), some of which cleave closely enough to the format of the core passage to wonder they might not have been taken from there. This is particularly true of the *saṃsthādhyakṣa*, who would find a ready place in the core passage. The *samāhartṛ* also conforms to this idiom, although we suspect this to be an iteration. The *dharmastha* and *pradeṣṭṛ* are mentioned as three officials, but we have some reason to believe that the introduction to these passages may have been altered. See below.

section on police activity at KAŚ 4.4.1 appears to conclude a discussion of *janapadarakṣaṇa*, "protecting the kingdom."

The majority of this section is taken up by a lengthy description of jurisprudence and the civil legal code at KAŚ 3.1–20, falling under the rubric of the duties of the *dharmastha*, "Judge." Given that such discussions of the civil legal code, known as *vyavahārapada*, "the titles of law," represent a kind of sub-genre within Sanskrit literature, it is not unlikely that the first iteration was motivated in part by the desire to introduce just such a discussion into the text. If so, however, that source would have been significantly smaller than it appears in the extant *Arthaśāstra*.[303] In particular, however, the present *adhikaraṇa* divisions of the *Arthaśāstra*, which segment the discussion of civil jurisprudence into its own *adhikaraṇa* (the third) cannot yet have prevailed during the composition of the first iteration, whose boundaries run from KAŚ 2.35–4.3. Hence, we can surmise that the discussion of the duties of the *dharmastha* were likely much more modest than they are in the extant *Arthaśāstra*, as that official seems to have been only one of several discussed in the first iteration's presentation of public safety officials.

The Second Iteration: KAŚ 4.4–4.8

The second iteration begins at KAŚ 4.1.1–3:

> KAŚ 4.4.1–2 In "Rules for the Administrator" (*samāhartṛpraṇidhi*) the protection of the country (*janapadarakṣaṇa*) was explained. We shall now explain the weeding of thorns (*kaṇṭakaśodhana*) in it.

---

[303] We know already that the last several topics, comprehending KAŚ 3.16–20, were added by the *adhyāya* redactor (§7.3.1). We find, moreover, that this discussion itself seems to have been built from different sources and expanded through successive interpolations. So, the original discussion of inheritance at 3.5.1–27 seems to have been expanded to include the material at 3.5.1.28–3.7.39. The beginning of the discussion of property law (*vāstukam*) at KAŚ 3.8.1–21 is written in a different idiom from the remainder of that section (KAŚ 3.8.22–10.45. Two discussions of witnesses (KAŚ 3.11.28–33 and 3.11.34–49) have been appended to the discussion of debts at KAŚ 3.11.1–27, and so forth. The history of the 3rd *adhikaraṇa* deserves independent study.

KAŚ 4.4.3 The *samāhartṛ* should station in the country *tāpasavyañjana*…

This passage, I would argue, is marking the boundary between a discussion of *janapadarakṣaṇa* and *kaṇṭakaśodhana*.[304] This *adhyāya* discusses investigating officials, presumably those introduced in the preceding discussions. The next two *adhyāya*s are linked by connective opening passages:

KAŚ 4.5.1 After the employment of spies (*sattriprayogād ūrdhvam*), agents appearing as holy men should entice criminals by means of…

KAŚ 4.6.1 After the practices of holy men (*siddhiprayogād ūrdhvam*) comes the topic of arrest on suspicion, with the articles, and because of the act.

The rest of the second iteration comprises two disconnected discussions, one on autopsies (KAŚ 4.7) and another on interrogation (4.8). Both pertain to the kind of pro-active police activity in KAŚ 4.4–4.6, but neither is directly connected and both appear to be independent discussions.

It is difficult to surmise whether the composer of the first iteration was also responsible for these passages.[305] At the present, then, we cannot assign this iteration either to an independent layer or to the preceding.

---

[304] This tells us that the composition recognizes a shift in topic between an earlier passage called *samāhartṛpraṇidhi* to the present topic of *kaṇṭakaśodha*. The term *samāhartṛpranidhi* does not correspond to any *prakaraṇa* or *adhikaraṇa* title in the text. The closest is *samāhartṛpracāraḥ*, which refers to the *prakaraṇa* at KAŚ 2.35.1–7, which, according to the topical outline, begins the discussion of public safety (i.e the first iteration at KAŚ 2.35–4.3). I would argue that this passage is not refering back merely to the last discussion of the *samāhartṛ* at KAŚ 2.35, but to the entire discussion of 2.35–4.3, which deals collectively with the protection of the country in various ways. This passage is, instead, marking the junction between two sections: *samāhartṛpraṇidhi* and *kaṇṭakaśodhana*, which corresponds to the boundary in the topical outline between public safety and police work. The term *samāhartṛpraṇidhi*, however, has been lost from the text except in this passage.

[305] We have mention here again of spies, only this time the standard triad of *tāpasavyañjana*, *gṛhapatikavyañjana*, and *siddhavyañjana* have been dramatically expanded (KAŚ 4.4.3). Moreover, we read that these spies are to "learn the purity or impurity (*śaucāśaucaṃ*)" of the "village heads and directors (*grāmāṇām adhyakṣāṇāṃ*)," which echoes the command at KAŚ 1.10.1 that the king "should ascertain the purity (*śodhayet*)" of his ministers (*amātya*).

The Third Iteration: KAŚ 4.9–4.13

The third iteration begins with KAŚ 4.9.1:

KAŚ 4.9.1 samāhartṛpradeṣṭāraḥ pūrvam adhyakṣāṇāṃ adhyakṣāpuruṣāṇāṃ ca niyamanaṃ kuryuḥ

The *samāhartṛ* and *pradeṣṭṛ*s should first restrain the Directors and their subordinates.

This *adhyāya* does not deal with specific instructions to either the *samāhartṛ* or the *pradeṣṭṛ*, but enumerates instead rules reminiscent of parts of the civil legal code.[306]

This passage, I would argue, was composed after the division of the *tantra* section into *adhikaraṇa*s. The reason for this is that when the discussion of *janapadarakṣaṇa* was divided by the transformation of the civil code into its own *adhikaraṇa* (3), two small segments were left: KAŚ 2.35–36 and 4.1–4.3. The former was absorbed into the preceding *adhikaraṇa* (2), and the latter became the beginning of the subsequent *adhikaraṇa* (4), which was identified as *kaṇṭakaśodhana* based on KAŚ 4.4.1–2 (see above). Hence, an interpolation to KAŚ 4.1 was necessary in order to mark the beginning of the newly-created *adhikaraṇa*:

KAŚ 4.1.1 Three *pradeṣṭṛ*s, all three ministers (*amātya*), shall carry out *kaṇṭakaśodhana*.

Here, the creator of the *adhikaraṇa* has ascribed KAŚ 4.1–4.3 to the topic of *kaṇṭakaśodhana*, and placed that duty under the responsibility of the *pradeṣṭṛ*. This, of course, produces all kinds of disjunctures in the text.[307] But, when the third iteration opens by saying

---

[306] This disjunction is quite similar to the other introductory passage featuring the *pradeṣṭṛ*s, KAŚ 4.1.1, where the remainder of 4.1 is simply a code that neither needs nor requires the *pradeṣṭṛ*s at all.

[307] The disjuncture with the following passage is clear, however, when not only is the *pradeṣṭṛ* not named again, but explict instructions are given directly to different groups (employers of artisans, weavers, washermen, etc.). Moreover, the only instructions to any official in the *adhyāya* come in the last prose sentence and refer to a singular subject (as opposed to the three *pradeṣṭṛ*s). Note, in this regard, how the

KAŚ 4.9.1 samāhartṛpradeṣṭāraḥ pūrvam adhyakṣāṇāṃ adhyakṣāpuruṣāṇāṃ ca niyamanaṃ kuryuḥ

The *samāhartṛ* and *pradeṣṭṛ*s should first restrain the Directors and their subordinates.

We see that this passage appears to be trying to harmonize the original start of *kaṇṭakaśodhana* at KAŚ 4.4.1 (addressed to the *samāhartṛ*) and the new start at 4.1.1 (addressed to the *pradeṣṭṛ*). Indications from within *adhyāya* 4.9 also indicate that it was written after the division of the text into *adhikaraṇa*s.[308]

This passage is followed by four more independent *adhyāya*s (KAŚ 4.10–13) which seem clearly to have been derived from a different source, as they each possess their own clear internal organization and prescribe, in several cases, different punishments for crimes discussed already in the text. Hence, these likely belong to the third iteration or later.

7.2.5 The First *Adhikaraṇa* and the Layers of the *Tantra* Section

We can surmise that the composer of the first iteration likely included some discussion of kingship before what we have called the "core compilation" (KAŚ 2.1–4.3). Formal indication of this comes from references at KAŚ 2.35.8, 2.35.11, and 2.35.13 to three secret agents: the *gṛhapatikavyañjana* ("Seeming-Householder"); the *vaidehakavyañjana* ("Seeming-Merchant"); and the *tāpasavyañjana* ("Seeming-Ascetic"). These are agents of the king introduced in the first *adhikaraṇa* at KAŚ 1.11.5–12. Because it is certain the composer of the first iteration composed this passage at KAŚ 2.35 (it representing the iterative adaptation of the *samāhartṛ*), we can be certain,

---

parallel mention of three *dharmasthīya*s in KAŚ 3.1.1 is retained in plural verbs at 3.1.2 (not however, in the second *prakaraṇa* of the *adhyāya* at 3.1.30).

[308] See KAŚ 4.9.18 where the *dharmastha* and *pradeṣṭṛ* are considered to have parallel functions, reflecting the manner in which the third and fourth *adhikaraṇa* mirror one another.

at least, that the introduction of these spies at KAŚ 1.11 must also have existed at that time.

If we turn, then, to the composition of the first *adhikaraṇa*, we are able to get a sense of the chronological relationship of different iterations of the *tantra* section. I have noted already that the initial discussion of the four sciences (*vidyā*s; 1.2.1–1.5.1) was greatly enlarged during the *adhyāya* redaction (§6.4.1). If we remove these interpolations[309] we find a core text covering the first three *prakaraṇa*s and written in a uniformly terse *sūtra* style,[310] in comparison with which most of the rest of the *Arthaśāstra* seems excessively verbose:

KAŚ 1.2.1	*ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti vidyāḥ*
KAŚ 1.2.10	*sāṃkhyā yogo lokāyataṃ cety ānvīkṣikī*
KAŚ 1.3.1	*sāmargyajurvedās trayas trayī*
KAŚ 1.4.1a	*kṛṣipāśupālye vaṇijyā ca vārttā*
KAŚ 1.4.3a	*ānvīkṣikītrayīvārttānāṃ yogakṣemasādhano daṇḍaḥ tasya nītir daṇḍanītiḥ*
KAŚ 1.5.1	*tasmād daṇḍamūlās tisro vidyāḥ*
KAŚ 1.5.2	*vinayamūlo daṇḍaḥ prāṇabhṛtāṃ yogakṣemāvahaḥ*
KAŚ 1.5.6	*vidyānāṃ tu yathāsvam ācāryaprāmānyād vinayo niyamaś ca*
KAŚ 1.5.10	*nityaś ca vidyāvṛddhasaṃyogo vinayavṛddhyarthaṃ tanmūlatvād vinayasya*
KAŚ 1.6.1	*vidyāvinayahetur indriyajayaḥ kāmakrodhalobhamānamadaharṣatyāgāt kāryaḥ*
KAŚ 1.6.2a	*karṇatvagakṣijihvāghrāṇendriyāṇāṃ śabdasparśarūparasagandheṣv avipratipattir indriyajayaḥ*

Philosophy, the Triple Veda, Economics, and Political Science are the Sciences.
Sāṃkya, Yoga, and Lokāyata are Philosophy.
The three Vedas: *Sāma-, Ṛg-,* and *Yajur-*; are the Triple Veda.
Agriculture, animal husbandry, and trade are Economics.

---

[309] And a few other suspected passages. What I have presented here are the minimum *sūtra*s required for the underlying *prakaraṇa* to make sense. The extent to which it resembles the original source is unclear. One notes also the tendency for certain lines of this passage to scan in *śloka* meter.

[310] I have been guided in the identification of these passages by following the main points of the *prakaraṇa*s. Thus, while the first half of this passage results merely from removing the interpolated material, the latter half (KAŚ 1.5.6–1.6.2) has been aggregated by tracing the main points of the argument. As such, while all of the excised material from the first half was removed on strength of evidence favoring its interpolation (§6.4.1–2), this is only partly true of the second half. In particular, the passages KAŚ 1.5.3–5, 7–10, 12–16, 1.6.3, and 1.7.1–2 have been removed as secondary to the main argument. They do, however, also deviate in point of style, reinforcing that at the root of this extended passage is the simple, *sūtra* style passage recorded above.

> The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Triple Veda, and Economics is the Staff (*daṇḍa*), and its use (*nīti*) constitutes Political Science (*daṇḍanīti*).
> Therefore, the three sciences are rooted in the Staff.
> The Staff, rooted in training, brings welfare to living beings.
> But, training and discipline in the sciences arise from the authoritativeness of teachers in their respective sciences.
> And there should always be association with elders in the sciences for the sake of developing one's training, as training has its root in that.
> Control over the senses, which is the result of training in the sciences, should be secured by abandoning lust, anger, greed, pride, arrogance and foolhardiness.
> Absence of improper indulgence in sound, touch, color, taste, and smell by the respective senses is the controling of the senses.

It seems we have here, then, the original introduction to the *Arthaśāstra* (or something near it).

This passage is connected with the next topic, the appointment of ministers (*amātya*), by a prose *sūtra*:[311]

> KAŚ 1.7.8 *maryādāṃ stāpayed ācāryān amātyān vā…*
>
> [The king] should set teachers or ministers as the bounds of good conduct…

As we have already deduced that the next *adhyāya* (KAŚ 1.8) is part of the *adhyāya* redaction, the conversation of *amātya*s picks up at KAŚ 1.9.1 with a long description of the "excellences of a minister" (*amātyasampat*), directions to appoint ministers (1.9.8) and a prime minister (*mantripurohita*; 1.9.9–10). At the beginning of the next *adhyāya* we read:

> KAŚ 1.10.1 *mantripurohitasakhaḥ sāmaṇyeṣv adhikaraṇeṣu sthāpayitvāmātyān upahābhiḥ śodhayet*
>
> After appointing ministers to ordinary offices in consultation with his prime minister, he should test their integrity by means of secret tests.

[311] This *sūtra* is problematic and features very clumsy syntax. It nevertheless links previous discussions of teachers (*ācārya*; KĀŚ 1.5.6) with the next subject of ministers (*amātya*; KAŚ 1.9.1*ff.*)

Then follows descriptions of the four tests by which the "purity" (*śuci*) of each minister is proven.

Finally, after this point, we arrive at two *adhyāya*s (KAŚ 1.11–12) that describe two sets of spies: *saṃsthā*s, "stationary spies" (KAŚ 1.11.2–21); and *saṃcara*s "mobile spies" (KAŚ 1.12.1–5). By looking at these spies, who bear unique names, we are able to discern something of the chronology of the text.

The first group of spies, the *saṃsthā*s, includes the *kāpaṭika*, *udāsthita*, *gṛhapatikavyañjana*, *vaidehakavyañjana*, and *tāpasavyañjana*. The second group, the *saṃcara*s, includes the *sattrin*, *tīkṣṇa*, *rasada*, and *bhikṣukī*. Of these, the term *sattrin* is a generic term for spy and, as such, I will not consider it in this analysis.

Of the *saṃsthā*s, the former two occur only in the first and fifth *adhikaraṇa*s, but these three and other *-vyañjana* spies also occur at KAŚ 2.21, 2.35, and importantly, in the second iteration at 4.4.3, 4.5.1, and 4.5.12. Of the latter group, the *saṃcara*s, none of the agents (aside from the generic *sattrin*) appear anywhere except for KAŚ 1.11–1.14 and 5.1 onward. Hence, we can say that the composers of the core compilation and the second as well as the third iteration were aware of the *-vyañjana* spies, while only the composer of 1.12–14 and the fifth *adhikaraṇa* are aware of the *saṃcara* spies.

What this demonstrates, I would argue, is that *adhyāya*s 1.12–14 date to the *adhyāya* redaction, and, because it is aware of the agents discussed there, so must the fifth *adhikaraṇa*. Hence, we have a relatively clear picture of the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction.

KAŚ 2.9 and 2.10

The final minor issue to be resolved is the status of these two *adhyāya*s falling amidst the older tract of the core source. It is clear from certain points of terminology

(*amātya*, "minister"; *sampad*, "ideal quality") that KAŚ 2.9 must post date at least the first expansion of the source text. That places it at least, then, sometime later than the core compilation without ruling out that it might be part of the *adhyāya* redaction. The same must be true for KAŚ 2.10, which, as a discussion on edicts, only makes sense if 2.9 already existed. Although KAŚ 2.10 appears itself to have been constructed from different sources,[312] I am inclined to date it to the *adhyāya* redaction on the strength of its clear subsidiary dependence on the already secondary KAŚ 2.9. It does, however, remain possible that it dates only to the *prakaraṇa*-text.

7.2.6 Conclusion

We have been able in the foregoing paragraphs to isolate the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction a great deal. We have seen first of all that the *adhyāya* redactor dramatically expanded the core text at KAŚ 1.2–1.7, added KAŚ 1.8, 1.12–14, and 1.17–21. He was also responsible for the inclusion of KAŚ 2.33 and 3.16–20, as well as the entire fifth *adhikaraṇa*. Because the fifth *adhikaraṇa* (as a set of unrelated appendices) presupposes the *adhikaraṇa* division, we can also assign KAŚ 4.9–13 to the *adhyāya* redaction.

Fig. 8: Proposed *Adhyāya* Redaction to the *Tantra* section

[312] Scharfe (1993, 60*ff.*) undertakes a full analysis of this *adhyāya* and theorizes that it was compiled from independent sources.

Hence, the *prakaraṇa*-text, in the *tantra* section, comprised the old core of KAŚ 1.2–1.7, 1.10–11, 1.15–16, 2.1–3, 2.5–2.9, 2.11–32, 2.34–4.8. The oldest parts of this are likely the core passages underlying 1.2–1.7, 2.1–2.34, and parts of the third *adhikaraṇa*.

7.3 THE *ĀVĀPA* SECTION (6.2–13.5)

The latter half of the extant *Arthaśāstra* deals with matters falling generally under the rubric of "foreign policy," or *āvāpa.* It is characterized by a greater number of shorter *adhikaraṇa*s than the *tantra* section, with the exception of the long seventh *adhikaraṇa*:



Fig. 9: The *Āvāpa* Section of the *Arthaśāstra*

	title	*translation*	*topics covered*
6.	*maṇḍalayoniḥ*	"The Circle as Source"	Central Concepts for the Following
7.	*ṣāḍguṇyam*	"The Sixfold Policy"	Foreign Policy Strategy
8.	*vyasanādhikārikam*	"On the Topic of Calamities"	Calamities of the State
9.	*abhiyāsyatkarma*	"Preparing to March"	Marching with the Army
10.	*sāṃgrāmikam*	"On War"	Fighting War
11.	*saṃghavṛttam*	"Practices against *Saṃgha*s"	Undermining Oligarchies
12.	*ābaliyasam*	"On the Weaker King"	Tactics for the Weak King
13.	*durgalambhopāyaḥ*	"Means of Taking a Fort"	Strategies of Taking Fortresses

These *adhikaraṇa* subdivisions seem to match the content of the text relatively, well, although, as we have already seen (§6.4.2), we can link *adhikaraṇa*s 8 and 11 to the *adhyāya* redaction.

7.3.1 Topical Outline

The *adhikaraṇa*s of the *āvāpa* section do not resolve into a structure nearly as clear as that with the *tantra* section. But, we do find traces of a loose structure to the

arrangement of topics, particularly if we remove two of the *adhikaraṇa*s (8 and 11) already associated with the *adhyāya* redaction:

	I. Considerations of Foreign Policy
6 "Circle as Source"	A. Technical Preamble
7 "The Sixfold Policy"	B. Determinations of Foreign Policy
	II. Military Strategy
9 "Preparing to March"	A. Marching with the Army
10 "On War"	B. Field Combat Strategy
12 "On the Weak King"	a. Non-Combat Strategies of Weak Kings[313]
13 "Means to Take a Fort"	C. Conquering a Fort

We can see in this basic outline the division into rather more academic considerations of foreign policy (*adhikaraṇa*s 6–7) and detailed preparations and tactics for war (9–10, 13). Unfortunately, a more detailed outline reveals nothing about the composition of the *āvāpa* section. As such, we are unable to penetrate deeper into the origins of the *prakaraṇa*-text in the second half to the same extent possible in the first half. As such, we must rely more on the formal elements and informal tendencies observed in the *adhyāya* redaction in the *tantra* section to determine the extent, at least, of that intervention.

7.3.2 Integrated Passages

We find much less in the *āvāpa* section by way of integrated passages. KAŚ 6.2 establishes a series of theoretical concepts used primarily in the subsequent seventh *adhikaraṇa*, which may be said to be the conceptual heart of the *adhikaraṇa*, as it demonstrates the archetypal uses of the basic vocabulary of the second half (as presented in KAŚ 6.2 and 7.1). Nevertheless, the seventh *adhikaraṇa* does not show any clear

[313] It should be noted here that the 12th *adhikaraṇa* does not deal, as might be suggested by the outline with combat strategies, but a variety of non-combat strategies, and does, therefore, break with the major organization of the outline.

structural organization except in a long discussion of treaties (KAŚ 7.9–12) that may be linked to the *adhyāya* redaction (§6.4.2)

The ninth *adhikaraṇa*, however, does possess an independent structure, which is laid out in its first *sūtra*:

> KAŚ 9.1.1 vijigīṣur ātmanaḥ parasya ca balābalaṃ śaktideśakālayātrākālabalasamuddhānakālapaścātkopakṣyavyayalābh āpadāṃ jñātvā viśiṣṭabalo yāyāt anyathā 'sīta
>
> After ascertaining the (relative) strength and weakness of powers, place, time, seasons for marching, time for raising armies, revolts in the rear, losses, expenses, gains and troubles, of himself and the enemy, the conqueror should march if superior in strength, otherwise stay quiet.

This *sūtra* lays out precisely the topics covered in the following *adhikaraṇa* (see §4.2):

KAŚ 9.1.1	***prakaraṇa***	***adhyāya***
1. Power	*śaktideśakālabalābalajñānam*	9.1.2–16
2. Place		9.1.17–21
3. Time		9.1.22–24
4. Seasons for Marching	*yātrākālāḥ*	9.1.25–52
5. Occasions to Raise Troops	*balopādānakālāḥ*	9.2.1–12
	saṃnāhaguṇāḥ	9.2.13–24
	pratibalakarma	9.2.25–30
6. Attack in the Rear	*paścātkopakopacintāḥ*	9.3.1-8
	bāhyābhyantaraprakṛtikopapratīkāraḥ	9.3.9–42
7. Loss, Expenses, and Gains	*kṣayavyayalābhaviparimarśaḥ*	9.4.1–27
8. Dangers	*bāhyabhyantarāś cāpadaḥ*	9.5.1–32
	dūṣyaśatrusaṃyuktāḥ	9.6.1–73
	arthānarthasaṃśayayuktāḥ	9.7.1–66
	tāsām upāyavikalpajāḥ siddhayaḥ	9.7.67–84

It was noted above (§4.2) that the *adhyāya*s redactor was likely responsible for the addition of the material in KAŚ 9.7. Internal indications also link KAŚ 9.6 to the *adhyāya* redaction.[314] Hence, this glimpse of structure in the *āvāpa* section reveals again the

[314] KAŚ 9.6.51 refers to oligarchies, which have been linked to the *adhyāya* redaction.

addition of material by the *adhyāya* redactor. We note also that despite the lack of clear structural principles, we find a Kauṭilya dialogue also indicating interpolations of the *adhyāya* redactor at the end of KAŚ 10.[315]

Adhikaraṇa 12 is a collection of secret strategies to help a king who is outmatched by an opponent. We can seen above that it breaks the general outline of the second half. We note now that the *adhikaraṇa* itself is introduced by a Kauṭilya dialogue at KAŚ 12.1.1–9. The organization of this *adhikaraṇa* is the most confused in the entire treatise. Its disruption of the general outline along with the introduction of its major topic by a Kauṭilya dialogue mark it as a likely candidate for interpolation, although little more can be said of it at the present.

Finally, the thirteenth *adhikaraṇa* once again shows good internal organization, but as with the ninth, it appears that an extra *adhyāya* has been added at the end. This *adhikaraṇa* discusses the *durgalambhopāyaḥ*, "Means of Taking a Fort," in five parts: instigation to sedition, drawing the enemy out, the use of secret agents, laying siege, and storming the fort. These are discussed in five *prakaraṇa*s and conclude at KAŚ 13.4.53:[316]

> KAŚ 13.4.53 paradurgam avāpya viśuddhaśatrupakṣaṃ kṛtopāṃśudaṇḍapratīkāram antarbahiś ca praviśet
>
> After obtaining the enemy's fort, he should enter it after it is cleared of the enemy's party and after precautions against silent punishment are taken inside and outside.

But, the text continues to describe the four ways "to conquer the world" (*pṛthivīm jetum*):

> KAŚ 13.4.54–60 evaṃ vijigīṣur amitrabhūmiṃ labdhvā madhyamaṃ lipseta tatsiddhāvugāsīnam

---

[315] See §4.2.

[316] Kangle recognizes that the *prakaraṇa* concludes at this point (1971, 485n)

eṣa prathamo mārgaḥ pṛthivīṃ jetum
madhyamodāsīnayor abhāve guṇātiśayenāriprakṛtīḥ sādhayet tat uttarāḥ prakṛtīḥ
eṣa dvitīyo mārgaḥ
maṇḍalasyābhāve śatruṇā mitraṃ mitreṇa vā śatrum ubhayataḥsaṃpīḍanena sādhayet
eṣa tṛtīyo mārgaḥ
śakyam ekaṃ vā sāmantaṃ sādhayet tena dviguṇo dvitīyam triguṇas tṛtīyam
eṣa caturtho mārgaḥ pṛtivhīṃ jetum

After thus conquering the enemy's territory, the conqueror should seek to seize the middle king, and after succeeding over him, the neutral king. This is the first method of conquering the world (*pṛthivīṃ jetum*).
In absence of the middle and neutral kings, he should overcome the enemy constituents by superiority of policy, then the other constituents. This is the second method.
In the absence of the circle he should overcome by squeezing from both sides the ally through the enemy or the enemy through the ally. This is the third method.
He should first overcome the weak or a single neighboring prince; becoming doubly powerful through him a second prince; three times powerful, a third. This is the fourth method of conquering the world.

And then the states that:

KAŚ 13.4.62 jitvā ca pṛthivīṃ vibhaktavarṇāśramāṃ svadharmeṇa bhuñjīta

Having conquered the world, he should enjoy it divided into *varṇa*s and *āśrama*s according to his *svadharma*.

We recognize here that the plan of the greater *adhikaraṇa* has ended at KAŚ 13.4.53, and that what follows uses a term (*pṛthivīm*) that characterizes the interpolations of the *adhyāya* redactor in the framing chapters (§3.3).[317] Thus, we should rightly regard KAŚ 13.4.54–62 as well as the following *adhyāya* to be interpolations of the *adhyāya* redactor.

[317] Moreover, this term is only found once outside of these passages, end verses, and Kauṭilya dialogues, where it appears as a gloss (unncessary?) for the term *deśa*: KAŚ 9.1.17.

Moreover, the discussions interpolated here by the *adhyāya* redactor, on the four means of conquering the world (KAŚ 13.4.54*ff.*) and the conduct of the king toward his conquered subjects (KAŚ 13.5) indicate that this was probably the end of the *prakaraṇa*-text as he found it. Thus, we can ascertain that the general outline above (probably less *adhikaraṇa* 12) gives a reasonable sense of the extent of the *āvāpa* section in the *prakaraṇa*-text.

7.3.3 The *Adhyāya* Redaction and the *Āvāpa* Text

It would appear, then, that the *āvāpa* section has undergone significant redaction, of which little clear trace can be established. We do, however, see a basic division between rather more theoretical discussions of various foreign policies (KAŚ 6.2–7.18) and practical advice for organizing the marching, combat, and siege tactics of the army itself (*adhikaraṇa*s 9, 10, and 13). We have already relegated *adhikaraṇa*s 8 and 11 to the *adhyāya* redaction. This is likely also the case with the twelfth *adhikaraṇa*, which not only breaks the general outline presented above, but is generally inaugurated by a Kauṭilya dialogue. Further, if we take the serial presentation of options for the use of secret agents as consistent with the style of the *adhyāya* redactor (as suggested by *adhikaraṇa* 5), then the 12th *adhikaraṇa* gives the strong appearance of having been added during the *adhyāya* redaction.

Moreover, analysis of *adhyāya* boundaries (§4.2) have indicated the likelihood of the addition of prose material at the end of *adhikaraṇa*s 9 and 10, a probability that finds strong support in the case of the former through an analysis of its underlying structure. Finally, then, we are able to determine that the end of *adhikaraṇa* 13 has likely been expanded during the *adhyāya* redaction, as well.



Fig. 10: Proposed *Adhyāya* Redaction of the *Āvāpa* Section

Collectively, these give us a tolerably precise sense of the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction with regard to the interpolation of discrete tracts, although there is also some indication that the *adhikaraṇa*s of the *prakaraṇa*-text in the second half have been expanded throughout.

7.4 THE BRIDGE AND THE FOURTEENTH *ADHIKARAṆA*

This brief passage at KAŚ 6.1.1 presents the *saptāṇga* theory; namely, that the state comprises seven "constituent elements" (*prakṛti*s): the king (*svāmi*), the minister (*amātya*), the country (*janapada*), the fort (*durga*), the treasury (*kośa*), the army (*daṇḍa*), and the ally (*mitra*).[318] This theory raises an interesting problem, as the term *prakṛti* also means in the text "subjects" or "people" of the realm.[319] Nevertheless, the *saptāṇga* theory is integrated not only into the following passage at KAŚ 6.2.13*ff.*, as well as in key passages throughout the remainder of the *āvāpa* section. Thus, it would seem that the bridge must date to the time when the *āvāpa* section took on the general form as witnessed in the presently theorized shape of the *prakaraṇa* text.

Finally, I think we can conclude that the fourteenth *adhikaraṇa* was also part of the *adhyāya* redaction. Its singular character and style within the greater context of the

[318] An eighth *prakṛti*, the enemy (*amitra*) is added in the prose (KAŚ 6.1.13–14), although the end verse (6.1.15) is quick to note that the enemy (*ari*) is not one of the *prakṛti*s. It is not clear whether the 8th is an addition.

[319] See also its use to describe the constituents of the "Circle of Kings" (*maṇḍala*) at KAŚ 7.2.13–23.

Arthaśāstra, in concert with its clearly appendectical character, has marked it as a clear interpolation from the beginning. The only question remains where it should be put in the compositional history. I think we can now solve this problem with reference to the specific nature of the material included by the *adhyāya* redactor at the end of the thirteenth *prakaraṇa*, which indicates to me that KAŚ 13.4.53 was the original conclusion of the *prakaraṇa*-text. This original closing has prompted the *adhyāya* redactor to add a section on the four ways to conquer the world (*pṛthivī*) and a subsequent *adhyāya* on the conduct of the conquiering king (which, however, has already been discussed at KAŚ 7.16). The appendectical character of the fourteenth *adhikaraṇa* in addition to its conspicuous introduction with reference to the four *varṇa*s and *āśrama*s (KAŚ 14.1.1) support this notion.

7.5 CONCLUSION: THE *PRAKARAṆA*-TEXT

We have arrived, then, at a reasonably well-supported idea of the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction. I must here restate the provisional character of this theory, limited, as it is, by the need to select only key pieces of evidence; certainly many more considerations, particularly examination of shifts in terminology and concepts, will refine, contradict, and, perhaps, ultimately overturn this theory. Nevertheless, it has its validity in presenting an articulate and detailed map of the text that is of potential use to the study of the history of the period.

7.5.1 The Extent of the *Adhyāya* Redaction

Based on the above, we can posit that, in addition to the end verses and Kauṭilya dialogues, the *adhyāya* redaction involved the following emendations of the *prakaraṇa* text:

1. The addition of KAŚ 1.1

2. The enlargement of the discussion of *vidyāvinayaindriyajayaḥ* at KAŚ 1.2–7
3. The addition of the discussion of appointing ministers KAŚ 1.8
4. The addition of the discussion of princes at KAŚ 1.17–18 [probably 19–21]
5. The addition of KAŚ 2.33
6. The addition of KAŚ 3.16–20
7. The addition of KAŚ 4.9–13
8. The addition of the fifth *adhikaraṇa*
9. The addition of the eighth *adhikaraṇa*
10. The addition of KAŚ 9.6–9.7
11. The addition of KAŚ 10.6
12. The addition of KAS 11
13. The addition of the twelfth *adhikaraṇa* [?]
14. The addition of KAŚ 13.4.53*ff.* and 13.5
15. The addition of the fourteenth *adhikaraṇa*
16. The addition of KAŚ 15.1

Additional interpolations that are identifiable but not discretely dateable to the *adhyāya* redaction include:

1. The addition of KAŚ 2.4
2. The addition of KAŚ 2.10
3. The addition of KAŚ 3.6–3.8

These changes measure out the probable extent of the *prakaraṇa*-text, a text that we have concluded was probably composed entirely in prose.

7.5.2 Corroboration of the *Prakaraṇa*-Text

It is difficult to find any independent corroboration of my proposed theory, but I believe that I have found just such a thing. For, my reading of the *Manusmṛti* suggests that its composer used the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* to produce the sections on *Rājadharma* (Book 7) and *Vyavahāra* (Books 8–9). What is interesting, however, is that I believe I can demonstrate that the *Manusmṛti* was not using the extant *Arthaśāstra*, but was in fact looking at the *prakaraṇa*-text as I have just outlined it.

The *Manusmṛti* deals with statecraft (*rājadharma*) in Books 7–9. Of these, the discussion of governance itself is covered in Book 7, while Books 8 and 9 deal with civil

and criminal law. As such, it is in Book 7 that we see the direct influence of our *Arthaśāstra* on the *Manusmṛti*.

The discussion of governance is divided into two main sections in the *Manusmṛti*, MS 7.37–144 and 7.145–226, corresponding precisely to the division of the *Arthaśāstra* into *tantra* and *āvāpa*. Each of these sections is formally demarcated with a frame provided by the trope of the king's daily routine. The first section begins at MS 7.37 with "After getting up in the morning…," and the second section begins at MS 7.145 with "He should rise in the last watch of the night…"[320] As mentioned, the first of these introduces a passage corresponding to the *tantra* section and the latter to the *āvāpa* section. The material preceding the first section (MS 7.1–35) is a rather more abstract and theoretical preamble; the first major section is formally introduced at MS 7.36:

> MS 7.36 I will explain to you precisely and in their proper order all that he, along with his deputies, should do as he protects his subjects.

The manner of their correspondence is somewhat complicated and is probably best demonstrated through a visual depiction. The correspondences for the *tantra* section follow below:

[320] Only the latter of these two examples actually concludes its frame with the afternoon (MS 7.216–222) and evening routines (7.223–226). The former only uses the trope of the morning routine to introduce the section.

Manusmṛti		*Arthaśāstra* (*prakaraṇa*-text)	
7.1–35	[*Introduction*]		
7.1.36	[*transitional verse*]		
7.1.37	[*morning routine*]		
7.1.38–39	Training from elders		
7.1.40–42	[*old kings*]		
7.1.43	Four Sciences	Four Sciences	1.2–1.4
		Training from elders	1.5
7.1.44	Conquering the Senses	Conquering the Senses	1.6–1.7
7.1.45-55	[*vices*]		
7.1.54–55	Appointing Advisors	Appointing Ministers	1.9
7.1.56–57	Seeking Counsel		
7.1.58–59	Brahmin Counselor	*Mantripurohita*	1.9
7.1.60–62	Appointing/Testing Officials	Appointing/Testing Officials	1.10–11
		Seeking Counsel	1.15
7.1.63–68	Appointing the Envoy	Appointing the Envoy	1.16
7.1.69	Settling the Countryside	Settling the Countryside	2.1–2
7.1.70–75	Constructing Forts	Constructing Forts	2.3
7.1.76	Constructing the Palace	Constructing the Palace	2.4.7
7.1.77	[*marriage*]		
7.1.78–79	[*purohita* and *ṛtvig*]		
7.1.80	Employing collectors	*samnidhātṛ* & *samāhartṛ*	2.5–2.9
7.1.81	Employing *adhyakṣa*s	Employing *adhyakṣa*s	2.11–32/4
7.82–95	[*praise of Brahmins*]		
7.96–98	[*war booty*]		
7.99–113	[*advice on governance*]		
7.114–119	Appointment of Regional Officers	*samāhartṛ* II (public safety)	2.35.1–8
7.120	Overseeing village activity	Spying on villages	2.35.9–14
7.121	Appointing City Officers	Appointing *nāgarika*	2.36
7.122–124	[*king inspects officers*]		
7.125–126	[*wages*]		
7.127–139	[*taxes*]		
7.140–141	Trying lawsuits	Jurisprudence	3.1–5, 8–16
7.142–144	Protecting subjects	Policing; *kaṇṭakaśodhana*	4.1–4.8

If we allow for the inclusion of several long digressions in the *Manusmṛti*, the progression of topics is nearly perfect. The only differences are, on one hand, the order in

which training from elders and the sciences are discussed, and, on the other hand, the position in which the topic of counsel is discussed.

The former is explained, I believe, by the fact that the composer of the *Manusmṛti* found a convenient link between his frame narrative of the king's daily activity and the worship of Brahmins, a trope common from the *dharma* literature, where the king is supposed to worship Brahmins when he awakes. Manu follows this convention, but then specifies that these are elders (*vṛddha*) from whom he should receive training (*vinaya*) in the sciences (*vidyā*). Hence, we have a reversal of the order discussed in the *Arthaśāstra* (*vidyā*, then *vinaya*).

The movement of the section on counsel can, I think, be explained because Manu has made the same error the *adhyāya* redactor made. Namely, he has misinterpreted the phrase *mantripurohita* as "counselors and *purohita*," and, not finding a discussion of counselors, places one here, but refering to them as *saciva*.[321] He has, I would argue, moved the discussion on seeking counsel in the *Arthaśāstra* to what seemed a more logical place, after the putative introduction of the ministers.

There are a few other difficulties,[322] but none sufficient to overshadow the clear concordance of the two texts.[323] In fact, the strongest evidence certainly favors that the

---

[321] We note, interestingly, that the term *saciva* is used only once in the *Arthaśāstra*, just prior to the interpolated discussion of ministers at KAŚ 1.8, which was introduced by the *adhyāya* redactor precisely because he also could not find a discussion of *mantrins*.

[322] There are two parts of this passage that look very similar to elements that I have assigned to the *adhyāya* redaction: 1) the examples set by former kings (MS 7.40–42); and, 2) the discussion of vices or causes of grief that stand in opposition to the control of the senses (MS 7.45-53). But, Manu's discussion discusses them separately and in different contexts. In the *Arthaśāstra*, they are combined into a single discussion of the *ariṣaḍvarga* (the "group of six enemies," *i.e.*, vices), in which the former kings are given as warnings to those who might succumb to one of the six vices. Thus, the *Arthaśāstra*'s discussion shows a high degree of integration over that of the *Manusmṛti*. It is the first but not last indication that the *adhyāya* redaction may have been influenced by the *Manusmṛti*.

version of the *prakaraṇa*-text posited above agrees with the source used by the *Manusmṛti*. We have, first of all, a concise discussion of the sciences (*vidyā*), training (*vinaya*), and control of the senses (*indriyavijaya*), with none of the later *adhyāya* expansions. Second, the *Manusmṛti* passes over the passages linked to the *adhyāya* redaction, KAŚ 12–14 on mobile spies and investigating seducible parties, KAŚ 1.17–21 on princes, the king's schedule, and the construction of the palace,[324] KAŚ 2.4 on the layout of the capital city, KAŚ 2.10 on edicts, and most importantly, all of *adhikaraṇa* 5. We could not have clearer evidence that the theory outlined above regarding the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction is generally accurate for the *tantra* section.

The discussion of *āvāpa* resets the narrative of the king's daily schedule. Its agreement with the *prakaraṇa*-text is also quite close, although it tends only to follow the broader divisions of the latter half:

[323] I am also not able to account for the failure of the *Manusmṛti* to discuss the spies at KAŚ 1.11. Perhaps the composer felt that they were included in the discussion of testing officials at 1.10. Likewise, they may not have been in the *prakaraṇa*-text, or he may simply have failed to mention them.

[324] He does mention the construction of the palace, but only in agreement the minor reference at KAŚ 2.4.7, which I think is original to the passage (it is written in the consistent optative idiom of the greater passage and not the nominative constructions of the interpolation on *vāstuśāstra*).

Manusmṛti		*Arthaśāstra*	
7.145–146	[*morning routine*]		
7.147–150	[*conferring with councilors*]		
7.1.51–154a	[*reflecting on different matters*]		
		The Seven *Prakṛti*s	6.1
		Miscellaneous	6.2.1–12
7.154b–156	The Circle of Kings I	The Circle of Kings	6.2.13–23
7.157a	The Seven *Prakṛti*s		
7.157b	The 72 Constituents	The 72 Constituents	6.2.24–29
7.158	The Circle of Kings II		
7.159	Prevailing over Enemies	Power	6.2.30–38
7.160-161	The Sixfold Strategy	The Sixfold Strategy	7.1–7.2.5
7.162–180	Application of Sixfold Strategy	Application of Sixfold Strategy	7.2.6–7.18
7.181	March to the Enemy's Fort		
7.182–187	Considerations for Marching	Considerations for Marching	9.1–9.5
7.188–194	Combat Tactics	Combat Tactics	10.1–10.5
7.195–197	Sieging the Fort	Sieging the Fort	13.1–4
7.198–205	Conduct in Victory	Conduct in Victory	13.5
7.206–215	[*secondary strategy*][325]		
7.216–222	[*afternoon routine*]		
7.223–225	[*evening routine*]		
7.226	[*abdication of duties*]		

The correlations in the second half are clear, although they are not nearly as striking as in the first. I think this is for two reasons. First, the discussions in the second half are far less organized than in the first, and it appears that the composer of the *Manusmṛti* is digesting complex tracts in simple ways. Second, the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction in the second half is far less certain, since there is no apparent underlying structure as found in the first half.

Nevertheless, the comparison shows that the major features of the *āvāpa* section that I have identified, consideration of six-fold policy and the march to the enemy's fort, are, indeed, the way the *Manusmṛti* has structured its discussion. Critically, then, the

[325] This long passage appears to draw on elements scattered throughout the second half of the text. As it breaks the discussion in the *Manusmṛti* it does not seem to militate against the identification of the *prakaraṇa*-text as the source for the discussion of statecraft in Book 7. More research is needed here as well.

model proposed above correctly predicts the absence of the eighth *adhikaraṇa* (on calamities) as well as the eleventh (on oligarchies), twelfth (on the weaker king), and fourteenth (on secret practices). This stands as strong indication not only that the *adhyāya* theory is correct, but that it has led to the correct conclusion about the general shape of the *prakaraṇa*-text. Of course, the situation is not entirely perfect: I have posited that KAŚ 13.5 is a later addition, although Manu shows a parallel passage. Moreover, the passages show only a general agreement in broad topics, but it is enough to demonstrate the major elements of the *prakaraṇa*-text. This demonstrable corroboration is, I think, extremely strong evidence not only that the composer of the *Manusmṛti* used the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* as his source for Book 7, but also that he was looking at the *prakaraṇa*-text.

Undoubtedly, there is much more work to be done on the relationship between these two texts, but it is sufficient here to note that the *Manusmṛti* testifies to the shape of the *prakaraṇa*-text, and there are some indications that the *adhyāya* redaction may itself have been influenced by the *Manusmṛti*. Nevertheless, this allows us to date the *adhyāya* redaction to sometime after the composition of the *Manusmṛti*, which Olivelle (2005, 25) has dated to the first to second centuries CE.

7.5.3 Origins of the *Prakaraṇa*-Text

The corroboration of the *Manusmṛti* has the effect of firming the deductions drawn above regarding the provenance of the *Arthaśāstra*'s end verses and Kauṭilya dialogues. We can, then, more strongly suggest that the *prakaraṇa*-text was a prose composition. Moreover, it appears to have been the result of successive emendations, and ultimately, composed from at least one, if not more, autonomous prose source. I agree with Trautmann's argument (1971) that (most of) the second *adhikaraṇa* is a single

source. As for the third *adhikaraṇa*, its composite nature makes any assessment of its origins very difficult and requiring independent study. The seventh *adhikaraṇa*, for its part, is so horribly confused that it is as yet impossible to ascertain how it took its present form.

The provenance of the *prakaraṇa*-text, however, is a matter that requires further explication. The purpose of this study has been primarily to isolate the *adhyāya* redaction, but, in doing so, I have come to believe that the evolution of the *prakaraṇa*-text can be articulated with a greater degree of specificity through intensive word study and increased intimacy with the text itself.

PART II: THE POLITICS OF BRAHMANISM

The first half of this dissertation (Part One) furnishes for the *Arthaśāstra* a compositional history by identifying relationships of dependency and disjunction that collectively illustrate the various processes through which the extant text was formed. The results of that study show that the *Arthaśāstra* was, in its earliest recoverable recension, already a composite text, assembled from both preexisting sources and new material.[326] Upon this prose[327] recension, which I have called the *prakaraṇa*-text, was wrought a final major redaction, which I have called the *adhyāya* redaction, in which the text was reapportioned into new textual units called *adhyāya*s, verse stanzas were added at the conclusion of each, substantial prose and verse segments were added, and the text was overtly ascribed to Kauṭilya, the legendary prime minister of the founder of the Mauryan dynasty, Candragupta Maurya (*c*. 321-297 BCE).

Every text is a witness to the cultural context from which it was produced. As such, texts reflect, each in their own ways, the complex social realities from which they emerged. It is the work of the textual historian to elicit from these sources, through novel, text-specific critical strategies, observations about the text's home culture. In this, the second half of the dissertation (Part Two), I will use the chronological and sequential distinctions between the *prakaraṇa*-text and the *adhyāya* redaction to demonstrate that certain concepts and perspectives widely considered to be fundamental features of the

---

[326] The extent to which this earliest version of the *Arthaśāstra* resembled the extant text is not entirely clear. While some material from the extant *Arthaśāstra* can be identified with a high degree of confidence as belonging to this earliest layer, much of the text belongs to an indeterminate compositional layer between the earliest material and the final major redaction (discussed below). Nevertheless, the identification of a major final redaction to the text indicates that there existed, prior to the *adhyāya* redaction a version of the *Arthaśāstra*, written mainly, if not wholly, in prose and resembling to a great extent the extant text.

[327] Or largely in prose; see §4.2.

expert tradition of political science in classical South Asia are, in fact, absent from the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra*.

As an example of the kind of historical work that the foregoing textual study makes possible, I will be tracing in Part Two the relatively late appearance in the text of attitudes and prescriptions favorable to Brahmins, the hereditary sacerdotal class of the classical period. This will contradict the prevailing notion that pro-Brahmanical sentiment and religious bias favoring Brahmins were standard features of state policy in classical South Asia. Most importantly, the isolation of pro-Brahmanical sentiments in the *adhyāya* redaction of the *Arthaśāstra* provides us with an excellent opportunity to investigate how and when Brahmanical ideology began to inflect political discourse in the classical period. I refer to all of these various means through which political interests were pursued as "political Brahmanism."

The five chapters of Part Two will accomplish three primary goals. First, I will discuss the history of pro-Brahmanical sentiments under the rubric of "Brahmanical exceptionalism" and look at how that ideology inflects our understanding of South Asian political and religious history. Second, I will show how these sentiments are native primarily to the *adhyāya* redaction of the *Arthaśāstra*. Finally, I will argue that the late occurrence of pro-Brahmanical ideology in the *Arthaśāstra* should prompt a reevaluation of the role of religion in statecraft during the classical period of South Asian history.

Chapter 8: *Varṇadharma* and Political Brahmanism

We can detect in the later layers of the extant *Arthaśāstra* a purposeful and comprehensive, if not entirely systematic, effort to integrate the political interests of the orthodox Brahmanical community into a text on statecraft previously devoid of such biases. Through the introduction of key passages during the *adhyāya* redaction, the underlying text was brought into agreement with the texts of the *dharma* literature and other orthodox Sanskrit sources regarding those elements of Brahmanical social thought most directly supporting the political advancement of the Brahmanical community. The interests pursued through the introduction of this ideology into the *Arthaśāstra* can be characterized generally as comprising a variety of economic, social, and political advantages devolving from the introduction of a self-interested view of society and the codification of favorable treatment for Brahmins within state policy itself.

8.1 The Role of *Varṇadharma* in Political Brahmanism

The primary strategy through which Brahmanical interests are pursued in the *Arthaśāstra* lies in the emigration into the text of the ideology of *varṇadharma*, a theory that claims that society is natively organized into a hierarchy of four social groups (*varṇa*s) and that the activities appropriate for the members of each *varṇa* are established by a sacred and universal law (*dharma*). The classification of society into these four social groups had begun already at the end of the early Vedic period, evidence for which comes from a late hymn in the *Ṛgveda*, the celebrated *puruṣasūkta* (ṚV 10.90). In this hymn, which reflects on the creation of the cosmos, the four social classes are said to emerge from different parts of the body of the cosmic man (*puruṣa*). We witness herein already the basic features of the system, in particular its hierarchy and exaltation of Brahmins. The system takes on a more definite form in the subsequent era, the middle

Vedic period, when the term "*varṇa*" (lit. "color") is applied to each of the classes. From the texts of this period forward, the exaltation of Brahmins through the idiom of *varṇa* becomes a regular feature of Brahmanical literature.

In addition to exalting the position of Brahmins in society (above even the ruling classes), the theory of *varṇadharma* also establishes a theoretical basis for the subordination of the king's royal functions to the sacred law of *dharma*. This subordination is expressed by the characterization of the king's official duties as his divinely-ordained individual duty (*svadharma*).[328] The equation of the activities of the king (*rāja*) with the tenets of sacred law (*dharma*) is expressed also in the term *rājadharma*, which is used in the Brahmanical literature as a synonym for other terms denoting "statecraft" or "governance."[329] As such, the emergence of the ideology of *varṇadharma* in the later layers of the *Arthaśāstra* represents the theoretical undermining of the king's authority by the authority of *dharma*.

This chapter is the first of four that will examine the concept of *varṇadharma* and its emergence in the later layers of the *Arthaśāstra*. We will examine the system of *varṇadharma* and its history in Brahmanical thought first (§8.2). Next, I will argue that *varṇadharma* is best understood as a political ideology, an interested worldview that makes claims about power and is itself a tool for the pursuit of political advantage (§8.3). Finally, the chapter will conclude with an examination of how *varṇadharma* works as an ideology within the discourse on statecraft and how best to analyze and make use of the

[328] Two approaches can be found in the Brahmanical literature to explain the origin of the king's *svadharma*. The first seems to hold that the king's *svadharma* exists outside of the *varṇa* system, as a *svadharma* particular to the king alone (ĀDS 2.25.1). The second casts the king's *svadharma* as established by or standing in for the general *svadharma* of the ruling Kṣatriya *varṇa*, one of the four *varṇa*s in the system (GDS 10.1–66; MS e.g. 9.325*ff*). There does not seem to have been much tension between these two perspectives in the Brahmanical literature, as both continue to appear throughout the *dharma* literature.

[329] *nītiśāstra*, *daṇḍanīti*, *arthaśāstra*, *rājanīti*, etc.

data in the *Arthaśāstra* to illuminate the confluence of religious ideology, statecraft, power, and discourse in classical South Asia (§8.4).

8.2 *VARṆADHARMA* IN INDIAN THOUGHT

As a theology, *varṇadharma* represents the expression of the omnipresent sacred order within society through the division of the world into a hierarchy of four *varṇa*s. When this theology is viewed as a feature of discourse in South Asian history and the claims made by the hierarchy embedded within the *varṇa*s are ramified through the matrix of social power relations, the ideological aspects of *varṇadharma* emerge. Viewed as an ideology, *varṇadharma* appears as a putatively descriptive but thoroughly normative social theory (and related set of injunctions) that seeks to propagate and naturalize a lived set of social relations, relations built upon a specific hierarchical social principle operating within a segmented society for the ultimate benefit of a Brahmin class.[330]

The relationship between *varṇadharma* ideology and the perspectives and policies of historical polities in South Asian history is not entirely clear. More generally, given the lack of historical detail available to students of classical South Asia, we do not know how or the extent to which this theory was accepted by the diverse elements of the classical social milieu as an accurate or meaningful depiction of the existing social order.[331] And, because we do not understand sufficiently the social dimensions of the groups who wrote

---

[330] See §8.2.3. On the composition of the Brahmin class and the role of *varṇa* in its establishment, see Chapter 10.

[331] Such corroboration could only come from non-Brahmanical texts or epigraphical records such as the reported account of the Greek ambassador Megasthenes who is said to have resided for several years at the Mauryan capital of Pataliputra. His account, refracted through the writings of later historians, record the division of society into 7 groups, which system does not closely resemble the *varṇa* system *in toto*. The epigraphical record of the Mauryan period is similarly silent on *varṇa*, recording only the term *brahmaṇa* (like Megasthenes account). See McCrindle 1979.

and read our texts or how the ideas in these texts circulated throughout the greater cultural milieu we do not know who propagated the theory, its intended audience and effect, or how it influenced social relations. As such, the investigation of the ideological character of *varṇadharma* is also an investigation into basic questions of social organization and power relations in the period of the *Arthaśāstra*, albeit one applicable to and limited by the non-local and atemporal discourses of our textual sources.

And yet, there are a few things about the relationship between *varṇadharma* and society in the classical period that we can establish at the outset. The demonstrably ideological character of *varṇadharma* discourages any positivist temptation to accept the system uncritically as descriptive. As such, it is inappropriate, though common, to assert without qualification that the society of the period (or any part of it) was, in fact, divided into the classes and groups claimed in the theory.[332] Such a claim would require not only corroboration from evidence external to the ideological world of orthodox Brahmanical sources, evidence that is not forthcoming, but also a thoughtful analysis of what precisely is implied by the term "descriptive."

Moreover, given what must have been the radical diversity of cultures in the different regions and eras of classical South Asia as well as the dynamic and transformational capacity of urban centers situated in transregional networks in the classical period, it seems very unlikely that a theory as simple as *varṇadharma* would be

[332] This includes, most importantly, the ongoing use of the terms defined by the system. In particular, I am referring to the uncritical use of the *varṇa*s to describe the social milieu of the period. This is, unfortunately, still quite common. A more transparent and increasingly less common example would also be the resort to *dharma* to explain the motives of historical actors and the shape and destiny of social institutions. Even in hermeneutical analyses we must guard against passively appropriating ideological elements into our own analyses.

able to provide a reasonably accurate, baseline model for the most prominent and/or noteworthy features of what was certainly an enormously complex society.[333]

At the same time, however, it is not sufficient to cast *varṇadharma* as pure fancy, for it clearly represents a powerful and relevant perspective developed and deployed over a long period of time that both reflected and sought to influence how some people lived their social experience. Moreover, Althusser's analysis of ideology pointedly reminds us that ideologies such as *varṇadharma* are, to their adherents, less ideational systems than actual lived relations (Eagleton 2007, 141). As such, *varṇadharma* is as much an expression of wishful thinking as a perception of social reality, operating all the time as an active tactic in a greater effort to promote political and material advantage for Brahmins.[334] Given this and the other limitations on such a study, an analysis of *varṇa* must focus primarily on its ideological effects within the discourse of statecraft and only secondarily on the truth or falsity of its empirical claims. As with much in the study of ancient South Asia, we must begin with analyses of text and discourse before we can use them as evidence for material conditions.

---

[333] It is the present use of *varṇa* as just such a "baseline" model that I am scrutinizing here. It cannot be reiterated enough that the one of the greatest distortions visited by the *varṇāśramadharma* theory upon the study of this period of Indian history is the homogenization of the culture. The lack of historical and geographical information in most of our texts from this period renders the imagined geography of these texts in no greater detail than "the northern half of South Asia." The prevalence of *varṇāśramadharma* in these sources gives the appearance, then, of a homogeneous underlying social structure across a vast area over vast periods of time and, hence, of a historical "unit." Given the upheavals we know to have occurred through the period as well as the dynamic interaction of different cultures, we must constantly reassert the multiplicity of social experiences in the area under study. The culturally-homogenizing ideology of Brahmanical texts must be understood as having been exerted against this actual multiplicity.

[334] Eagleton addresses the question of the true or falsity of ideologies thus: "A world view will tend to exhibit a certain 'style' of perception, which cannot in itself be said to be either true or false…But it will also typically contain other sorts of component, both normative and empirical, which may indeed sometimes be inspected for their truth or falsity" (1991, 23). The question, then, is not of the "truth" of such a system, but of its relationship both with other views of society as well as with empirical evidence.

Our concern with the ideology of *varṇadharma* is limited in the present chapter to looking at how it operated within and inflected the discourse on statecraft within the *Arthaśāstra* with regard to its implications for how one conceives the sources, function, and proper use of power in society. We will begin with a description of the *varṇadharma* theory as it appears in the *Arthaśāstra* and then look briefly at how it operates as an ideology. We will then consider the development of *varṇadharma* in the Brahmanical literature before analyzing its emergence in the later layers of the *Arthaśāstra*.

8.2.1 The *Varṇadharma* System in the *Arthaśāstra*

Membership within a *varṇa* is determined by birth,[335] but also requires the fulfillment of the *varṇa* obligations.[336] Within the logic of the system, migration of an individual from one *varṇa* to another is generally only possible in the fall from a higher *varṇa* to a lower, although some texts provide a limited mechanism for the upward migration of certain families over time.[337] Despite occasional allowances for intermarriage and *varṇa* migration, the *varṇa*s are conceived in the Brahmanical literature as discrete and stable hereditary social groups set within a systematic unity. The system of *varṇadharma* claims that society's primary sociological feature is its division into *varṇa*s.[338]

---

[335] This is true, despite disagreement within the Brahmanical literature regarding the precise mechanism. The extant *Arthaśāstra* (KAŚ 3.7.20), for example allows that a person is a member of the father's *varṇa* if his mother is a member of the same *varṇa* or the next lower. Manu (MS 10.5) allows only children from a union between parents of the same *varna* to be of that *varṇa*.

[336] It can generally be asserted that ritual *and* vocational obligations are assumed requisite for full membership within a *varṇa*.

[337] The reality of upward and downward migration through the *varṇa* system is a different matter. We are speaking here only of how movement between the *varṇa*s is conceived within the idiom of *varṇadharma*.

[338] This is the descriptive character of the system. It might be more appropriate to thing of *varṇa* as society's native organization, as the texts possess a clear anxiety about the collapse of *varṇa* distinctions and record instances of the non-observance of *varṇa* in certain places and times. It is perhaps most accurate

In the system of *varṇadharma*, the *varṇa*s are governed and defined by sets of obligations specific to each. The obligations of each *varṇa* are referred to collectively as the *svadharma* (individual duty) of the members of that *varṇa*. The imperatives of *svadharma* cover ritual, vocational, and moral obligations,[339] and it is through the observance of *svadharma* that the *varṇa*s are materially realized within the world. A passage near the beginning of the extant *Arthaśāstra* gives a succinct exposition of the *varṇadharma* system:

KAŚ 1.3.5	svadharmo brāhmaṇasyādhyayanam adhyāpanaṃ yajanaṃ yājanaṃ dānam pratigrahaś ca
KAŚ 1.3.6	kṣatriyasyādhyayaṃ yajanaṃ dānaṃ śastrājīvo bhūtarakṣaṇaṃ ca
KAŚ 1.3.7	vaiśyasyādhyayanaṃ yajanaṃ dānaṃ kṛṣipāśupālye vaṇijyā ca
KAŚ 1.3.8	śūdrasya dvijātiśuśrūṣā vārttā kārukuśīlavakarma ca

> The special duty [*svadharma*] of a Brahmin is: studying, teaching, performing sacrifices for himself, officiating at other people's sacrifices, making gifts and receiving gifts.
> That of the Kṣatriya is: studying, performing sacrifices for himself, making gifts, living by (the profession of) arms and protecting beings.
> That of the Vaiśya is: studying, performing sacrifices for himself, making gifts, agriculture, cattle-rearing and trade.
> That of the Śūdra is: service to the twice-born, engaging in an economic calling, and the profession of artisan and actor.

The simplicity and abstraction of the core system is in marked contrast to the detailed prescriptions of other areas theoretically peripheral to the core (marriage, inheritance, commensality, and a variety of other social practices), where more direct

---

to say that *varṇa* is society's inherent organization, but that it requires the vigilance and effort of human agents, particularly the king, to maintain.

[339] The ritual and vocational obligations of *svadharma* are reflected in the duties of the three upper *varṇa*s; the Śūdras lack any ritual obligations within the system. A set of moral obligations (abstaining from injury, truthfulness, uprightness, freedom from malice, compassionateness, and forbearance) is recorded in the KAŚ as being "common to all" (KAŚ 1.3.13).

claims are made about *varṇa* and its bearing on social practices and where we find a more robust and combative disagreements among our sources.

8.2.2 Excursus on *Varṇāśramadharma*

In the *Arthaśāstra*, the idiom of *varṇadharma* is integrated into the larger theory of *varṇāśramadharma*: "the law (*dharma*) of the social classes (*varṇa*) and ways of life (*āśrama*)." The theory of *varṇāśramadharma* resulted historically from the addition of the four *āśrama*s or "ways of life" to the concept of the *varṇa*s.[340] The *āśrama*s are different modes of life that overlap, to some extent, with the *varṇa*s: householder (*gṛhastha*), student (*brahmacārin*), forest dweller (*vānaprastha*), and wandering ascetic (*pravrajita*).[341] They are given in the *Arthaśāstra* along with the *varṇa*s:

KAŚ 1.3.10 gṛhasthasya svadharmājīvas tulyair asamānarṣibhir vaivāhyam ṛtugāmitvaṃ devapitratithipūjā bhṛtyeṣu tyāgaḥ śeṣabhojanaṃ ca

KAŚ 1.3.11 bhramacāriṇaḥ svādhyāyo 'gnikāryābhiṣekau bhaiṣavratitvam ācārye prāṇāntikī vṛttis tadabhāve guruputre sabrahmacāriṇi vā

KAŚ 1.3.12 vānaprasthasya brahmacaryaṃ bhūmau śayyā jaṭājinadhāraṇam agnihotrābhiṣekau devatāpitratithipūjā vanyaś cāhāraḥ

KAŚ 1.3.13 parivrājakasya jitendriyatvam anārambho niṣkiṃcanatvaṃ saṅgatyāgo bhaikṣavratam anekatrāraṇye ca vāso bāhyābnyantaraṃ

> [The *svadharma*] of the householder is: earning his living in accordance with his own special duty [*svadharma*], marrying into families of the same caste but not of the same gotra, approaching the wife during her period, worship of the gods, manes, and guests, making gifts to dependants, and eating what is left over.
> That of the student is: studying the Veda, tending the fires and bathing, keeping the vow of living on alms only, residing till the end of his life with the preceptor or, in his absence, with the preceptor's son or with a fellow student.

---

[340] The *varṇa* system appears in the later Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas (*i.e.*, the middle Vedic period), while the *āśrama* system appears for the first time in the Dharmasūtras, following the late Vedic period (Olivelle 1993, 30, 73–74).

[341] These are the terms used for the *āśrama*s in the KAŚ. There is some variation in the names applied to the *āśrama*s in the *dharma* literature, but the modes of life themselves remain consistent.

> That of the forest dweller is: observing celibacy, sleeping on bare ground, wearing matted locks and an antelope skin, worship of the fires and bathing, worshipping the gods, manes, and guests, and living on forest produce.
> That of the wandering ascetic is: having full control over the senses, refraining from all active life, being without any possessions, giving up all attachment to worldly ties, keeping the vow of begging alms, not residing in one place, staying in the forest, and observing external and internal cleanliness.

The concept of *varṇāśramadharma* is used in the *dharma* literature to refer to the teachings of the *dharma* texts themselves, and so becomes roughly synonymous with the constituent genres. By extension, then, *varṇāśramadharma* is also conceived as the expression of *dharma* (in its more abstract sense as the universal sacred principle) within society. But, despite the eventual development of *varṇāśramadharma* as the complete social expression of *dharma*, *āśrama* itself is always a peripheral concern to the *dharma* literature; moreover, the concept is functionally absent from the *Arthaśāstra*. As such, we take account of *āśrama* itself here only in passing. It should be noted, however, that the references to the system of *varṇadharma* in the *Arthaśāstra* at which we will be looking below are frequently embedded in the larger concept of *varṇāśramadharma*.

8.3 *VARṆADHARMA* AS IDEOLOGY

I have chosen to refer to *varṇadharma* as "ideology" so that we might think first about how the theory of *varṇadharma* operates within discourse in regard to power relations. Thinking about *varṇadharma* as a feature of discourse used in the interest of power allows us to avoid the trap into which scholars have traditionally fallen when thinking about South Asian history in terms of *varṇa*, namely the reification (intentional or not) of the *varṇa*s themselves.[342] Thinking of *varṇadharma* as ideology situates the

[342] The political dimension of *varṇāśramadharma* is diminished when, for example, it is referred to as "ancient India's version of sociology" (Smith 1994, 26). While all discourses about society are ideological,

concept in such a way that we are immediately aware of its coercive potential. The term "ideology," as I use it, does not prejudge the empirical validity of the claims made by the system; we are free to examine them subsequently on their merits. But, it does imply that the claims of the system are both politically interested and contested (or contestable). Ultimately, we must begin by recognizing that, whatever else it might be, *varṇadharma* is a version of reality, the ascription to which held political benefits for some.[343]

We can think of ideology broadly as the politically-interested[344] aspect(s) of a discourse or worldview. As an idiom, *varṇadharma* makes claims and assumptions about society that have political implications. This is the sense in which *varṇadharma* is ideological. Ideology does not, however, reside in explicit argumentation alone, for we find it at work also in the systematic inflection of the production of reality within a discursive field of conflict, where the interests of an individual or community are interwoven with affirmations and denials, generally implicit, about the nature of reality.

---

the analogy here is misleading. What is more, it is misleading in a familiar direction: the projection of modern scholastic values (such as transparency and empiricism) on Brahmanical texts, with its attendant distortion of the source material.

[343] Eagleton argues that "ideology is a matter of 'discourse' rather than 'language'. It concerns the actual uses of language between particular human subjects for the purpose of specific effects. You could not decide whether a statement was ideological or not by inspecting it in isolation from its discursive context, any more than you could decide in this way whether a piece of writing was a work of literary art" (1991, 9). Thus, to have identified *varṇadharma* as an ideology, we must make some appeal to the discourse that reveals its political interests. There are few reasons why I feel comfortable calling *varṇadharma* an ideology without explicit reference to any discourse. First is its claim about hierarchy, which, far from being a natural phenomenon, seems always to represent political interest. Second, as suggested above, the concept of *varṇadharma* is too simple and rigid to represent a *believable* social model for the period. Third would be the clear promotion of Brahmanical interests elsewhere in Sanskrit literature. Fourth, and perhaps most important, is the *prima facie* sense that in monarchical societies, the king and martial elements have the greatest and highest consolidation of power, and that such power is the primary determinate of hierarchy as traditional understood (in socioeconomic terms).

[344] While using the term "politically-interested" to differentiate certain kinds of interest may seem not only redundant but also potentially misleading to those who subscribe to a Foucaldian notion of power as an inherent quality of all interactions, I mean to signify here interests that are broadly shared or pursued and reflect the perspective of social groups. There is something in the shared character of ideology that flushes it out and attunes it to other social realities, preventing it from being idiosyncracy or megalomania.

The content of an ideology, its politically-interested claims, can cycle in various dialectic circuits between explicit locutions and implicit assumptions, but it is the integration of such claims into the apprehension of reality that makes something properly ideological. This is the alienation of mental products in the theory of Berger (1967), with the important recognition that, in the case of ideology, these misapprehensions follow the contour of specific political interests.

This is not to say that the content of ideologies are necessarily "false" (at least any more so than other types of cognition). Eagleton argues instead that "[a] world-view will tend to exhibit a 'style' of perception, which cannot itself be said to be either true or false" (1991, 23). It is less a matter of an ideology being "true" than of being non-falsifiable. Specific claims made by an ideology about the nature of things may, however, still be subject to validation or falsification. Says Eagleton, "[i]t is possible, then, to think of ideological discourse as a complex network of empirical and normative elements, within which the nature and organization of the former is ultimately determined by the requirements of the latter" (23). Thus, we may talk of the truth of specific claims, but not of the ideology itself. I contend, however, that we cannot address the question of empirical validity until we have satisfactorily addressed the coercive potential of *varṇadharma*.

I have used above the rather bland term "political interest." I choose to think of this idea in the simplest possible terms: "political interest" refers generically to the pursuit of power in its many manifestations. Power is itself a characteristic of the relationship between two social entities, ranging from naked force to subtle forms of manipulation but always marking the ability of one party to exert their will over against the interests and will of other parties. It is, simply, coercive capacity. The pursuit of "political interests," then, can take nearly any form within any context, existing, as it

does, in the dense and irreducibly complex matrix of social power relations. Ideology accomplishes its goal when its version of reality, attuned as it is to specific interests, is appropriated. At this point, the individual's perception of the world reinforces, naturalizes, or promotes the interests of certain groups.

By claiming that ideology is the politically-interested aspect(s) of a discourse, we are calling attention to one way in which language is used to pursue power. The present study focuses on evidence to be found in the *Arthaśāstra* that speaks to that pursuit of power. Thinking of *varṇadharma* as an ideology, and one that has been introduced to the text at a relatively late period, tells us that we can trace this pursuit of power within the pages of the *Arthaśāstra* itself. When we examine *varṇadharma* in the discourse of the *Arthaśāstra* we can identify the specific interests embedded in the *varṇa* system as well as how it pursues these interests ideologically. This is the primary purpose of the following chapters: to call attention to the presence of political interests in the text; to expose the ideological influence they exert within the text; to demonstrate their posteriority and their revisionist character; and to resurrect other worldviews and perspectives (*i.e.*, ideologies) whose presence has been lost, subsumed, or diminished. Recognizing the ideological character of *varṇadharma* allows us to see the system as in competition with other ideologies and worldviews and suggests, as mentioned above, that the proper manner of investigation of these ideologies is not exhausted by confirmation or rejection of their empirical claims, nor by elucidations of their theories, but requires also that we understand how social reality was constituted by them.[345]

[345] There are number of other parameters implied by "ideology" that are not discussed here. This analysis is limited to the effect of this ideology within the *Arthaśāstra*. On competition among ideologies see Walford, 1979.

In an important sense, ideology is the trace left in discourse by the broader pursuit of power by specific groups. In a subsequent phase, we can look beyond the operation of the ideology in the text to the broader social conflicts to which it bears witness.

As a subset of ideology, it is characteristic of a *political* ideology that it present an ideal social and political order, rooted by some reference to absolute principles and in contrast to perceived existing conditions, and posit the absence of that ideal as the primary social problem in need of solution. It is also a critical component of a political ideology that it provides a solution to that problem. In this light, we recognize in discussions of *varṇa* in the *Arthaśāstra* a polemical and suasive tone. Within the ideology of *varṇa*, it is the destruction of the *varṇa* system that leads to the ultimate nightmare of social disintegration, the collapse of the political endeavor, and the death of civilization (KAŚ 1.3.15–17).[346] With the death of society as its great fear, existing social problems are easily cast as preliminary stages of the destruction caused by mixture of *varṇa*s. The solution to the problem is, of course, the observance of *varṇa* through the enforcement of *svadharma* as well as rules on intermarriage. As such, the *political* purpose of the *varṇadharma* theory can be seen not as the (re-)establishment of the *varṇa* hierarchy within society *per se*, but in casting the exaltation of Brahmins and protection of Brahmanical interests as the mechanism for addressing society's fundamental underlying problem.

The state is politically integrated into this dilemma by virtue of the king's role as protector of his subjects. In the narrative that the failure to observe *varṇadharma* will lead to the destruction of his subjects, the king is obligated to avail himself of the remedy provided: the "protection" of *varṇadharma* through the enforcement of the principle of

[346] The narrative of the Kali Yuga is instructive in this regard: society is sunk low and only the exertions of Brahmins and righteous kings save it from utter depravity.

endogamy, as well as through the protection and patronage of Brahmanical orthopraxis and its ordering of the world. The threat and the solution represent the central power of *varṇadharma* as an ideology, and the structure of the system provides for the advancement of Brahmanical interests.

These are the more overt claims made about *varṇadharma* itself. And we can certainly imagine how this rhetoric may have inflected the manner in which kings related to and reacted to efforts on the part of Brahmins to secure political advantage. But, as an ideology, the system also works in "invisible" ways to promote its interests by organizing how the world is perceived. Thus, simply by establishing the *varṇa*s as valid units of social analysis, this ideology continually leads to specific ways of thinking about society and its problems implied by the social order of the *varṇa*s as well as to the claims that the system made overtly. Simply by analyzing society in terms of *varṇa*, one invokes the question of their proper organization, relative position in social hierarchy, and the promise of harmony or the specter of disorder in terms of the proper arrangement of hereditary social groups divided by function. As such, the use of *varṇa* in the analysis of society in the period has the effect of returning the inquirer to the "reality" of Brahmanical claims of superiority.[347]

8.3.1 The Politics of *Varṇadharma*

The *varṇa* system is a view of the world, including an illustration of its main groups and their relationship to one another. This worldview can be called political because it makes claims about hierarchy. And, although the logic underlying *varṇa* hierarchy is not made explicit in the general formulation of the system witnessed above,

[347] One could argue that we see this happen again in the colonial period, when British scholars were initiated into the ideology of the Sanskrit sources and effectively restored the position of the Brahmin. This would have been in many ways a predictable outcome of reasoning made based on the textual sources.

its potential impact of its claims can be interpreted within the matrix of social power relations. Because an ideology pursues political interests (*i.e.*, power) through implicit and explicit claims within discourse, we can track these claims as rhetorical efforts to establish, consolidate, or protect power.

The core of the *varṇadharma* system, as given above (§8.2), makes three implicit claims about the organization of society: 1) society is segmented into (hereditary) groups based on social function; 2) these segments are arranged in a hierarchy; and 3) this arrangement functions dynamically as a greater unity. Of these, it is the claim of hierarchy that does the most to support the political interests embedded in the system; segmentation and systematicity work in the ideological realm only to support or naturalize the hierarchical claims.

The exposition given at §8.2 only implies the existence of an abstract hierarchy. No political or social implications of this hierarchy are articulated: even as the system asserts the primacy of Brahmins, it makes no discrete claims about how this superiority is expressed in the field of power relations. That is to say, the exposition of the core *varṇa* idiom dictates no specific political structure between the Brahmin and the *varṇa* endowed with military and political power, the Kṣatriya. Although we can find elsewhere in the Brahmanical literature direct political claims based on the notion of Brahmanical supremacy, such as in the *Gautama Dharmasūtra* (*rājā sarvasyeṣṭe brāhmaṇavarjam*, "The king rules all except Brahmins"; 11.1) it remains that *varṇa* hierarchy fails to find expression in terms of an unambiguous political structure.[348] Ultimately, *varṇa* hierarchy makes only an inarticulate claim about the superiority of Brahmins. It clearly has political intent, insofar as it marks hierarchy as a general feature of society, but avoids overtly

[348] This may say as much about the lack of any ecumenical structure in Brahmanism as any other factor. It remains a feature of the system, however, that it does not provide a political basis for its hierarchy.

structuring the relationship. I believe this is not accidental, as *varṇadharma* thereby makes no direct theoretical challenge to the temporal power holders, but can nevertheless find ready use in hermeneutical exercises aimed at political interests more tactical and refined than absolute rulership.

The assertion of hierarchy while avoiding direct confrontation with temporal power holders through the positing of a specific political structure is made possible by the promotion of a value system tangential to and comprehensive of coercive force, the most basic and important expression of political will. The *varṇa* system introduces proximity to the Vedic ritual (and the Veda) as the ultimate value (superceding coercive force) in the determination of social hierarchy. Access to the Vedic ritual is seen, in the worldview of the *varṇa* system, as another social value and superceding determinant of social status and power.

Despite the absence of any express political structure through which the principles of *varṇa* might be expressed, the core idiom of the *varṇa* system does dictate certain social relations, through which the *varṇa*s themselves are replicated in the material world to some extent. Looking at the larger structural features of the system, we see that the three upper *varṇa*s share a set of common obligations: education (*adhyayana*), sacrificing (*yajana*), and gifting (*dāna*):

KAŚ 1.3.5	svadharmo brāhmaṇasyādhyayanam adhyāpanaṃ_yajanaṃ yājanaṃ dānam pratigrahaś ca
KAŚ 1.3.6	kṣatriyasyādhyayaṃ yajanaṃ dānaṃ śastrājīvo bhūtarakṣaṇaṃ ca
KAŚ 1.3.7	vaiśyasyādhyayanaṃ yajanaṃ dānaṃ kṛṣipāśupālye vaṇijyā ca

The *svadharma* of the Brahmin is: studying, teaching, sacrificing, officiating at sacrifices, gifting, and receiving gifts.
That of the Kṣatriya is: studying, sacrificing, gifting, living by the profession of arms, and protecting creatures.
That of the Vaiśya is: studying, sacrificing, gifting, agriculture, husbandry, and trade.

These three upper *varṇa*s are, in this regard, set off against the Śūdra who is denied access to these institutionalized exchanges and to some extent defined by this denial:

KAŚ 1.3.8 śūdrasya dvijātiśuśrūṣā vārttā kārukuśīlavakarma ca

That of the Śūdra is: serving the twice-born, business [*i.e.*, agriculture, husbandry, and trade] and the work of the artisan and actor.

A division, then, is drawn within the system between those with access to education, sacrificing, and gifting (we will look into the specifics of these activities below) and those who lack access. The former group is called the "twice-born,"[349] and the latter stand in a relation of subservience (*śuśrūṣā*) to them. According to the *varṇa* theory presented here, then, access to these institutions parallels the division of society into upper and lower segments as between master and servant. This divide, between the "twice-born" (*dvijāti*) and Śūdra, also marks the traditional divide in Brahmanical literature between *ārya* and *anārya* (non-*ārya*).[350] And so we have then the expression of this aspect of *varṇa* hierarchy in specific social relations, indicating the political implications of these activities.[351]

---

[349] This is based on their right to undertake rebirth in the initiation ceremony (*upanayana*) before the beginning of studentship.

[350] See Kane II.1, 35*ff*. He cites in this regard TB 5.5.14; ĀDS 1.3.40–41; 2.3.1, 4; GDS 10.69; 12.3; PMS 6.1.25–38. The idea that the Śūdra was *anārya* is not stated in the KAŚ, which juxtaposes the *ārya* with the *cāṇḍala* (3.20.16) or *śvapāka* (4.13.35), but here only in late passages. In fact, the KAŚ holds the position, against most of the Brahmanical literature, that the Śūdra *was* an *ārya* (3.13.1). This flies in the face of the mainstream assertion of the Brahmanical literature. The passage at KAŚ 3.13.1, which is by all appearances original to the text, seems to controvert the division established here between *dvijāti* and Śūdra, although it is not made explicit anywhere in the KAŚ that *ārya*hood is equated with access to the institutions of education, sacrifice, and gifting. This adds circumstantial evidence to the contention, argued below (KAŚ 8.3.1.2.1), that the passage enumerating the *varṇa*s, *āśrama*s, and *svadharma*s of both (1.3.5–14*ff*) has been interpolated.

[351] Particularly when we consider that the Śūdra class is often conceived as filled not only by those born into it, but also be twice-borns who have failed in some regard to follow their *dharma*.

Another expression of *varṇa* hierarchy in the realm of social relations is found in the duties specific to the Brahmin. These duties set the Brahmin in the powerful role of mediator of the exchanges discussed above by virtue of a set obligations complementary to those that mark membership among the twice-born: teaching (*adhyāpana*), officiating at sacrifices (*yājana*), and receiving gifts (*pratigraha*):

> KAŚ 1.3.5 svadharmo brāhmaṇasyādhyayanam adhyāpanaṃ yajanaṃ yājanaṃ dānam pratigrahaś ca
>
> The *svadharma* of the Brahmin is: studying, teaching, sacrificing, officiating at sacrifices, gifting, and receiving gifts.

Within the greater nexus of obligation and mediation, Brahmins and Brahmanically-mediated exchanges (educational, ritual, and economic) are central to the concept of *varṇa* and to the social distinctions established by and reflected in the system. Through these exchanges, *varṇa* segmentation, at least with regard to the divide between the twice-born and the Śūdra as well as between the Brahmin and the other twice-born *varṇa*s, is reproduced in the social sphere. Indeed, by setting these exchanges as a major operative mechanism through which classes are materially re-produced in the world has also the effect of inscribing class implications upon those exchanges themselves and, by extension, the very identity of the Brahmin as defined by *svadharma*. In this manner the concept of "Brahmin" shares an intimacy with the concept of *varṇa* beyond those of the other *varṇa*s as the linchpin of the greater system.

The Kṣatriya, in addition to the shared obligations of the three upper *varṇa*s, is given the obligations of "living by arms" (*śastrājīva*) and the "protection of beings" (*bhūtarakṣaṇa*) (KAŚ 1.3.6). This likely denotes little more than a martial vocation and indicates no specific obligations for the king as the primary practitioner of statecraft beyond that of his putative *varṇa*. It is important to note, however, that the *varṇa* system

recognizes this class as the temporal power holders and grants them a monopoly on the use of force.

We have seen above that access to certain exchange institutions marked key boundaries within the *varṇa* system, but the social boundary within the system that it does not mark clearly is that between the Kṣatriya and the Vaiśya. I would suggest that this boundary did not need marking by the *varṇa* system, as it reflects the basic relationship within society between ruler and ruled. If we take the distinction between the Kṣatriya and the Vaiśya (as well as the Śūdra) as a self-evident hierarchy based on material conditions (*i.e.,* threat of force), we note that the *varṇa* system, via the mechanisms of Brahmanically-mediated exchange, creates two distinctions not implied in the basic relationship between ruler and ruled.

The first of these is the establishment of Brahmanical priority over the ruling class (Kṣatriya). The second is the division of the commoners into a forward class (with access to the exchanges) and a backward class (excluded from the exchange). This creates a division between the "cultured" and the "uncultured" that is broader than the class identity based simply on membership in the ruling class, thereby allowing room for the Brahmins among the cultured. At the nadir of the social order, the Śūdra is enjoined to the *dvijātiśuśrūṣā* "service of the twice-born" (*i.e.,* the three upper *varṇa*s) as well as *vārttā*, "business," which entail the same occupations ascribed to the Vaiśya above, and also the work of the artisan and actor (*kārukuśīlavakarma*) (KAŚ 1.3.8). Given the overlap between the occupations of the Vaiśya and Śūdra, we can see that access to Brahmanical institutions would have been the only difference between the two in many cases. As such, the former would seem in this theory to represent a kind of forward or privileged commoner, differing from the latter only in point of ritual practice. In both of these cases, the Brahmanical monopoly on education, ritual, and gifting combines with the use of

these to establish a kind of broad class consciousness to present an articulation or embellishment of what must be seen as more fundamental determinants of social hierarchy.

The linear hierarchy among the *varṇa*s is clear within the exposition of the system although not explicitly stated.[352] A structuralist study of the *varṇa* hierarchy, however, suggests that the greater system can be conceived as thoroughly constituted of a number of binary oppositions:

> As many scholars have pointed out, the tripartite or quadripartite social hierarchy is really formed out of a series of binary oppositions which creates divisions of several sorts between the three or four classes. First, Brahmins are in various ways separated from and placed above everyone else… Next, Brahmins and Kṣatriyas united are together regarded as the ruling classes, with all others becoming the ruled in relation to them. Third, Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, and Vaiśyas, as "twice-born" or "initiated" full members of Āryan society are sometimes distinguished from the lowly Shūdra servants, especially when it comes to the Vedic sacrifice, from which the latter are excluded (Smith 1994, 28–29).

Smith, in this passage, establishes the framework for understanding the *varṇa* system a set of "overlapping, hierarchically ordered domains over which each *varṇa* exerts mastery. Each domain and each social class is encompassed within the realm of the higher, and each domain is assigned to a particular social class because of the inherent traits that class reputedly possesses" (1994, 29). This is certainly true to the internal logic

---

[352] The presence of a linear hierarchy within the system is reflected in the minutiae of law and statecraft in various ways, such as rules that prescribe successively greater penalties for offenses against successively higher *varṇa*s. As it is, for example, at ĀDS 1.1.5: "Among these, each preceding class is superior by birth to each subsequent" (*teṣāṃ pūrvaḥ pūrvo janmataḥ śṛeyān*). Nevertheless, the hierarchy is implicit in the order of their presentation as elsewhere in the text where differential treatment based on *varṇa* is observed. As the present study is concerned with *varṇa* as an ideology rather than as a feature of South Asian society, it is possible to limit our analysis in this regard to those elements upon which the distinguishing features of the Brahmanical *varṇa* theory depend. If we examine *varṇa* as an ideology, that is, as a self-interested set of claims about society meant to promote specific political interests, but which was nevertheless experienced as "real," we become interested not so much in the justifications for the system but in the mechanisms through which it is replicated and promulgated in society. Eagleton (1991, 26): "ideology is no baseless illusion but a solid reality, an active material force which must have at least enough cognitive content to help organize the practical lives of human beings."

of the *varṇa* system, but we should emphasize that, as an ideology, the tensions within the *varṇa* hierarchy are not equally expressed at every level. The primary areas of tension in the system lie in the exaltation of the Brahmin above the ruling classes (Kṣatriyas)[353] and in the division between the *dvijāti*s and Śūdras (*ārya*s and non-*ārya*s), for these are the points of the system that defy the *prima facie* sensibility that social hierarchy in monarchical societies flows from the king downward and that the divide between "cultured" and "uncultured" classes was a cultural phenomenon based on broader material realities than simply access to orthodox exchanges.

Structuralist reduction of the *varṇa* system into elemental binaries threatens to obscure the "work" of *varṇa* as an ideology. And, it is one of the effects that the type of systematic thinking found in *varṇa* ideology has on discourse that it not only obscures the constituent oppositions of which the more abstract linear hierarchy is composed, but also attempts to equalize all internal tensions within the system and encourage us to think of *varṇa* hierarchy as emerging from and explained by structural patterns of thought.

Claims about the function and structure of power in society in the *varṇadharma* system are applied to the individual through the mechanism of *dharma*. In the worldview of the *varṇa* system, *varṇa* hierarchy, with its implicit and explicit claims, is inherent in

---

[353] Smith (1994) distills the proclamations of the Vedic sources and arrives at "four principal reasons" given there for the preeminence of the Brahmin: "(1) they were created prior to the others and therefore take precedence; (2) they are the most complete and perfect instance of the human being; (3) they are learned in the Veda; and (4) they had a monopoly on the priesthood and control of the powerful sacrifice." All of these concepts point to social distinctions through which *varṇa* segmentation and hierarchy were actualized. All of these reasons are justifications, but the latter two, and particularly the fourth, give also a mechanism for the replication of *varṇa* ideology in the composition of the social sphere. Notwithstanding claims to a monopoly on sacrifice, we can nevertheless infer from the system of *varṇāśramadharma* itself that ritual exchanges, Brahmanical orthopraxis, represents the social activity through which *varṇa* is reproduced in society. And it is at the points of greatest tension in the *varṇa* system, precisely those points where its hierarchy diverges from the expectation, particularly in point of the king's preeminence and the nature of the cultural divide between elites and commoners, we find distinctions marked by inclusion or exclusion from the ritual community both in point of teaching and learning, officiating and offering.

the sacred obligations of every individual. Falling toward the normative end of the discursive spectrum, *dharma* possesses an imperative reality of its own, fully endowed in Brahmanical literature with soteriological consequences. In addition to *varṇa* identity, hierarchy, vocational, ritual, and moral obligations, and the hybrid value system, the personal imperative of *dharma* is the last major component of the world according to *varṇadharma*.

8.3.2 *Rājadharma*: the King's *Svadharma*

The central tenet of the *varṇadharma* system, that society is divided into four social groups each possessed of an individual duty (*svadharma*), argues in favor of a divinely-ordained order within the world subject to the specific prescriptions of *dharma*. Theoretically, then, the *dharma* as sacred law attains primacy over the activities of all people. This includes, most importantly for this analysis, the activity of the king (*rāja*), potentially covering all of the facets of governance that fall to his caveat as monarch. The the idea of *rājadharma*, however, may have been only one interpretive scheme among many and not all individuals who set their minds to the contemplation of statecraft perceived the project as one of *rājadharma per se*. One of the goals of this analysis is to understand how this universalizing concept of *rājadharma* relates to the greater content of the *Arthaśāstra*.

The presentation of statecraft as *rājadharma*, or the *dharma* of the king emerges from the paradigm of universal *dharma*.[354] The relationship between *svadharma* of the king is treated in some texts (GDS, MS) as an extension of the *svadharma* of Kṣatriyas, while in others (ĀDS, ŚP, YS) the king's *svadharma* is treated outside of the system:

[354] We are safe, in this regard, in asserting that *dharma* as used here retains fully the sense of sacred order rather than merely its mundane sense of "law."

ĀDS 2.25.1–2 vyākhyātāḥ sarvarṇānāṃ sādhāraṇavaiśeṣikā dharmāḥ | rājñas tu viśeṣād vakṣyāmaḥ

We have explained the general and specific laws [*dharma*s] of all the classes. We will now present specifically the laws [*dharma*s] pertaining to the king.

The extant *Arthaśāstra*, to the extent that it can be determined from a handful of passages, follows the latter position. It refers to the king's *svadharma*, but also considers him subject to the more general strictures of *kṣatriyadharma*. It is likely, however, that the distinction is purely academic, as both approaches ultimately subject the entire practice of kingship to the imperatives of *dharma* as sacred order.

The comprehensive and preemptive nature of this idiom allows for the wholesale subjugation of the discourse on statecraft, since the concept of *svadharma* is easily appended to existing advice for kings, thereby transforming mundane political advice into sacred decree. As such, we should be cautious to separate the abstract theological concept of *rājadharma* from the body of writing about statecraft and should recognize that, to a critical degree, the emerging literary tradition of statecraft may well have developed according to its own imperatives and not necessarily as a subsidiary to the expert tradition on *dharma*.[355]

It is important to recognize that the idea of *rājadharma*, as also the notion of *varṇa*, has penetrated the interpretive models of modern scholars. Certainly, some of the most important secondary sources on statecraft present this Brahmanical theory as something close to historical reality, either using the notion of *rājadharma* to explain the general mindset of the period or failing to take sufficient account of its primary role as an ideology. So Kane can say without qualification that "[t]he fulfillment of their duties and responsibilities by rulers was of paramount importance to the stability and orderly

[355] As argued by Kane 1974, 158.

development of society and to the happiness of individuals to the State…" (1997, 3). In fact we do not as yet know who believed this or even to what extent; in particular we do not know the extent to which this idea was held by the variety of individuals and institutions involved in the actual practice of statecraft in the classical period or how it may have exerted itself upon that practice.

In fact, we know very little about the pertinence of the *rājadharma* and *varṇadharma* theories to the practice of kingship in the classical period. This is primarily because we have little understanding of the relationship between our source texts and the varied practices of governance throughout the period. We have, on one hand, a very powerful ideology of kingship that subjects the king to the prerogatives of sacred *dharma*, and, on the other hand, the actual project of governance. The former is lavishly imagined and illustrated not only in the texts of the *dharma* literature, but, perhaps most importantly, in the great Sanskrit epics.[356] The latter, properly dependent primarily on material evidence, we cannot as yet clearly perceive through the lens of our Brahmanical literature. But, to apply the ideology of *varṇadharma* and the implication of *rājadharma* too freely to the latter misses the crucial point that the ideology itself worked in the arena of political power, actively seeking to limit the power of the king. And if we are to understand the relationship between religious and royal authority in the period, we must examine the ideology of *varṇadharma* as it operated within the contested realm of social authority rather than taking its perspective completely, and, in doing so, denying the fact of the king as a separate locus of power and denying any possibility of a dynamic relationship between the two as well as the ongoing need to defend the interests of a Brahmin class within the mundane world.

[356] See, e.g. Fitzgerald 2004, 100*ff.*

8.4 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate not only that *varṇadharma* is best understood as an ideology, but also the specific claims made by the system and its manner of pursuing its interests. In the following chapters I will illustrate the full extent of the ideology of *varṇadharma* and demonstrate that it is indeed a late import into the *Arthaśāstra*.

Chapter 9: *Varṇadharma* and *Svadharma* in the *Arthaśāstra*

We come, finally, to a consideration of Brahmanical exceptionalism in the *Arthaśāstra*. The present chapter looks at the invocation of *varṇadharma* itself within the text and how it inflects local discourse. It is also the job of this and the following chapters to demonstrate the posteriority of those passages through which this ideology colors the text.

The *varṇadharma* theory, as mentioned above and in consonance with all extant texts of the *dharma* literature, is found in the extant *Arthaśāstra*. In fact, the extant *Arthaśāstra* presents perhaps the most concise formulation of the theory in all of the classical literature. In addition to these explicit references, we also find implicit uses of the theory in the *Arthaśāstra*, which are discussed in subsequent chapters. As such, we can assert without reservation that the extant *Arthaśāstra* is in full consonance with the tenets of Brahmanical exceptionalism and political Brahmanism more generally as encapsulated and expressed in the ideology of *varṇadharma*. We look in this chapter first at discrete references to the system itself (§9.2), and then at references to *svadharma* (§9.3), which implies the greater system.

9.1 *Varṇadharma*

We have already looked (§8.2) at the direct explication of the *varṇadharma* system in the *Arthaśāstra*. It occurs in the first *prakaraṇa* of the text:

> KAŚ 1.3.5–13 The special duties [*svadharma*] of the Brahmin are: studying, teaching, performing sacrifices for himself, officiating at other people's sacrifices, making gifts, and receiving gifts.
> Those of the Kṣatriya are: studying, performing sacrifices for himself, making gifts, living by (the profession of) arms and protecting beings.
> Those of the Vaiśya are: studying, performing sacrifices for himself, making gifts, agriculture, cattle-rearing and trade.

Those of the Śūdra are: service to the twice-born, engaging in an economic calling, and the profession of artisan and actor.

Presented prominently at the outset of the text, the ideology of *varṇadharma* seems to fulfill here the constitutional role it plays in the *dharma* literature as providing the elementary framework through which the analysis and discussion of society will continue.

Two of the five direct references to *varṇadharma* in the *Arthaśāstra*[357] are found in the context of this passage: introducing it and providing the end verse to its *adhyāya*, respectively. Both have already been implicated in the *adhyāya* redaction:

KAŚ 1.3.4 eṣa trayīdharmaś caturṇāṃ varṇānām āśramāṇāṃ ca svadharmasthāpanād aupakārikaḥ

This Vedic dharma is useful because it establishes the *svadharma* of the four *varṇa*s and *āśrama*s.

KAŚ 1.3.17 vyavasthitāryamaryādaḥ kṛtavarṇāśramasthitiḥ
trayyābhirakṣito lokaḥ prasīdati na sīdati

The world, its *āryan* boundaries established, observant of the institutions of *varṇa* and *āśrama*, and protected by the Veda, becomes tranquil and does not sink.

A third reference comes in the end verse of the following *adhyāya*, and has been implicated in the *adhyāya* redaction as an end verse, as part of the expansion of the first *prakaraṇa*, and by virtue of missing the underlying *prakaraṇa* boundary:

KAŚ 1.4.16 caturvarṇāśramo loko rājñā daṇḍena pālitaḥ
svadharmakarmābhirato vartate sveṣu vartmasu

The world, possessed of four *varṇa*s and *āśrama*s, protected by force by the king, and devoted to its individual occupations and *svadharma*, rolls along in its own wheel tracks.

[357] KAŚ 1.3.4; 1.3.17; 1.4.16; 3.1.38; 13.4.62

As noted above, all of these passages come from modifications made to the text during the *adhyāya* redaction (§7.5.1). Hence, we find that the constitutional enunciation of *varṇadharma* in the *Arthaśāstra* was the work of the *adhyāya* redactor.

The remaining direct references to *varṇadharma* are also linked to the *adhyāya* redaction. The first comes in an *adhyāya* end verse:

KAŚ 3.1.38 caturvarṇāśramasyāyaṃ lokasyācārarakṣaṇāt
naśyatāṃ sarvadharmāṇāṃ rājā dharmapravartakaḥ

This king, by virtue of guarding the conduct of the world possessed of four *varṇa*s and *āśrama*s, becomes the promulgator of *dharma* when all *dharma*s are perishing.

The final direct mention of *varṇadharma* comes near the end of the *āvāpa* section, where we read:

KAŚ 13.4.62 jitvā ca pṛthivīṃ vibhaktavarṇāśramāṃ svadharmeṇa bhuñjīta

Having conquered the world, he should enjoy it divided into *varṇa*s and *āśrama*s according to his *svadharma*.

The probability that this passage belongs to the *adhyāya* redaction is very high. In order to understand this, we must understand the structure of the thirteenth *adhikaraṇa* in which it falls.

The thirteenth *adhikaraṇa* is given the name *dūrgalambhopāyaḥ*, "Strategy for Taking a Fort," and is composed of six *prakaraṇa*s and five *adhyāya*s. The different strategies for taking the fort (sedition, drawing out, secret agents, sieging, and storming) are discussed in the first five *prakaraṇa*s (171–175). The fifth of these, *avamardaḥ*, "Storming," concludes at KAŚ 13.4.53, as noted by Kangle (1971, 485n):

KAŚ 13.4.53 After obtaining the enemy's fort, he should enter it after it is cleared of the enemy's party and after precautions against silent punishment are taken inside and outside.

This *sūtra* ends the discussion of storming the fort. A subsequent passage, however, goes on to discuss the four ways of conquering the world (*pṛthivīṃ jetum*):

> KAŚ 13.4.54–60 After thus conquering the enemy's territory, the conqueror should seek to seize the middle king, after succeeding over him, the neutral king. This is the first method of conquering the world.
> In absence of the middle and neutral kings, he should overcome the enemy constituents by superiority of policy, then the other constituents. This is the second method.
> In the absence of the circle he should overcome by squeezing from both sides the ally through the enemy or the enemy through the ally. This is the third method.
> He should first overcome the weak or a single neighboring prince; becoming doubly powerful through him a second prince; three times powerful, a third. This is the fourth method of conquering the world.

It is after this passage, which (along with the following *prakaraṇa*) departs from the subject of taking a fort, that we find our fifth citation:

> KAŚ 13.4.62 jitvā ca pṛthivīṃ vibhaktavarṇāśramāṃ svadharmeṇa bhuñjīta
>
> Having conquered the world, he should enjoy it divided into *varṇa*s and *āśrama*s according to his *svadharma*.

The phrase *jitvā…pṛthivīṃ* in this passage (KAŚ 13.4.62) clearly echoes the *pṛthivīṃ jetum* of the preceding passage (13.4.54–61). There can be little doubt that it is dependent on the foregoing, if not an integral part.

Both this discussion of conquering the world and the next *prakaraṇa* (176) depart from the main topic of the *adhikaraṇa*, a tendency displayed by the *adhyāya* redactor in the first, third, and fourth *adhikaraṇa*s. What is more, we find used in this passage the term *pṛthivīm*, "earth," which aside from a single usage,[358] is restricted only to this passage (KAŚ 13.4.54–65), one Kauṭilya dialogue,[359] six *adhyāya* end verses,[360] and the

[358] KAŚ 9.1.17, where it is used to gloss the term *deśa* in commentarial fashion.

[359] KAŚ 9.1.9

[360] KAŚ 1.5.17; 2.12.37; 2.15.64; 5.4.15; 6.1.18; 7.10.38;

first[361] and last *adhyāya*s:[362] all elements of the *adhyāya* redaction. Concurring in form and content with emblematic features of the *adhyāya* redaction, there can be little doubt that this passage was inserted under influence of one of the major tropes of the *adhyāya* redaction.

Although these five passages do not represent all of the points at which we can detect the *varṇadharma* theory at work in the *Arthaśāstra*, they are some of the most explicit arguments in favor of this ideology. It is, of course, extremely poignant that all five can be connected with the *adhyāya* redaction.

Collectively, these five passages tell us a few interesting details about how their composers felt *varṇadharma* to be related to statecraft. Most clear is the claim that the division of society into *varṇa*s is a potential quality of the world (*loka* or *pṛthivī*), and that this division, although desirable, is yet dependent on the efforts of the king who must "protect" that world so ordered.

Another major characteristic of this group of scattered passages is a clearly persuasive intent meant to compel the king to enforce *varṇadharma*. Both KAŚ 1.3.17 and 1.4.16 make the pragmatic argument that the *varṇa* system will benefit the king by delivering tranquility and stability. The last passage (KAŚ 13.4.62) implies that the king has a sacred duty to rule a world divided into *varṇa*s and *āśrama*s. Underlying the suasive tone of these passages is the clear recognition that the power to enforce *varṇadharma* ultimately lay with the king. This is significant because it tells us that even promoters of the *varṇadharma* theory understood that the real political power of the king

[361] KAŚ 1.1.1

[362] KAŚ 15.1.2 (15.1.5)

(with its own implicit hierarchies) need not be consonant with the values of the *varṇa* system.

The promotion of *varṇadharma* is, however, an ambiguous concept. The passages tell us that this has to do with guarding conduct (*ācāra*) (KAŚ 3.1.38) and dividing the world into *varṇa*s (KAŚ 13.4.62), a set of mutually reinforcing activities. We can surmise that these amounted both to the enforcement of the *svadharma* of each *varṇa* (although what that meant specifically is unclear), as well as the prevention either of any intermarriage between *varṇa*s (as implied at KAŚ 1.3.15) or only of "against the grain" (*pratiloma*) marriages, where a man of a lower *varṇa* marries a woman of a higher *varṇa* and is said elsewhere in the text to represent a transgression of the king's *svadharma* (KAŚ 3.7.30).

Most interesting, perhaps, is how the removal of these passages changes the underlying discussion of statecraft. We are told at KAŚ 1.4.3 and 1.5.1 that all the sciences, including the Veda, from which *varṇadharma* is said to come (1.3.4), depend on proper training in the use of the king's staff (*daṇḍa*), a symbol of his coercive force and monopoly on the use of physical violence. Clearly, then, the underlying text takes the study of politics to be that most capable of insuring the kinds of public order promised by *varṇa*.

Thus, we can argue on the whole that explicit reference to the *varṇāśrama* theory in the *Arthaśāstra* is a feature of the *adhyāya* redaction or later. This is significant, because it means that the *prakaraṇa*-text was constructed without direct reference to this key ideology of the *dharma* literature and other Brahmanical writings. This, in turn, suggests that the *Arthaśāstra* evolved in a tradition of statecraft that was neither heavily influenced by nor drew upon *varṇa* ideology, which would presumably place it outside of the fold of orthodox Brahmanical social thought. But these conclusions pertain only to

direct references to the system. We have yet to look at references to other concepts derived from the system, such as *svadharma*, and more generally, to *dharma* itself.

9.2 *SVADHARMA*

The larger theory of *varṇadharma* is also invoked in discussions of *svadharma*. The notion of *svadharma* is, of course, intimately connected with the idea of *varṇadharma*, the prefix "*sva*-" (one's own) referring to the specific *dharma* prescribed to one's *varṇa* in the *varṇadharma* system. I will consider the possibility that some general references to *dharma* also invoke this principle, although it seems likely that many uses of *dharma* may invoke a more general sense of sacred order and duty. We will look first at specific prescriptions of the king's *svadharma* in this section and then at his *dharma*. A general discussion of the concept of *dharma* in its relation to statecraft concludes this section.

9.2.1 The King's *Svadharma*

The term *svadharma* occurs 15 times in the extant *Arthaśāstra*.[363] Eight of these references occur in the context of the king's duties, and among them we find a few different characterizations of *svadharma*.[364] Our first example comes also from the general introduction of the *varṇadharma* theory dating to the *adhyāya* redaction and promises soteriological benefit to the enforcement of *varṇadharma*:[365]

---

[363] KAŚ 1.3.4; 1.3.5; 1.3.9; 1.3.14; 1.3.16; 1.7.1; 1.14.12; 3.1.41; 3.7.30; 3.7.37; 8.2.14; 11.1.12; 12.1.5; 13.4.62; 13.5.4

[364] KAŚ 1.3.16; 1.7.1; 3.1.41; 3.7.30; 3.7.37; 8.2.14; 13.4.62; 13.5.4

[365] Here the king is enjoined to insure that all beings adhere to their *svadharma*; the promised reward is happiness now as well as in the afterlife. Reference to the *svadharma* of beings invokes the greater *varṇāśramadharma* system according to which *svadharma* is determined. We find here another strategy, this time soteriological, to persuade the king to protect the *varṇāśramadharma* system, for observance of it is said leads to happiness in this life as well as in the afterlife.

KAŚ 1.3.16 tasmāt svadharmaṃ bhūtānāṃ rājā na vyabhicārayet
svadharmaṃ saṃdadhāno hi pretya ceha ca nandati

Therefore the king should not let creatures neglect their *svadharma*.
For, supporting *svadharma*, he becomes happy in the afterworld as well as in the present.

Another end verse records a similar promise to the king who follows his *svadharma* of protecting his subjects "according to *dharma*":[366]

KAŚ 3.1.41 rājñaḥ svadharmaḥ svargāya prajā dharmeṇa rakṣituḥ
arakṣitur vā kṣeptur vā mithyādaṇḍam ato 'nyathā

The *svadharma* of a king who protects his subjects according to *dharma* leads to heaven,
That of one who does not protect or who inflicts unjust punishment is the opposite of this.

That it is the king's *svadharma* to enforce the *svadharma* of his subjects is implied in KAŚ 13.4.62, cited above.

As mentioned above, one of the ways in which the king was supposed to accomplish his duty was in the prohibition of certain kinds of marriages between *varṇa*s. As much is stated at KAŚ 3.7.30, after a discussion of *pratiloma* sons (those born from a man of a lower *varṇa* and wife of a higher *varṇa*):

KAŚ 3.7.30 ta ete pratilomāḥ svadharmātikramād rājñaḥ saṃbhavanti

These are the *pratiloma* sons that arise from the king's transgression of his *svadharma*.

This passage falls in a discussion of mixed *varṇa*s, itself a fourth iteration within the treatment of inheritance, the original discussion being complete at KAŚ 3.5.1–22 and subsequent iterations occurring at 3.6.1–22, 3.7.1–19, and 3.7.20–39. Although not directly

[366] In contrast to the previous verse, though, the *svadharma* spoken of in KAŚ 3.1.41 is the king's. We have read above that the king receives happiness in the next life by enforcing the *svadharma* of his subjects; here we see that he goes to heaven by following his own *svadharma*, namely, the protection of his subjects.

linked to the *adhyāya* redaction, it is clearly a very late addition to the *prakaraṇa*-text. Nevertheless, we find the enforcement of hierarchical marriage[367] to be stated policy implications of adherence to the *varṇadharma* system, as enjoined at KAŚ 3.7.30.

In one instance (not included in the eight mentioned above) we find Kṣatriya *dharma* applied to the king. An opponent argues in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the Kauṭilya dialogue at KAŚ 12.1.1–9 that a king should fight even a more powerful opponent because "this is the *svadharma* of a Kṣatriya, whether there be victory or defeat in war" (12.1.5). Such an argument tells us that the logic of *kṣatriyadharma* could be also be applied to the activities of the king.

The only passage in the text that discusses the mechanism by which the king should enforce *svadharma* comes at KAŚ 1.7.1. Here, in a discussion of the king's proper behavior, we read:

> KAŚ 1.7.1 Therefore, by casting out the group of six enemies [*i.e.,* vices], he should acquire control over the senses, cultivate his intellect by association with elders, keep a watchful eye by means of spies, bring about security and well-being by activity, maintain the observance of *svadharma* by decreeing what should be done [*kāryānuśāsanena*], acquiring discipline by instruction in the sciences, attain popularity by association with *artha*, and maintain proper behavior by doing what is meet.

This passage emphasizes the role of kingly edicts as an instrument of statecraft.[368] In the difficult area of enforcing customary obligations, the king is instructed to do so by the issuance of decree. This not only enforces certain *varṇa*-friendly policies, but also

---

[367] See also KAŚ 3.7.36–38 which concludes the discussion of mixed castes: "Among them, marriage is to be in their group of origin, there is to be the observance of precedence and the pursuit of hereditary occupation. Or, they are to have the same *svadharma* as the Śūdra, excepting the Caṇḍāla. Only the king who behaves in this manner will obtain heaven, otherwise, hell."

[368] Kangle mistranslates *anuśāsana* as "carrying out." Other examples of *anuśāsana* as decree can be found.

makes public his support for the *varṇadharma* system, which in turn would not only lend the king's punitive authority to *varṇadharma* but also presumably empower proponents to pressure their communities toward its observance. This passage has been connected in the *adhyāya* redaction above at §6.3.

Finally, we have two passages that discuss the performance of king's *svadharma* from the perspective of a third party. The first comes in a Kauṭilya dialogue in Book 8:

> KAŚ 8.2.13–18 As between a sick king and a new king: "The sick king meets with the overthrow of his rule caused by ministers or danger to his own life caused by rule; the new king busies himself with acts such as his *svadharma*, showing favors, granting exemptions, bestowing gifts, and conferring honor, which please and benefit the subjects," say the teachers.
>
> "No," says Kauṭilya. "The sick king carries on the kingly duties as they were going on before. The new king, however, thinking the kingdom won by force to be his, behaves as he likes without restraint. Or, being in the power of his associates in revolt, he tolerates the ruin of the kingdom. Not being rooted among his subjects he becomes easy to uproot."

This exchange is very telling because it illustrates the kind of reasoning each side believes might be persuasive. Despite the fact that the same author probably wrote both positions, we can assume that he endowed even the inferior position (*pūrvapakṣa*) with some good reasoning. The "teachers" here argue that a new king would use the observance of *svadharma* as a means to endear himself to his subjects. On the face, then, it might seen that the observance of *svadharma* is being cast as an activity generally praised by his subjects. But, we note also that *svadharma* is here listed among other activities that are clearly palliatives to restive or potentially disruptive elements in his kingdom: showing favor, giving gifts, granting exemptions, and conferring honor. We can safely assume that such strategies were wisely aimed at those elements of the kingdom that might cause problems to a new and vulnerable king. If we think of

svadharma in this regard, it seems likely that the king's adherence to *svadharma* was another kind of gift to powerful and potentially subversive elements in the kingdom. Given the inherent biases of the *varṇa* system, we can assume that adherence to *svadharma* was a palliative for restive Brahmins or certain elements of the orthodox Brahmanical community. We are able to surmise as much because we can read a bit here "between the lines."

Kauṭilya's response seems to reinforce and extend this logic. He argues that if the king feels he has attained his position purely with force (*balāvarjitaḥ*), he will conduct himself only according to his own desires. The passage is not entirely clear in relating the precise danger such behavior will precipitate, but we can assume it is referred to in the final passage of the statement: "Not being rooted among the subjects, he becomes easy to uproot." While falling short of a threat, one gets the sense that Kauṭilya is arguing that the king's position isn't secure without the support of his subjects. But, as in the *pūrvapakṣa*, we can see that the term "subjects" (*prakṛti*) probably refers to a limited number of potentially disruptive power holders rather than to the generality of the collective masses. The foundation of Kauṭilya's argument is not so different from that of the teachers (although they come to opposite conclusions). Both regard the support of the "subjects" as fundamental to the security of the king's rule. The position of the teachers implies that the king is able to gain their support by adherence to *svadharma*. We can see something of the power dynamic between king and the orthodox Brahmins here, although we do not see clearly the leverage held by Brahmins with which they might threaten the king's rule. Likely this leverage came from many different sources from economic to political to ideological.

The last reference to *svadharma* in the context of the king comes in the final *adhyāya* of Book 13 (KAŚ 13.5). It echoes very closely the passage just examined. Here

are given the strategies for pacifying a newly-conquered territory. Among the various strategies for pacification, we read:

> KAŚ 13.5.4 svadharmakarmānugrahaparihaāradānamānakarmabhiś ca prkṛtipriyahitāny anuvarteta
>
> He should carry out what is agreeable and beneficial to the subjects by doing his *svadharma* as laid down, granting favors, giving exemptions, making gifts and showing honor.

We can see immediately the parallel of the long noun compound *svadharma-karmānugrahaparihāradānamānakarmabhiś* with *svadharmānugrahaparihāradāna-mānakarmabhiḥ* in KAŚ 8.2.13. This *sūtra* reinforces the argument of the former that the adherence to *svadharma* is agreeable to the "subjects," but also casts it as part of a set of activities most likely directed toward powerful individuals and institutions. A broader sentiment is expressed a few *sūtra*s later when we read that the king should "cause the honoring of all temples and hermitages, and make grants of land, money, and exemptions to men distinguished in learning, speech, and *dharma*, order the release of all prisoners and render help to the distressed, helpless, and the diseased" (KAŚ 13.5.11). This latter passage illustrates also how some of the favorable behavior could be expressed toward the more general public, but its specific mention of gifts and exemptions to "men distinguished in learning, speech, and *dharma*" is very suggestive. Are these the orthodox Brahmanical teachers, the authors of such sentiments as we have seen expressed above in the *adhyāya* redaction and in the *dharma* literature more generally?

We note here that *adhyāya* 13.5 was linked to the *adhyāya* redactor above, its nearly verbatim repetition of a line from the eighth *adhikaraṇa*, which was clearly the work of the *adhyāya* redactor, only reinforces that it was produced during or after the *adhyāya* redaction.

Ultimately, then we can assert with some confidence that explicit articulation of a direct relationship between the king's activities and the imperatives of *svadharma* all date to the *adhyāya* redaction. The underlying *prakaraṇa*-text, therefore, did not use this theory directly as a way to compel or justify certain practices, particularly those aimed at protecting the interests of orthodox Brahmins.

9.2.2 General Uses

The term *svadharma* is used in seven places in the *Arthaśāstra* in reference to individuals other than the king.[369] As explicit extensions of the theory of *varṇadharma* we can examine these to see whether *varṇadharma* may have existed in the *prakaraṇa*-text as a discrete ideology even if it was not applied directly to the king.

Four of the seven references come in *adhyāya* 1.3 in the presentation of the *varṇadharma* system mentioned above and are thereby linked to the *adhyāya* redaction. The fifth example (KAŚ 12.1.5) has already been discussed above. It comes in the *pūrvapakṣa* of a Kauṭilya dialogue and dates also to the *adhyāya* redaction.[370]

The last two examples are quite interesting and appear to demonstrate tactical uses of *svadharma* in the carrying out of governmental activity. The first passage (KAŚ 11.1.22) falls in a discussion that outlines a strategy for sowing dissent among states run by oligarchies. It comes in the eleventh *adhikaraṇa*, which has been independently linked to the *adhyāya* redaction. The passage is somewhat unclear, but the intent seems to be that by appointing someone considered unworthy by the "righteous chiefs of the oligarchy" (*saṅghamukhya dharmiṣṭha*) to the position of crown prince, these righteous chiefs might be instigated to rebellion by secret agents who encourage them to "observe

[369] KAŚ 1.3.4; 1.3.5; 1.3.9; 1.3.14; 1.14.12; 11.1.12; 12.1.5

[370] It seems somewhat possible that this passage has been interpolated into the Kauṭilya dialogue itself.

your *svadharma* towards the son or brother of the king." It is unclear in exactly what respect *svadharma* is invoked here. It would seem to refer to an obligation shared among nobles to protect the interests of those members in good standing. It is a strange usage and falls outside of our common understanding of *svadharma*. It is possible, ultimately, that the appointment of the undesirable individual to the position of crown prince implies a contravention of the *varṇa* system, but as much is not said. More likely is that the term *svadharma* is used here as a broader moral imperative in the sense of *dharma*.

The next comes in a long list of characteristics (KAŚ 1.14.2), also dated to the *adhyāya* redaction, by which the king's agents are able to determine which individuals in his own realm or in the enemy's realm are capable of being turned to treason. The passage in question details the "group of the enraged" (*kruddhavarga*), and includes *inter alia* a person who has been blocked from his *svadharma* or his inheritance (*svadharmād dāyādyād voparuddhaḥ*). Frustration of *svadharma*, then, might indicate an individual ready to turn against his lord. This usage would seem to recognize that some individuals considered the observance of *svadharma* to be extremely important. This is very different from the ideological prescription of *svadharma*, but may indicate that the composer of this passage was aware of the concept that he himself did not advise for the king.

We know from other examples that adherence to *dharma* was seen as a potential liability to both kings and ministers (KAŚ 1.10.2–4).[371] This, I think, reflects the position of the *prakaraṇa*-text *vis-à-vis* such matters, more generally: the text seems to promote a general sense of righteousness under the rubric of *dharma*, although it does occasionally advise against pursuit of *dharma*, broadly understood, in contravention of political aims.

[371] We note in this regard a passage from the latter half of the book wherein among the obstacles to achieving a gain, we find listed "*dharmika*," being too righteous (KAŚ 9.4.25). This is not the only example to be found of cases in which adherence *dharma* was seen as a weakness. Compare especially in this regard the "test of *dharma*" in 1.10.

9.3 CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis has examined direct references to *varṇadharma* and *svadharma*, the latter devolving from the same logic informing the former. It has revealed that all direct references to *varṇadharma* occur only in or after the *adhyāya* redaction. This is true also for the occurrences of the term *svadharma*. As it is, the presentation of *varṇadharma* here appears to consider the *svadharma* of the king, which falls outside the general system of *varṇadharma*, to pertain primarily, if not exclusively, to the preservation of the *varṇa*s and *āsrama*s. The king safeguards the system via decree by preventing *pratiloma* marriages, watching the "conduct" (*ācāra*) of his subjects, and ensuring adherence to ascribed *svadharma*, all of which serve to promote Brahmanical exceptionalism. This appears to be the shape of the system as it has been introduced via the *adhyāya* redaction. The *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* did not advocate *varṇadharma*, a ubiquitous sentiment in the *dharma* literature.

Chapter 10: *Dharma* in the *Arthaśāstra*

The system of *varṇadharma* has been treated here as separate from general claims and uses of the term *dharma*, which is more widespread in the *Arthaśāstra*. We look now at the use of the term *dharma* in the text in order to determine its relationship there to Brahmanical exceptionalism.

The need to treat *dharma* separately from *svadharma* has been prompted by the recognition that the notion of *dharma* circulated more generally in classical South Asia than in the narrow ideology of orthodox Brahmanical thought. Moreover, it is immediately apparent how advocacy of *varṇadharma* directly benefitted Brahmins. The mechanism by which adherence to *dharma* benefits Brahmins is less definite, although perhaps no less real. It is true that there is overlap between the concept of *dharma* and the idiom of *varṇadharma*; it is also true that just as the *dharma* texts were referred to as providing the rules of *varṇadharma*, their contents are also thought of more generally as "*dharma*." Nevertheless, the term *dharma* bore a much wider semantic range than its parochial usage within the pedagogical circles of orthodox Brahmanism. I will look in this chapter at such uses of the term *dharma* that relate it to the king or the state in order to define the relationship expressed in the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* between the principle of *dharma* and the practice of statecraft.

10.1 *Dharma* as *Svadharma*

It is of great importance to note that, despite occurring some 135 times in various forms, the term *dharma* and its derivatives seem to refer to something like the *svadharma* only once in reference to the king.

At KAŚ 5.1.4, we read that "against those treasonable principal officers, who cause harm to the kingdom and who, being favorites or being united, cannot be

suppressed openly, [the king] should employ silent punishment, finding pleasure in his *dharma*." The sense here would seem to be that the king was enjoying his duty to quash treasonous officers. This seems, however, to be a bit of an extension of the other references to *svadharma*. Regardless, the fifth *adhikaraṇa* is certainly one of the latest parts of the text and is clearly linked to the *adhyāya* redaction.

It is notable, however, that even here, the specific compulsion provided by the *varṇadharma* system, namely that the institutes of kingship devolve specifically from the prescriptive evolutes of a divinely-ordered world, is not strongly present in any uses of the term *dharma* in the context of kingship. This is not to say that there is not some discussion of *dharma* as it pertains to kingship and statecraft. There is, of course, and we shall examine a few of these below. The term *dharma*, however, is used most generally to refer to what is "righteous," "proper," or "legal."

There seems to be a clear distinction, then, between *dharma* and *svadharma* as they pertain to the king. The latter directly invokes the greater cosmic order and seems more properly "royal" in its application, as it prescribes specific vocational responsibilities for the king. The former is a more general assessment of the righteousness of the king's actions. In the Brahmanical universe, *dharma* and *svadharma* ultimately prove to have their worldly basis in the texts of the *dharma* literature, but the ideologies informing each and its bearing on the practice of statecraft are, as we shall see, markedly distinct.

10.2 *TRIVARGA*

We do find a few cases in which the concept of *dharma* is discussed directly in the text. These come in several considerations of the three aims of man, called the *trivarga* ("Group of Three"), which consists of *dharma* ("law," "duty"), *artha* ("wealth,"

"power"), and *kāma* ("love," "desire"). The *Arthaśāstra* argues that *artha*, or material considerations, are more important than the others. We read such a statement early in the text when Kauṭilya himself is attributed as saying, "*artha* alone is primary; for *dharma* and *kāma* are based in *artha*"(KAŚ 1.7.6–7). This means that the pursuit of sacred duty or physical pleasure depend ultimately on the security provided by attending to material needs first. This argument is again forwarded in the *pūrvapakṣa* of a Kauṭilya dialogue (KAŚ 8.3.31-33), where Parāśara uses it to justify the position that injury to property is worse than physical harm: "*dharma* and *kāma* are rooted in *artha*. And the world is tied up with *artha*. Its destruction is a greater evil." Kauṭilya holds that the preservation of one's life trumps even *artha* (KAŚ 8.3.34–36).

In an extension of the concept of *artha*, the *trivarga* idiom is applied to elements of the state in another Kauṭilya dialogue (KAŚ 8.1.49), where Kauṭilya rejects the claim that a calamity befalling the army (*daṇḍa*) is more severe than a calamity befalling the treasury (*kośa*): "'No,' says Kauṭilya, 'The army, indeed, is rooted in the treasury. In the absence of a treasury, the army goes over to the enemy or kills the king. And the treasury, ensuring the success of all endeavors (*sarvābhiyogakara*[372]), is the cause (*hetu*) of *dharma* and *kāma.*'" The parallel between *kośa* and *artha* is here quite clear. Elsewhere, Kauṭilya, arguing that coercive institutions of the state support all three members of the *trivarga*,[373] states at KAŚ 1.4.11 that "The Staff, thoughtfully wielded, endows the people with *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma*." Both of these appear to represent rather loose uses of *trivarga* in the service of specific claims.

---

[372] *Cf.* 1.4.3, where *daṇḍa* (the Staff) is said to ensure the pursuits of the other sciences.

[373] That the passage at KAŚ 1.4.11–15 is part of the preceding Kauṭilya dialogue is demonstrated both by the use of the connective (and dependent) particle "*hi*" in 1.4.11 as well as the otherwise anomalous "*iti*" at the end of 1.4.15.

In two subsidiary discussions in *adhyāya*s at the end of the ninth *adhikaraṇa* linked to the *adhyāya* redaction, we also find use of the *trivarga* in the discussion of types of gains and their relative value (KAŚ 9.7.60–64; 9.7.81). The first comes in a discussion of "Gain, Loss, and Uncertainty," where *artha*, *dharma*, and *kāma* are given as the triad of gains, *anartha*, *adharma*, and *śoka* ("grief") as the triad of losses, and inability to decide between each pair (e.g. *dharma* vs. *adharma*) as the triad of uncertainty. In the discussion of gains we are told that the earlier gain is better than the latter, as also among losses, the earlier must be addressed before the latter. These both firmly reinforce the general notion that *artha* is superior to *dharma* and *kāma*.

In the second example, after a discussion of the different types of success based on which means are used to achieve them (conciliation, gifts, dissent, and force), we read that:

> KAŚ 9.7.80 Of [the four means of overcoming calamities], success with one means is single success, with two, two-way success, with three, three-way success, with four, four-way success.
>
> KAŚ 9.7.81 And, since material wealth has *dharma* as its root and *kāma* as its fruit, that attainment of *artha* which continually results in *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma* is the attainment of all successes.

This pronouncement has every appearance itself of a secondary interpolation, as it clearly exists to tack the *trivarga* onto an already complete discussion.[374]

---

[374] Moreover, Kangle advises translating *dharmamūla* as a *tatpuruṣa* compound ("the root of *dharma*") rather than a *bahuvrīhi* compound ("*dharma* as its root"), despite the fact that the parallel compound *arthamūla* is always translated as the latter ("*artha* as its root"). He justifies this based on the argument from the preceding discussion at KAŚ 9.7.60–64 that a gain of *artha* is better than a gain in *dharma*. But is this warranted? I would suggest that it is not, specifically because the passage is clearly using the metaphor of a plant. The plant itself is *artha*, with *dharma* as its root (*dharmamūla*) and *kāma* as its fruit (*kāmaphala*). This may be inconsistent with the rest of the discussion of *trivarga* in the *Arthaśāstra*, but I do not believe that it is inconsistent with the ultimate goal of the *trivarga* idiom, which is not so much the promotion of *artha* above *dharma*, but the inclusion of *dharma* within the goals of statecraft. In this analogy, *artha* is still the primary goal in the quest for a gain, but it is said to be rooted in *dharma*, presumably referring to the rooting of the practice of kingship in observance of orthodox Brahmanical law. I would argue that the *trivarga* formula makes a similar argument in its own way: it recognizes the ultimate

While the supremacy granted to *artha* in the *Arthaśāstra* is certainly intended to establish a precedent for the contravention of *dharma* on the part of the king, it must be recognized that these formulations in the *adhyāya* redaction do not dismiss *dharma* and *kāma* (and the extant text is unanimous on this point), but see them only as lesser though still valid (and perhaps necessary) goals. Ultimately, one must ask whether these pronouncements on the relative importance of the *trivarga* are generally accurate regarding the attitudes in the text.

That Kauṭilya is cast as valuing *artha* above *dharma* is consonant with the portrait of this legendary figure in the literature. It should not, however, be seen as dissonant with the proclamations of the king's duty to follow his *svadharma*. Based on the conclusions drawn above, even the statements in favor of *dharma* implicitly or explicitly recognize that the ultimate power holder was the state; *dharma* depends on the king. This *trivarga* formulation breaks no new ground, then, and as I have argued above, actually serves to define and elevate *dharma* as a goal of kingship.

Ultimately, we can confirm that the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* was devoid of any sense that the project of statecraft was meaningfully engaged in a balance among the three goals of life. It is true that these ideas may have been held in the background, but they certainly don't seem to have merited much if any inclusion in a discussion of statecraft. This tells us that statecraft was not perceived in the *prakaraṇa*-text to be linked closely with considerations of the *trivarga*.

---

superiority of the interests of *artha*, but actually burdens it with a responsibility ultimately to uphold *dharma*. And, given the encompassing nature of *dharma*, its inclusion has systemic repercussions for the practice of statecraft.

10.3 *DHARMA* AND *ARTHA*

We find *dharma* discussed also in the context of *artha*. For example, the opening discussion on the sciences (*vidyāsamuddeśa*) tells us that "Since with their help one can learn *dharma* and *artha*, therefore the sciences are so-called" (KAŚ 1.2.8). But, this statement is almost certainly intended to form part of Kauṭilya's *uttarapakṣa* from KAŚ 1.2.7. Moreover, the capacity to learn what is *dharma* and what is *artha* actually only applied to the first of the sciences, *ānvīkṣikī*, and seems poorly suited to the last three (the Veda, Economics, and Statecraft).

In another passage on the comportment of kings, we read:

KAŚ 1.7.2 evaṃ vaśyendriyaḥ parastrīdravyahiṃsāś ca varjayet svapnaṃ laulyam anṛtam uddhataveṣatvam adharmasaṃyuktam anarthasaṃyuktam ca vyavahāram

With his senses thus under control he should avoid the wife or property of another man, as also sleepiness, capriciousness, falsehood, wearing extravagant dress, association with harmful persons, and any transaction associated with unrighteousness or harm.

The provenance of this sentence is unclear: the last list seems to have been appended, as it breaks the expected verb final word order of the prose.[375]

In a discussion of princes in *adhyāya* 1.17, Kauṭilya tells us that a prince should be instructed "in what conduces to spiritual and material good (*dharmyam arthyam*)" (KAŚ 1.17.33) and princes are divided into "one possessed of sagacity" (*buddhimant*), who "understands spiritual and material good (*dharmārthān*)" (1.17.45) and "one of evil intellect (*durbuddhi*), who "is ever full of harm and hates spiritual and material good (*dharmārthadveṣī*)" (1.17.47).

[375] Moreover, this passage was almost certainly not part of the underlying discussion of *indriyajayaḥ*. It seems designed to set up the Kauṭilya dialogue in the next line: "He should enjoy *kāma*…" (KAŚ 1.7.3).

To these we can add a passage from the fifth *adhikaraṇa*. Here, in a discussion of fixing salaries for state employees, the text advises that "He should pay regard to the body [of income], not causing harm to spiritual good and material advantage (*na dharmārthau pīḍayet*)" (KAŚ 5.3.2).

Much like the invocation of *svadharma* in attempting to influence a king seen above, we read at KAŚ 12.2.2 that a king who is unable to induce a more powerful rival to accept a peace treaty should admonish him:

> KAŚ 12.2.1–4 If he were not to accept a peace treaty, he should say to him, "Such and such kings, under the influence of the group of six enemies, have perished; it does not behoove you to follow in the footsteps of those who were without self-control. You should pay regard to spiritual and material well-being (*dharmam artham ca*). For those are the real enemies, wearing the masks of friends, who make you undertake a rash deed, an impious act, and the foregoing of material good. To fight with brave men who have given up all hope of life is a rash deed, to bring about loss of men on both sides is an impious act, to give up a good in hand, and to forsake a blameless ally is foregoing of material good."

This passage clearly refers back to the discussion at 1.6.6–1.7.1 of the *ariṣaḍvarga* ("the group of six enemies," *i.e.*, vices), which was determined to belong to the *adhyāya* redaction (§6.3; 7.5). We have already seen that the 12th *adhikaraṇa* also belongs to the *adhyāya* redaction or later.

Despite the connection of these passages with the *adhyāya* redaction, how do they collectively use the concept of *dharma*? First, we note the pairing of *dharma* with *artha*, which suggests that the king's judgment ought to be subject to the dual consideration of morality and expediency. This pairing of *dharma* and *artha* seems to me to have been affected for the sake of *dharma*. For, it would be rather redundant for a text on statecraft to implore the king to observe sound policy regarding *artha*. In fact, the purpose of the

formulation of *dharmārtha* is to *add* the imperative of *dharma* to more purely material considerations in statecraft.

That this is so is born out by the fact that in the *Arthaśāstra* we never read of a passage imploring the king observe *artha* that does not also praise *dharma* in a parallel manner. As such, the *dharmārtha* formula examined here bears what I would argue is the same purpose as the general *trivarga* formulation, namely the legitimation not of *artha* and *kāma* as aims of life (greed and desire being universal human drives), but instead the legitimation of *dharma* as an area of interest to be considered on par with the drive toward *artha* implicit in all striving for power. Hence, the creation of the notion of *artha* really serves to imply the coexistence of a parallel concept of *dharma*. It is, therefore, not surprising that *artha* is never considered independently in this (or any?) text. Moreover, the very naming of the text *Arthaśāstra* (when it was likely called *daṇḍanīti* originally), suggests an attempt to subjugate it to the *trivarga* ideology, whose ultimate purpose is the promotion of *dharma* in the context of the king's power.

Second, it would seem that term *dharma* is used in these examples in a much broader sense of "righteousness." For example, we do not know how causing the loss of life is considered *adharma* for a king, especially given that his *svadharma* is given at KAŚ 1.3.5 as "living by the profession of arms." There is, I think, an appeal here to a broader sense of morality than implied by the narrow constraints of the *varṇadharma* system. This probably reflects a wider sense that the term current in the general cultural milieu of the classical period. The sense is not so much of the abrogation of rules but of generally uncommendable behavior. This is precisely how the adjective *dharmya* is defined in the text itself: *praśastopādānād dharmyaḥ*, "Because [a gain] is obtained in a praiseworthy manner, it is *dharmya*" (KAŚ 9.4.22). In fact, we see this broader usage in

much of the middle and later portions of the text. It remains to be seen whether any more can be said about this more general sense of *dharma* as it applies to kingship.

10.4 *DHARMA*: RELIGIOUS GOOD AND LEGAL GOOD

Several uses of the term *dharma* give us some insight into its specific injunctive moral character in the *prakaraṇa*-text. Most poignantly, the citation given above (KAŚ 9.4.22: "Because [a gain] is obtained in a praiseworthy manner, it is *dharmya*.") reflects a broader sense of *dharma* that operates in much of the text, where it seems to invoke not a formal code of behavior but instead a general sensibility of righteousness.

Clearly, the term *dharma* was itself contested in this period, and all traditions drew on the ethical dimensions of the term as "that which is moral." It only makes sense that the concept of *dharma* must have had general currency if we see kings and religious leaders attempting to use it to characterize their own behavior and teachings. The question for the *Arthaśāstra* is the extent to which specifically Brahmanical *dharma* is invoked in uses of the term.

There is a clearly legal sense in which the term *dharma* is used to justify certain elements of the legal code. Although it is almost certain that the king was not compelled to follow the legal code as we have it in the *Arthaśāstra*, the argument is made nevertheless that certain activities are *dharmya*, as when in an end verse we are told that death by torture is "*dharmya*" because the methods have been "laid down in the *śāstra*s of high-souled authors (*śāstreṣv anugatāḥ…mahātmanām*)" (KAŚ 4.11.26). Certainly this passage is trying to justify the morality of death by torture with its reference to the *mahātman*s, but the authority of the practice is its legal basis in *śāstra*. As such, the argument is made that this aspect of statecraft, capital punishment, is allowable because it is supported by the *śāstra*s.

It is also likely that an appeal to canonical law is also implied when in another end verse an added impost and surcharge are called *adharmiṣṭha*, and only a "basic fine is known as *dharmya* (*dharmyā tu prakṛtiḥ smṛtā*)" (KAŚ 3.17.16). The term *smṛta* here suggests that the acceptability of the practice is based on the recognized body of authoritative customs and laws circulated within the expert tradition on *dharma*. Importantly, both of these direct appeals to *dharma* genres associated with the orthodox Brahmanical expert tradition on *dharma* are found in end verses.[376]

We are told at KAŚ 3.11.1 that 1 *māsa* per 100 is the *dharmya* monthly interest rate (3.11.1). No hint can here be found of reference to the *dharma* tradition itself, although the sense is certainly that of "legal," "proper," or "fair." For, the context alone suggests that judges should disallow higher interest rates, rendering this a legal opinion. The question then arises as to the relationship between the term *dharmya* and what we now think of as "the expert tradition on *dharma.*" In other words, on whose authority does this verse deign to instruct the king on the proper amount of interest? Likely, the authority comes from a customary consensus of what constitutes a "just" interest rate. The question is whether that consensus has its basis in the orthodox Brahmanical circles or in other circles, more specifically mercantile, economic, or political circles. It is not entirely clear, and it is somewhat beyond the scope of this chapter to launch into a full investigation of *dharma* in the text.

The confusion in this regard stems not only from the realization that *dharma* was a widespread concept with currency outside of the orthodox Brahmanical experts, but also because we see the term used generically with regard to what can only be thought of as authoritative and settled custom. Thus, we read in both the *adhyāya* redaction as well

[376] There is some overlap here, as with the next example, of the generic sense of *dharmya* as "just" or "fair."

as the *prakaraṇa*-text of *dūtadharma* (messenger-*dharma*),[377] *pālanadharma* (herding-*dharma*),[378] *nikṣepadharma* (deposit-*dharma*).[379] It is clear that *dharma* here is both more and less than "law." It seems that the sense lies somewhere between "custom" and "rule," probably splitting the difference.[380] This is the sense I also take from an end verse that, despite its lateness, seems to collapse any distinction between custom and *dharma*:

> KAŚ 3.7.40 Whatever be the customary law of a region, a caste, a corporation, or a village, in accordance with that alone shall he administer the law of inheritance.

Thus, without further contextualization, the authority for some references to *dharmya* are unclear. If we follow the pronouncement seen above that "What is *dharmya* is what is praised by all," we come close to the sense of approved custom, inculcating notions of both morality and legality.

As such, it is not immediately clear that the use of the term *dharmya* invokes Brahmanical law or even Brahmanical authority. Undoubtedly, Brahmins played a large role in the character of public opinion and the sense of which customs were moral and which immoral. What we are looking for, however, is a sense of whether the use of the *dharma* and its derivatives in the text betrays any ideological attempt to promote the interests of Brahmanical exceptionalism.

---

[377] KAŚ 1.16.17

[378] KAŚ 2.29.7

[379] KAŚ 3.12.37

[380] This makes the distinction drawn at KAŚ 2.7.2, 2.7.29, 3.1.39, and 3.1.40 between *dharma* and *caritra* and at 3.1.43 between *dharma* and *saṃsthā* somewhat problematic. My sense is that, as part of the additions to the second book and end verses, this use of *dharma* refers more specifically to canonical codes of behavior, Brahmanical or otherwise. Even broader is the use in the end verse at KAŚ 3.1.45 that discusses conflict between *śāstra* and edict "in a matter of *dharma*." Here *dharma* can only mean law writ large.

It is clear that *dharma* appeals to a sense of right or propriety, even when the question is not one of legality. Thus we read that one of the characteristics of an excellent treasury (KAŚ 6.1.10) or an excellent gain for the king (KAŚ 9.4.4) is that it is *dharmya*, while the possibility that a rival might be forced into achieving an *adharmya* object provided an opportunity for the king to exploit his rival (KAŚ 7.6.10). What is implied in these, and stated explicitly at KAŚ 9.4.7, is that this quality meant the activity was considered praiseworthy and good by observers.

But here the concern is tactical and has more to do with the management of public opinion than of any direct coercion. That concern with *dharma* was wrapped up with public perception is also clear at KAŚ 12.2.25–30, dated to the *adhyāya* redaction, where secret agents create the perception that the adminstrator called *samāhartṛ* is plotting against the king and robbing the citizens and slaying their chiefs. When they have turned the people against the *samāhartṛ*, they are to slay his subordinates in the middle of the village and proclaim, "Those who oppress the countryside unrighteously (*adharmeṇa*) are dealt with thus" (KAŚ 12.2.30).

This sentiment is explained precisely in a passage that discusses who is better to attack, a just or unjust king:

> KAŚ 7.5.16–18 Between a strong king unjustly behaved (*anyāyavṛtti*) and a weak king just behaved (*nyāyavṛtti*), he should march against the strong king unjustly behaved. The subjects do not help the strong unjust king when he is attacked, they drive him out or resort to his enemy. But the subjects support in every way the weak but just king when he is attacked or follow him if he has to flee.

It is enormously important to note here the use of the term *nyāyavṛtti*, "just behavior," rather than the notion of *dharma*, for the use of the former frees us from the question of whether *dharma* invokes Brahmanical exceptionalism or even a dominant Brahmanical ethos. I would argue that this passage makes clear that the sense of

righteousness and justness being discussed generally with the term *dharma* above is much broader than the Brahmanical notion that equates *dharma* with either *varṇadharma*/*svadharma* or the content of the *dharma* literature.

A long interpolated passage (KAŚ 7.5.19–26)[381] immediately following this citation and likely dating to the *adhyāya* redaction interprets *nyāyavṛtti* in terms of *dharma*, but it is clear that it is making pains to define *anyāyavṛtti* in a context more familiar to the *dharma* literature. But, the citation stands on its own merits, and we are safe to assume that the citizens would have been able to judge by their own standards whether the king was just or unjust based on his exercise of statecraft.

At the very least, the passage at KAŚ 7.5.16–18 indicates a more general sense of righteousness in which the notion of *dharma* shared than is typically assumed when the latter is thought of solely as the province of orthodox Brahmanical thought in the science of statecraft. It is in this context that we can understand the discussion in the text (KAŚ 12.1.11) of "the righteous conqueror," *dharmavijayin*. He is opposed to the "greedy conqueror" (*lobhavijayin*) and the "demoniacal conqueror" (*asuravijayin*). Here, the *dharmavijayin* is defined not by his religious practices, but by the fact that, when he has conquered, he "is satisfied with submission" (KAŚ 12.1.11). The other two are satisfied only with the seizure of land and goods or land, goods, sons, and wife, respectively. Thus, the *dharmavijayin* is defined by his behavior in conquest.

I would summarize this phenomenon as follows: The *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* show a familiarity with *dharma* as a normative set of customs specific to certain groups, activities, and so forth. There seems to be a potentially endless plurality of *dharma*s. But, at the same time, we see evidence of the normative sense of *dharma* native

[381] The supposition that this passage is interpolated has been suggested independently at §4.3.

to the Brahmanical literature, but typically confined to activities having directly to do with some kinds of Brahmanical rites. Finally, we have a general and seemingly non-ideological use of *dharma* as something that is generally "just." Thus, I would estimate that earlier parts of the *Arthaśāstra* were generally not aware of and/or concerned with any ideological dimension of Brahmanical *dharma* rising to the level of that always implicit in the concepts of *rājadharma* and *varṇadharma*, or of its specific relation to the ideological world of the *dharma* literature.

In the later layers of the text, we find the introduction of the notion of *dharma* as deriving from *śāstra* as well as a more directly evaluative term based not on public commendation, but on some other sense of absolute referent: "For the sake of protecting the four *varṇa*s, he should use secret practices against the unrighteous (*adharmiṣṭha*)" (KAŚ 14.1.1). This opens the real possibility that ideological moral evaluations (and perhaps also the term *dharmiṣṭha*) is a marker of general lateness in the text, as we see also in KAŚ 13.5: "[a]nd discontinuing whatever custom he may regard as harmful to the treasury and army or as unrighteous (*adharmiṣṭha*), he should establish a righteous course of conduct (*dharmyavyavahāra*)."[382]

10.5 Conclusion

We can draw several firm conclusions from the foregoing analyses. Regarding *varṇadharma*, we can assert with some certainty that the *prakaraṇa*-text bore little or no sense that the king's behavior was or ought to be governed by *svadharma* or *varṇadharma*. This conceit seems to be wholly part of the *adhyāya* redaction. The same can generally be said to be true for discussions of the *trivarga* and comparisons between

[382] The latter half of this sentence is effectively repeated in the end verse (KAŚ 13.5.24).

artha and *dharma*, both formulations that invoke and promote Brahmanical ideology to greater or lesser degrees.

In the early text, we get some sense of *dharma* as referring to something generally righteous or praiseworthy, without, however, any invocation of *varṇadharma* or Brahmanical exceptionalism. Interestingly, some usages also discuss *dharma* as it relates specifically to Brahmanical rites. The idea of *dharma*, however, becomes more pronounced in the *adhyāya* redaction, and in certain places we find uses of the term that appear to be based not in abstract notions of righteousness, but in the narrow strictures of Brahmanical law or ideology.

Chapter 11: *Varṇa* and Society

We have just looked at how the *varṇadharma* ideology was used in the *adhyāya* redaction to argue in favor of specific and general policies from the king. We have also seen that the term *dharma* in the *prakaraṇa*-text identifies something generally commendable or righteous, rather than refering to ideological aspects of Brahmanical orthodoxy. But, as noted before, ideologies also influence by controlling the terms through which the discourse is carried out. The present chapter will trace the use of key terms within the *varṇa* ideology (*cāturvarṇya*, Brahmin, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, Śūdra, *varṇa*, and so forth) in an attempt to understand the extent to which the use of these terms also invoked the political amibitions of Brahmanical exceptionalism and whether, perhaps, the concept of *varṇa* also possessed a broader sense less tied to the ideology of political Brahmanism.

When an ideology becomes productive of socially constructed reality, it begins to exercise control over the kinds of conclusions that anyone analyzing that society may reach. It does this by embedding in its terms a certain kind of logic, while denying typologies and constructs that contest this logic. The former is accomplished by the *telos* embedded in the ideology itself, and the latter by creating the appearance of illogic, irrelevance, and incompatibility. Crucial to these, however, is the control of the meaning of such terms. Like any ideology, the influence exerted by *varṇadharma* is of both types; it is in the nature of ideology that it can only exist in an admixture of both, for no explicit argument can be persuasive if the categories it uses are not to some extent seen as accurate or meaningful to the object under scrutiny.

11.1 *VARṆA* AND *CĀTURVARṆYA* IN THE *ADHYĀYA* REDACTION

We find in the extant text many uses of the term *varṇa* itself. Most of these are restricted to discussions we have already identified as interpolations or part of the *adhyāya* redaction: the discussion of *vāstuśāstra* at (KAŚ 2.4);[383] the interpolations on inheritance (KAŚ 3.5.28–3.8);[384] an addendum[385] to the discussion of witnesses (KAŚ 3.11.34–49),[386] magic (KAŚ 14.1–14.4);[387] violence against Brahmins (KAŚ 3.16–3.20;

---

[383] The greater passage on *vāstuśāstra* makes other notable uses of *varṇa*, prescribing different quadrants of the city for the residences of each of the four *varṇa*s (KAŚ 2.4.9, 2.4.11, 2.4.13, 2.4.15), as also for the mixed *varṇa* and most despised Caṇḍāla (2.4.23). The northern or eastern part of the cremation ground should be for those of the highest *varṇa*, to the south the cremation ground for the low *varṇa*" (KAŚ 2.4.21). The distinction drawn here is presumably between Brahmins (the highest of the *varṇa*s) and Śūdras (the lowest *varṇa*). The passage also assesses a fine for abrogation of this rule (KAŚ 2.4.22).

[384] The original discussion of inheritance appears to conclude at KAŚ 3.5.27 with the phrase "They shall divide again what is wrongly divided, what is robbed by one from the other, what is hidden, or what, being unknown, comes to light later" or possibly at 3.5.28 with "The king shall take that to which there are no heirs, excluding maintenance for the wife and what is needed for the funeral right" excluding the clearly spurious addendum "except for the property of a *śrotriya* [*i.e.*, a Brahmin learned in the Vedas]." Up to this point, *i.e.*, through the entirety of the original passage, the discussion of inheritance makes no mention of *varṇa*, even stating unambiguously that: "There is to be an equal division of debts and properties [among brothers]" (KAŚ 3.5.22). It appears, then, that KAŚ 3.5.29–30 and the subsequent extensions of the discussion of inheritance at KAŚ 3.6 and 3.7 are additions, as they fall outside of the proper discussion and miss their logical points of inclusion therein.

[385] The discussion on witnesses seems itself to be out of place, being discussed well into the legal code after the topic of debt repayment. A more appropriate location for the this would have been in the latter half of *adhyāya* 3.1, where rules for procedure are laid down. It might be argued that the previous sections do not pertain to transactions to which witnesses are required. In fact, there are discussions of such transactions. I would argue that such a developed discourse as is found generally in 3.11 is not original to the code. It must always be remembered, however, that the code has undergone perhaps greater changes than any other part of the text (7th Book excluded). As such, when changes cannot be linked to the *adhyāya* redaction, we must not always assume that they belong to the later layers.

[386] This passage maintains that Brahmin witnesses are not subject to the threats made to witnesses of other *varṇa*s (KAŚ 3.11.35–37).

[387] The style and outlook of the material is completely different from the text, and its inclusion has been rather obviously carried out by the inclusion of an introductory *sūtra* (KAŚ 14.1.1, quoted above) and two end verses (KAŚ 14.2.45 & 14.3.88). So, in one of the spells we read that "After pressing in a camel-shaped vessel the aborted fetuses of all the *varṇa*s or dead infants in the cemetery-the fat from that [enables one to walk untired] for one hundred *yojana*s" (KAŚ 14.2.44). This citation is not only late (possibly part of the *adhyāya* redaction, but certainly after the composition of the original text), but also based on a convention of the passage's home genre.

4.10–13);[388] sexual crimes (KAŚ 4.12);[389] and proper behavior for a courtier (KAŚ 5.4–5.5).[390]

We also find the term *cāturvarṇya*, a word meaning collectively "the four *varṇa*s" and a nominal derivative of the compound *caturvarṇa*, used some seven times.[391] This is, of course, a reference to the *varṇa* system as we have discussed, and its use frequently suggests the broader meaning of "the world as divided into four *varṇa*s," echoing the division into *varṇa* as a potential quality of the world. Four of its occurrences clearly reflect this meaning, and all can be traced to directly to the *adhyāya* redaction.[392] In at

---

[388] It is in this section that we find a provision for cutting of the hand of one striking a Brahmin (KAŚ 4.10.12), a crime that has already been addressed under the discussion of *daṇḍapāruṣya* at 3.19. There, we find a provision for the cutting off of a Śūdra's limb should he strike a Brahmin (KAŚ 3.19.8–10). That passage has been identified as spurious by both Meyer and Kangle. The following passage, KAŚ 4.10.13, calls for the blinding of a Śūdra who impersonates a Brahmin. Not only are both KAŚ 4.10.12 and 13 much more draconian than the general attitude of *adhikaraṇa* 3 (meriting an alternative punishment of exorbitant 700 and 800 *paṇa* fines respectively), but they are not integrated where applicable into earlier discussions. Fines for verbal assault are dependent on the relative position of those involved in the *varṇa* system ,with a Brahmin insulting a Śūdra paying the least and, in the reverse situation, the Śūdra paying the most (KAŚ 3.18.7). Finally, KAŚ 4.13.1 allows the highest fine for making a Brahmin drink something unfit to be consumed, the penalty decreasing for such an offense against the respective *varṇa*s.

[389] Another set of references to *varṇa*, also found in the later *adhyāya*s of the 4th *adhikaraṇa*, concern crimes against women. The discussion of *varṇa* in this context highlights the areas in the text where consideration of *varṇa* is greatest: marriage, sex, procreation, and inheritance. KAŚ 4.12 deals with sex crimes against women, and consideration of *varṇa* figures largely into the determination of punishments for sexual crimes in this chapter. Thus, the punishments for certain crimes depend on the relative *varṇa*s of the individuals (KAŚ 4.12.1; 4.12.14; 4.12.20–21) as also in determining the appropriate amount of time before a menstruating woman (presumably unmarried) may approach a man (4.10.10).

[390] We read that a servant of the king should recognize as a sign of the king's anger an incident when the king *inter alia* maligns the servant's education, *varṇa*, or country (KAŚ 5.5.9). This comes in a set of *adhyāya*s KAŚ 5.4–6 that give advice directly to the king's minister rather than the king.

[391] KAŚ 1.6.7; 2.4.6; 2.35.4; 3.6.17; 5.6.35; 7.11.21; 14.1.1

[392] So, we read in a passage that tells of legendary kings who succumbed to one of the Six Vices (the so-called "Group of Six Enemies," *ariṣādvarga*) that the king Aila, "extorting money from the *cāturvarṇya* out of greed [perished], as also Ajabindu of the Sauvīras" (KAŚ 1.6.7). In the third *adhikaraṇa*, in an interpolated passage on inheritance, a distinction in shares received by the son of a Brahmin is carried out with references to wives of the *cāturvarṇya*, *i.e.*, of each of the four *varṇa*s (KAŚ 3.6.17). So also in the 5th *adhikaraṇa*, secret agents build support for a proposed heir to the throne during a succession crisis by whispering among the high officers: "Who else but this king, with you to guide him, would be able to protect *cāturvarṇya*?" (KAŚ 5.6.35). Finally, in the prose *sūtra* that has been used to link the appendectical 14th *adhikaraṇa* to the body of the text, we read that "for the purpose of protecting the four *varṇa*s, he

least one case, *cāturvarṇya* seemingly refers to a more restricted part of society, designating those within the *varṇa* system over against those outside of the *varṇa* system.[393] Thus, in the interpolated passage on *vāstuśāstra*[394] (KAŚ 2.4.1–6, 8–16, 21–23), we read that "on an excellent building site, fit for the *cāturvarṇya* to live on, the royal residence [should be constructed]" (KAŚ 2.4.6). Here, the term *cāturvarṇya* seems more restrictive than its usage above; the mention later in the passage of the exclusion of Caṇḍālas and Pāṣaṇḍas, two groups traditionally considered to be outside of the four *varṇa*s, from the city itself reinforces this sense.[395] These examples are also confined to clearly interpolated passages.

11.2 *Varṇa* and *Cāturvarṇya* Outside of the *Adhyāya* Redaction

A number of uses of the term *varṇa* fall in more scattered occurences in the text, however, and cannnot be dismissed out of hand as additions of the *adhyāya* redactor. Two of these occur in the legal code of the third *adhikaraṇa*. The first we find in a discussion of disaffected husbands and wives a passage informing that "[o]ne who speaks

---

should employ secret practices against the unrighteous" (KAŚ 14.1.1). We note in all of these that the *cāturvarṇya* is used as a synonym or synecdoche for the world and is deployed *in relation to the king*. We note also that each of these passages has been ascribed to the *adhyāya* redaction.

[393] The heavily interpolated discussion of inheritance at KAŚ 3.5–3.7 also seems to adhere to this more restrictive usage: we are told there that the issue of inheritance among sons of different *varṇa*s should be resolved thus: "Among a Brahmin's sons from wives of the four *varṇa*s (*cāturvarṇyaputrāṇām*), the son of a Brahmin wife shall receive four shares, the son of a Kṣatriya wife three shares, the son of a Vaiśya wife two shares, the son of a Śūdra wife one" (KAŚ 3.6.17). This latter case is unclear, however, as the union between a Brahmin male and mixed *varṇa* female is never mentioned. Both of these passages, like those mentioned above, fall in clearly interpolated passages that, have not, however, been directly linked to the *adhyāya* redaction.

[394] The principles of *vāstuśāstra* call for the division of space according to systemic principles, usually for the sake of construction, such as those found in the *varṇa* theory.

[395] This comes at 2.4.23, although I am not firmly convinced of this passage's authenticity. After the discussion of how the cremation ground should be divided according to its use by different castes, the passage in questions adds that Caṇḍālas and Pāṣaṇḍas should dwell outside of the cremation grounds. It is derivative, therefore, of the discussion of the cremation grounds and not part of the discussion of dwelling places.

a falsehood, when indications are clear, when there is refusal of intercourse or when an approach is made to a person of the same *varṇa* through a secret emissary, shall give 12 *paṇa*s" (KAŚ 3.3.14). A second occurrence, this one found within discussion of "Rescission of Sale and Purchase" (KAŚ 3.15), is an excursus on the revocation of marriage (3.15.11–13) that gives different lengths of time, based on *varṇa*, up to which a marriage can be revoked. The greater discussion is concerned only with the buying and selling of trade goods (*paṇya*). This passage would seem a better fit had it been given in the discussion of marriage. (KAŚ 3.2–4). Regarding such occurrences in the legal code, we should keep in mind that the third *adhikaraṇa* shows signs of heavy emendation, and that this is the subject most intimately shared between the genres of Arthaśāstra and Dharmaśāstra. Hence, the presence of small interpolations and addenda should not be surprising, given the density of discourse in Sanskrit literature on this subgenre. Given the trans-textual life of the subgenre of *vyavahāra*, its compositional history is more complex than the rest of the text to a degree.

Another occurrence of *varṇa* is found in the enumeration of the duties of the *samāhartṛ*, where we read that this powerful official should ascertain "the number of fields, houses, and families in those villages in which they are stationed—fields with respect to their size and total produce, houses with respect to taxes and exemptions, and families with respect to their *varṇa* and occupation" (KAŚ 2.35.8). There is little doubt that this passage is interpolated, since it clearly breaks the structure of the passage:

KAŚ 2.35.8	samāhartṛpradiṣṭāśca gṛhapatikavyañjanā yeṣu grāmeṣu praṇihitās teṣāṃ grāmāṇāṃ kṣetragṛhakulāgraṃ vidyuḥ — mānasaṃjātābhyām kṣetrāṇi bhogaparihārābhyāṃ gṛhāṇi varṇakarmabhyāṃ kulāni ca
KAŚ 2.35.9	teṣāṃ jaṅghāgramāyavyayau ca vidyuḥ
KAŚ 2.35.10	prasthitāgatānāṃ ca pravāsāvāsakāraṇamanartyānāṃ ca strīpuruṣāṇāṃ cārapracāraṃ ca vidyuḥ
KAŚ 2.35.11	evam vaidehakavyañjanāḥ svabhūmijānāṃ rājapaṇyānāṃ khanisetuvanakarmāntakṣetrajānāṃ pramāṇamardhaṃ ca vidyuḥ

KAŚ 2.35.12 purbhūmijātānāṃ gāristhalapathopayātānāṃ sāraphalgupaṇyānāṃ karmasu ca śulkavartanyātivāhikagulymataradeyabhāgabhaktapaṇyāgārapramāṇaṃ vidyuḥ

KAŚ 2.35.13 evaṃ samāhartṛpradiṣṭāstāpasavyañjanāḥ karśakagorakṣakavaidehakānām adhyakṣāṇāṃ ca śaucāśaucaṃ vidyuḥ

We have here six consecutive *sūtra*s that end with the verb *vidyuḥ* ("they should learn"); the reference to *varṇa* comes in a line appended *after* the verb at KAŚ 2.35.8. Here, *varṇa* is listed next to *karma* ("work," "occupation") as two elements by which a family (*kula*) can be identified. Hence, we see *varṇa* and *karma* working as parallel ways to index the identity of families. The provenance of this interpolation is not clear, but the greater passage belongs to the posited core compilation.

A second usage from earlier in the same *adhyāya* draws out this parallel indexing between *varṇa* and occupation. The passage also concerns the duties of the *samāhartṛ*, and the passage in which we find the term *varṇa* (*cāturvarṇya*) also appears to be interpolated. There we read:

KAŚ 2.35.3–4 sīmāvarodhena grāmāgraṃ kṛṣṭākṛṣṭasthalakedārārāmaśaṇḍavāṭavanavāstuvaithyadevagṛhasetu-bandhaśmaśānasattraprapāpuṇyasthānavivītapathisaṃkhyānena kṣetrāgraṃ tena sīmnāṇ kṣetrāṇāṃ ca maryādāraṇyapathi-pramāṇasaṃpradānavikrayānugrahaparihāranibandhān kārayet gṛhāṇāṃ ca karadākaradasaṃkyānena

teṣu caitavac cāturvarṇyam etāvantaḥ karṣakagorakṣakavaidehakakārukarmakaradāsāś ca etāvac ca dvipadacatuṣpadam idaṃ caiṣu hiraṇyaviṣṭiśulkadaṇḍaṃ samuttiṣṭhatīti

He should record the number of villages by fixing their boundaries, the number of lands by an enumeration of plowed and unplowed, dry and wet, parks, vegetable gardens, enclosures, forests, structures, sanctuaries, temples, water-works, cremation grounds, rest-houses, sheds for drinking water, holy places, pastures, and roads, and in conformity with that he should keep records of the extent of boundaries, forests, and roads, and of grants, sales, favors, and

> exemptions, concerning village boundaries and lands, and of houses by an enumeration of tax-payers and non-tax-payers.
> And in them, so many people are cāturvarnya, so many are farmers, cowherds, traders, artisans, laborers, and slaves, so many are two-footed and four footed creatures, and so much money, labor, duty, and fines arise from them.

The passage in question, KAŚ 2.35.4, is syntactically dependent (*teṣu*, "among them") to the reference to houses (*gṛhāṇām*), which begins the phrase that has been appended to KAŚ 2.35.3 after the finite verb *kārayet*. But here we see again a relationship between *varṇa* and *karma*, as a kind of parallel indexing between social class and occupation: farmer (*karṣaka*), cowherd (*gorakṣaka*), merchant (*vaidehaka*), aristan (*kāru*), laborer (*karmakara*), and slave (*dāsa*).[396] Regarding this and the previous passage, the most we can say is that they probably do not date to the *prakaraṇa*-text.

In this context, *i.e.,* the relationship between work and *varṇa*, we can examine a few other occurrences of the term *varṇa*. The first comes in the sixth *adhikaraṇa*, which I take to be from one of the *prakaraṇa*-text. There, in the explication of the sevenfold (*saptāṅga*) state, one of the ideal qualities (*saṃpad*) the constituent called *janapada* (the "country") is given as *avaravarṇaprāya*, "possessed primarily of the lower/lowest *varṇa*" (KAŚ 6.1.8). This echoes a sentiment found elsewhere in the text. For example, at KAŚ 2.1.2, we read that, in the settlement of new country, one should "cause villages to be settled consisting mostly of Śūdra farmers (or Śūdras and farmers; *śūdrakarśakaprāya*)." This is a somewhat curious compound, but it seems to be making a point to tell us *which kind of Śūdras* are to be preferred. It also provides a link between *varṇa* and *karma*. I date this passage also to the *prakaraṇa*-text, although an interpolation in the case of this compound would be difficult to ascertain, given that it falls in a simple list.

---

[396] That these are exclusive categories is confirmed by the mention in the next compound of "two and four footed creatures."

A seeming connection between the sentiments of these two passages comes at KAŚ 7.11.21, appended to a discussion on the relative merits of different types of land. The provenance of this passage is difficult to ascertain, as it breaks the structure of the greater passage (KAŚ 7.11), but in discussing the relative merits of land with "disunited inhabitants" versus land with "people in bands," we read:

> KAŚ 7.11.18–20 As between land with people disunited and one with people in bands, that with people disunited is preferable. One with people disunited becomes easy to enjoy and is not susceptible to the instigation of others, yet it is unable to bear difficulties. One with people in bands is the reverse of this, full of danger during revolt.
>
> KAŚ 7.11.21 tasyāṃ cāturvarṇaniveśe sarvabhogsahatvād avaravarṇaprāyā śreyasī bāhulgyād dhruvatvāc ca kṛṣyāḥ karṣakavatī kṛṣyāś cānyeṣāṃ cārambhāṇāṃ prayojakatvād gorakṣakavatī paṇyanicayarṇānugrahād āḍhyavaṇigvatī
>
> In the matter of settlement of the *cāturvarṇya* on that, one consisting mostly of the low *varṇa*(s) (*avaravarṇa*) is best because it yields all gains, one with farmers because of the plentifulness and reliability of agriculture, andone with cowherds because of its starting agriculture and other undertakings, one with rich traders because of the benefit of stores of goods and loans.

This passage first claims that the *avaravarṇa*/s (low *varṇa*) is/are better in the settlement of land and then goes on to describe the benefits accruing from settling different types of groups: agriculturalists (*karṣaka*), cowherds (*gorakṣa*), and rich merchants (*āḍhyavaṇik*).

It is not entirely clear in this regard whether we can draw in this passage a discrete correlation between *avaravarṇa* and *śūdra*. That is certainly suggested by the seeming parallel between these three passages which extol the virtues of land settled with either *avaravarṇa*s or *śūdrakarṣaka*s. My sense is that the identification of *varṇa* and *karma* is not felt to be exactly precise, and in all of these cases specific correlation (*i.e., śūdrakarṣaka*) or ambiguity (*avaravarṇa*) are being used to address what is

fundamentally the recognized insufficiency of *varṇa* terminology to the practical task at hand, to which considerations of occupation speak more usefully.

The most interesting passage in this regard, however, comes in the discussion of "Rescission of Sale and Purchase" just mentioned. There, we read that

> KAŚ 3.15.5–6 vaidehakānām ekarātram anuśayaḥ karṣakāṇāṃ trirātram gorakṣakāṇāṃ pañcarātram
> vyāmiśrāṇām uttamānāṃ ca varṇānāṃ vṛttivikraye saptaratram
>
> For traders (*vaidehaka*) a period of retraction of one day [may be allowed], for agriculturalists (*karṣaka*) three days, and for cowherds (*gorakṣa*) five days. In the case of sale of the means of livelihood by mixed and the highest *varṇa* (*vyāmiśrāṇām uttamānāṃ ca varṇānāṃ*) [the period of allowed retraction shall be] seven days.

Here we have separate time alotted to *vaidehaka*s, *karṣaka*s, and *gorakṣaka*s; the first two of these have been seemingly identified above at KAŚ 7.11.21 as *avaravarṇa*. But we see a clear differentiation in the law regarding them here based on occupation. We then read that the "mixed" (*vyāmiśra*) and "highest" (*uttama*) *varṇa*s are allowed a longer time to rescind a sale. The latter term usually refers to the Brahmin, but the term *vyāmiśravarṇa*, would seem to refer to the "mixed" *varṇa*s that result from the union of two individuals from different *varṇa*s.[397] But, these categories are a poor fit with the supposed hierarchy of rescission allowed here. If we take the first three occupations to be the *avaravarṇa* (*i.e.,* Śūdras), then it would appear that the "mixed" and "highest" *varṇa*s stand above them.

It would seem possible, therefore, that we have a different notion of *varṇa* at work in this passage than in the formulation of the *varṇadharma* ideology we have heretofore encountered. The difference would apparently be between the "low classes"

[397] The term *vyāmiśra* is used elsewhere in the *Arthaśāśtra*, but never in reference to *varṇa*s or people. It generally means "mixed" and is used to refer to fabrics (2.11.104), strategies (9.7.70), terrain (10.3.52–3), or military divisions (10.5.31).

(*avaravarṇa*), the "mixed classes" (*vyāmiśravarṇa*), and the "highest classes" (*uttamavarṇa*). One wonders, in this regard, if we aren't witnessing in this passage an attempt to apply the logic of *varṇa* to a social reality too complex to yield to the basic cateogories. What we are ultimately seeing is the use of the term *varṇa* to refer to a basic tripartite division of society into menial laborers (*avaravarṇa*), a kind of "middle class" (*vyāmiśravarṇa*), and the elites (*uttamavarṇa*).

I would suggest that the term *varṇa*, which found application beyond social divisions in earlier eras, was applied in the *prakaraṇa*-text to social groups aside from the classical fourfold division of *varṇadharma*. Certainly, the ideology of *varṇadharma* had exerted an influence on this formulation (in the reference to the "highest *varṇa*s"), but the rest of the picture appears much more muddled. While not wanting to put too much weight on a single obscure term (*vyāmiśravarṇa*), it seems, nevertheless, that different notions of the subdivision of society may have informed thought about the organization of the state.

11.3 *VARṆA* NAMES USED INDIVIDUALLY

If we look at usages of the *varṇa* names outside of their collective occurrences and those discussed above, we note a few interesting things. First of all, we find no references to the Vaiśya independent of the other *varṇa*s. This is not surprising, as the historical existence of the "Vaiśya" in classical period has long been questioned. That the text contains no independent reference to the class is telling at least to the extent that the composers had no habit or reason to directly speak of or to such a group. The classical economic functions of the Vaiśya instead seem to be comprehended either by mention of *avaravarṇa* (low *varṇa*/s) or Śūdras.

Independent references to the Kṣatriya *varṇa* are interesting, but few. We find five references to Kṣatriyas outside of the collective enunciation of all four *varṇa*s, and all of them date clearly to the *adhyāya* redaction: one end verse which uses the term *kṣatra* (KAŚ 1.9.11), two in Kauṭilya dialogues (1.17.7; 12.1.5), and one in a list of historical oligarchies in the eleventh *adhikaraṇa* (KAŚ 11.1.4).[398]

A reference in KAŚ 6.1.11 sites as an excellent quality of the army that, *inter alia*, it is "consisting mostly of Kṣatriyas" (*kṣatraprāya*). There is no reason to suspect that this passage from the *prakaraṇa*-text is interpolated, but it is equally difficult to tell if this term carries the full connotation of *varṇadharma* with it or is, as the previous uses of *avaravarṇa* and *śūdra* seem to indicated, rather more descriptive of a professional fighting class.

References to Brahmins are by far the most numerous and are dealt with in the next chapter.[399]

---

[398] A last reference to Kṣatriyas is most interesting. We are told in the discussion of oligarchies (*adhikaraṇa* 11) that "The Kāmbojas, Surāṣṭras, Kṣatriyas, Śreṇīs and others live by an economic vocation and the profession of arms. The Licchivikas, Vṛjikas, Mallakas, Madrakas, Kukuras, Kurus, Pañcālas and so forth make use of the title of '*rāja.*'" It is very interesting to find the Kṣatriyas mentioned on equal footing with what can only be ruling clans. It is difficult to know (and will require more research) what to make of this passage. But, at the least, it would seem that Kṣatriya may have been a real identity marker for some clan at some point in the Classical Period. If so, this would represent quite a disruption of the *varṇa* system in the early text. For, how could the Kṣatriyas be a general social class and also a specific clan (unless none of the others qualified as Kṣatriyas, and that seems unlikely). Do we have a different sense here of Kṣatriya than implied in the *varṇa* system. And, why are they listed as a confederation? This also defies our expectation that the monarch was himself a Kṣatriya.

[399] An analysis of the mixed *varṇa*s demonstrates that most of the groups identified in the single discussion on mixed *varṇa*s (KAŚ 3.8.20*ff.*) are not found elsewhere in the text. The notable exception to these are the *caṇḍāla*s, *sūta*s, *māgadha*s, *vaidehaka*s, and *śvapāka*s. Of these, the *śvapāka* only appears in a few rules from the appendices to the 4th *adhikaraṇa* dated to the *adhyāya* redaction. The *sūta*s and *māgadha*s are always mentioned together as "bards and panegyrists" in pay of the king. Only one of these, 10.3.43 falls outside of the *adhyāya* redaction, where we see these two figures in their classical role of encouraging the troops before battle. Any hereditary origin for the groups is absent in these passages.

The Caṇḍāla is cast variously as an executioner, a forest-dweller, and general outcaste. It seems likely that this name actually acted as a catch-all for several different groups. They are usually juxtaposed to the *ārya* in the *Arthaśāstra* (as is the *mleccha*). We are reasonably safe in supposing that this term was an umbrella designation and that, because it is used twice to in analogies illustrating rhetorical arguments, it

11.4 REFERENCES TO THE *VARṆA*S IN THE *PRAKARAṆA*-TEXT?

Only two references to legal distinctions based on *varṇa* seem sufficiently well-integrated into the *prakaraṇa*-text to suggest that they are original: KAŚ 3.4.28 and 3.13.1,[400] both of which follow the unusual convention of enumerating the *varṇa*s from lowest to highest (*i.e.,* Śūdra, Vaiśya, Kṣatriya, and Brahmin). And, it could be argued, both passages are more lenient toward Śūdras. These passages deal with absences from home and slavery, respectively. In the case of the former, the Śūdra wife need only wait one year before remarrying, while the Brahmin wife was forced to wait four. Which *varṇa* is actually favored in this regard is ambiguous and depends on whether we are discussing the interests of the wife, who benefits from a short period, or of the husband, who benefits from a longer required time. As for the latter, it clearly shows more leniency toward Śūdras, who pay only 12 *paṇa*s for selling their children into servitude, while Brahmins pay 96 *paṇa*s. It is possible that these two early uses of *varṇa* in the text have the opposite intention of the rest of the usages: they both hold Brahmins to higher standards rather than conferring special privileges on them. Why they would have made use of *varṇa* and not other social divisions is unclear and a little troubling. In the case of absence from home, it is difficult to understand why *varṇa* would be applied here of all places and so many more common or important points of law discussed without reference

---

was generally operative in the society. Interestingly, most of the occurrences of the term come in the legal portions of the text, and in discourses that are clear late. The Caṇḍāla group does seem to have existed. If we remove the most spurious passages in which we find them, we find little said of the group, other than that they guard forests and are regarded as non-*āryan*.

But, the Vaidehaka is the most interesting because this group is mentioned with great frequency in the text. Usually, the term refers to the occupation class of "merchants". The statement in the discussion of mixed *varṇa*s that the Vaidehaka is the offspring of a Vaiśya man and a Brahmin woman. They are a despised "*pratiloma*" group with the status either of Śūdras or Caṇḍālas. It is likely, therefore, that the *vaidehaka* was a generica occupational identifier in the *prakaraṇa*-text, whereas the interpolation of the discussion on mixed *varṇa*s added an ideological interpretation to the same.

[400] We note here again the particularly complex compositional history likely attending these discussions of civil law.

to *varṇa*.[401] Whatever concession must be made to these two passages appearing to belong to the *prakaraṇa*-text, it is clear that, for the most part, special treatment for Brahmins using the logic of *varṇa* is generally a late feature in the text. It should, however, be noted that these sentiments find parallels in the *dharma* literature and, given the particularly complex history of the third *adhikaraṇa*, stand out as odd among passages otherwise dating to the *prakaraṇa*-text. It is possible, although unproven, that they may, in fact, date to the *adhyāya* redaction as well.

11.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, the *prakaraṇa*-text demonstrates a much less intensive concern with *varṇa* than found in the *adhyāya* redaction. References to specific *varṇa*s are sufficiently uncommon to question whether they might not be latter additions. Better attested in the *prakaraṇa*-text is discussion of *avaravarṇa*s. Seemingly, these are in ideological agreement with the fourfold division of the *varṇadharma* system, but it seems also that more general and/or dissonant conceptualizations of "*varṇa*" may have informed some of their usages (as at KAŚ 3.15.5–6).

What accounts, then, for this limited use of *varṇa* in the *prakaraṇa*-text? This is difficult to say without a better understanding of the social history of the period, but it is not unlikely that the concept of *varṇa* may have possessed a broader sensibility than implied in the *varṇadharma* system, while yet sharing certain features with the more discretely formulated understanding of *varṇa* found in Brahmanical sources.

---

[401] Perhaps it is because this section discusses discrete time periods, which lent themselves to *varṇa* like gradation. It is, of course, possible that these passages reflect an unspoken sense of hierarchy informing the whole text. This is unlikely, however, because it is difficult to imagine that the conscious pursuit of Brahmanical interest would fail to make itself generally overt in the established legal code. As such, the other likelihood, that of interpolation, must be considered as well.

It would seem likely then, that the presence of *varṇa* here cannot be explained by a dawning recongition of observed social facts, but of the gradually-expressed influence of broad ideological formations, perhaps broader than the comparatively narrow system of Brahmanical *varṇadharma*. I think that the efforts seen in the *adhyāya* redaction of the *Arthaśāstra* reflect what is going on in the *dharma* literature: a renewed effort to impose a Brahmanical version of *varṇa* ideology on the king's (and hence the state's) view of the world.

Chapter 12: Brahmanical Exceptionalism—Specific Privileges

At the root of *varṇadharma* is political bias. The present chapter considers examples of the specific kinds of rights and privileges directly pursued by Brahmins in the *Arthaśāstra*. These examples are uniquely situated to help us in this regard, since, divorced from the ideological work of *varṇadharma*, they do not hide their presuppositions or goals. We will see in the present chapter the articulation of the inchoate privileges generally claimed in the ideology of *varṇadharma*. In particular, we will note in the present chapter how the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* did not grant to Brahmins the immunity from corporal punishment that they sought ubiquitously in the *dharma* texts.

We have just reviewed the influence of certain orthodox Brahmanical ideologies on the *Arthaśāstra* and determined that the related notions of *varṇadharma* and *svadharma* seem to have been included in the text very late in its compositional history. We looked there at how the introduction of these ideas inflected the underlying text regarding issues of the origin of the king's authority, the guiding tenets of statecraft, and the organization of society. Finally, we were able to track a few key areas, namely kingship and family law, wherein emphasis on *varṇa* tends to be the greatest.

We also noted, however, traces of thought from the *prakaraṇa*-text that demonstrate less ideological uses of the term *dharma* and potentially *varṇa*. These give us pause to consider what historical processes might account for the increasing ideological burden placed on such terms throughout the compositional history of the text.

There is, however, a more direct manner in which Brahmanical interests are pursued in the extant text. These include the direct introduction of special prerogatives into state policy and the legal code: we have, on one hand, the ascription to "Brahmins"

of special privileges and exemptions, and on the other hand, the appointment of Brahmins to key governmental posts and the use of Vedic ritual and other Brahmanical practices in the operation of the government.

12.1 PRAISE OF BRAHMINS

Some of the most interesting evidence of the character of Brahmanical exceptionalism in the *Arthaśāstra* come from passages that do not prescribe special treatment, but rather reflect or invoke the high social standing of the Brahmin. In these examples we see how status is assigned to Brahmins as well as the context in which that status was discussed and recognized. By analyzing the targeted audience for these passages, we can get a sense of how the composers of the text understood and acted upon notions of Brahmanical superiority.

Most of these come, interestingly, in cases of reported speech, where the status of the Brahmin is somehow supposed to motivate the audience. Two of these, at KAŚ 1. 14.9[402] and 11.1.38,[403] come in passages assigned to the *adhyāya* redaction, but an interesting mention in rules for the envoy is of less clear provenance:

---

[402] In KAŚ 1.14, the text divides individuals ripe for treason into four categories: the enraged (*kruddha*), the frightened (*bhīta*), the greedy (*lubdha*), and the proud (*māni*). The purpose of this division is for the sake of refining the tactics to be used by spies in instigating treasonable parties in the enemy's kingdom. As such, the spies attempting to turn these individuals take tailored approaches. Our reference comes in the strategy for enticing members of the "group of the greedy (*lubhdavarga*)":

> KAŚ 1.14.9 *yathā śvagaṇināṃ dhenuḥ svebhyo duhyate na brāhmaṇebhyaḥ evam ayaṃ rājā sattvaprajñāvākyaśaktihīnebhyo duhyate nātmaguṇasaṃpannebhyaḥ asau rājā puruṣaviśeṣajñaḥ tatra gamyatām iti lubdhavargam upajāpayet*
>
> "Just as the cow of the dog masters is milked for dogs, not for Brahmins, so this king is milked for those devoid of spirit, intelligence, and eloquence, not for those endowed with qualities of the self; the other king recognizes men of distinction; go to him" –in this way he should cause the group of the greedy to be instigated.

This argument appeals to the pride of the individual by using the dichotomy between a Brahmin and a dog. Clearly, these two are meant to stand in absolute opposition to each other, one the highest and the other the lowest on the scale of purity and cleanliness. This analogy is meant naturally to appeal to the ego of its audience. Yet, it is the promise of rewards, the "milk" in the analogy, that is considered the fundamental

KAŚ 1.16.5 taṃ brūyāt dūtamukhā hi rājānaḥ tvaṃ cānye ca
tasmād udyateṣv api śastreṣu yathoktaṃ vaktāro dūtāḥ
teṣāṃ antāvasāyino py avadhyāḥ kimaṅga punar brāhmaṇāḥ
purasyaitad vākyam eṣa dūtadharmaḥ iti

To him he should say, "For kings have envoys as their mouths: both you and others. Therefore, envoys speak as instructed even when weapons are raised against them. Among them, even outcastes (*antāvasāyin*) are not to be slain, how much less so a Brahmin! These are someone else's words: this is the duty of an envoy."

I am doubtful about this passage, or at least the reference to outcastes (*antāvasayin*) and Brahmins, owing to the use of the term *antāvasayin*, which is found only one other time in the text (KAŚ 3.18.7) in a passage from the *adhyāya* redaction.[404] The passage in question also seems to provide a secondary reason. Nevertheless, this passage clearly implies that the speaker is a Brahmin. And yet it also allows for the possibility of *antāvasayin* envoys. We nowhere read that the office of the envoy (nor any office; we can assume as much, however, for the *ṛtvij*, *ācārya*, and, presumably, *purohita*) is restricted to Brahmins. And yet, here we have a direct implication that the envoy is a Brahmin. This can only be so, however, if we consider this passage to have been directed at a Brahmin audience in a world with non-Brahmins also fulfilling the role of envoys. That would conform to the teaching of this text in a Brahmanical curriculum.

---

attraction. This passage relies on the effectiveness of the Brahmin/dog analogy, and we can assume that the specific character of the distinction between the two was immediately understood.

[403] This passage outlines an elaborate attempt to sow dissent between chiefs in a confederacy. The relevant passage comes at the end, where the king's assassins have slain one of the king's spies who was pretending to be a Brahmanical *siddha*, or holy man. In a particularly mandarin turn, yet other agents dressed as *siddha*s appear on the seen and attempt to pin the murder on one of the chiefs of the confederacy, saying "that one is a Brahmin-slayer and a keeper of Brahmin women!"(11.1.48). The text does not tell us, but presumably this is sufficient to create dissent among the confederates.

[404] The presumption that the passage is interpolated is strengthened by the prohibition against an envoy drinking while being detained by the foreign king. Given that drinking was a great sin in the orthodox tradition, the specific injunction to avoid drink during this dangerous detention would be redundant. Of course, if the Brahmin is not orthodox after the fashion of the *dharma* texts, there is no problem.

This passage is the only in the text that implies a Brahmanical audience and, absent any other implied or direct evidence of the same elsewhere in the text, it is difficult to support an entire theory of context on one passage regarding which some doubt can be expressed. We will look, then, to further examples.

Nevertheless, these passages attest to the general recognition of the high status of Brahmins (KAŚ 1.14.9) as well as the particular opprobrium adhering to the murder of a Brahmin or sex with a Brahmin woman (by a non Brahmin) (KAŚ 1.16.5 & 11.1.38). Both of these crimes are referred to in a passage that is certainly part of the *adhyāya* redaction (KAŚ 1.6.4–1.7.1), where kings committing these acts are said to have perished thereby. They tell us little more directly, but the passage at KAŚ 1.16.5 certainly suggests that the envoy in question is a Brahmin. If this passage is early, then we have strong but limited support for the notion that the original *Arthaśāstra* was written in awareness of a certain opprobrium against the killing of a Brahmin. The citations at KAŚ 1.14.9, 11.1.38, and 1.6.4–1.7.1 have all been dated to the *adhyāya* redaction. Given the emerging conclusion that decidedly pro-Brahmanical passages are strongly characteristic of the later parts of the text, we should revisit the date of KAŚ 1.16.5 in light of the remaining evidence in order to see if they remain consistent with their putative layers.

Two other passages from the *adhyāya* redaction speak of the honoring of Brahmins. In the first, KAŚ 1.12.4[405] a female Brahmin renunciate is spoken of as honored

[405] Here, the agent called *parivrājikā* has the following qualities: "seeking a livelihood, poor, widowed, bold, Brahmin, and treated with honor in the palace" (*vṛttikāmā daridrā vidhavā pragalbhā brāhmaṇy antaḥpure kṛtasatkārā*). We read also that "by her are explained shaven low (*muṇḍā vṛṣalyaḥ*) ascetics"(1.12.5). The juxtaposition seems to be between Brahmin renouncers and shaven "low" renouncers. The display of disdain for the *muṇḍa* seen here through the use of the pejorative *vṛṣala* is not common in the text, confined to two other late uses: KAŚ 3.14.37 & 3.20.16. The first, an endverse, states that someone with a vṛṣala wife can, inter alia, be abandoned despite having a contract for work; it is clear from the context that this is an abrogation of Dharmaśāstric customs. The second also comes from an orthodox context and states that someone should be fined 100 paṇas for feeding Śakya, Ājivaka, and other heretical ascetics (vṛṣalapravrajita) at a Śrāddha ceremony. The character of these other citations puts the use of the term vṛṣala in the company of only late and clearly Dharmaśāstric conventions. Otherwise,

in the palace. In the second, we receive the advice that calamities can be overcome by "prostration before gods and Brahmins" (*daivatabrāhmaṇapraṇipatataḥ*) at KAŚ 9.7.83. Finally, in a digression from the discussion of encouraging the troops, we read at KAŚ 10.3.34–37) that "[w]hen 'the battle is tomorrow' he should observe a fast and sleep beside his weapons and vehicles. He should offer oblations with Atharva-*mantra*s. He should make blessings to be recited invoking victory and insuring rebirth in heaven. And he should give himself to Brahmins (*brāḥmaṇebhyaś cātmānam atisṛjet*). This has little to do with the other strategies for encouraging the troops, which involve issuing challenges, arranging the best troops at the center of the battle array, distributing bards and panegyrists among the ranks, and so forth. It is clear that a preceding interpolation, which integrates verses to be recited from the Veda (KAŚ 10.3.28–31),[406] has attracted the passage being discussed here.[407]

The next citation, also coming from the *adhyāya* redaction, is in the abbreviated *vāstuśāstra* at KAŚ 2.4 by which the city is organized. In this, the Brahmin is settled in the same part of the city as the deities of the city as well as the king, metalworkers, and jewelers (2.4.15). Passages indicating the high status of Brahmins definitely reflect the high social rank accorded to that group, and one of these (KAŚ 1.16.5) potentially predates the *adhyāya* redaction, although it is not above suspicion. If, as we have some reason to believe, *varṇa* considerations were beginning to emerge in the *prakaraṇa*-text, it might not be surprising to find some recognition of the high standing of Brahmins, something reported both by Megasthenes and Aśoka. Moreover, the use of Brahmins as

---

muṇḍa ("shaven") ascetics are spoken of in the context of *jaṭila*s (dreadlocked ascetics), and without particular opprobrium, for the king uses these frequently as spies

[406] Kangle 1972, 440n

[407] While the second of these passages, KAŚ 10.3.34–37, cannot be directly linked to the *adhyāya* redaction, it seems at least to be later than the *prakaraṇa*-text.

envoys may have been an established practice owing to a general opprobrium against killing them or the perception that they were above political maneuvering. Such exploitations of the general esteem of the class would be of a different order than demands for special privileges based on class identity.

12.2 PRIVILEGES

Privileges afforded Brahmins are piecemeal and most are demonstrably later.[408] Several can be assigned to the *adhyāya* redaction, such as a provision for cutting off the hand of a Śūdra striking a Brahmin (KAŚ 3.19.8), a fine for forcing Brahmins to pay at ferry crossings (3.20.14: a passage which continues the misunderstanding first seen in an interpolation at 2.28.18 that presumes a fee for use of ferries when none is mentioned), and the settling of the Brahmin in the same part of the city as the deities of the city as well as the king, metalworkers, and jewelers (2.4.15). Also dating to the *adhyāya* redaction is a passage making a traditional assertion that judges should look into the affairs of Brahmins *inter alia* (3.20.22).[409] Finally, we have the draconian measures of blinding a Śūdra who calls himself a Brahmin (4.11.13), as well as tearing out the tongue of anyone who licks something in a Brahmin's kitchen (4.12.21).[410]

Based on the frequency with which pro-Brahmanical sentiments can be linked directly to the *adhyāya* redaction, we might also consider as an interpolation a strange passage in the third *adhikaraṇa* during a discussion of the "The Non-Observance of

---

[408] Not mentioned here are the handful of privileges granted to *śrotriya*s and other subgroups of Brahmins. I have left them out primarily because they distended the argument too greatly. But, the evidence adduced from such passages does not change the conclusions drawn above.

[409] This recalls a passage at KAŚ 1.19.29, replacing, however, Brahmins for Śrotriyas, whose affairs that passage enjoins the king to look into

[410] Meyer and Kangle both think the particular extention of crimes warranting the tearing out of the tongue to this offense against Brahmins is even an interpolation to this late section.

Conventions," which not only refers to Brahmins as the "best" (*jyeṣṭha*) (3.10.43), but also grants them the right to participate in festivals to which they have not contributed (3.10.44). Both of these passages are oddly out of place, and Kangle suggests the latter might be a gloss of the former (1972, 225n). This is a case of a passage rendered obscure by its failure to connect to the overall passage requiring further explication.

Indication of esteem for the role of Brahmins in the successful running of the state, a common sentiment in the *dharma* literature, is found in an end verse (KAŚ 1.9.11).[411] We find, moreover, no mention of the role of Brahmins specifically in the office of the judge, another convention of the *dharma* literature.

The role of the *mantripurohita* is, however, an exception to this. Although he is never called a Brahmin, he is said to be of a very exalted family and schooled in the Veda as well as a variety of divinatory and magical specialties. Here we see, perhaps, the actual use of this high social position for political purposes without insinuating any special privileges for the class as a whole.

12.3 Exemption from Corporal Punishment

The exemption of Brahmins from corporal punishment is, perhaps, the premier consideration motivating the ideology of Brahmanical exceptionalism. The king's coercive authority, as represented by his Staff, came through the right to dole out punishment. We see in the *dharma* literature a thoroughgoing opprobrium against the king killing Brahmins (or even hurting them). This is the central issue undergirding claims of Brahmanical exceptionalism. Whether or not Brahmins stood above or outside

[411] "*Kṣatra*, made to prosper by a Brahmin, sanctified (*abhimantra*) by spells *(mantra*) in the form of the counsel of ministers (*mantrin*), possessed of weapons (*śastra*) in the form of *śāstra*, triumphs, remaining ever unconquered" (KAŚ 1.9.11).

the law depends entirely, in a sense, on whether they are subject to the punitive authority of the king.

The texts of the early *dharma* literature display a two-fold strategy in prohibiting the corporal punishment of Brahmins at the hands of the king. The first aspect of this strategy, as exemplified by the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*,[412] is to judge offending Brahmins according to the quasi-judicial apparatus of prescriptions and penances (*prāyaścitta*) found in the text,[413] rather than subjecting them to the criminal jurisprudence of the king.[414] This includes, most importantly, those grievous offenses that might be considered capital crimes by the king. This also seems to be the path followed in the later *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra*, which neither directly prohibits the corporal punishment of brāhmaṇas nor discusses any concrete punishments to be doled out by the king in his discussion of statecraft.[415]

The second aspect of this strategy comes in the form of overt prohibitions against the corporal punishment of *brāhmaṇa*s. This aspect is operative in the *Gautama Dharmasūtra*[416] and the *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra*.[417] What is less clear in these two

---

[412] ĀDS 2.10.12–16, 2.27.17–20. Interestingly, as discussed in the previous chapter, the ĀDS still grants to the king his traditional role as the executioner of Brahmin thieves (1.25.4–8). Also, there is some ambiguity as to whether the king was further responsible for castrating young Brahmin rapists (2.26.20).

[413] In this, I follow the general perspective of E.W. Hopkins (1924), who sees in the penances of the Dharmasūtras a kind of legal code: "the horrible penances…are really legal punishments, only they are still called penances"(248). I differ with his estimation, however, that regarding these penances, "the punisher is the king himself, either in person or as authority" (247), except, of course, in the case of the penance for theft.

[414] The extent of which, I would argue, is ignored in the Dharmasūtras.

[415] Importantly, however, Vasiṣṭha does expunge the king's traditional punitive role from the *prāyaścitta* for theft (20.42): …*tena ātmānaṃ pramāpayet*, "With that [the thief] should kill himself."

[416] GDS 12.46 na śārīro brāhmaṇadaṇḍaḥ

There shall be no corporal punishment of brāhmaṇas.

[417] BDS 1.18.17 avadhyo vai brāhmaṇaḥ sarvāparādheṣu

texts is the status of the penances as a system of criminal jurisprudence. I have argued that both texts fundamentally agree with the ĀDS in implying that Brahmins fall under the jurisdiction of their own customary *prāyaścitta*s rather than that of the king's system of criminal justice.[418] This does, however, generate an odd disjuncture in the BDS, which prescribes both exile and branding as well as the traditional penances for the *mahāpātaka*s, leaving the exact jurisdiction of each option unresolved.[419]

The *Manusmṛti* uses both of these strategies in its approach to the corporal punishment of *brāhmaṇa*s. Unlike the Dharmasūtras, the *Manusmṛti* possesses a fully-developed system of civil and criminal laws[420] that does not appear in its specific injunctions to make any distinction between the *varṇa*s with regard specifically to corporal punishment.[421] The *Manusmṛti* does, however, prohibit the corporal punishment of *brāhmaṇa*s altogether at the beginning of the *vyavahāra* section[422] and further prohibits their capital punishment after enumerating those *vyavahārapāda*s covering crimes warranting corporal and capital punishment.[423] Finally, at the end of the *vyavahāra* section, the *Manusmṛti* resolves the disjuncture in the BDS by prescribing that

---

A brāhmaṇa, clearly, is not subject to capital punishment for any crime.

[418] In the case of the GDS, I have argued that the prohibition against corporal punishment is rendered only in connection with theft. Otherwise, I think that the GDS agrees with the position of the ĀDS that brāhmaṇas are subject only to the system of penances. Both texts enumerate the penances as though they operate in this legal capacity.

[419] The later Smṛtis seem to offer rectification this disjuncture, as the *Manu Smṛti* (9.236) offers royal punishment as an alternative to those who have not performed the penances for the *mahāpātaka*s. The same seems implied in the *Nāradasmṛti* (15.19).

[420] The *vyavahārapāda*s (MS 8.1–9.251).

[421] This is supported by my reading of the text. More is said of it in the previous chapter.

[422] MS 8.124–125

[423] MS 8.379–381

anyone[424] guilty of one of the *mahāpātaka*s may avoid the king's corporal punishment by performing the prescribed penance and paying a monetary fine.[425]

It is clear that the Brahmanical exemptions from corporal punishment in the texts of the early *dharma* literature are directed solely at the king,[426] indicating that these exemptions were motivated not so much by a sense of indignation at taking a Brahmins's life (which is allowed as punishment in the system of traditional penances), but rather by an antagonism toward the inclusion of Brahmins under the penal jurisdiction of the king.

As we examine this issue in the context of the *Arthaśāstra*, a few important differences from the early *dharma* literature emerge. The first of these is that the *Arthaśāstra* nowhere discusses a system of penances corresponding to the *prāyaścitta*s of the *dharma* texts.[427] We do have one mention of the practice of exile and branding for Brahmins guilty of one of the four *mahāpātaka*s, which amounts to a limited exemption from certain types of torture (examined below).[428] But, this single instance can be demonstrated to be an interpolation and only serves to highlight the absence of any

---

[424] MS 9.240 prāyaścittaṃ tu kurvāṇāḥ sarvavarṇā yathoditam
nāṅkyā rājñā lalāte syur dāpyās tūttamasāhasam

But men of all castes who perform the prescribed penances,
Should not be branded by the king, but should give the highest fine for violence.

[425] MS 9.235–242

[426] A single exception to this is BDS 2.4.1. I have argued, however, that this cited *smṛti* verse comes originally from a context directed toward the king.

[427] The *Arthaśāstra* only mentions the term *prāyaścitta* twice, both times referring to *prāyaścittaśānti* (KAŚ 4.3.13) or *śānti prāyaścitta* (13.2.33). These seem to be "pacificatory rites" to be performed by magicians or *siddhatāpasa*s. Other technical terms related to *prāyaścitta*, such as *mahāpātaka* and *patanīya* are also missing. I expect to do a more thorough study of this if it seems necessary.

[428] KAŚ 4.8.27–29. Three of the *mahāpātaka*s are also given in a chapter end verse (KAŚ 3.14.37), which is likely spurious.

alternate system of criminal jurisprudence for Brahmins based on penances. Moreover, no indication is to be found in the text that Brahmins are uniquely subject to any system of criminal justice outside of the general code expounded in the text (*adhikaraṇa*s three and four).

The second major difference from the *dharma* literature is that in the context of a fully-developed civil and criminal code,[429] the *Arthaśāstra* does not replicate the strategy of the *Manusmṛti* to amend unambiguously that code with carefully-placed prohibitions. The few exemptions found in the *Arthaśāstra* are very limited in nature and can in no sense be construed to amend the civil and criminal codes in their entirety.

Finally, with regard to offenses warranting corporal punishment, the *Arthaśāstra* does not tend to draw distinctions based on *varṇa*. Rather, it more frequently looks at sex, age, intentionality, and other universal human distinctions. This is in accord with the more general perspective of the law code, which seems to be more directed at individuals as *vyavahārin*s, authorized legal transactors, than at members of specific *varṇa*s.[430] Exceptions to the code are made based on occupation and, possibly, by extension on *jāti* or *saṅgha*. These are, however, always made with reference to the variety of unique practices prevailing among different vocational sectors of society.

With these differences in mind let us now turn to the Brahmanical exemptions from corporal punishment found in the text. Altogether, we have only three exemptions pertaining generally to Brahmins. Generally speaking, we find an exemption from certain

---

[429] By this phrase I mean (at the present time) to indicate the entire third *adhikaraṇa* as well as those parts of the fourth that prescribe punishments for anyone other than state employees (KAŚ 4.1–2, 4.5, 4.8, 4.10–13).

[430] Exceptions to this are to be found in the discussions of marriage, inheritance and possibly elsewhere. See Chapter 4.

kinds of forced labor,[431] an exemption from torture during interrogation,[432] and an exemption from execution for certain treasonous activities.[433] As mentioned above, the exemptions are extremely limited and require an examination of their local context in order to understand the extent of the exemption. This will also give us opportunity in the first two cases to attend to certain difficulties in the general sections of the *Arthaśāstra* in which they are found.[434]

12.3.1 Exemption from Forced Labor: KAŚ 3.1.37

The first exemption comes in the final prose *sūtra* of the first chapter on *vyavahāra* in the *Arthaśāstra*. The context of the exemption is somewhat unclear, but it is possible to summarize it generally: it is an exemption for Brahmins from laboring as a pledge in order to repay someone else's damages and legal expenses:

KAŚ 3.1.36–37 ādhiṃ vā sa kāmaṃ praveśayet
rakṣoghnarakṣitaṃ vā karmaṇā pratipādayed anyatra brāhmaṇāt

Alternatively, [the defeated defendant] may, if he wishes, provide a pledge.
Or, he may give one protected by the rakṣoghna mantra, with labor,[435] except for a Brahmin.

It is not readily apparent how this exemption should be interpreted, for neither the meaning nor the language of the *sūtra* is especially clear. Specifically, it is not clear

[431] KAŚ 3.1.37

[432] KAŚ 4.8.27–29

[433] KAŚ 4.11.12

[434] I would like to sustain a program throughout the dissertation of treating certain textual issues in the midst of more general discussions. I hope to produce in the end a helpful index directing the reader to discussions of certain problematic parts of the text.

[435] It is not entirely clear that the instrument *karmaṇā* signifies accompaniment. It is also possible that the instrumental here denotes the agent productive of the past passive participle, *rakṣitam*.

whether KAŚ 3.1.37 presents a second option to that given in the preceding *sūtra* or presents a gloss of it. Moreover, the passage preceding these two *sūtra*s is somewhat problematic. More clarity is provided by looking at the larger context.

The third book of the *Arthaśāstra*, entitled *dharmasthīya*, deals with jurisprudence, including rules for transactions between private parties, rules for court procedure, private lawsuits, criminal law, and monetary and corporal penalties. The first chapter of this book, at the end of which this exemption is found, enumerates the proper conditions for executing a legal transaction between private parties (*vyavahāra*), discusses the procedure under which a plaint may be brought before a judge (*dharmastha*), and establishes procedural rules for both the plaintiff (*abhiyoktṛ*) and defendant (*abhiyukta*).

The prose body of the chapter closes (KAŚ 3.1.29–37) with the establishment of guidelines regarding the length of time allowed for a defendant to respond to a plaint as well as the penalties for exceeding the allotted time. The earlier part of this subsection is clear:

KAŚ 3.1.29–33 tasyāpratibruvatas trirātraṃ saptarātram iti
ata ūrdhvaṃ tripaṇāvarārdhyaṃ dvādaśapaṇaparaṃ daṇḍaṃ kuryāt
tripakṣād ūrdvham apratibruvataḥ paroktadaṇḍaṃ krtvā yāny asya dravyāṇi syus tato 'bhiyoktāraṃ pratipādayed anyatra vṛttyupakaraṇebhyaḥ
tad eva niṣpatato 'bhiyuktasya kuryāt
abhiyoktur niṣpātasamakālaḥ paroktabhāvaḥ

A defendant has three nights to respond[436] to a plaint; some say seven nights.

[436] *pratibruvatas*: Although this verb can mean "to contest," it is clear from its use at 3.1.27, where the plaintiff is called upon to reply to the answer rendered by the defendant (*cet…na pratibrūyāt*), that it means rather in this context "to reply." It is unclear, however, whether *prati* + *brū* might have the extended meaning of "to reply without capitulating." As KAŚ 3.1.21 allows for a confession of guilt, it seems likely that some replies were admissions of guilt. As the court's fine for a guilty plea is less (1/10 of damages sought) than failure to reply (1/5 of damages, which is the same as the penalty for loss of suit), it seems

> After that, the judge should fine the defendant a minimum of three and a maximum of twelve paṇas.
> If a defendant has not replied to the plaint after three fortnights, the judge should assess the penalty for loss of suit and should have the damages due the plaintiff repaid out of any things of value that the defendant might possess with the exception of the tools of his trade.
> The judge should do the same if the defendant absconds.
> A plaintiff immediately loses his suit the very moment he absconds.

The passage is clearly a coherent whole, with only the final sentence (KAŚ 3.1.33) diverging somewhat from the topic. Rather than continuing the thread of failure to reply, KAŚ 3.1.33 continues the theme of absconding (*niṣpāta*) from the previous *sūtra*. Moreover, it has already been established in an earlier *sūtra* (KAŚ 3.1.27) that "If a plaintiff to whom a response has been given fails to reply that very day, he loses the suit." It seems rather superfluous to provide an additional rule covering the disappearance of the plaintiff, as the effect would be largely the same.[437]

Moreover, KAŚ 3.1.33 appears to have misunderstood the preceding sentence. KAŚ 3.1.32 reads: *tad eva niṣpatato 'bhiyuktasya kuryāt*, "The judge should do the same with regard to a defendant who absconds." The idea is that the same penalty (*i.e.,* loss of suit: KAŚ 3.1.31) should be applied to a defendant who runs away (*niṣpatato 'bhiyuktasya*) as to one who fails to reply after three fortnights (*tripakṣād ūrdhvam apratibruvataḥ*[438] [*abhiyuktasya*]). Thus, for a defendant, absconding at any point immediately triggers the same penalty as failure to reply within an acceptable timeframe: loss of suit. It is clear, however, that KAŚ 3.1.33 is contrasting *samakāla*, "at that very

---

unlikely that non-response was equal in all respects to a guilty plea. That is to say, it does not seem that the losing party would just as readily have not responded as entered a guilty plea. Therefore, it seems unlikely that *prati* + *brū* only refers to instances wherein the accused planned to contest the charge.

[437] Without a better understanding of court procedure, it is difficult to understand the import of the rule on the absconding plaintiff given in KAŚ 3.1.33.

[438] This phrase is clearly a syntactical unit representing an introductory genitive denoting the subject of the rule: "Regarding one who fails to respond after three fortnights."

moment," with *tripakṣād ūrdhvam* from the preceding sentence, implying that it understands the previous two sentences to indicate that a judge should only declare loss of suit against an absconding defendant after three fortnights and not also in case of absconding. This does not seem to be what is meant in KAŚ 3.1.31–32, and it is unlikely that the author of the larger passage would have misunderstood his own intention.

At any rate, KAŚ 3.1.33 would have better retained the organizational scheme had it occurred between 3.1.27 ("If a plaintiff to whom a response has been given fails to respond that very day, he loses the suit") and 3.1.28, which states: "For, it is the plaintiff who makes the decision to go to court, not the defendant." In that case, KAŚ 3.1.27–28 (plus the current 3.1.33) would discuss conditions resulting in loss of suit for the plaintiff, and KAŚ 3.1.29–32 would have discussed conditions resulting in loss of suit for the defendant.

If KAŚ 3.1.33 seems slightly out of place, the next sentence in the passage seems to be completely lost. For, in the midst of a discussion on judicial procedure with regard to the plaintiff and defendant we find the quizzical remark that:

KAŚ 3.1.34 pretasya vyasanino vā sākṣivacanam asāram

The testimony of a dead or sick individual is invalid.

The previous thread is picked up, however, in the following sentence:

KAŚ 3.1.35 abhiyoktā daṇḍaṃ dattvā karma kārayet

The plaintiff may/should pay the defendant's fine and make him work to pay off the damages due.

How then does a sentence on the validity of witnesses' testimony find its way into this passage? The discussion of valid witnesses in the *Arthaśāstra* comes only later at KAŚ 3.11. It is, at best, a strange place to find this statement. I believe that the answer to this puzzle lies in an examination of the following *sūtra*.

The sentence KAŚ 3.1.35 also presents some small difficulty. It reads: *abhiyoktā daṇḍaṃ dattvā karma kārayet*. It is difficult to understand whether the passage is intended to present an option to KAŚ 3.1.31, or whether it relies on some different, though unstated, set of conditions, such as if the defendant is insolvent and unable to pay his fine and damages due. If we believe that the optative sense of *kārayet* is intended to present an option,[439] then we must accept that the plaintiff could exercise a choice to force the defendant to work in order to pay the damages, even if the latter were capable of paying.[440] If, instead, we assume that KAŚ 3.1.35 refers to a new set of conditions, we are left searching for any indication in the text of the new conditions. The clear choice is certainly the latter, *i.e.,* that the text is referring to a situation in which the defendant is insolvent, unable to pay either the fine or his damages. In that case, the plaintiff should pay the fine due the court and demand satisfaction for that and his own damages due through forced labor.

Thus, the discussion (KAŚ 3.1.29–35) that immediately precedes our exemption exhibits a few textual difficulties. I believe that these can be explained, however, by a single intrusion into the otherwise completely coherent discussion. I have already pointed out that KAŚ 3.1.33 seems to be something of a digression from the thematic thrust of the passage. This is certainly true of KAŚ 3.1.34, which is completely out of place. Moreover, KAŚ 3.1.35 seems to lack some qualifying statement indicating a new set of conditions. Let us look at these sentences, along with KAŚ 3.1.32 as a unit:

---

[439] In which case we might reasonable expect to see a *vā*, *athavā*, or, as in KAŚ 3.1.36, *kāmam*.

[440] It is also possible that the passage refers only the court fine (*daṇḍa*), but that leaves us either with the conclusion that the plaintiff could choose to pay the fine and demand work or that the sentence is referring only to situations where the defendant is able to pay the damages but not able to pay the smaller sum of the court fine. This also requires us to accept that the court put the return of damages to the plaintiff about the recuperation of its own fines.

KAŚ 3.1.32–35 tad eva niṣpatato 'bhiyuktasya kuryāt
abhiyoktur niṣpātasamakālaḥ paroktabhāvaḥ
pretasya vyasanino vā sākṣivacanam asāram
abhiyoktrā daṇḍaṃ dattvā karma kārayet

Looking first at 3.1.35, we note again that it lacks any indication that it deals with a different set of conditions than those prevailing in the original rule (KAŚ 3.1.31). We can infer that the different set of conditions is precisely that the defendant is insolvent. If we refer to the last word of the preceding sentence, we find *asāram*. In its present context it means "without merit." The term *sāra* is a noun referring to the "pith" or "core" of an object. By extension it can mean "strength," "essence," "value," or even "wealth."[441] Thus, *asāra* can be used in the sense of "without value," "unprofitable," or, I am suggesting, in this context "insolvent." If we append this term to KAŚ 3.1.35 we have our discrete indication of the new state of affairs: the defendant is without wealth. Certainly, it would be preferable to have the noun in a different case, *i.e., asāre*,[442] but as we shall see, we have some reason to believe that the ending on the noun may have been altered.

The appending of *asāram* to KAŚ 3.1.35 leaves us with a sentence fragment at 3.1.34: *pretasya vyasanino vā sākṣivacanam*. Attempting to append this to the previous sentence, 3.1.33, yields nonsense.[443] Even appending merely the first part, *pretasya vyasanino vā*, yields nothing. But, if we append that same first part to 3.1.32, then we get the interesting possibility:

*KAŚ 3.1.32 tad eva niṣpatato 'bhiyuktasya kuryāt <u>pretasya vyasanino vā</u>

---

[441] This meaning is supported elsewhere in the *Arthaśāstra*. *Cf.* 4.9.2.

[442] In accordance with the well attested convention of applying a previous rule to a new condition by opening the sūtra with a locative, "If…."

[443] These two genitives clearly cannot be in agreement with *abhiyoktur*. Nor can they agree grammatically with the most sensible term: *niṣpāta* (absconding). Although *niṣpāta* is presumably in a genitive relationship with *samakāla*, it would lead us not to expect personal nouns such as *preta* and *vyasanin*, but abstract nouns such as "death" and "illness." Thus there seems no good manner in which to render this fragment with 3.1.34.

The judge should do the same with regard to a defendant who has absconded, or for one who has died or been taken ill.

The solution I have offered here suggests that KAŚ 3.1.33 be viewed as a marginal or commentarial gloss on 3.1.32 that was inserted into the text in such a way as to break 3.1.32 into a sentence and a fragment.[444] I have already suggested that whoever inserted KAŚ 3.1.33 had misread 3.1.31, and this only increases the likelihood that he may have misread the remainder of the passage, believing 3.1.32 to end with *kuryāt*.[445] This left future copyists and editors with the difficult position of interpreting the truncated passage after the interpolated 3.1.33. Reading then: *pretasya vyasanino vā asār(-e?) abhiyuktā daṇḍaṃ dattvā…*and forced to make sense of the mess, the copyist assumed *asāra* must have gone with *pretasya vyasanino vā*. And what, to the mind of a political or legal scholar belongs to a dead or sick man that is without value (*asāra*) in the context of legal proceedings? The answer, of course, is his testimony: *sākṣivacanam*. Similar sentiments are expressed elsewhere in the *dharma* literature.[446] In order to get *asāra* to act as the predicate of the inserted neuter noun -*vacanam* it was necessary to change it from its previous form to *asāram*.

---

[444] Many manuscripts, of course, do not discretely demarcate individual sentences. Thus, such a misreading is not at all improbable.

[445] Certainly the gloss in 3.1.33 refers only to the condition of absconding and not the reconstructed breadth of the original 3.1.32, which refers also to dead and sick individuals.

[446] *Cf.* MS 8.64, 71. Specifically, see the rule at 8.108:

MS 8.108 *yasya* dṛśyeta saptāhād uktavāk*yasya* sākṣiṇaḥ
rogo ‘gnir jñātimaraṇam ṛṇaṃ dāpyo damaṃ ca saḥ

The witness to whom, within seven days after he has given evidence,
happens a misfortune through sickness, fire, or the death of a relative,
shall be made to pay the debt and a fine.

This single explanation has the merit of most easily explaining all of the textual difficulties presented in KAŚ 3.1.33–35. Moreover, it renders a cohesive flow to the passage and makes explicit the intention of 3.1.35:

*KAŚ 3.1.32–35 tripakṣād ūrdvham apratibruvataḥ paroktadaṇḍaṃ krtvā yāny asya dravyāṇi syus tato 'bhiyoktāraṃ pratipādayed anyatra vr̥ttyupakaraṇebhyaḥ
*tad eva niṣpatato 'bhiyuktasya kuryāt pretasya vyasanino vā
asāre 'bhiyoktā daṇḍaṃ dattvā karma kārayet

If the defendant fails to reply after three fortnights, the judge should assess the penalty for loss of suit and give to the plaintiff the damages due him out of the defendant's possessions.
The judge should do the same in the case of a defendant who absconds, or for a dead man or ill man.
If the defendant is insolvent, the plaintiff should pay the fine and force the defendant to work off the damages due.

By eliminating the confusion in KAŚ 3.1.35, which can no longer be considered to present an option to 3.1.31, this emendation renders us an appropriate context within which to analyze the Brahmanical exemption. The passage continues:

KAŚ 3.1.36 ādhiṃ vā sa kāmam praveśayet

Alternatively, if he wishes, the defendant may render a pledge.

This sentence provides an option for the defendant[447] to present in his place some kind of pledge as a substitute. It implies that the pledge will perform the work due the plaintiff in his stead.[448] There is little reason, from a lexical, grammatical, or thematic viewpoint, to support that this statement is anything but original to the passage.

[447] That the subject has changed from the previous sentence is indicated by the use of the pronoun *sa*.

[448] While it remains possible that this passage was added after the insertion of 3.1.34 in order to rectify the confusing possibility that even a wealthy defendant could be forced to work, such a judgment is not necessary.

We come then, finally, to the first of our Brahmanical exemptions from corporal punishment. For, the final prose sentence of this chapter reads:

KAŚ 3.1.37 rakṣoghnarakṣitam vā karmaṇā pratipādayed anyatra brāhmaṇāt

We seem to have two basic choices in our interpretation of this rather difficult sentence. Either it provides an alternative to the alternative given at KAŚ 3.1.36 or it is an explanation of the latter. If it provides an alternative to the alternative, it is difficult to get at its meaning. KAŚ 3.1.36 indicates that the defendant may choose (*kāmaṃ*) to produce a pledge, presumably a person to work in his stead. If KAŚ 3.1.37 presents an option to that, then we have only a few choices. First, it seems that *pratipādayet* is synonymous with *praveśayet*. Although there is some lexical distinction between the two, both seem here only to mean "should cause to give." Thus, it seems unlikely that the alternative lies in the action denoted by the respective verbs. If the alternative lies in the object given, then KAŚ 3.1.37 presents us with a problem: it does not discretely name the object given, only a quality of it: protected by the *rakṣoghna mantra*. The *karmadhārya* compound, ending as it does in a participle, can hardly be construed as anything more than a substantive: "something/someone protected by the *rakṣoghna mantra*." It seems unlikely that difference lies in the object given, as *rakṣoghnarakṣitaṃ* presents rather more of a specification than a real alternative.

There is the outside possibility that *rakṣoghnarakṣitaṃ* refers not to the *ādhi* but to some unnamed referent. If so, we have no hope of recovering that referent. This leaves us only with *karmaṇā*, which, on the surface seems to make explicit what seems to be implied by KAŚ 3.1.36, namely that the defendant may present a pledge "with labor." If all of this is true, then KAŚ 3.1.37 hardly seems to offer any true alternative to 3.1.36.

That KAŚ 3.1.37 is an explanatory gloss on 3.1.36 seems greatly preferable. As such it serves to clarify that the pledge should be protected by spells, that he pays the debt with labor, and that *praveśayet* is synonymous with *pratipādayet*, which has already been used in this passage (KAŚ 3.1.31). We can be nearly certain that 3.1.36 is a marginal gloss, not original to the text.

Even so, the actual exemption, *anyatra brāhmaṇāt*, is rather clumsily appended to KAŚ 3.1.37. The meaning is clear enough: a Brahmin cannot be rendered in such cases as a pledge to labor for someone else's debt. But, if we assume that *rakṣoghnarakṣitaṃ* is a gloss for *ādhiṃ*, then the fact that *brāhmaṇāt* is in the ablative as required by *anyatra* results in the same subject in the sentence being rendered in two different cases, the accusative and ablative. We would much prefer *brāhmaṇavarjam*. This seems an unhappy situation and only serves to cast further doubt on the veracity of this exemption. Moreover, throughout the prose of the first chapter, no previous reference has been made to *varṇa* or any of the four *varṇa*s themselves. In all of these respects, then, the exemption of Brahmin from being made to labor for someone else's debt seems of very dubious authenticity.

Even so, we can see that this immunity from forced labor would, in fact, be limited only to cases wherein a Brahmin is asked or demanded to work as a pledge on behalf of someone who is unable to pay his legal costs. This hardly amounts to a major privilege. But, we have every indication that the *Arthaśāstra* conceived of not only the matter of remuneration through work, but also of the entire undertaking of the legal apparatus with reference to *varṇa* whatsoever.

12.3.2 Immunity from Torture (during interrogation): KAŚ 4.8.27–29

The second and third Brahmanical exemptions in the *Arthaśāstra* come both from the fourth *adhikaraṇa*, entitled *kaṇṭakaśodhana*, "The Clearing of Thorns." Broadly speaking, this *adhikaraṇa* concerns itself with instruction on how certain ministers should deal with a wide variety of malevolent and potentially malevolent forces affecting the state. This *adhikaraṇa* does not display the same tight internal integration seen in the first three books of the *Arthaśāstra*, and presents some confusing changes of topic that challenge both the concept of the book as a coherent whole, as well as local understandings of the specific subjects (or agents) of some of its chapters.[449] Thus, the precise context, and therefore, the full purview of these Brahmanical exemptions is somewhat unclear, but a closer examination of each of them can reveal the extant exemptions and their relation to their immediate context.

The eighth chapter of the fourth book mirrors exactly the topic entitled *vākyakarmānuyogaḥ*:[450] "Examination through Interrogation and Torture." This chapter forms, with the two preceding chapters, the subsection of the fourth book dealing with methods of criminal investigation (KAŚ 4.6–4.8). Here we read about the procedure for ascertaining the guilt or innocence of someone accused of theft.[451]

---

[449] The opening sūtra of the *adhikaraṇa* which directs groups of three *pradeṣṭṛ*s to undertake *kaṇṭakaśodhana* is belied by the fact that individual chapters in this book are directed to many different agents, chief among them the *samāhartṛ*. In fact, the *pradeṣṭṛ* seems (aside from this sūtra), appears in a much-diminished roles, acting as a functionary of superior(s).

[450] The provenance of this title is unclear, for the compound does not appear as such in the text. The chapter does explicitly mention *vākyānuyoga*, however, as an alternative to torturing women during interrogation (4.8.18). Moreover, it is characterized by the use of *anu* + *yuj* meaning, "to examine (verbally)" (4.8.1, 4.8.4) and the term *karma* to denote torture (4.8.4, 14, 17–21, 23, 25–26). On the whole, the *prakaraṇa* title seems to represent a conceptual integration of the chapter's topics rather than a direct extraction from the text of the passage.

[451] While it is certain that this investigation pertains directly to crimes of theft, it is less clear whether it is intended as a model for the investigations of other types of crime. Given the iconic place of theft as the crime *par excellence* in much of Sanskrit literature, the latter seems at least possible.

The investigation begins by gathering information on the suspect (4.8.1).[452] The investigator[453] then convenes all the involved parties (victim, witnesses, and accused) and questions the witness (KAŚ 4.8.2–3). This seems to comprise the *vākyānuyoga* mentioned in the title. If the suspect's alibi is sound, he is considered innocent of the crime; if not, he is to be tortured (KAŚ 4.8.4). After three nights, we are told, he should be released under suspicion if the inquiry has proven fruitless until such time as additional evidence arises (KAŚ 4.8.5).

The chapter then enters into a discussion of the penalties for false accusation,[454] harboring a thief, and harboring an innocent suspect (KAŚ 4.8.6–8). Following this are instructions for how to entrap a suspected thief (KAŚ 4.8.9–11), a warning against assuming someone is a thief simply because he looks like one (4.8.12), and a concomitant injunction to adduce only firm evidence (*samāptakaraṇaṃ*) (4.8.13).

Then comes a discussion of torture proper, including persons who should and should not be tortured or fully tortured (KAŚ 4.8.14–20[455]); the eighteen types of torture (4.8.21–23); a reference to a text from which they may be learned (4.8.24); and further instructions on who should receive how much torture (4.8.25–26).

---

[452] It seems that the chapter intends the victim or, more likely, witnesses, to provide to the investigator a suspect (4.8.1). That is, unless we translate *anuyuñjīta* more broadly, in the sense of "he should ascertain", rather than "he should inquire." If so, it is oddly discontinuous with chapter 4.6 which has provided an investigator means of narrowing his pool of suspects in order to identify the culprit.

[453] As has been examined in the first part of the dissertation, the official intended to carry out this work is somewhat unclear. For the purpose of this discussion, however, such concerns are immaterial.

[454] Here, the thief (*cora*) seems to be a particular type of career criminal, rather than someone who simply steals. More inquiry would be welcome.

[455] KAŚ 4.8.19–20, which provides an exemption for brāhmaṇa *śrutavat*-s engaged in long sacrifices and ascetics as well as penalties for those who do so, is almost certainly an interpolation, as it interrupts a discussion of torture to recommend secreate agents for these individuals instead. Both the mention of horizontal social distinctions and the provision of penalties for professional misconduct (for those torturing the *śrutavat* or *tapasvin*) are completely alien to this chapter and its larger sub-group of chapter (4.6–8).

As in the previous example, the Brahmanical exemption comes in the final prose *sūtra*s of the *adhyāya* (KAŚ 4.8.27–28), only this time the end verse (KAŚ 4.8.29) reinforces the preceding prose.

KAŚ 4.8.27–29 sarvāparādeṣv apīḍanīyo brāhmaṇaḥ
tasyābhiśastāṅko lalāṭe syād vyavahārapatanāya steyo śvā
manuṣyavadhe kabandhaḥ gurutalpe bhagaṃ surāpāne madyadhvajaḥ
brāhmaṇam pāpakarmāṇam udghuṣyāṅkakṛtavraṇaṃ
kuryān nirviṣayaṃ rājā vāsayed ākareṣu vā

Regardless of the offense a Brahmin is not to be oppressed.
Instead, for the purpose of preventing him from taking part in legal transactions he should have the symbol of his crime branded on his forehead: a dog for theft, a headless and limbless trunk for murder, a vagina for sexual transgressions, and a vintner's flag for drinking alcohol.
Having declared a Brahmin guilty of an evil deed and fixing him with the symbol of his crime,
The king should exile him or force him to live in the mines.

We can recognize this passage immediately as parallel with both BDS 1.18.17–18 as well as MS 9.235–239. Nevertheless, it seems very much out of place in the *Arthaśāstra*, which lacks any contextualizing discussion of *mahāpātaka*s or the system of punitive penances. Read narrowly, as the style of this book would lead us to expect, the passage would only exempt Brahmins from torture during interrogations for crimes of theft. Even then we would have expected it to come after the preceding discussion of persons partially or completely exempt from torture (KAŚ 4.8.14–20).[456] Clearly, however, the passage intends itself to have a wider effect, as in both the BDS and MS. In that case, we would expect it to occupy a more prominent position *vis-à-vis* the criminal code in the text, such as at the beginning or end of the third or fourth book, such as we find in the

[456] Perhaps it was excluded from inclusion there because of another exemption to brāhmaṇa *śrutavat*-s, an almost certainly spurious passage we will discuss later.

MS. Based on its vast divergence from the topic at hand, it is impossible to assume that this passage was inserted by the same person who authored the chapter.

Indeed, this passage (KAŚ 4.8.27–29) appears to be a moralizing gloss prompted by some commentator's or redactor's horror at the idea of torturing Brahmins. It is clearly an iteration of the rule from Baudhāyana regarding the *mahāpātaka*s:

> BDS 1.18.17–18 avadhyo vai brāhmaṇaḥ sarvāparadheṣū
> brāhmaṇasya āgurutalpagamanasuvarṇasteyasurāpāneṣu
> kusindhabhagasṛgālasurādhvajāṃs taptenāyasā lalāṭe 'ṅkayitvā
> viśayān nirdhamanam
>
> A Brahmin, indeed, is not to be executed for any offense.
> When a Brahmin kills another Brahmin, commits *gurutalpa*, steals gold, or drinks alcohol [the king] should brand on his forehead with a heated iron a trunk, a vagina, a jackal, or a tavern banner and cast him out of the realm.

The first *sūtra* (BDS 1.18.7) is likely the source of KAŚ 4.8.27. The interpolator has placed the locative compound *sarvāparādheṣu* in the first position at KAŚ 4.8.27 in imitation of the *Arthaśāstra*'s well-attested convention of placing a locative in sentence-initial position in order to adapt a previous rules to new conditions (although this is not, strictly speaking, a new condition). The gerundive *avadhyaḥ* has been replaced with the more generic term *apīḍanīyaḥ*[457] to reflect that the passage is about torture for interrogation and not corporal punishment *per se*. Finally, the archaic *vai* has been dropped.

The correlation between KAŚ 4.8.28–29 and BDS 1.18.18 is less direct, but I think it can be demonstrated to have been the ultimate source of this passage. For, among the *dharma* authors Baudhāyana has the distinction of being the first (and only among the Dharmasūtras) to link these four *mahāpātaka*-s with branding and to specify these four

[457] This is the only occurrence of *apīḍanīya* in the KAŚ, although we do find its positive form.

symbols on the forehead. Manu's discussion of the same is almost certainly based on Baudhāyana's (or one very similar).[458]

It appears that the interpolater reserved the final component of this formula, exile, for the *adhyāya*'s end verse. He states *brāhmaṇaṃ pāpakarmāṇam udghuṣya-*, "having announced the Brahmin to be an evil-doer." This serves to establish that the king, as in the *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra*, is the one in charge of the punishment. Once again, however, a term found nowhere else in the *Arthaśāstra*, *ud* + *guṣ*, is introduced. Then we are told the king should wound him with the symbol and banish him or send him to the mines. Finally, direct orders to the king in this *adhikaraṇa* are very rare, occurring only in two other places. The rare issuance of a directive to the king seems further indication that the form of this passage derives from a different context.[459] Thus we see that the

---

[458] A few things require explanation. The switching of positions between *brahmahatyā* and *steya* would have been necessitated by placing this passage at the end a chapter on interrogation for crimes of theft alone. Thus, moving *steya* to the first position helps connect the two passages. The substitution of *manuṣyavadhe* for *brahmahatyā* would have been necessary, as the *Arthaśāstra* nowhere outside of this passage considers the murder of a brāhmaṇa to be a separate offense from murder in general. But here the interpolater reveals himself, for the compound *manuṣyavadha* is unknown to the rest of the text, which refers to the murder of humans simply as *vadha*. The interpolater, feeling a need to specify that he is not simply talking about *brāhmaṇa*s has introduced a subtly foreign concept into the text. Finally, the inclusion of the term *abhiśasta* has been necessitated by the formula "crime:symbol" generated when the long compounds of Baudhāy*a*na's passage were broken up. Here, again, however, the interpolater has left a clue: *abhiśasta* in the *Arthaśāstra* only refers to an accusation, and not a crime itself as in the Dharmasūtras (ĀpDS 1.24.6, *et al*). The latter usage is native to the *dharma* literature. The alien term *kusindha* is rendered with *kubandha*, which we find elsewhere in the *Arthaśāstra*. The change from *surādhvaja* to *madyadhvaja* is less clear. Finally, the inclusion of the compound *vyavahārapatanāya* shows that the offenses still cause a "falling," but now it is not from caste, as in the *dharma* literature, but from the right to conduct legal transactions, as made explicit in MS 9.238–239 (although this was almost always the logic behind branding). Again, the term *patana* elsewhere in the *Arthaśāstra* always denotes a literal rather than a metaphorical fall.

[459] This conclusion, if accurate, has great importance to our larger understanding of the text. Here we have an example of interpolated material being used to generate an *adhyāya* end verse. This supports the theory that the *adhyāya* end verses are, in fact, products of the redaction of the text into *adhyāya*s and not relics from the earlier *Arthaśāstra*. For clearly here we have a passage with an alien provenance, the last portion of which is conspicuously rendered into an *adhyāya* end verse. Unless we posit that it has overwritten or otherwise obscured an earlier verse, we have clear evidence the transformation of this *prakaraṇa* into an *adhyāya* involved the inclusion of new material, including the end verse itself.

second of our Brahmanical exemptions, also falling at the end of the *adhyāya*, is spurious as well.

12.3.3 Immunity from Death for Treasonous Activities: KAŚ 4.11.12

The final Brahmanical exemption comes also from the *adhyāya* redaction, in the eleventh *adhyāya* of the fourth *adhikaraṇa*, entitled *śuddhaś citraś ca daṇḍakalpaḥ*, "Guidelines for Execution, Simple and with Torture." It discusses, primarily, penalties for murder and manslaughter (KAŚ 4.11.1–8), violent theft (4.11.9–10), and crimes against the state as well as damage to state and/or public property (4.11.11–17, 20–23). Interspersed are various individual rules on other crimes (KAŚ 4.11.18–20, 24–25). The end verse (KAŚ 4.11.26) claims that these violent punishments "follow the *śāstra*-s written by great men", and allow simple execution in the case of crimes without violence.

At KAŚ 4.11.11–12 we find the following *sūtra*s:

KAŚ 4.11.11–12 rājyakāmukam antaḥpurapradharṣakam atavyamitrautsāhakaṃ
durgarāṣṭradaṇḍakopakaṃ vā śirohastapradīpikaṃ ghātayet
brāhmaṇaṃ tamaḥ praveśayet

He should execute by burning his head and hands anyone who desires the kingdom, who harms the palace, who renders comfort unto a forest chieftain or an enemy, or who reviles the fort, region, or army. He should cause a Brahmin to enter darkness.[460]

This passage is out of place here, even in material dateable to the *adhyāya* redaction, for several reasons. The phrase *tamaḥ praveśayet* is unclear and unknown elsewhere in the *Arthaśāstra*. The term *tamas* is only used one other time, and then only in the curious 14th *adhikaraṇa*,[461] which functions as the *upaniṣad* of the text and contains many unusual and probably later usages. What is more, KAŚ 4.11.12 is entirely

[460] Altekar (2005[1949], 69) takes this as a reference to drowning.

[461] KAŚ 14.3.2

out of keeping with the rest of the chapter, which makes few distinctions between different kinds of persons when listing offenses and punishments. Aside from this passage and one other in KAŚ 4.11,[462] the only distinct social sub-sets in this section are: pregnant women, new mothers, children, fetuses, and parents.[463]

Once again, the *sūtra* in question seems an odd and narrow limitation given the breadth of tortures mentioned in the chapter. It is not clear why a Brahmin should be exempt only from punishment for treasonous activities and not many of the other crimes listed here. Perhaps not coincidentally, a similar injunction is found in the Dharmasūtras albeit in a different context:

ĀDS 2.27.17 *cakṣunirodhas tv eteṣu brāhmaṇasya*

The immediate context of this exemption is regarding a more comprehensive set of crimes, including murder, theft, and appropriation of land (ĀDS 2.27.16).

12.4 CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, not only can it not be maintained that the *Arthaśāstra* generally prohibits the torture of Brahmins as a class, the only three examples of such exemptions to be found therein either date clearly to the *adhyāya* redaction or are spurious. Thus, it can be stated that the *Arthaśāstra* originally made no provision for the exemption of Brahmins from corporal punishment.

We are thus left in the interesting position that our only extant text from the expert tradition of statecraft in the classical period does not prohibit the corporal punishment of Brahmins. This puts it at direct odds with the texts of the early *dharma* literature. It also suggests that we can reappraise the claims of the *dharma* literature in

[462] KAŚ 4.11.22–23 discusses thefts from the armory by both soldiers and non-soldiers. Clearly the drawing of this distinction is necessitated by the context.

[463] References to *ācārya*-s and *tapasvin*-s (KAŚ 4.11.13 and 4.11.19) are most likely spurious.

light of a parallel tradition that did not recognize their assertion of exemption from corporal punishment.

Despite the clearly later character of these pro-Brahmanical sentiments, I believe that its would be erroneous to draw the conclusion that the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* is somehow anti-Brahmanical or non-Brahmanical. At least one reference favorable to Brahmins (KAŚ 1.16.5) and several discussing *varṇa*s according to some kind of hierarchy (KAŚ 3.15.5–6; 6.1.8; 7.11.21 *et al*) may well date to the *prakaraṇa*-text. And, even though there is a hint that early references to Brahmins may have been to expect greater responsibilities from that group, there is no real anti-Brahmanical sentiment. There is a definite cynicism about all religious practices and an undoubted willingness to use religious pretexts to gain political advantage, to flaunt religious convention, and generally bend religious entities to political advantage. But this does not seem to amount to any kind of criticism or alienation from Brahmanical religion.

On the contrary, the text seems to assume a privileged social position for Brahmins, even though it does not address it in its policy or law. Moreover, the king's prime minister, the *mantripurohita*, his astrologers, diviners, and many other functionaries were almost certainly Brahmins. As such, we can assume that many of his counselors may also be conceived of as such in the *Arthaśāstra*. The presence, however, of Brahmins in the text has not resulted in the presence of the Brahmanical ideology of the *dharma* literature. Why?

The picture of society that emerges is one where Brahmins held an elevated position, but wherein ascetics were not debased or disdained. And the distinction between different ascetic movements does not seem to have been particularly important to the state. Nonetheless, we see the presence of traditional Brahmanical institutions, but always in the service of the state. There is no indication of the kind of religious control of the

king implied by the Vedic sources and the *dharma* literature. As such, we may well be dealing with a text written by Brahmins and possibly also for Brahmins, at least in part. But what is missing from the equation are the orthodox ideologies of the *dharma* literature. If Brahmins wrote the *Arthaśāstra*, they would certainly be elites, but not necessarily coming from the same class of orthodox specialists that composed the *dharma* literature. Moreover, no special distinctions of *varṇa* or *jāti* are evident with regard to employment by the state, and so on. We can be certain that some social pressures existed to exert pressure on outsider groups and prevent their entry into power, but the text tells us little of that. We do read of the need to be from a "good family." And perhaps, then, it is best to think of a general divide between forward families and backward families, using the notion of *ārya* as a kind of shorthand for the former. Even so, this does not make much of an impression on the text.

Much is assumed in the *Arthaśāstra*, and we can be certain that those eligible for high positions in government comprised a small, elite part of the greater whole. There is little said of this, however. Moreover, the appointment of governmental positions would have been carried out according to the interests of those authorized to make such appointments, meaning that the composition of the governmental elite would have followed other flows of power in society.

Ultimately, I don't believe that the ideological assumptions and implications of the *varṇa* system, evident in the treatment of statecraft in the *dharma* literature, were operative in the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra*. Certainly, it would have been a well known theory. Moreover, it is a certainty that Brahmins received different treatment from other members of society, were esteemed by many, and operated from their own base of power. If the *prakaraṇa*-text can be taken as any indication, however, it doesn't appear

that *varṇadharma* had made a very large impression on kings and states in the period in which it was composed.

Finally, however, we can expect great differences in the operation of states in the period, given the variety of regional influences affecting the practice of governance. As a technical treatise, the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* need not be assumed to have been authoritative everywhere. It does represent, however, how statecraft was thought about during the period, and we can see in it that the kind of Brahmanized kingship evident in the *dharma* literature and the epics had made little imprint on the early text.

CONCLUSION

It has been proposed here that the *Arthaśāstra* developed over some centuries through a seminal period in Indian history. It is further proposed that the *Arthaśāstra* was witness to some of the major shifts in the political discourse of that time. With its origins lost sometime in the late centuries of the first millennium BCE and its final form have taken shape by the 3rd – 4th century, the *Arthaśāstra* comprises in itself many political worlds of that axial age.

I stated at the beginning of this dissertation that I wanted to increase the usefulness of the *Arthaśāstra* as a source for the reconstruction of society and, in particular, religion, in the classical period. There is no doubt that the most important efforts toward that end lie in textual criticism, even if only to demand attention to the complex and composite character of this text. I think that I have, in small and large ways, helped to move forward our understanding of the text. Of the occurrence of an *adhyāya* redaction, I am quite certain; of the precise extent of that transformation, I still have questions. But I stress the latter qualifier, for it is my conviction that this text can be teased apart with increasingly sophisticated approaches. The majority of the work remains to be done on the underlying *prakaraṇa*-text. I am convinced here, also, that rigorous application of the methods of philology can contribute greatly to our understanding of the formation of that text.

13.1 READING THE *ARTHAŚĀSTRA*

Source criticism undoubtedly represents the most important tool for historicizing the text and helping it to speak to questions about the past. But, such efforts only get us so far. For, once we know what we are reading, which is to say, how the passages of the text stand in chronological and logical relation to one another, we must as a separate

concern figure out *how* to read the *Arthaśāstra*. I wrote briefly about the dangers of positivist interpretations of the text and the distortions they have wrought upon retellings of Indian history. Something more fundamental, however, must be understood about the nature of the *Arthaśāstra*.

Neither the *Arthaśāstra* as a whole nor any of its parts is in any way a description of any state at any time. To be certain, empirical data can be extracted from the text. But, the world within which all of the facts and personages of the *Arthaśāstra* are cast is a fiction. What is more, it is not sufficient to call it normative, imaginary, idealized, or archetypal. It is not a manual of statecraft, as it is often called.[464] It is a *śāstra*, and that means that the content of this treatise is, first and foremost, knowledge. It is not so much a "blueprint for the state,"[465] but a tool for the production of expertise, less as a source for practical action than as a sign of erudition.[466]

To say that a *śāstra* is a field of discourse is perhaps the most generic set into which it can be reduced. When we begin to populate that space with the priorities that shaped this *śāstra* we must count, purely in the realm of epistemology, values such as comprehensiveness, detail, prior consideration of opposing positions, and so forth. And that is what I believe we see in the *Arthaśāstra*, an attempt to think of *everything* that could pertain to statecraft, to achieve authoritativeness through a kind of intellectual

---

[464] Note Scharfe's use of the term "Manual" in the English translation of his 1968 work; much more could be said in this regard.

[465] This is the estimation of Thapar (2002, 185).

[466] Pollock states that "We may in fact characterize the ideological effects of śāstra as follows: First, all contradiction between the model of cultural knowledge and actual cultural change is thereby at once trasmuted and denied…Second, the living, social, historical, contigent tradition is naturalized, becoming as much a part of the order of things as the laws of nature themselves…The theoretical discourse becomes in essence the practical discourse of power."

domination of the topic. I say all of this in order to explain how I think this text should be read, or rather, why I think the state appears the way that it does in pages of this text.[467]

This is evident, as D.N. Lielkhune (2001) has argued, already in the earliest layers of the text: the discussion of the *adhyakṣa*s. Here we have a vision of the state bureaucracy as parceled out into departments (called *adhikaraṇa*s in a later layer of the text), each overseen by an official called an *adhyakṣa*. And so the business of the state is divided into its elementary subdivisions and each is given an advisor. We have, then, what is certainly a theoretical distillation of state functions organized into a symmetrical typology.[468] Like a trip through the funhouse, we recognize certain features in the reflection, but distorted, sometimes beyond recognition. It is a perfect illustration of the influence of *śāstric* priorities on the textual reproduction of the state.

And this represents a portion of the text most clearly representing one of the independent sources from which the *prakaraṇa*-text was composed. Whereas we might once have hoped to find the most "accurate" presentation, the most essential

---

[467] This, I think, explains more than anything, why attempts to link the *Arthaśāstra* (even in its various parts) to historical polities and other ancient sources have failed so completely. It isn't that we haven't found the state or text that resembled the *Arthaśāstra* (even in part) because our evidence is too meager, but because what we have in the *Arthaśāstra* is not a description, nor even an idealization, of any given historical state. It is a set of intertwined, exhaustive refractions of the state within the contours of *śāstric* priorities.

[468] Samozvantsev (2001) argues, regarding the "meaning" of the term *adhyakṣa* (I will not note grammatical errors): "There are no bases to give therm "*adhyakṣa*" (as well as to information about them) special "bureaucratic" meaning in KA and being based on it to judge about reliability of the treatise. Major importances of the term—supervisor—*i.e.*, the head, the governor, the ruler, are quite comprehensible both for KA and to other texts. "*Adhyakṣa*s" representatives of authority (instead of "officials"), governors from various levels, *big peoples* were called, mainly in connection with execution of corresponding functions by them (first of all, gathering up taxes and fill up of treasury). Similar artificial divisions when the same person depending on a context is called as various terms, is quite comprehensible both to the traditional literature and for shastras. "Activity of Adhyakṣas (*adhyakṣapracāraḥ*)," equally, as well as "mandala," follows, more likely to examine as a complex of ideas on the describing of an Ancient Indian state. And reocmmendations of the treatise, thus, equally it is possible to correlated the "ideal" state KA both with large and little states of ancient times." I would add to this only the above consideration, as shown by Pollock, of the ideological dimensions of *śāstra*, through which such idealizations become distorted by the priorities of the genre and its bearers.

characterizations, of the state in its earliest passages, we find instead that the core of the text is already in its earliest form, in a word, a *śāstra*. What, then, of the subsequent evolution of the text? While no doubt these expansions of the text represent, to the composers, the inclusion of important overlooked material, they too are *śāstra*. And what is more, all of these *śāstric* refractions must be brought together into some kind of unity. This is accomplished in many ways within the text: the subsuming of *adhyakṣapracāra* by the role of the *samāhartṛ*, the greater organization of the state into seven *prakṛti*s ("constituents"), and so forth, until finally, the ultimate unification of chronologically and ideationally diverse material comes through the formal structure of the *adhyāya* redaction. The "state" in the text takes its ultimate shape through a combination of idealization, *śāstric* priorities, and redactorial exigencies.

So how do we read this text as a historical source, particularly on religion? As mentioned above, there is certainly empirical data to be retrieved from the *Arthaśāstra*: likely this is the material that will ultimately serve to give us a durable absolute chronology. Misguided, then, are attempts to find a comparison between the states as described by, for example, Megasthenes and Kauṭilya. The ironic element here is that if one were to find a good connection between the two, we would likely have to attribute it more to similarities in formal elements of discourse than in the objects "described."

But what of the other types of information that are sought, such as opinions, habits, ways of seeing the world, cultural tensions, and so forth? The answer, as will already have suggested itself, lies in understanding the priorities that are expressed in the depiction of the state in the *Arthaśāstra* and the influence that depiction of the state in the *Arthaśāstra* had on its society. The latter is difficult to recover and will no doubt require inspired new approaches retrieve it. The former, however, is what I have attempted in the second part of this dissertation.

13.2 THE *ARTHAŚĀSTRA* BEFORE POLITICAL BRAHMINISM

From the perspective of cultural and religious history, the most significant dimension of the compositional history of the *Arthaśāstra* is the "moment" in which political Brahmanism emerged with full force into the *śāstra*. We have what appears by all accounts to be a fully-realized *daṇḍanīti* that is ideologically transformed by the emergence of a new set of political priorities. Pursuant to the preceding conversation, this means that we had, sometime around the turn of the millennium, a comprehensive articulation of the state (within *śāstric* convention) that displayed little, if any, evidence of the political interests of the Brahmanical community (the so-called "*prakaraṇa*-text"). And, in one major overhaul (the *adhyāya* redaction), a religious ideology had been inserted into the text sufficient to recast the entire project of statecraft as being carried out within a greater religious order. Also resulting from this was the ideological co-opting of the *Arthaśāstra* as representative of its genre.

Before considering the character of this change, we should examine the implications of the *prakaraṇa*-text before its transformation. In all, we have a representation of the state that is not entirely devoid of religious considerations (consider here the role of the *mantripurohita*, the use of ascetics dressed as spies, some degree of the recognition of the status of Brahmins, and so forth), but which aggregated all of these within a fundamentally political outlook. This is not to say that the *prakaraṇa*-text (or its predecessors) was secular, but that the political interests of the state completely dominated the discourse. And, what is more, there is a general absence of claims to political advantages on the part of Brahmins.

Now, if we imagine that the *prakaraṇa*-text evolved during roughly the same period as the Dharmasūtras (*c.* 300 BCE–100 CE), then we have a strong counterpoint to this *Arthaśāstra* in the treatments of statecraft in the Dharmasūtras, which are unanimous,

in concert with preceding Vedic tradition, in ascribing specific rights to Brahmins, from freedom from punishment to (claimed) autonomy from the king. Moreover, these aren't just the conceits of an isolated text or two, but the culmination of centuries of political thought expressed with a great deal of uniformity in the new sub-genre of statecraft within the *dharma* tradition.

Chronologically parallel to this, however, we have the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra*, which represents a treatment of statecraft several orders of magnitude greater than the comparatively meager expositions in the Dharmasūtras (with the attendant differential in detail suggested thereby) and, what is more, an ongoing and independent expert tradition in political science. And yet, barely a whisper of this Brahmanical ideology is to be found in the text. To compound matters, it appears that we have evidence of the role of Brahmins in some positions (*mantripurohita* and, perhaps, the *dūta*) and possible indications of limited considerations of *varṇa*. What explains the disparity?

13.3 *ARTHA* AND *DHARMA*

We have entered, then, into the consideration of the respective historical contexts of the production of these treatises. There can be little doubt that a number of factors are required to explain this discrepancy: geography, community, genre, political intent, and so forth.

Foremost among these, I would argue, is the distinction in genre. Now, as a deeply composite text that took its final form through successive iterations, it does not appear that the *Arthaśāstra* was composed after any kind of formal genre template. This would speak against any kind of densely populated and discretely articulated formal genre of *Arthaśāstra*. We also know, however, that it drew on at least one independent

source and probably more. What is more, we have no real way of telling whether its broad arrangement of topics (king→administration→law enforcement→foreign policy→war) might not itself represent a guiding convention shared with lost text from a shared genre. (Certainly we cannot take the invented polemical dialogues in the text as evidence of an earlier genre.)

Nevertheless, when we compare the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* to the contemporaneous genre of the Dharmasūtras, we find that, despite similarities, we are looking at two very distinct kinds of texts. In fact, if we assume that the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* possessed a discussion of civil law (*vyavahāra*) significantly less developed in certain areas than that found in the extant text, a major point of contact between the two traditions is greatly diminished. I would say that, on the one hand, we have a genre representing the full, independent, and single–minded treatment of statecraft, and on the other, we have a genre of texts apparently written by Brahmanical savants, highly educated in the traditional learning of their orthodox communities and writing primarily as instructors of young Brahmins (and experts more generally) on the proper customs, conduct, ritual observations, and penances of their hermetic community.

The intended audience of the two texts, it would seem, are importantly different. The Dharmasūtras are written as complete expositions of the *dharma* of the Brahmanical community (with subsidiary consideration for the *dharma* of other communities—as inculcated within Brahmanical orthodoxy). The authors are probably the most conservative intellectual elites in the orthodox communities, men authorized by learning (in the Vedas) and their exemplary conduct to hold forth on authoritative tradition. Moreover, these texts are meant for other such individuals and for the education of the young in the proper practices and behavior of the orthodox community. The audience, to

be specific, are other orthodox Brahmins, men whose reputation and prestige are based on their knowledge and demonstration of Brahmanical custom.

What, then, is the purpose of including discussions of statecraft in these texts? The answer to this lies, I would argue, in the specific interest these texts take in statecraft. We read nowhere in the Dharmasūtras of state bureaucracy, envoys, the constituents of the state, foreign policy, and so forth. Instead we read of two major topics: the king's conduct and law (in a nascent form). Is it possible, then, that these treatments of statecraft and law in the Dharmasūtras are not artifacts of the emerging intellectual and literary tradition on governance *per se*, but only reflections of that, digested and pared down to the interests of Brahmins who might seek work with a king either in the role of *purohita* or as a judge?

This, I think, is very likely. It can be put differently by saying that, from a standpoint of textual sources, the history of law and statecraft in ancient India is not well reflected by the evolution of these subjects in the Dharmasūtras, which, in this model, only reflect those aspects of polity of interest to the orthodox Brahmanical community. The juxtaposition of their meager treatment of the topic with the fulsomeness of the *prakaraṇa*-text of the *Arthaśāstra* suggests as much. This is further reinforced, I would argue, by the possibility that the *Gautama Dharmasūtra* may have been aware of the *prakaraṇa*-text[469] and that the *Manusmṛti*, which was fully aware of the same, only represented it in a highly-compressed form (with the exception of the legal code, which the composer appears to have developed into a formal science).

Such considerations might begin to explain the difference between these two visions of the state, one represented by the early *dharma* literature, the other by the early

[469] Compare GDS 11.2–4, which appears, much like the passages of Manu explored below, to follow the precise order of topics introducing the *Arthaśāstra* in the source underlying KAŚ 1.2–1.7, 1.9.

Arthaśāstra. To this potential difference in genre (and the contexts of production implied thereby), we might certainly also add certain geographical and historical components. Although we have not yet determined the date of the *prakaraṇa*-text, nor its earliest sources, we know that the center of the political world in ancient India beginning at least in the third century BCE lay in the northeast of the subcontinent. Bronkhorst (2007, 4–9) posited a cultural zone in this area called "Greater Magadha" and suggested that it is represented by a culture markedly distinct from that represented in Vedic sources. We need not posit much of a difference to imagine that the fortunes of Brahmanical ideology, with regard to royal patronage, may well have been very different in the Mauryan Imperium and any subsequent polities for which it served as an exemplar of governance (even if allowing for the traditional roles of Brahmins in government such as the *purohita* or, potentially, envoy). It is not out of the question that the Dharmasūtras were composed closer to the traditional Vedic heartland in the middle and lower Gangetic valley, and that the *Arthaśāstra* was composed farther east, although this is not necessary, and is as yet unsupported by any evidence. It is also not impossible that the texts of the Dharmasūtras represent a more rural (or at least hermetic) reality over against the undoubtedly urban and cosmpolitan *Arthaśāstra*. In fact, we have several possible explanations based on geography, but as yet no real leads.

There are a number of possible differences in the context of production (such as suggested above) that might be better suited to explain the variation we see between the two genres on the point of Brahmanical exceptionalism. But what is most interesting about the divide is that our only existing representative from the expert tradition on statecraft was so utterly devoid of a sentiment so central to the Brahmanical descriptions of the political order within Vedic and classical literature. Much work remains in this area.

13.4 Context of Production

So who wrote the *Arthaśāstra*? The *Arthaśāstra* was composed in Sanskrit; there is no evidence that it is a transcription of a Prakrit text. Typically, this has implied Brahmanical authorship, although the transformation of Sanskrit to a scholastic language may have implied greater access to the language.[470] But the early text attests to the role of Brahmins, particularly the *mantripurohita*, in the government. The early test of *dharma* (which, however, is meant to insure that the ministers are more loyal to the king than the dictates of orthodox Brahmanism) turns on the assumption that many ministers would be outraged by the king forcing his *purohita* to sacrifice for one not authorized by Vedic tradition (KAŚ 1.10.2–4). Moreover, despite such disregard for religious sentiments, we find no hostility toward Brahmins in the text. Brahmanism appears rather as a feature of the broader culture within which the state operated, but not one possessed of the strong political rhetoric we have traced throughout the Vedic and Sūtra literature in an earlier chapter.

The answer, I think, is that the *Arthaśāstra was* written by Brahmins (or, at the least, Brahmanically-educated individuals), but Brahmins who either did not feel that political Brahmanism applied to the topics of their *śāstra* or who were not influenced by the political Brahmanism of Vedic sources.

The latter, I think, is very unlikely. Even a rudimentary traditional education would likely have inculcated any Brahmin of the period with the basic ideology of Brahmanical exceptionalism and *varṇadharma*. What seems more likely to me is that the context of production and the expected audience for the text were dominated by individuals who would not have been receptive to these elements of Brahmanical

[470] On this transformation, see Deshpande 1979, 11

ideology. I have pointed out before the directly confrontational character of Brahmanical exceptionalism as a conflict between Brahmin and king over power. We can imagine that most of the functionaries and powerful officials of any state were drawn from the nobility, that kings and dynasties would look first to patronize their own relatives and other nobles in strategic alliance. The patronage of Brahmins, as Lariviere has argued, would only have been a necessity for weaker kings.[471]

The world of the *Arthaśāstra* undoubtedly takes Brahmanical religion to be the norm. The "Test of *Dharma*" from the *prakaraṇa*-text mentioned above is an interesting example. It tells us that generally, Vedic orthopraxy was respectfully observed, but that it existed within a power framework whereby the king actually asserted his control over the religious system himself by occasionally flaunting deeply-held convictions.

Hence, I think we have good reason to believe that the lack of Brahmanical exceptionalism in the *prakaraṇa*-text can be explained by a certain culture of containment of political Brahmanism within the state. This may not simply refer to Brahmins eager to sermonize on *varṇadharma*, but potentially of a generational culture where such claims were taken with a grain of salt.

We have noted several times now that Brahmanical exceptionalism is not enunciated in our texts over against other religious claimants, but against the temporal power of the king. Thus, the ideological elements of Brahmanical exceptionalism cannot have been exceedingly popular in the halls of the palace. It is not surprising, therefore, that we might find a limited use of *varṇa* nomenclature without, however, much in the

---

[471] "A strong king with the proper political alliances and a strong treasury and army would have been immune from the concerns of a priestly class. A king in a less advantagous position may well have needed the public endorsment, perhaps even the repeated public endorsement [through state ritual] of the keepers of Vedic tradition. Yet once a man occupied the throne he was endowed with authority. The office demanded it" (1997, 326).

way of direct enunciations of its hierarchy; moreover we seem to see a broader view of *varṇa* in the *prakaraṇa*-text than is to be expected within the rigorous confines of *dharma* literature.

13.5 The Emergence of Political Brahmanism in the *Arthaśāstra*

What is more interesting, perhaps, is the sudden emergence of Brahmanical exceptionalism within the text during the *adhyāya* redaction. If the above conditions explain why we don't see it in earlier layers of the *Arthaśāstra*, what changed? We might first appeal to a rather mundane and unexciting conclusion: the text simply entered the orthodox Brahmanical curriculum. It is very likely that the reapportioning of the *Arthaśāstra* into *adhyāya*s represents its adaptation to an educational curriculum (see Chapter 3). The transformations wrought on the text in that moment suggest, moreover, that this was a curriculum dominated by the same kind of political Brahmanism that is evident in the *dharma* literature. What is more, we almost certainly owe the existence of the extant *Arthaśāstra* to its transmission through a stable educational tradition over the centuries. Only the robust and distributed tradition of Brahmanical education would have been sufficiently durable to have preserved the text. Hence, we are almost certainly witnessing in the *adhyāya* redaction the adoption of the *prakaraṇa*-text into the fold of Brahmanical pedagogy.

The integration of the *prakaraṇa*-text into orthodox Brahmanical culture is also likely reflected in the ascription of the name "Arthaśāstra" to the text. All such occurrences of this term within the text can be dated to the *adhyāya* redaction.[472] The older name for the expert tradition, if not also the text itself, appears to be *daṇḍanīti*,

[472] Occurrences are found at KAŚ 1.1.1; 1.5.14; 5.6.47 (end verse); 7.10.38 (end verse); 7.18.42 (end verse); 15.1.2; 15.1.5. See §7.6 for a full exposition of the extent of the *adhyāya* redaction: none of these occurrences is controversial.

"The Use of the Staff," which occurs in several passages clearly dating to the *prakaraṇa*-text[473] and is the only candidate for an earlier name found in the text. The transformation of *daṇḍanīti* to *arthaśāstra* would seem to accomplish the same conceptual project as the introduction of discussions of the *trivarga* in the *adhyāya* redaction (§10.2): to cast the project of statecraft as falling within a world organized into *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma*. As mentioned above, the purpose of this strategy seems not to have been necessarily to subordinate statecraft (as *artha*) to *dharma per se*, but to promote *dharma* as a consideration equal to that of statecraft, whose importance would have been self-evident.

However, the appropriation of the *prakaraṇa*-text into the fold of orthodox Brahmanism is not an isolated incident within this era of Sanskrit textual production. I have posited that the *adhyāya* redaction took place sometime after the composition of the *Manusmṛti*. This is significant because the *Manusmṛti* represents a quantum leap in the integration of political Brahmanism into thinking about statecraft. It can be argued that we see in Manu, for the first time, a fully articulated vision of society according to political Brahmanism. The *Manusmṛti* seems to have abandoned the parochial character of the earlier *dharma* texts and transformed the genre into a more properly literary expression of revealed truth, likely appealing to the emergence (roughly) in this period of personal styles of religious devotion. Put differently, the *Manusmṛti* seems to have adapted to the content of the *dharma* literature to a broader audience.

If we date the *Manusmṛti* to the early centuries of the Common Era, then we find that it is broadly concurrent with the emergence of the use of Sanskrit in royal inscriptions (which further reinforces the idea that the chapter on edicts in the *Arthaśāstra*, KAŚ 2.10, dates to the *adhyāya* redaction). The *adhyāya* redaction of the

[473] Occurrences in the *prakaraṇa*-text include KAŚ 1.2.1; 1.4.3; 1.9.9. Occurrences that may belong to the *adhyāya* redaction include KAŚ 1.2.4; 1.2.6; 1.2.11; 1.5.8.

Arthaśāstra would have followed sometime shortly after this, after which time we see the full transformation of Sanskrit from a sacerdotal language to language of politics and culture.[474]

Historically speaking, then, it seems that political Brahmanism was making great strides in the early centuries of the Common Era. But, the concrescence between Brahmanical and royal interests does not appear to have been the gradual and linear apotheosis of the dual rule between Brahmin and Kṣatriya from the Vedic period. Instead, it seems to have reemerged most clearly in the historical record with a rather minor and relatively insignificant dynasty: the Śuṅgas.

While the Śuṅgas figure largely in the histories of the Sanskrit *purāṇa*s and their founder, Puśyamitra, is said to have claimed to be a Brahmin and to have performed the ancient Vedic *aśvamedha*, or "Horse Sacrifice" (Kulke and Rothermund 1986, 68), Bhandare has, based on the study of coins and inscriptions, called into question whether there is any historical evidence for a linear Śuṅga dynasty to speak of (2006, 97). Thus, despite its high profile in Sanskrit sources, the dynasty itself does not seem to have been a significant player in the greater politics of the classical period. Rising and falling in the shadow of more powerful empires (the Indo-Greeks and Śakas, particularly), I would posit that the Śuṅgas (and other minor lineages of the east) used political Brahmanism as a way to bolster their own political power. Because they could not compete in resources, they resorted to elements of "soft-power," such as the promotion of certain ideologies through text, ritual performance, patronage, and the co-opting of Brahmanical prestige. Again, following Lariviere's thesis, I would posit that weak, over-matched kings first

[474] See, in this regard, the work of Sheldon Pollock 1996 and 2006. I do not agree with Pollock, however, regarding the agentless operation of transculturation. I think, more properly, the spread of Sanskrit into epigraphy and *kāvya* represents a larger expansion of the "Brahmanical Cosmopolis," which, to be certain, was a material entity driven by ideological and political considerations.

made widespread political use of Sanskrit and Brahmanic culture in the classical period.[475]

13.6 Historical Context

Concurrent with the emergence of the *Manusmṛti* and the *adhyāya* redaction of the *Arthaśastra*, then, we enter a period in which political Brahmanism seems to explode, with the authorship of the *Mahābhārata*,[476] the emergence of the Smṛti and Purāṇa genres, the use of Sanskrit in political inscriptions (Pollock 1996, 199*ff.*), and so forth, culminating in the "golden age" of the Gupta empire in the fourth-fifth centuries CE (Kulke and Rothermund 1986, 81–91). Having for centuries taken much of the ideology of Sanskrit literature as broadly reflective of ancient South Asian culture, the present thesis suggests that the literature of the early classical period was part of a campaign of sorts to project political power through Brahmanism when other means for political success were not available. It further suggests that the production of these texts and these ideologies were more localized than previously suggested and that the eventual spread of political Brahmanism in subsequent eras has obscured the regional character of this phenomenon in the early centuries CE.

13.7 Date of the *Arthaśāstra*

This brings us finally to the date and authorship of the *Arthaśāstra*. For reasons outlined above pertaining to the character of *śāstric* composition, I find attempts to harmonize the data of the text with what is known of or suspected to be true for historical polities to be an ill-fated endeavor. The best information, therefore, will likely come from

---

[475] This might explain why the *adhyāya* redaction adds substantial discussions on "strategies for the weaker king."

[476] Hiltebeitel (2001, 18) suggests a date between 0 and 200 CE; Fitzgerald (1983, 612) suggests 200–300 CE.

the ability to link broadly-attested features of the text either with material culture (coinage, architecture) or sufficiently-secure bodies of expert knowledge (astronomy). A detailed study of these considerations has not been undertaken here.

The *adhyāya* redaction, with which this dissertation is primarily concerned, must have occurred sometime after the composition of the *Manusmṛti*, but before the composition of the *Kāmasūtra*,[477] which places it likely in the second-third centuries CE, perhaps earlier. The date of the *prakaraṇa*-text abuts the lower range of those dates, but is perhaps witnessed by the *Gautama Dharmasūtra* (see above), a not-too-helpful fact considering the general lateness of that Dharmasūtra. It does seem that the *prakaraṇa*-text is unaware of gold coins altogether (*hiraṇya* meaning "cash" more generally in the text), and if its directions for minting punch-marked silver coins could be linked to denominations from the numismatic record, we might be able to locate the earliest layers of the text. As it is, we have no reason to date the *prakaraṇa*-text much before the second century BCE, although there is little to prevent it from being older than that by a few centuries. Ultimately, then, I would say that we have a text that was originally composed between the second-first centuries BCE and may have undergone successive enlargements before a final major redaction in the first-second centuries CE.

Whether any part of it may be used as a source for the Mauryan period is as yet unclear. Considerations for dating the *prakaraṇa*-text certainly deserve their own study once the character of its composition is known more clearly.

[477] See Trautman 1971, 171 and Scharfe 1993, 4–5.

Appendix

Appendix A: Topical Outline of the Tantra Section

I. The King

A. Training

1. *vidyā* (KAŚ 1.2–1.4)
2. *vinaya* (KAŚ 1.5)
3. *indriyajaya* (KAŚ 1.6–1.7)

B. King's Activities

1. Appointing Officials
   a. *amātya*s (KAŚ 1.8–1.9.8)
   b. *mantripurohita* (KAŚ 1.9.9–10)
2. Spying
   a. testing *amātya*s (KAŚ 1.10)
   b. appointing spies (KAŚ 1.11–1.12.4)
   c. spying on high officers (KAŚ 1.12.5–1.12.17)
   d. spying on citizens (KAŚ 1.13)
   e. spying on enemy's people (KAŚ 1.14)
3. Counsel (KAŚ 1.15)
4. Emissaries (KAŚ 1.16)

C. On Princes (KAŚ 1.17–1.18)

D. King's Daily Schedule (KAŚ 1.19)

E. Constructing Palace/Protecting the King (KAŚ 1.20–1.21)

II. Officials

A. Administrative Offices

1. unnamed [Settlement & Construction] (KAŚ 2.1-2.2.9)
   a. *nāgavanādhyakṣa* (Director of Elephant Forests) (KAŚ 2.2.10–14)
      [Settlement & Construction] (KAŚ 2.3–2.4)
2. *samnidhātṛ* (Depositor) (KAŚ 2.5)
3. *samāhartṛ* (Collector)
   a. income (KAŚ 2.6)
   b. *adhyakṣa* (generic "Director," probably the *samāhartṛ*) (KAŚ 2.7)
   c. treasury (KAŚ 2.8)
   d. overseeing "adhikaraṇas" (KAŚ 2.9)
   e. edicts/*kayastha* (Scribe) (KAŚ 2.10)
5. *koṣādhyakṣa* (Director of the Treasury) (KAŚ 2.11)
6. *ākārādhyakṣa* (Director of Mines) (KAŚ 2.12.1–2.12.22)
7. *lohādhyakṣa* (Director of Metals) (KAŚ 2.12.23)
8. *lakṣaṇādhyakṣa* (Director of Mint) (KAŚ 2.12.24)
9. *rupyadarśaka* (Examiner of Coins) (KAŚ 2.12.25)
10. *khanyadhakṣa* (Director of Mining) (KAŚ 2.12.27)
11. *lavanādhyakṣa* (Director of Salt) (KAŚ 2.12.28–34)
12. *suvarṇādhyakṣa* (Director of Gold) (KAŚ 2.13)
13. *sauvarṇika* (Head Goldsmith) (KAŚ 2.14)
14. *koṣṭhāgārādhyakṣa* (Director of the Granary) (KAŚ 2.15)
15. *paṇyādhyakṣa* (Director of Trade) (KAŚ 2.16)
16. *kupyādhyakṣa* (Director of Forest Goods) (KAŚ 2.17)

17. *āyudhāgārādhyakṣa* (Director of the Armory) (KAŚ 2.18)
18. *pautavādhyakṣa* (Director of Weights & Measures) (KAŚ 2.19)
19. *mānādhyakṣa* (Director of Standardization) (KAŚ 2.20)
20. *śulkadhaykṣa* (Director of Taxes) (KAŚ 2.21–2.22)
21. *sūtrādhyakṣa* (Director of Threads) (KAŚ 2.23)
22. *sītādhyakṣa* (Director of Agriculture) (KAŚ 2.24)
23. *sūrādhyakṣa* (Director of Alcohol) (KAŚ 2.25)
24. *sūnādhyakṣa* (Director of Butchering) (KAŚ 2.26)
25. *gaṇikādhyakṣa* (Director of Prostitutes) (KAŚ 2.27)
26. *nāvādhyakṣa* (Director of Shipping) (KAŚ 2.28)
27. *go'dhyakṣa* (Director of Cattle) (KAŚ 2.29
28. *aśvādhyakṣa* (Director of Horses) (KAŚ 2.30)
29. *hastyadhakṣa* (Director of Elephants) (KAŚ 2.31–32)
30. *rathādhyakṣa* (Director of Chariots) (KAŚ 2.33.1–2.33.6)
31. *pattyadhyakṣa* (Director of Foot Soldiers) (KAŚ 2.33.7–8)
32. *senāpati* (Army Commander) (KAŚ 2.33.9–10)
33. *mudrādhyakṣa* (Director of Passports) (KAŚ 2.34.1–4)
34. *vivītādhyakṣa* (Director of Pastures) (KAŚ 2.34.5–11)

B. Legal Offices

1. Law Enforcement I (Public Safety)

a. *samāhartṛ* (protecting the country) (KAŚ 2.35)
b. *nāgarika* (protecting the city) (KAŚ 2.36)
c. *dharmastha* [**a. Transactional Law**] (KAŚ 3.1–19)
d. *dyūtādhakṣa* (Director of Gambling) (KAŚ 3.20.1–13)
e. *dharmastha* [**b. Transactional Law**] (KAŚ 3.20.14–23)

2. Law Enforcement I_2

d. *pradeṣṭṛ* (?) (regulating common vocations) [4.1.1] (KAŚ 4.1)
e. *saṃsthādhyakṣa* (Director of Markets) (KAŚ 4.2)
f. appendix—counteracting calamities (KAŚ 4.3)

3. Law Enforcement II (Policing)

a. *samāhartṛ* [4.4.1]
i. spying on illicit businesses (KAŚ 4.4)
ii. spying on criminals (KAŚ 4.5)
iii. arrest on suspicion, for possession, and in the act (KAŚ 4.6)
iv. autopsies (KAŚ 4.7)
v. interrogation (KAŚ 4.8)

4. Law Enforcement III (Rules for Government Officials)

a. *samāhartṛ* and *pradeṣṭṛ* [4.9.1] (KAŚ 4.9)

5. Criminal Law (KAŚ 4.10–13)

III. Miscellanea

1. Secret Practices
   a. Law Enforcement IV (Against Treason) (KAŚ 5.1)
   b. Filling the Treasury (KAŚ 5.2.1-5.2.63)
   c. Law Enforcement IV_2 (KAŚ 5.2.64–69)
2. Salaries of Officials (KAŚ 5.3)
3. Advice for Ministers
   a. On Getting a Job from the King (KAŚ 5.4)
   b. How to Behave under the King's Employmentc (KAŚ 5.5)
   c. Calamity Against the King (KAŚ 5.6)

Bibliography

Acharya, N.R (ed.). 1949. *Yājnavalkyasmṛti*. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press.

Aiyangar, K.V.R. 1988 [1914]. *Some Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity*. 2nd ed (?). Patna: Eastern Book House.

Aiyangar, S.K. 1980 [1911]. *History of Ancient India*. Delhi: Seema Publications.

Allchin, F.R. (ed.) 1995. *The Archaeology of Early Historic South Asia: The Emergence of Cities and States*. Cambridge: University Press.

Altekar, A.S. 1977 [1958]. *State and Government in Ancient India*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Agrawal, K.M. 1979. "Religious Offences in the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya" *Ludwik Sternbach Felicitation Volume*. Lucknow: Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad.

Banerji, S.C. 1962. *Dharmasūtras: A Study in Their Origin and Development*. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak.

Berger, P.L. and T. Luckmann. 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality*. New York: Anchor

Bhandare, S. 2006. "Numismatics and History: The Maurya-Gupta Interlude in the Gangetic Plain" in P. Olivelle ed. *Between the Empires*. Oxford: OUP.

Bhandarkar, D.R. 1926. "Date of Kauṭalya," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 7, pp. 65–84.

Breloer, B. 1973 [1927–1934]. *Kauṭalīya Studien*. Osnabruck: Otto Zeller Verlag.

Brooks, E.B. 2001. *Growth Texts: Layered*. http://www.umass.edu/wsp/philology/typology/layered/index.html

-----. 2002. *Lectures: The Date of the Buddha.* http://www.umass.edu/wsp/lectures/buddha.html

Brough, J. 1953. *The Early Brahmanical System of Gotra and Pravara: A Translation of the Gotra-pravara-mañjarī of Puruṣottama-paṇḍita*. Cambridge: University Press.

Bronkhorst, J. 2007. *Greater Magadha: Studies in the Culture of Early India*. Leiden: Brill.

Burrow, T. 1968. "Cāṇakya and Kauṭalya," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 48–49.

Cohen, R.S. 2005. "Response: The Circle Without a Center: Rethinking Religious Authority in India" *JAAR* 73 no. 1, pp. 133–150.

Derrett, J.D.M. 1973. *A History of Indian Literature: Dharmaśāstra and Juridical Literature*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Deshpande, M. 1979, *Sociolinguistic Attitudes in India: An Historical Reconstruction*. Ann Arbor: Karoma Publishers Inc.

Dhavilkar, M.K. 1975. "The Beginning of Coinage in India" *World Archaeology* 6 no. 3, pp. 330–338.

Dikshitar, V.R.R. 1929. "The Religious Data in Kauṭalya's Arthaśāstra." *Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik* 7, p.251–258.

Dirks, N.B. 1989. "The Original Caste: Power, History and Hierarchy in South Asia" *Contributions to Indian Sociology* (n.s.) 23, no. 1, pp. 59–77.

Drekmeier, C. 1962. *Kingship and Community in Early India*. Stanford: Stanford UP.

Dumont, L. 1980. *Home Hierarchicus*. rev. ed. Trans by M. Sainsbury. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dutt, M.N. (trans. and ed.) 1979. *Kamandakiya Nitisara*. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Press.

Dwiwedi, G. 1966-1970. "Geographical Data in the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*" in *Proceedings of the Twentysixth Congress of Orientalists*. Poona Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

Eagleton, T. 2007. *Ideology: An Introduction*. 2nd ed. London: Verso

Edgerton, F. 1928 "The Latest Work on the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra" *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 48, pp. 289-322.

Fitzgerald, J. 1983. "The Great Epic as Religious Rhetoric: A Fresh Look at the *Mahābhārata*" *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 51 no. 4, pp. 611–630.

Franco, F. and S.V.S. Chand. 1989. "Ideology as Social Practice: The Functioning of *Varna*" *Economic and Political Weekly*, November 25, 1989, pp. 2601–2612.

Gonda, J. 1969. *Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

-----. 1975. *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. 1, Fasc. 1: *Vedic Literature*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

-----. 1977. *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. 1, Fasc. 2: *The Ritual Sūtras*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Gopal, R. 1983. *India of Vedic Kalpasūtras*. 2nd ed. Delhi: Motialal Banarsidass.

Hacker, P. 1978. *Kleine Schriften*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH.

Heesterman, J.C. 1957. *The Ancient Indian Royal Consecration: The Rājasūya Described according to the Yajus Texts and Annotated*. 's-Gravenhage: Mouton.

-----. 1985. *The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hertel, J. 1910. "Literarisches aus dem Kauṭilīyaśāstra." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 24, p. 416–422.

Hillebrandt, A. 1923. *Altindische Politik*. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer.

Hiltebeitel, A. 2001. *Rethinking the Mahābhārata: A Reader's Guide to the Education of the Dharma King*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hopkins, E.W. 1924. "Priestly Penance and Legal Penalty" *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 44, pp. 243–257.

Hultzsch, E. 1969 [1924]. *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, Vol. 1: *Inscriptions of Asoka*. Delhi: Indological Book House.

Jacobi, H. 1918. "Über die Echtheit des *Kauṭilīya*" Trans. by V.S. Sukthankar in *Indian Antiquarian* 47, pp. 157–161; 187–195.

Jackson, B. 1975, "From Dharma to Law" *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 23 no. 3, p. 490-512.

Jolly, J. and R. Schmidt. 1923. *The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya: A New Edition*. 2 vols. Lahore: Punjab Sanskrit Series.

Kane, P.V. 1974. *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol 2, Part 1. 2nd ed. Poona: Bhandarkar Institute Press.

-----. 1997. *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. 1, Part 1. 3rd ed. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

Kangle, R.P. 2000 [1965]. *The Kauṭalīya Arthaśāstra Part III: A Study*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

-----. (ed.) 2000 [1969]. *The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra Part I: Sanskrit Text with Glossary*. 2nd ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

-----. (tr.) 2000 [1972]. *The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra Part II: An English Translation with Critical and Explanatory Notes*. 2nd ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Kertzer, D.I. 1988. *Ritual, Politics, and Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kieth, A.B. 1996 [1928]. *A History of Sanskrit Literature*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Konow, S. 1975. *Kautalya Studies*. Delhi: Oriental Publishers and Distributors.

Kosambi, D.D. 1958. "The Text of the Arthaśāstra." *JAOS* 78 no. 3, p. 169–173.

Kulke, H. and D. Rothermund. 1998. *History of India*. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.

Lariviere, R (trans. and ed.). 1989. *The Nāradasmṛti*. 2 vols. Philadelphia: Department of South Asia Regional Studies, University of Pennsylvania.

-----. 1997. “Power and Authority: On the Interpretation of Indian Kingship from Sanskrit Sources” in S. Lienhard and I. Piovano, eds. *Lex et Litterae: Studies in Honor of Professor Oscar Botto*. Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso.

Lielkhune, D.N. 2001. “The Term ‘Adhyakṣa’ in the Indian Tradition.” http://indepigr.narod.ru/paper/eng/adhyakshas.pdf

Lingat, R. 1998 [1973]. *The Classical Law of India*. Trans. with additions by J.D.M. Derrett. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Losch, H. 1959. *Rājadharma: Einsetzung und Aufgabenkreis des Königs im Lichte des Purāṇa’s*. Bonn: Selbstverlag des Orientalischen Seminars der Universität Bonn.

Mabbett, I.W. 1968. “The Date of the *Arthaśāstra*” *JAOS* 84, no. 2, pp. 162–169.

Majumdar, R.C. (ed.) 1965 [1951] *The Vedic Age*. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.

-----. 1981. *The Classical Accounts of India*. Calcutta: Firma KLM Private Ltd.

McCrindle, J.W. 1979 [1901]. *Ancient India as Described in Classical Literature*. New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp.

Meyer, J.J. 1977. *Das Altindische Buch vom Welt- und Staatsleben: Das Arthaçāstra des Kauṭilya*. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

Misra, P. 1978. *Evolution of the Brahmin Class: In the Perspective of Vedic Priesthood*. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University Press.

Nag, K. 1923. *Les Théories Diplomatiques de L’Ind Ancienne et L’Arthaçāstra*. Paris: Librairie Orientale et Américaine.

Nath, P. 1931a. “The Date of the Compilation of Kauṭalya’s *Arthaśāstra* (484–510 A.D.).” *Indian Antiquary* 60, pp. 109–112; 121–123.

-----. 1931b. “Was the *Kauṭalīya Arthaśāstra* in Prose or in Verse.” *Indian Antiquary* 60, pp. 171–174.

Olivelle, J.P. (tr.) 1998. *The Early Upaniṣads*. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal

-----. 2000. *The Dharmasūtras: The Law Codes of Āpastamba, Gautama, Baudhāyana, and Vasiṣṭha*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

-----. 2002. “Structure and Composition of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*.” *JIP* 30, no. 6, 535–574.

-----. 2004a. “The Semantic History of *Dharma*”

-----. 2004b“Manu and the *Arthaśāstra*: A Study in Śāstric Intertextuality.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 32, pp. 281–291.

-----. (tr. and ed.) 2005. *Manu’s Code of Law: A Critical Editiona dn Translation of the Mānava-Dharmaśāstra*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pollock, S. “The Sanskrit Cosmopolis, 300–1300: Transculturation, Vernacularization, and the Question of Ideology.” in J.E.M. Houben, ed. *Status and Ideology of Sanskrit*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

-----. 2006. *The Language of the Gods in the World of Men.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rau, W. 1957. *Staat und Gesellschaft im Alten Indien: Nach dem Brāhmaṇa-Texten Dargestellt*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Renou, L. 1961 “Sur la Forme de Quelques Textes Sanskrite: Le Kauṭilīya” *Journal Asiatique* fasc. 2, p. 183–197.

Ritschl, E and M. Schetelich. 1973. *Studien zum Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.

Samoszvantsev, A.M. 1980–1. “Arthaśāstra and Dharmaśāstra—Two Traditions”, *Indologica Taurinensia*, 8–9 (*Ludwik Sternbach Felicitation Volume*), pp. 353–363.

-----. 1982–3. “The Legal Systems of the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Dharmaśāstra* and Some Problems in the Evolution of Two Genres of Literature” in *Orientalia Suecana* 31–32, pp. 147–162.

Sarkar, B.K. 1922. *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*. Leipzig: Verlag von Markert and Petters.

Sastri, G.H. (ed.) 1958. *Arthaśāstra-Vyākhyā Jayamaṅgalā*. Mylapore: Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute.

Scharfe, H. 1989. *The State in Indian Tradition*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

-----. 1993. *Investigations int Kauṭalya’s Manual of Political Science*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.

Shah, K.J. “Of artha and the *Arthaśāstra*” in T.N. Madan ed. *Way of Life: King, Householder, Renouncer: Essays in Honor of Louis Dumont*. Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd

Sharma, 1977. *Brahmins through the Ages*. Delhi: Ajanta Books International.

Sharma, R.S. 1968. *Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions in Ancient India*. 2nd ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

-----. 1980. *Śūdras in Ancient India*. 2nd ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Singh, B.D. 2004. *Bibliography of Kautiliya Arthasastra*. Varanasi: Kishor Vidya Niketan.

Sircar, D.C. 1965. *Indian Epigraphy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

-----. 1967. *Inscriptions of Aśoka*. 2nd ed. Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India.

-----. 1968. *Studies in Indian Coins*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Smith, B.K. 1994. *Classifying the Universe*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Spellman, J.W. 1964. *Political Theory of Ancient India: A Study of Kingship from the Earliest Times to ca. A.D. 300*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Stein, O. 1921 "Megasthenes und Kauṭilya" in *Sitzungsbericte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien*. Wien: Der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien.

Sternbach, L. 1968. "Quotations from the Kauṭalīya Arthaśāstra I" *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 88, no. 3, pp. 495–520.

-----. 1972. "Review: Kauṭilya and the Arthaśāstra." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 92 no. 4, pp. 498–500

-----. 1973a. *Bibliography on Dharma and Artha in Ancient and Medieval India*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz.

-----. 1973b. *Bibliography of Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*. Hoshiapur: Vishveshvaranand Institute.

-----. 1974. *A History of Indian Literature: Subhāṣita, Gnomic and Didactic Literature*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Tarn, W.W. 1951. *The Greeks in Bactria and India*. Cambridge: University Press.

Trautmann, T.R. 1968 "A Metrical Original for the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra?" *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 88, no. 2, pp. 347–349.

-----. 1971. *Kauṭilya and the Arthaśāstra: A Statistical Investigation of the Authorship and Evolution of the Text*. Leiden: Brill.

Upadhyay, G.P. 1979. *Brāhmaṇas in Ancient India*. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.

Vigasin, A.A. and A.M. Samozvantsev. 1985. *Society, State, and Law in Ancient India*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Ltd.

Walford, G.W. 1979. *Ideologies and Their Functions: A Study in Systematic Ideology*. London: Walford.

Wilhelm, F. 1960. *Politische Polemiken im Staatslehrbuch des Kauṭalya*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Winternitz, M. 1988 [1963–1967]. *History of Indian Literature*, 3 vols. Trans. by Subhadra Jha. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass

Witzel, M. 1989. “Tracing the Vedic Dialects” in C. Caillet, ed. *Dialectes dans les litteratures Indo-Aryennes*. Paris: Collège de France, Institut de civilisation indienne: Dépositaire exclusif Edition-diffusion de Boccard.

----. 1997. “The Development of the Vedic Canon and Its Schools: The Social and Political Milieu” in M. Witzel ed. *Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts*. Cambridge: Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University.

Vita

Mark Richard McClish was born on April 23, 1974 to Richard Robert McClish and Barbara Ann McClish. He moved several times during his childhood, living for three separate stretches in Mt. Vernon, Indiana, where he attended St. Matthew's Catholic School and Mount Vernon High School, as well as one year apiece in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and upstate New York. He graduated from Ottawa Township High School in Ottawa Illinois and went on to attend the University of Illinois, Front Range Community College, Parkland Community College, Indiana University (B.A.), The University of Texas at Austin (M.A., Ph.D.), and Harvard University.

On June 15, 2005 he married Asenath Anne Bartley. They have since lived in Austin, Texas, Alpine, Texas, and Trivandrum, India. On May 10, 2008 Asenath gave birth to their son Augustus Finn McClish. In 2009, Mark received a post-doctoral fellowship from Ripon College in Ripon, Wisconsin.

Permanent address: 413 Bonnie Bay Court, League City, TX

This dissertation was typed by Mark McClish.